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Book T 6 _ ' 

GopyiiiihrN" 


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FEELING AND ATTENTION 



WORKS BY 
EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER 

D.Sc. (Oxon.), Ph.D. (Leipzig), LL.D. (University of Wisconsin) 
Member of the Aristotelian Society: Fellow of the Royal Society of 
Medicine : Associate Editor of Mind and of the American Jour- 
nal of Psychology ; Sage Professor of Psychology in 
Cornell University 

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THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

64-66 Fifth Avenue, New York 



LECTURES 

ON THE 

ELEMENTARY PSYCHOLOGY OF 
FEELING AND ATTENTION . 



BY 
EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

1908 

All rights reserved 






^' 



LtBftARY of GON(^HESS 
1wt€0D<ts Ke€eivtf0 

JUL 28 1»08 



i r 



-r^ 



COPTKIOHT, 1908, 

By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. 



Set up and electrotyped. Published July, 1908. 



NorfajootJ i3w3» 

J. 8. Gushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. 

Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. 



EDMUND CLARK SANFORD 



PREFACE 

The eight lectures which make up this little 
book were read during my tenure of a non- 
resident lectureship in psychology at Columbia 
University, February, 1908. I have printed 
them as they were written for delivery, except 
that quotations from the French and German 
have, for accuracy's sake, been restored from 
English translation to their original form/ 

I have not been able, either in the lectures 
themselves or in the appended notes, to take 
account of all that is important in the current 
psychology of feeling and attention. Indeed, 
my sins of omission are obvious. I can only 
say that they weigh heavily upon my scientific 
conscience, and that, were it not for other and 
imperative claims upon my time, I should have 
delayed publication until I had done what I 
could to correct them. 

My thanks are due to my wife; to my col- 
league. Professor I. M. Bentley, who has read 

* Professor Pillsbury's English work on Attention reached me 
too late for reference in the text, though I have cited it in the 
notes. 



viii PREFACE 

the manuscript of the book and during its prep- 
aration gave me unsparingly of his time and 
counsel; to Professor J. McK. Cattell, of Co- 
lumbia University, whose invitation prompted 
the writing of the lectures ; and to many kindly 
critics among my hearers. I have dedicated 
the volume to Professor E. C. Sanford, of Clark 
University, my close friend and trusted mentor 
of the past sixteen years. Would that it were 
worthier of his acceptance ! 

Cornell Heights, Ithaca, N.Y., 
March, 1908. 



CONTENTS 



LECTTTRK PA6B 

I. Sensation and its Attributes . . . . 3 

II. Sensation and Affection : the Criteria of Affection 33 

III. The Affections as Gefuhlsempfindungen . . 81 

IV. The Tridimensional Theory of Feeling . . 125 
V. Attention as Sensory Clearness . . . .171 

VI. The Laws of Attention : I . . . .209 

VII. The Laws of Attention : II . . . . 251 

VIII. Affection and Attention 285 

Notes to Lecture I 321 

Notes to Lecture II ...... . 

Notes to Lecture III ....... 

Notes to Lecture IV 345 

Notes to Lecture V 352 

Notes to Lecture VI 360 

Notes to Lecture VII 374 

Notes to Lecture VIII 385 

Index of Names ........ 393 

Index of Subjects ....... 397 



IX 



SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 



LECTURE I 

SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 

THE system of psychology rests upon a three- 
fold foundation: the doctrine of sensation 
and image,^ the elementary doctrine of feeling, 
and the doctrine of attention. Our views of sen- 
sation, of feeling, and of attention determine, if 
we are logical, the whole further course of our 
psychological thought and exposition. Where 
systems differ by anything more than relative 
emphasis and fulness of treatment, their differ- 
ences invariably lead us back to the consideration 
of these fundamental doctrines. It is, therefore, 
more than important — it is necessary — that the 
student of psychology have a firm grasp of the 
issues involved and a comprehensive knowledge 
of the relevant facts. 

These requirements are, however, by no means 
easy of fulfilment. Look, first of all, at sen- 
sation. We know a great deal about sensation 
itself, as an elementary process ; we know a great 
deal about the simpler syntheses ; and we have 
working theories in most of the sense-depart- 
ments. On all these points we owe a debt, 

3 



4 SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 

which we must gratefully acknowledge, to physi- 
ological interest and physiological equipment. 
Methods and results, together with apparatus 
that embodied methods and assured results, were 
at our disposal as soon as we had the skill to 
use and the funds to acquire. We have bor- 
rowed freely from physiology, and we have turned 
the loan to such good account that physiology is 
not ashamed, on occasion, to borrow again from 
us. Nevertheless, with all the advantage that 
comes of an experimental tradition, and with all 
the facilities for work afforded by the local dif- 
ferentiation of the sense-organs, we are still far 
removed, in this sphere of sensation, from finality 
or general agreement. A mental element can 
be defined only by the enumeration of its attri- 
butes. Turn, now, to the table of contents of 
the Physiologische Psychologie, and you find but 
two attributes of sensation : intensity and quality. 
Turn to Ebbinghaus' Grundziige, and you find 
that sensations have both special and general 
attributes, and that the latter include such ap- 
parently heterogeneous things as extension and 
duration, movement and change, likeness and 
difference, unity and multiplicity.^ 

But if there is difference of opinion as re- 
gards sensation, what shall we say of feeling 
and attention ? The unsettled state of the psy- 



INTRODUCTION 5 

chology of feeling is notorious. Here are prob- 
lems on which, as it would almost seem, the 
trained and the untrained, the professional and 
the amateur psychologist exchange ideas on equal 
terms ; here is a field in which one man's casual 
opinion is as valuable as another man's reasoned 
conclusion, in which a general impression is 
worth as much as an experimental result. 
And, what is worse, the path of inference is so 
precarious, and the experimental results are as 
yet so few, that psychologists von Fach are them- 
selves tempted to overhasty generalisation, and 
become dogmatic before criticism has done its 
work. Does not Wundt base the psychology of 
language on his theory of affective pluralism ? ^ 
Nor is attention in much better case : the first 
sentence of the preface to Pillsbury's recent book 
refers to the ' chaotic state of current theories of 
attention.' ^ It is, perhaps, true that the prob- 
lems of attention are less widely discussed, have 
attracted less general notice, than the problems 
of feeling. If, however, this is the fact, the prob- 
lems are none the less insistent ; and their neg- 
lect by the educated public means simply that 
popular psychology long ago worked out a theory 
of attention for its own use, and so far has not 
felt the need of reconsideration. 

It follows, plainly enough, that I cannot in 



6 SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 

these Lectures give you any complete or finished 
account of the psychology of affection and 
attention ; if time allowed, the nature of the case 
would forbid. It follows also that my account, 
such as it is, will of necessity take on an individ- 
ual colouring. It would be absurd to make the 
claim of impartiality when all one's efforts, 
whether of criticism or of construction, are de- 
termined by training and temperament. Be- 
sides, the attitude of impartiality is irrelevant, 
so long as every set of observations is coupled 
with the name of the observer, and every ob- 
server has his private interpretation. I shall, 
however, keep as closely as possible to docu- 
ments and to experimental results; and where 
I venture a personal opinion, I shall offer it as 
an opinion and as nothing more. 

So much may be said by way of general in- 
troduction. But now, before we come to close 
quarters with affection and attention, we must 
give a little time to sensation. This special 
introduction is necessary for the reason that, 
throughout the following discussions, sensa- 
tion will be our standard of reference. When 
we ask whether the affective processes show dis- 
tinctive features, we are in search of features that 
distinguish affection from sensation; when we 
speak of the laws of attention, we have always 



PSYCHOLOGY AND PS YCHOPH YSICS 7 

in mind a distribution or redistribution of the 
sense-processes that make up the consciousness 
of the moment. Hence it is important that 
we understand clearly what sensation is : or at 
any rate, that we frame a working definition 
of sensation, adequate to our present purpose 
and free of ambiguity. 

It will help to clear the ground if we distin- 
guish, at the outset, between the sensation or 
sensory element of psychology and the sensory 
element of psychophysics. The sensation of 
psychology is any sense-process that cannot be 
further analysed by introspection : every one 
of the forty thousand lights and colours that 
we can see, every one of the eleven thousand 
tones that w^e can hear, is a psychological sen- 
sation. The sensations of psychophysics, on 
the other hand, are the sense-correlates of the 
elementary excitatory processes posited by a 
theory of vision or audition or what not. Thus 
the six Urfarben of Hering's theory of vision — 
black and white, blue and yellow, carmine and 
bluish green — are, if that theory be accepted, 
the psychophysical elements of vision ; they 
are the sources of the whole series of psycho- 
logical elements. These latter are, none the less, 
psychologically elementary : a light unsaturated 



8 SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 

yellowish green, while psyehophysically com- 
pound, is introspectively simple; it cannot 
be factored into a white, a yellow, and a green, 
as a chord may be factored into a number of 
simple tones. Similarly, if we could accept 
Mach's notion of dull and bright components 
in tonal sensation,^ we should have only two 
psychophysical elements in audition; whereas 
the Helmholtz theory gives us parallel series 
of psychophysical and of psychological sensa- 
tions. Here, as elsewhere in experimental psy- 
chology, the failure to distinguish between 
psychophysics and psychology proper has led 
to much confused argument.^ 

We are now concerned with the sensory 
element of psychology. And a mental element, 
as was said above, must be defined by an enu- 
meration of its attributes. What, then, are the 
attributes of sensation ? 

An attribute of sensation, as commonly de- 
fined, is any aspect or moment or dimension 
of sensation which fulfils the two conditions of 
inseparability and independent variability. The 
attributes of any sensation are always given 
when the sensation itself is given, and the anni- 
hilation of any attribute carries with it the 
annihilation, the disappearance, of the sensa- 
tion itself ; this is what is meant by the ' insepara- 



/i 



THE DEFINITION OF ATTRIBUTE 9 

bility' of the attribute. A sensation that has 
no quality, no intensity, no duration, etc., is 
not a sensation; it is nothing. Conversely, if 
a sensation is to exist, it must come into being 
with all of its attributes; we cannot have an 
intensive sensation that is dispossessed of qual- 
ity. These statements are evidently true, and 
so far the definition cannot be questioned. But 
we are told, in the second place, that the attri- 
butes of sensation are independently variable; 
quality may be changed while intensity remains 
constant, intensity changed while quality re- 
mains constant, and so on throughout the list. 
Is this statement true ? Relatively, yes : true 
for certain cases and under certain conditions. 
If it were not true, — true, within limits, for the 
attributes of intensity and quality, as originally 
recognised, — how could it have been made ? 
what could have suggested it ? It is matter of 
observation that the intensity of tone or noise 
may be varied while the quality is the same, 
that warm and cold may change in degree with- 
out change in kind. Absolutely true, however, 
the statement is not. In certain cases and be- 
yond certain limits the variation of one attribute 
implies the concomitant variation of another; 
and in extreme instances the separation of the 
two can be effected, if at all, only by a sort of 



10 SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 

analogical abstraction, — by neglect, we will 
say, of quality, and by direction of attention to 
what, in the light of previous experience, we con- 
ceive to be intensity. I come to the concrete 
in a moment. What I now wish to emphasise 
is the fact that there are bound attributes as 
well as free, and that the test of independent 
variability, useful enough for a preliminary 
survey, must be applied with caution when we 
demand accuracy of detail. 

Having thus amended the definition of * attri- 
bute,' we might proceed at once to enumerate 
the distinguishable attributes of the various 
classes of sensation. The result would be a 
list, longer or shorter according to the sense- 
department, in which term followed term in 
conventional order, — an empirical list, in which 
every term stood apart from every other, and 
all terms were on the same level. I think that 
we shall do better to cast about for some prin- 
ciple of classification ; and I have seemed to 
find such a principle in Miiller's distinction of 
intensive and qualitative change. A sensation 
changes intensively, Muller says, when it moves 
along the shortest path to or from the zero- 
point ; it changes qualitatively when it moves in 
a direction that neither carries it towards nor 
withdraws it from the zero-point. "^ If we gen- 



QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES: VISION 11 

eralise these statements, we may group all the 
attributes of sensation under the two headings, 
qualitative and intensive. I should, for instance, 
rank as intensive attributes, in the broad sense, 
degree or intensity proper, duration, extension, 
and clearness. Duration varies between a limi- 
nal value and the maximum set by adaptation 
or fatigue; extension varies between a liminal 
value and the maximum set by the boundaries 
of the field of sense; and clearness, too, varies 
between a liminal value and the maximum set 
by the limit of attention al concentration. On 
the other hand, I regard what is ordinarily 
termed the quality of sensation as, in several 
cases, a complex of distinguishable qualitative 
attributes. 

We will take the qualitative attributes first, 
and we will begin with vision. Visual sensa- 
tions fall, for psychology, into the two great 
classes of sensations of light and sensations of 
colour; the whole system finds representation 
in the double pyramid, which is itself a purely 
psychological construction. The sensations of 
light need not detain us. The sensations of 
colour, however, are interesting in that they 
have no less than three qualitative attributes. 
A given colour may be varied in hue or colour 



12 SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 



tone, in tint or brightness, and in chroma or 
saturation; and reference to the colour pyra- 
mid will show that, within limits, these three 

attributes, hue, 
tint, and chroma, 
are independent 
variables, — so 
that we may 
change hue while 
G tint and chroma 
remain the same, 
change tint with- 
out changing hue 
and chroma, and 
change chroma 
with constancy of 
tint. 
The limits are set, 
of course, by the form of the double pyramid, 
which, as I have said, is an empirical, psycho- 
logical construction. But here are three dis- 
tinguishable attributes under the currently single 
heading of quality. 

When we turn to audition, we are on more 
debatable ground. I myself believe that tonal 
sensations show a qualitative duality, — that 
the quality of tone is a resultant of the two 
attributes known respectively as pitch and as 




Fig. 1. The Colour Pyramid. — H. Eb- V.^^ and 
binghaus, Grundzuge der Psychologies i., 
1905, 199. 



QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES: AUDITION 13 

voluminousness (Stumpf's Tongrosse). I dare 
say that, at first thought, it seems far-fetched, 
even a little ridiculous, to make volume a quali- 
tative attribute, especially in view of the uses to 
which it has been put in systematic psychology. 
But I would remind you, in the first place, that 
we are inveterately addicted to spatial meta- 
phors, and that the term 'pitch' contains a spa- 
tial reference no less obvious, on consideration, 
than that of 'volume/ Pitch means height, 
elevation; the German equivalent is Tonhohe^ 
the French hauteur; and in characterising 
pitch, we speak, in English, of high, low, deep 
tones. Yet nobody nowadays would dream 
of making pitch an intensive attribute. Now- 
adays, no! — but listen to Fechner. ''Bei den 
Tonen,'' he says, ''hat die Hohe, obwohl als 
Qualitat des Tones fassbar, doch auch eine 
quantitative Seite, sofern wir eine grossere und 
geringere Hohe unterscheiden konnen.'' ^ There 
the spatial metaphor was at work. But if this 
spatial reference is to be ignored in the case of 
pitch, why should we pay regard to it in the case 
of volume.^ May it not be the fact, simply, 
that the idea of tonal voluminousness is less 
familiar to us than that of tonal pitch, that we 
have observed the attribute of volume less fre- 
quently or less accurately than we have observed 



14 SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 

height and depth, — and so that we are misled 
by the name ? Secondly, I would remind you 
that, if we are to turn the attribute of volume to 
account for a theory of space-perception, we must 
be extremely careful to take it as v\^hat it intro- 
spectively is, an attribute of tonal sensation, and 
not to surround it with visual or tactual asso- 
ciates. I may illustrate by a quotation from 
James, though James is not dealing primarily 
with tones. ''Loud sounds," he says, ''have 
a certain enormousness of feeling. It is im- 
possible to conceive of the explosion of a cannon 
as filling a small space. In general, sounds 
seem to occupy all the room between us and 
their source; and in the case of certain ones, 
the cricket's song, the whistling of the wind, the 
roaring of the surf, or of a distant railway 
train, to have no definite starting-point." ^ These 
statements are offered as evidence of the general 
principle that a spatial attribute, extensity, volu- 
minousness, vastness, is inherent in all sensa- 
tions without exception. But the sensation, as 
elementary process, knows and says nothing 
whatever of its stimulus or its organ or its object. 
An explosive noise, considered as sensation, is 
not the noise of a cannon or of anything else; 
a continuative noise, hiss or whistle or roar, 
considered as sensation, has nothing to do with 



QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES: AUDITION 15 

a starting-point in objective space, definite or 
indefinite/^ The evidence must be sought else- 
where, — sought in sensation proper, under rigid 
introspective conditions, and sought, more es- 
pecially, under conditions that rule out the com- 
plicating attribute of intensity, — for ' loud ' 
sounds may be enormous in one way, and weak 
sounds in quite a different way. 

Make, then, the experiment for yourselves. 
Take a series of tuning-forks, standing on their 
resonance boxes, — a series that extends from 
bass to treble, — and listen to their tones. 
There can be no manner of doubt that volume 
is an attribute of tonal sensation. There may, 
however, I think, be a very considerable doubt 
whether the volume is in any real sense spatial. 
Choose your adjectives. The deep tones are 
bigger, larger, not more massive, perhaps, but 
more diffuse ; the high tones are smaller, thin- 
ner, sharper. The spatial reference lies very 
near. Still, when you say more diffuse, thin- 
ner, sharper, you refer to more than space- 
form or space-extension; there is a hint in the 
words of a difference of texture. Try now the 
terms milder, softer, for the deep tones, and 
shriller, harder, for the high; do they not 
fit the facts ? Surely, volume is not an in- 
tensive attribute, a mere bulkiness that ranges 



16 SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 

between the extremes of pin-point concentra- 
tion and all-pervading vastness, but a qualita- 
tive attribute, moving between the extremes of 
mild and shrill. Volume and pitch are to the 
tonal sensation what hue and tint and chroma 
are to the sensation of colour; and the attri- 
butes are independently variable, in the sense 
that at the two ends of the scale volume changes 
more quickly than pitch, while over the middle 
region it changes more slowly.^^ 

Little can be said, at present, of the sensations 
of noise. Both the explosive noise (the pop of 
a soap-bubble, the sharp drop of a wooden 
block upon a wooden table) and the continua- 
tive noise (the hiss of escaping steam), if heard 
singly, appear simple to introspection. If, how- 
ever, we make the observation serial, we can 
distinguish an attribute of pitch and a concomi- 
tant noisiness. The question then arises whether 
pitch is a constituent of noise quality, or whether 
it is due to the admixture of tone. Noisiness 
itself seems to remain constant over fairly wide 
regions of the scale of pitch ; but nothing more 
definite can be said about it. 

The qualitative attribute presents no difficulty 
in the spheres of taste, smell, and temperature. 
It is otherwise with cutaneous pressure, cutane- 
ous pain, and many of the organic sensations. 



QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES: PRESSURE 17 

Suppose that a well-defined and responsive 
pressure spot is stimulated with increasing de- 
grees of intensity. We get at first, with the 
weakest stimulus, a sensation of tickle. At 
moderate stimulation, this passes over into 
pressure; either a quivering, wavery pressure, 
or a hard, 'cylindrical' pressure. If the in- 
tensity of stimulus is still further increased, but 
not carried to the point at which subcutaneous 
tissue becomes involved, we have the Gold- 
scheider sensation of 'granular' pressure. I am 
not now concerned with psychophysical ques- 
tions, but with psychological ; and the peculiar- 
ity of these observations, from the psychological 
side, is that the qualities just mentioned some- 
times overlap. I have not noticed, it is true, 
any overlapping of the granular by the cylin- 
drical pressure. But the ticklishness of weak 
stimulation is often sensed along with the differ- 
ent quality of quivering pressure, and this again 
may at times be sensed alongside of the Gold- 
scheider granular pressure. Suppose, again, 
that a pain spot is similarly stimulated. We get 
at first, with the weakest stimulus, a sensation 
of itch. At moderate stimulation, this passes 
over into prick or sting; and with further 
increase of the intensity of stimulus, into cuta- 
neous pain. And here, as before, there is over- 



18 SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 

lapping. A sting may be an itchy sting, and 
a pain may be a stinging pain. 

The same thing holds , apparently, of certain 
kin aesthetic sensations. The dragging, tired sen- 
sation which is probably attributable to the 
muscle-spindles passes through a sore, achy 
stage into dull pain : the three stages are intro- 
spectively distinguishable; but there is, never- 
theless, an overlapping. The strain sensation 
which seems to be due to stimulation of the Golgi 
spindles in tendon also passes into dull pain by 
gradual transition and overlapping of quality. 

Finally, I am inclined to think — though I 
say this with greater reserve — that the same 
thing holds in the case of alimentary sensations. 
Isolate hunger and nausea, at fairly low inten- 
sities, and you have a dull pressure. The same 
dull pressure ? It would be overhasty to assert 
a precise identity; but, at any rate, the likeness 
revealed by analysis is surprising when we re- 
member the gross difference between the hungry 
and the nauseated consciousness. It looks as 
if, with increase of intensity of stimulus, a second 
qualitative factor — possibly a group of quali- 
tative factors — comes into play in the two 
cases, differentiating sensations which, at the 
beginning of the intensive scale, are so nearly 
alike as to run the risk of identification.^^ 



THE INTENSIVE ATTRIBUTES 19 

At this point you may very well object that 
I am confusing two distinct things : the fusion 
of qualitatively different sensations, and the 
confluence of different qualitative attributes in 
one and the same sensation. Tiredness, you 
may say, does not pass over into pain, but is 
coloured by, fused with, a pain sensation; the 
hungry and the nauseated consciousnesses are 
formations of great complexity, and imply the 
fusion of a large number of qualitatively differ- 
ent sensations. That may be true. On the 
other hand, I think that psychology has taken 
the simplicity of the qualitative attribute in too 
dogmatic a spirit. There can be no doubt that 
the sensation of colour is qualitatively compound ; 
there can be no doubt, I believe, about the ob- 
servations just described in the spheres of pres- 
sure and cutaneous pain. And there is no reason 
a "priori why the organic sensations should fol- 
low the type of taste and smell rather than that 
of touch. Even, then, if you do not accept the 
conclusions that I have suggested, you will 
perhaps be ready to admit that there is a great 
deal of work still to be done before we can make 
out a final list of the sense-qualities. 

We may now go on to consider the intensive 
attributes of sensation, and we may start out 



20 SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 

with intensity proper. Intensity has been so 
exhaustively discussed, in connection with the 
methods of quantitative psychology, that it is 
not necessary to enter into details. Let me re- 
mark, however, that the attribute is, in practice, 
much less free than it is sometimes made in 
theory. I have already given instances from 
the cutaneous senses and possible instances from 
the kinsesthetic. But even in the case of sounds, 
those who have worked with the Fechner pen- 
dulum or with the gravity phonometer know 
that, beyond narrow limits, independent varia- 
tion of intensity is exceedingly difficult. 

The classical difficulty arises in the sphere 
of vision. Hering long ago denied the attribute 
of intensity ''im ublichen Sinne des Wortes" 
to the sensations of the black-white series. 
Hillebrand, in 1889, declares that intensive 
differences do not appear anywhere in the do- 
main of visual sensation, though there may be 
a constant intensity that is never noticed and 
therefore cannot be empirically demonstrated. 
Kulpe, in 1893, writes that "intensity cannot 
be ascribed to sensations of sight.'' Hering 
repeats, in 1907, that the "Begriff der Inten- 
sitat auf die Farbe nicht anwendbar ist.'' Per- 
sonally, I have never been able to subscribe 
to this doctrine. It is true, as Miiller says, that 



INTENSIVE ATTRIBUTES : VISION 21 

''die Empfindung einer und derselben Grau- 
nuance kommt in der That in unserer Erfah- 
rung nicht mit merkbar verschiedenen Intensi- 
taten vor/' and that ''auch eine Farbenempfin- 
dung von ganz bestimmter Qualitat konnen 
wir . . . nicht in verschiedenen Intensitaten 
herstellen.'' That is matter of observable fact. 
But it is surely true, on the other hand, that we 
recognise degrees of intensity in visual sensa- 
tion, and that — by the process of analogical 
abstraction of which I spoke earlier in this 
Lecture — we are able in some measure to ig- 
nore the concomitant change of quality and to 
direct our attention to intensity alone. Miiller, 
in the paper just quoted from, has rescued the 
intensity of visual sensation, on the psycho- 
physical side, by his theory of central gray ; and 
Kiilpe has now accepted, if not that theory itself, 
at any rate the attribute whose behaviour it is 
meant to explain. The theory, in brief sum- 
mary, is this : that we owe the intensive pecul- 
iarity of visual sensation to the dual character, 
peripheral and central, of the nervous processes 
involved. The retinal processes are antagonistic : 
two coincident stimuli — black and white, for 
instance — are effective for excitation only by 
their difference, by excess of the one over the 
other. The endogenous, central excitation is 



22 SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 

constant. Hence a peripheral stimulation may 
result in the whitening, lightening, or in the 
blackening, darkening of the central gray, but 
there is no way of intensifying that gray without 
changing its quality, — no way of strengthening 
its black and white components at the same time 
and in the same degree. ^^ 

I have digressed thus briefly into psycho- 
physics, because it is precisely in such cases that 
that much-abused science shows to its best 
advantage. Introspection is at fault. Some 
psychologists will have it that the scale of tints, 
the black-white series, is a scale of intensities, 
and will hear nothing of quality; others affirm 
that it is a scale of qualities, and will hear noth- 
ing of intensity; others, again, declare that it is 
at once qualitative and intensive. Psycho- 
physics not only resolves the difficulty, but shows 
why the difficulty was there. 

Here we may leave intensity, and pass to the 
consideration of the spatial and temporal attri- 
butes, extension and duration. This, as you 
know, is controversial ground. I cannot help 
thinking, however, that the psychology of these 
attributes is simpler than it is ordinarily repre- 
sented to be. We must, of course, distinguish : 
we must not identify physical with mental time, 
or physical with mental space; we must not 



EXTENSION AND DURATION 23 

confuse processes that in some way mean time, 
or mean space, with attributes that in some way 
are time and are space; we must not run to- 
gether time-estimate and durational experience, 
or space-estimate and extensional experience. 
Granted ! But the attributes themselves are 
surely obvious enough. What is psychological 
extension ? It is the aspect of sensation that 
we attend to when we are called upon to answer 
the questions (perhaps with reference to an after- 
image, perhaps with reference to a cutaneous 
sensation) : How large is it ? What shape has 
it? Is it regular or irregular? large or small? 
continuous or patchy ? uniform or broken ? 
And in the same way, psychological duration 
is the attribute that we attend to when we 
answer the questions : How long does it last ? 
When does it disappear ? Has it gone out yet ? 
Is it steady or interrupted? — That is all. The 
attributes of sensation are always simultaneously 
present, — evidently ! since the nullifying of any 
attribute annihilates the sensation. But when 
we are thus attending to extension or duration 
we may have very hazy ideas indeed about in- 
tensity and quality; precisely as, when we are 
observing intensity, we may have very hazy 
ideas about quality and duration. The ques- 
tion what extension and duration are, in direct 



24 SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 

experience, is a nonsensical question ; we 
can only reply, tautologically, that duration is a 
going-on, and extension a spreading-out. But 
what, then, are quality and intensity 'in direct 
experience ' ? Does it help to say that quality 
is the individualising attribute ? That is only 
saying that quality is quality. Does it help to 
say that intensity is always a more or a less? 
What, then, of clearness, or duration, or exten- 
sion? Or that high intensities make a greater 
claim upon us, dominate consciousness more 
exclusively, than low ? What, then, of clearness 
or of the Eindringlichkeit that we are to discuss 
presently? You cannot define the indefinable: 
at most you get a formal equivalent — ' simplest 
spatial determination ' or the like — that serves 
you as a paragraph heading. As to the difficulty 
that duration and extension must find expression 
in physical units, and that we have no right to 
equate the psychical and the physical, that is a 
difficulty which occurs also in the case of inten- 
sity, where it has been successfully met. To 
work over the whole ground again, with simple 
change of terms, is purely gratuitous labour.^^ 

It is more to the point to inquire into the em- 
pirical distribution of the two attributes. Dura- 
tion appears to attach to all sensations. Exten- 
sion attaches, without any doubt, to all visual 



EXTENSION AND DURATION 25 

sensations. It is also ascribed, in common 
parlance, to the ' sense of touch.' Touch, how- 
ever, is an extremely ambiguous term; it may 
refer to cutaneous pressure, while it may cover 
all the cutaneous and many of the organic 
senses. If, now, you ask me which of these 
component senses 
has the extensional 
attribute, I must con- 
fess that decision is, 
in some instances, 
very difficult, and 
that my own opin- 
ion has differed at 
different times. Just 
now, I am inclined to r. o a i. r ^r i c 

' Fig. 2. Schema of a Visual Sensation. 

be liberal. I should ^^^ ^^^^ vertical lines represent the 

four intensive attributes: intensity, 
give the attribute to clearness, extension, duration. The 

allfoUroftheCUtane- l^'^' horizontal lines represent the 

three quautative attributes : hue, tint, 

ous senses, — pres- chroma. 

sure, warmth, cold, and pain; I should give it 
to the organic pains; and I should give it also 
to the organic sensations, kinsesthetic or other, 
whose quality suggests the term 'pressure.' It 
seems to me that in all these sensations we get 
a true extension, different from the quasi-exten- 
sity of tones. Let me repeat, however, that de- 
cision is difficult ; I have no wish to be dogmatic.^^ 



26 SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 

Clearness, our fourth intensive attribute, is 
no more definable than its fellows. It is the 
attribute which distinguishes the 'focal' from 
the 'marginal' sensation; it is the attribute 
whose variation reflects the 'distribution of 
attention.' ^^ We may postpone its discussion 
until we come to deal with the subject of 
Attention. 

I must also touch, however briefly, upon the 
appearance of attributes of a higher order. The 
best illustration of what is meant by the phrase 
is afforded, perhaps, by tone-colour or tone- 
tint, — a certain colouring or timbre which at- 
taches to simple tones, and which may, but 
need not, be analysed. We owe the recognition 
of this compound attribute to Stumpf, who de- 
rives it from pitch, intensity (high tones are in- 
trinsically louder than low), and volume. It 
finds expression in such antitheses as bright and 
dull, sharp and flat, full and hollow. Other 
instances are the penetratingness of certain 
scents, — camphor and naphthaline, e.g.^ as 
compared with vanilla and orris-root, — the 
urgency or importunity of certain pains or of 
the taste of bitter, the obtrusiveness or self- 
insistence of certain lights and colours and tones. 
All these latter attributes involve clearness, in 



THE CRITERION OF SENSATION 27 

conjunction with quality, or with intensity, or 
with intensity and quality together. Their 
investigation in detail cannot but prove fruitful, 
whether for psychology or for psychophysics.^^ 

I spoke, earlier in this Lecture, of the forty 
thousand lights and colours that we can see, 
and the eleven thousand tones that we can hear. 
The 'forty thousand' was a rough guess at the 
number of discriminable qualities included in the 
colour pyramid ; a modest guess, too, when you 
compare it with Ebbinghaus' ''many hundred 
thousand,'' or Aubert's " many million " ! But 
I prefer underestimation to overestimation ; and 
I think that Ebbinghaus would find it difficult 
to bring convincing evidence even of a single 
hundred thousand visual qualities. On the 
other hand, the eleven thousand tones are dis- 
tinguished on the basis of pitch alone ; and that 
number must be increased if investigation proves 
— what is a ^priori extremely probable — that 
pitch may remain the same while the qualita- 
tive attribute of volume undergoes noticeable 
change.^ ^ 

Let us, however, raise in conclusion a more 
general question. Why do we identify the num- 
ber of sensations furnished by a particular 
sense-department with the number of distin- 



28 SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 

guishable sensory qualities ? Why is quality 
the 'individualising' attribute? Why are not 
the different intensities of a given pitch ' different 
sensations ' ? 

I suppose that, in strict logic, any noticeable 
change in an attribute of sensation gives us a 
'different' sensation. As soon as ever intro- 
spection turned to the attribute of intensity, 
it found differences, not of simple more and less, 
but of 'kind/ Lotze, for instance, declares 
that a strong sour does not taste the same as 
a weak; there are "qualitative Veranderungen 
des Empfindungsinhalts, die von jenen [inten- 
siven] Differenzen des Reizes abhangen/' Now, 
to call intensive change a change of 'quality' 
is to introduce unnecessary confusion of terms. 
We need not do that; but we need not either, 
it seems to me, quarrel with those who hold 
that sensations of the same quality but of differ- 
ent intensity are, psychologically regarded, dif- 
ferent sensations. The innovation would not 
lengthen our list of visual sensations ; it would, 
very considerably, lengthen the list of auditory 
sensations. 

And what of clearness, duration, extension ? 
Are we, in their case, dealing again with differ- 
ences of 'kind,' or merely with differences of 
degree ? It is really impossible to say ; the intro- 



THE CRITERION OF SENSATION 2^P 

spective judgments are lacking. From general 
impression, I incline to the view that differ- 
ences of clearness are, like intensive differences, 
ultimate and distinctive. On the score of dura- 
tion and extension I do not like even to hazard 
a conjecture; though, if I were compelled to 
take sides, I should fall back on the analogy of 
intensity. 

If, therefore, there is anything to be gained 
by substituting ' attributive difference ' for ' quali- 
tative difference' as a criterion of sensation, I 
shall be willing to make the change. As things 
are, I do not see the gain; and I do not see, 
either, the necessity of logical strictness. Our 
classification of sensations is a matter of utility, 
of expediency; the question involved is general, 
but it is not scientifically important. In science, 
as in ordinary life, we call things different when 
their difference is striking and outweighs their 
likeness, and we call things like when their like- 
ness is striking and outweighs their difference. 
Red and blue, sour and sweet, are in this sense 
'different'; loud and soft, light and heavy, are 
'like.' Until it is shown that the new and more 
elaborate classification brings positive advan- 
tage to descriptive psychology, I shall accord- 
ingly rest content with the traditional list of 
sensible qualities.^® 



^0 SENSATION AND ITS ATTRIBUTES 

So this hasty review comes to an end. I do 
not apologise for its imperfection, its sketchi- 
ness; for sensation is not our primary subject, 
and at the best one cannot say very much about 
sensation in a single hour. I have tried only to 
raise such points and to discuss such issues as 
will put you in tune with me, so to say, for our 
later study of affection and attention. When I 
speak of sensation, in the following Lectures, 
I shall mean by it the kind of process that we 
have been considering to-day ; the fringe of asso- 
ciation with which the word is surrounded will 
be drawn from the circle of ideas within which 
we have now been moving. 



II 

SENSATION AND AFFECTION: THE CRITERIA OF 
AFFECTION 



LECTURE II 

SENSATION AND AFFECTION: THE CRITERIA 
OF AFFECTION 

THE psychology of feeling, as I said in the 
introduction to the preceding Lecture, is in 
a notoriously unsettled state. We have psycholo- 
gists of the first rank who posit an elementary 
affective process alongside of sensation ; we have 
psychologists of the first rank who deny the dis- 
tinction. Wundt and Lipps stand over against 
Brentano and Stumpf .^ I propose, now, in the 
present hour, to examine the principal arguments 
that have been urged in favour of an inde- 
pendent feeling element, and the arguments 
that have been brought forward in reply. I 
shall use the term 'affection' for the elementary 
process in question, and for the sake of clear- 
ness I shall speak only of the qualities of pleas- 
antness and unpleasantness. These, of course, 
are recognised by all psychologists alike, — by 
those who hold a plural as well as by those who 
hold a dual theory of affective processes at large. 
What we may call the gross reason, the obvious 
reason, for assuming an affective element is, 
i> 33 



34 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

I suppose, the gross and obvious difference be- 
tween the intellectual processes of the adult 
mind, on the one hand, and the emotive processes, 
on the other. As thought differs from emotion, 
so must the element of thought, the sensation, 
differ from the element of emotion, the affection. 
Personally, I attach more weight to this argument 
than its formal expression might seem to warrant. 
I believe that the simple feelings — our expe- 
riences when we 'feel hungry,' 'feel dizzy,' ^feel 
tired,' 'feel comfortable,' 'feel poorly,' 'feel first- 
rate ' — represent a stage or level from which 
we ascend to the emotions; and that the emo- 
tions, again, represent a stage or level from which 
we descend to secondary feelings : our anger 
weakens and simplifies to a feeling of irritation, 
our resentment to a feeling of chagrin or annoy- 
ance, our joy to a feeling of pleased content- 
ment, our grief to a feeling of depression. I 
believe that we are here in presence of a general 
law or uniformity of mental occurrence; that all 
conscious formations show like phenomena of 
rise and fall, increase and decrease in complexity, 
expansion and reduction. Nevertheless, as sys- 
tematic psychology stands to-day, the argument 
has no objective validity, no power to carry con- 
viction. It may be traversed, flatly and finally, 
in two different ways: by the James-Lange 



FEELING AND EMOTION 35 

theory of emotion, and by the theory of Stumpf. 
If we accept a strict version of the James-Lange 
theory, and identify the specifically emotive 
or affective processes in emotion with organic 
sensations, then evidently we dispense, at this 
middle level, with the independent affective 
element, and the argument from continuity 
falls to the ground. And if we divorce the sense- 
feeling from the emotion, in Stumpf's way, and 
assert that the 'psychological nucleus' of the 
emotion, the central and characteristic process 
that makes it what it is, is altogether different 
from sense-feeling, — that ''die Sinnesgefiihle 
den Gemiitsbewegungen heterogen sind," — then, 
again, we have a sharp severance of continuity, 
and the argument lapses. Neither of these 
alternative views can be lightly brushed aside : 
the James-Lange theory has aroused prolonged 
discussion, and has gained many adherents; 
and the Stumpf theory, in essential points, com- 
mands the assent, e,g., of Stout and Irons.^ 

It w^ould be interesting to take representative 
statements of the three views of emotion — say, 
the statements of Wundt, James, and Stumpf 
— and to estimate each one in the light of the 
other two. I doubt, however, whether the com- 
parison would be profitable. Surely, if we are 
to reach anything like a conclusion, we must 



36 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

begin lower down ; we must go, not to emotion, 
but to sense-feeling. Is there any one who, when 
weighing James' theory in the balance, has not 
heartily wished that he had given us a chapter 
on the feelings ? Is there any student of the 
Tonpsychologie and of Stumpf 's later work who 
has not felt the want of that 'Abschnitt uber 
die durch Sinneseindriicke erweckten Gefiihle' 
which was promised in 1883 and has delayed 
until 1906 ? ^ Can any one doubt that the issue 
raised by Wundt's tridimensional theory of 
affections is, systematically, a more fundamen- 
tal issue than is involved in the most radical 
doctrine of emotion ? I may be seeing things 
crookedly ; but as I see them, the heart of the 
problem lies in feeling. Let us, then, attack the 
problem at this point; let us consider, as criti- 
cally as we may, the alleged criteria of affection. 

(1) We may take up, first, the statement that 
sensations are the objective and affections the 
subjective elements of consciousness; and we 
will try to give these terms, 'objective' and 
'subjective,' a tangible psychological meaning. 

Let us be clear that the meaning must be 
psychological ; the difference, if it exist, must be 
a difference that is open to introspective verifica- 
tion. Anything in the way of epistemological 



AFFECTION AS SUBJECTIVE 37 

argument is wholly out of place. It is out of 
place for two reasons. On the one hand, psy- 
chology is an independent discipline, and can 
no more take dictation from epistemology than 
it can from metaphysics or ethics. And, on 
the other, epistemology is concerned with the 
principles of knowledge — whether with the 
material and formal principles together, or with 
the material principles alone, is matter of defini- 
tion; while the psychological element has no 
part or lot in knowledge, has no reference or 
meaning or object or cognitive contents of any 
sort. 

/ Let us be clear, also, that the meaning which 
we give to the terms ' objective ' and ' subjective ' 
must cover a difference in the elementary pro- 
cesses regarded as elementary. It has been 
urged, for instance, that the sensory elements 
in perception are looked upon, in ordinary 
thought, as properties of external things, whereas 
feeling is always personal, reflects always a state 
of the mind itself. Heat seems to reside in the 
burning coals; but the pleasantness, the grate- 
fulness, of the warmth is in me. I will not now 
dwell on the epistemological implications of this 
argument, but will accept it at its face value, 
as an argument from the psychology of percep- 
tion and feeling. And I reply, first, that the 



38 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

statement which it makes is not true, the dis- 
tinction which it draws cannot be drawn. For 
the pleasant or grateful feeling which is subjec- 
tive, in me, is a feeling and not an affection; 
it comprises certain organic sensations; and 
nobody confuses organic sensations with prop- 
erties of external things. I reply, secondly, 
that the argument, even if it were true, would be 
irrelevant. For it is an argument based, not on 
introspection of the elementary processes as 
such, but on the character or behaviour of these 
processes in combination. We, however, are 
dealing with the mental elements in their status 
as elements. 

There are, I think, three interpretations of the 
terms 'objective' and 'subjective' that have 
claims upon our attention, (a) The first is 
that of Wundt. In a recent study of Wundt's 
doctrine of psychical analysis, Hollands has made 
the subjectivity of affective process, in Wundt's 
system, the topic of detailed study. I need not 
here attempt any summary of the discussion, 
since Hollands' articles are easily accessible 
in The American Journal of Psychology. The 
upshot of the investigation is that Wundt con- 
trasts, under the two rubrics, tendency to fusion 
and persistent discreteness. ''Feeling ... is 
always falling into unitary masses, it forms a 



AFFECTION AS SUBJECTIVE 39 

single continuum. This ... we may take as 
Wundt's final meaning in psychology for sub- 
jective.^^ 

Whafe-are we to say in criticism ? This, evi- 
dently : that while Wundt has, as Hollands main- 
tains, given the distinction an ''introspective 
definition," he has not derived it from a com- 
parison of isolated sensation with isolated affec- 
tion. A 'tendency to fusion' is not an attribute 
that shows, like intensity or quality, in the single 
element. Besides, there is also a tendency to 
fusion in the organic sensations ; they, too, are 
'always falling into unitary masses.' Indeed, 
if we reject Wundt's theory of the plurality of 
affective qualities, the criterion becomes meaning- 
less : the ' unitary masses ' and the ' single con- 
tinuum' formed with pleasantness-unpleasant- 
ness by excitement-depression and strain-relaxa- 
tion take us out of the affective sphere and into 
that of organic sensation ; the subjectivity that 
should characterise affection now characterises 
a group of sensations. Finally, it must be 
remarked that the doctrine of the Totalgefiihl 
is not universally accepted. "Es giebt," says 
Saxinger, "einen grossen Kreis von Thatsachen, 
welcher Zeugniss fiir das Vorkommen coexis- 
tirender Gefiihle ablegt." Here is no fusion, 
no continuum, but separation and discontinuity. 



40 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

Let us try another interpretation. We might 
argue (b) that sensations are objective because 
they are experienced in the same way by every 
one, and that affections are subjective because 
they are experienced differently, individually, 
by different persons or by the same person at 
different times. Here, again, however, it would 
be enough to point out in answer that the single 
elements carry no such distinction upon them. 
Stumpf has also brought up a factual objection : 
he reminds us that what is supposed to hold of 
the affective processes holds very definitely of 
sensations of temperature. A room that seems 
overwarm when you come in from the outside 
air may seem chilly to those who have been sit- 
ting in it for some time. Stumpf might have 
generalised this objection, and referred simply 
to the phenomenon of adaptation. Wherever 
we have adaptation, there we have the possibility 
that like stimuli will arouse different sensations 
in different minds. And if you rejoin that the 
sensations are, nevertheless, always the same 
under the same conditions, then I ask : How do 
you know that this rule does not also apply to 
affections.^ The variability of affective expe- 
rience may be due, precisely, to difference in 
affective adaptation. 

There is still the third possibility. We might 



AFFECTION AS SUBJECTIVE 41 

express, in the terms 'objective' and 'subjec- 
tive/ the fact (c) that sensations can stand alone 
in consciousness, independently of affection, 
while affection never appears alone, but always 
and of necessity as the concomitant of some sen- 
sation. Many psychologists, as we know, have 
looked upon affection not as an elementary pro- 
cess, coordinate with sensation, but as an attri- 
bute of sensation; they speak of GefiXhlston, 
affective tone, feeling tone, algedonic quality. 
The hypothesis that underlies these phrases I 
shall discuss in the next Lecture ; I am here con- 
cerned simply with the alleged fact that sensa- 
tions occur in isolation, affections only in con- 
nection with sensations. If the difference exists, 
it is an admissible ground of distinction; for 
although it is not a difference of attribute, it is 
nevertheless a difference that shows in the com- 
parison of element with element : the attempt to 
isolate an affection will result, always, in the iso- 
lation of paired sensation and affection. 

But does the difference exist ? Listen to 
Kiilpe. ''We find sensations present,'' he says, 
"where feeling is absent; that is, we have 
sensations which are neither agreeable nor dis- 
agreeable; and we further find (such at least 
is the author's experience) feelings present where 
sensation is absent; that is, we have feelings 



42 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

which are not accompanied by or attached to 
definite sensations , or which arise where the ner- 
vous conditions of sensation are debarred from 
the exercise of their ordinary influence on con- 
sciousness." I do not think that many of the 
psychologists who recognise the independence of 
the affective element would subscribe, without 
qualification, to this opinion. But it is by no 
means uncommon — e.g. in experimental work 
upon the association of ideas — to find cases re- 
corded in which a feeling precedes or lags behind 
or outlasts its idea. And if Kiilpe is too extreme, 
Ladd can probably claim a widespread accept- 
ance of his view that ''in the flow of the one 
stream of conscious life the feelings may assume 
either one of the three possible time-relations 
towards the sensations and ideas by which we 
classify them ; they may fuse with them in the 
'now' of the same conscious state, or they may 
lead or follow them." Our final possibility is 
thus sufficiently disposed of .^ 

We have considered three meanings of the 
term 'subjective.' We have taken it to imply 
a tendency towards fusion ; individual variability 
of experience; and what we may call a second 
remove or a higher power of conscious existence. 
In every instance argument has been met by 
counter-argument, authority for by authority 



AFFECTION AS NON-LOCAL 43 

against. We must, I think, conclude that, if 
there really is a difference between sensation 
and affection, the words 'objective' and 'subjec- 
tive' are ill chosen to express it.* 

(2) The distinction that we have next to con- 
sider is the distinction of local and not -local. 
Sensations, it is said, may be localised; affec- 
tions are not localisable. The distinction is 
ambiguous, since the 'locality' may be a position 
in perceptual space or a place in consciousness. 
We will take the question of 'outer' localisation 
first. 

Are all sensations localisable at some point of 
space .^ "Allen Sinnesempfindungen," says von 
Frey, "ist die Beifiigung eines Lokal- oder 
Merkzeichens eigentiimlich." And he adds, 
"fiir den Unbefangenen wird gerade das Lokal- 
zeichen ein Beweis sein, dass der Schmerz ein 
den iibrigen Sinnesempfindungen gleichwertiges 
Element des Bewusstseins darstellt." That is 
definite enough. As usual, however, there are 
statements on the opposite side. "Eine Lokal- 
isation der Geruchsempfindungen als solcher," 

* In my own mind, the difference of subjective and objective 
appears always as a difference of texture: affection is softer, 
flimsier, more yielding than sensation, — however organic the 
sensation may be. This textural difference is what I ^feel' when 
I read, e.g., that '^feeling as such is matter of being rather than of 
direct knowledge.'' 



44 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

writes Nagel, ''gibt es genau genommen nicht. 
Ich fiir meine Person wenigstens vermag meine 
sehwachen Geruchsempfindungen gar nicht zu 
lokalisieren." When odours are localised, they 
are localised because their stimuli affect more 
than one set of end-organs: "bei dem Geruchs- 
sinn ist das lokalisierende Vermojjen gleich Null." 
Definite again ! Angell and Fite tell us, simi- 
larly, that ''genuinely pure tones are essentially 
unlocalisable in monaural hearing"; ''it seems 
quite safe to say that in monaural hearing really 
pure tones are unlocalisable." And even with 
binaural hearing, it is not difficult so to arrange 
the conditions of observation that localisation is 
impossible. If you work with sounds of very 
low intensity, or if you work with tuning-fork 
tones in the open, your observer surrounded with 
a curtain, you will find cases in which there is 
sheer inability to localise. "There are sounds," 
says Pierce, "that prior to all accessory expe- 
rience are sharply and definitely located. . . . 
But over against these sharply located sounds are 
others that can be assigned no position what- 
ever." Finally, Orth insists that there are or- 
ganic complexes, vague resultants of diffuse, weak 
stimulation, which cannot be localised. Not 
all sensations, then, are capable of localisation. 
But, on the other side, is affection unlocalis- 



AFFECTION AS NON-LOCAL 45 

able ? Stumpf reports that the agreeableness 
and disagreeableness which accompany sensa- 
tions of the higher senses seem to him to have a 
certain spatial moment; they are not localised, 
it is true, in the colours and tones themselves, 
but are felt ''als im Kopf ausgebreitet." '' Auch 
diese etwas unbestimmte Lokalisation ist aber 
Lokalisation." I have known observers to in- 
sist, similarly, that the pleasantness of the taste 
of chocolate cream is localised in the mouth, the 
pleasantness of tones and chords in the head or 
chest. Lagerborg bears witness to the same 
effect: ''an einem Katermorgen nehmen wir 
Unlust im Kopf, im Rachen, im Magen wahr/' 
And Storring distinguishes a Stimmungslustj 
"an der . . . die gesammten jeweilig vorhan- 
denen Bewusstseinsinhalte teilhaben," from a 
localised Empfindungslust, ''die an die . . . 
[betreffenden] Empfindungen allein gebunden 
erscheint." 

There remains the question of 'inner' locali- 
sation. Sensations, it is said, run their course 
side by side in consciousness ; affection is always 
coextensive with consciousness. The argument 
hinges, therefore, on the possibility of what are 
called 'mixed feelings.' Can pleasantness and 
unpleasantness exist simultaneously in conscious- 
ness ? 



46 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

If we appeal to the text-books, we find the 
expected divergence of opinion. ''It is hardly 
possible in the present state of our knowledge 
to decide positively for or against the reality of 
these mixed feelings. ... In our own view, 
mixed feelings are certainly less well authenti- 
cated than cancellation of feeling." This is 
Kiilpe's statement in the Outlines. ''Just as 
we may sense cold in the feet and warmth in the 
hands at the same time, so may we experience 
the pleasantness of a savoury dish along with 
the unpleasantness of a severe headache. . . . 
The affective accompaniment of complex mental 
formations may be extremely complicated." 
This is Ebbinghaus' statement in the Grundzuge. 
"All the affective elements present in conscious- 
ness at a given moment connect to form an uni- 
tary affective resultant": that is Wundt. "A 
full sense of conflict between pleasure and pain 
arises when the two feelings are both present in 
a distinct and strong form, and are not so unequal 
in point of strength as to allow of one over- 
powering the other" : that is Sully. And so we 
might continue. 

So far as I know, the coexistence of pleasant- 
ness and unpleasantness has only in three cases 
been made the subject of experimental inquiry. 
In two, the result has been negative. Orth, 



MIXED FEELINGS 47 

in 1903, gave seven tests to four observers with 
a view to the analysis of the emotion of doubt. 
He records unpleasantness ten times and pleas- 
antness five times (in nine and four of the twenty- 
eight tests, respectively) ; there is no instance 
of simultaneity, but one very striking instance of 
succession, in which the order is pleasantness, 
unpleasantess, pleasantness again, and terminal 
unpleasantness. Alechsieff, in 1907, attacked 
the problem directly. He made twenty-nine 
experiments with pairs of stimuli (tastes and 
odours, tones and colours) so chosen that the 
one, taken alone, would be pleasant and the 
other unpleasant. " Aus diesen Versuchen kam- 
en wir zu dem Schlusse, dass Lust und Unlust 
nicht gleichzeitig in unserem Bewusstsein ex- 
istieren konnen, sie konnen nicht nebeneinander, 
sondern immer nur nacheinander von uns erlebt 
w^erden.'' I may add that in 1906 experiments 
of the same type were begun by Hayes in the 
Cornell laboratory, and — so far as they went 
— yielded a like result ; they were, however, too 
few in number to warrant separate publication. 
It is, perhaps, unfortunate that Orth was a 
pupil of Kiilpe's, Alechsieff a pupil of Wundt's, 
and Hayes a pupil of my own; for all three 
of us may be suspected of parti pris, and all 
three of the experimenters may therefore have 



48 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

been influenced — despite our efforts at im- 
partiality — by what is called ' laboratory atmos- 
phere/ It is still more unfortunate, I think, 
that the experiments themselves are so scanty. 
All the more welcome, then, is Johnston's paper 
of 1906. The investigation covers a period of 
two years; the observers are twelve graduate 
students in Harvard University or Radcliffe 
College; the paired stimuli include colours, 
tactual surfaces, tuning-fork tones, noises, forms 
filled with different colours, and odours, as well 
as more complicated material ; and the outcome 
is definitely positive. We are informed, e.g.^ 
that, after training, eleven of the twelve observers 
''were all convinced that both feeling-tones, for 
tactual and visual impressions, could be present 
at once.'' 

I should be very sorry, now, to criticise for the 
sake of criticising. On the contrary, I would 
give a good deal, as the saying is, to have this 
question of mixed feelings settled in the one 
way or the other ; it is a question that has been 
with me, more or less insistently, for the past 
dozen years; and I should have attacked it 
experimentally long ago, had I found an ade- 
quate method. Theories, believe me ! sit more 
lightly on their owners than is commonly sup- 
posed ; I would cheerfully exchange all my 



MIXED FEELINGS 49 

Views' of feeling for a handful of solid facts. 
And if Johnston had proved his conclusion, I 
should accept it. So far, however, is he from 
proof that it is even difficult to say, in precise 
terms, what his conclusion is meant to be. 

Consider ! There were twelve graduate ob- 
servers, seven of whom ''had had from one to 
five or more years' training in laboratory in- 
vestigations." Here is no levy of tiros, but a 
band of veterans. Had they never heard of 
feeling, never run across theories of feeling, 
never thought out for themselves what feeling 
might mean, never discussed the various defini- 
tions of feeling ? Moreover, several members of 
the group were available for the whole period of 
two years. Did they not work out a definition 
of their own, adopt some particular criterion or 
criteria of feeling in the course of the period.^ 
Not a word is said upon these two points; we 
do not know what the observers meant by feel- 
ing either at their down-sitting or at their up- 
rising. At the most we can guess from the intro- 
spective reports. And the very first report 
cited — the description of feeling for a particular 
shade of red — reads thus: "It feels as if it 
would be soft." No doubt it does ! But in what 
sense is ' soft ' a feeling ? 

The instruction given to the observers was of 



50 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

a very general kind. They ^'were requested to 
give themselves up to the situation and to report 
as accurately as they could the kind of affective 
state experienced." In preliminary series, with 
single stimuli, the same observers had, how- 
ever, been given a far more complex instruction. 
They had been told, in effect, to describe the 
feeling ; to report always all concomitant organic 
sensations; and to distinguish the significant 
organic concomitants from the accidental. This 
is a large order ! The rule of work in Aus- 
frageex'perimente is, surely, to make instruction 
narrow and definite, for any given series, and 
thus to fractionate the introspections. There 
is no other way to secure unequivocal results. 
While, now, the instruction in the experiments 
with paired stimuli was simpler than that in the 
experiments with single stimuli, there can, I 
think, be little doubt that the habit of observa- 
tion formed in the first series was carried over 
to the second ; only thus can I account for cer- 
tain of the introspections recorded. At any 
rate, the complexity of the original instruction 
was a mistake; and the general instruction of 
the second series should, in my judgment, have 
been narrowed by specific regulations concerning, 
e.g.^ the direction and distribution of attention. 
Or if it seemed advisable to take series with 



MIXED FEELINGS 51 

general instruction, then these should have been 
paralleled by other series in which the instruc- 
tion was variously narrowed. It is odd that 
Johnston says nothing, gives not a single refer- 
ence, on the score of the Ausfragemethode. 

I have sometimes been charged with pre- 
ferring method to result. I do not know that 
that would be a crime ; I do not know why the 
search for truth should not be the sole end of a 
man's endeavours. If he sinned, he would sin 
in good company. But on lower ground the 
point is, of course, that your result is, after all, 
a function of your method; method is the road 
to result ; given a method, — and in fairly com- 
petent hands results will follow of themselves. 
Let us see, then, to what kind of result the method 
of which I have just spoken has led. 

It is essential that the results of this form of 
the method of impression be stated in the ob- 
servers' own words. Orth gives his complete 
records. Alechsieff gives complete samples. 
Johnston does not. While he writes out a 
temperamental analysis of his twelve observ- 
ers, later verified by themselves, he has edited 
and arranged the introspections, and only occa- 
sionally mentions an initial or puts a phrase 
into inverted commas. The temperamental 
analysis does not help us ; we want to know 



62 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

who said what, and how often, and in what 
context. Moreover, Johnston's own account is 
both meagre and confused. I can find no men- 
tion of the time during which the paired stimuli 
were exposed, — though this fact is of cardinal 
importance when it is a question of the coexist- 
ence or succession of affective processes. I 
find no mention of the number of experiments 
made with each observer, or of their arrange- 
ment, or of the time-interval between them. As 
for the outcome, I hope, but I cannot be sure, 
that the following summary is correct. 

Johnston notes (a) phenomena of complete 
fusion. This appears to be identical with what 
he terms "a total mood with similar or harmoni- 
ous constituents." To be distinguished from 
fusion is (b) summation, where, e.g., two un- 
pleasant elements ''exist throughout, each in 
turn intensifying the whole undertone of feeling, 
but also remaining a feeling-tone of a particular 
kind.'' In (c) partial reenforcement, ''both feel- 
ing-tones contribute to a feeling of the same kind, 
yet do retain some individual characteristics 
which stand out for themselves." I do not see 
how this differs from (b) ; at most there is a 
slight difference of degree. What is differen- 
tiated by Johnston as (d) partial inhibition seems 
to be only a name given by certain observers to 



MIXED FEELINGS 53 

partial reenforcement. At any rate, these four 
are all cases of fusion or summation, and do not 
directly concern us. Next comes (e) total inhi- 
bition, which does interest us here. "Cases 
of total inhibition . . . are by far the most 
frequent, as would naturally be expected [.^]. 
When sandpaper is being applied, and no re- 
pose is felt in the body, a colour, suddenly pre- 
sented, for a moment pleases the eye, but quickly 
loses all feeling-character, and can only be 'in- 
tellectually perceived.' " ''In cases of feelings of 
opposite nature occurring together, the stronger 
generally prevails, finally in most cases effacing 
all specific tone for the weaker element. An 
odour, for example, even when always un- 
pleasant, becomes less so when one looks at a 
pleasant colour, when a feeling-tone can, or 
often when it cannot, be detected for the colour 
at the time." I understand from these sentences 
that when two opposite feeling-tones are aroused 
by two stimuli, operating at the same time, the 
regular or usual result is cancellation; what we 
feel, if we feel at all, is the excess of the one over 
the other. But Johnston has a sixth category, 
of (J) merely simultaneous, independent coex- 
istence. "When a very unpleasant form . . . 
is being felt, a slightly unpleasant colour tends 
to arouse often in this situation, as if by con- 



54 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

trast, a simultaneously pleasant element in the 
total experience." ''When there is a clear strife 
between the two [feeling-tones], they both can exist 
as equal partial tones with an undertone of un- 
pleasantness in the failure to coordinate them/' 
Now these experiences must, in the light of what 
has just been said, be rare. Why, then, — see- 
ing how critical the observations are, — were 
not the complete introspections given ? It looks 
to me as if, in both of the instances quoted, we 
were in presence of fairly complex emotive pro- 
cesses ; the pleasure that arises 'by contrast,' and 
the displeasure that comes from 'failure to 
coordinate,' are not the feeling-tones of the 
stimuli. Are they feeling-tones at all ? Or are 
they organic complexes, the organic sensations 
characteristic of relief and of disappointment ? 
And again : if they are feeling-tones, were they 
strictly coexistent ? Is it possible to experience 
three affective processes at once — a pleasant- 
ness, an unpleasantness, and another unpleas- 
antness — and to hold them distinct at a given 
moment of time ? Very little weight, I am 
afraid, can be attached to this imperfect report 
of what are, admittedly, exceptional cases. — 

Let us now glance back over this whole dis- 
cussion. We found that the distinction of local 
and not-local, as referred to sensations and 



AFFECTION AS NON-LOCAL 55 

affections, might mean two different things. It 
might mean, first, that sensations are, and 
affections are not, localisable in perceptual space. 
We found, however, statements to the effect 
that some sensations cannot be localised, while 
we found also alleged instances of the localisa- 
tion of affection. We may therefore reject this 
criterion, without going into the further question 
whether locality, some form of MerkzeicheUy is 
an attribute that shows in the single sensation. 
The distinction might mean, secondly, that 
sensations run their course side by side in con- 
sciousness, while affections are always coex- 
tensive with consciousness. The experimental 
evidence, so far as it goes, appears to bear out 
this contention. Orth, Alechsieff, and Hayes 
find no mixed feelings ; Johnston finds that 
mixed feelings are the exception and not the 
rule; and we have seen that the exceptional in- 
stances are themselves not above suspicion. On 
the other hand, the experimental evidence is 
scanty and incomplete ; and psychological opin- 
ion at large is sharply divided. Moreover, it 
might be urged that there are occasions when 
consciousness reduces to a single sensation : 
pain, or a deafening noise, or a blinding glare. 
So we seem to be as uncertain at the end as we 
were at the beginning.^ 



56 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

(3) A third distinction, which we owe to 
Wundt, is that of difference and antagonism. 
Sensations range between maximal differences; 
feelings, between maximal opposites. ''Allge- 
mein werden die Empfindungsqualitaten durch 
grosste Unterschiede, die Gef iihlsqualitaten durch 
grosste Gegensatze begrenzt." 

I think that there has been a tendency, in 
the discussions of feeling, towards too cavalier 
a treatment of this distinction. It is really not 
quite easy to see what the difference means, and 
not quite easy to bring valid argument for or 
against it. Before, however, we come to details, 
let us notice that Rehmke refuses to connect 
pleasantness and unpleasantness in any way 
whatever. ''Lust und Unlust sind 'incommen- 
surable Grossen,' wie Ton und Farbe es sind.'^ 
"Die Thatsachen des Seelenlebens . . . geben 
nicht den geringsten Anlass zu der Behauptung : 
*Lust und Unlust sind gegensatzliche Zustande, 
welche durch einen Indifferenzpunkt in einander 
iibergehen.'" "Lust und Unlust als that- 
sachlich besondere Bestimmtheiten der Seele 
haben nichts mit einander gemein." This view 
is, no doubt, exceptional; but it deserves con- 
sideration in the present context. 

The objection usually brought against Wundt's 
formula is that there are sensations, too, which 



AFFECTIONS AS OPPOSITES 57 

range between maximal opposites. This is 
probably what Stumpf has in mind when he 
says that the statement is ''so offenbar mit 
den Tatsachen in Widerspruch, dass wir nicht 
darauf einzugehen brauchen." What, then, are 
the ' Tatsachen ' ? Orth refers to warmth and 
cold: ''die Empfindungen des Temperatur- 
sinnes bewegen sich in derselben Gegensatz- 
lichkeit." He cites also the organic complexes 
of hunger and satiety, and the bodily states that 
we term 'fresh' and 'tired.' Ktilpe, in his sec- 
tion on sensations of temperature, argues in the 
other direction. "A simple increase or diminu- 
tion of temperature can change either sensation 
into its opposite, the path of change lying through 
a point of indifference or zero-point. There is 
no analogy to this fact in the sphere of sensation, 
though there is a very complete one in that of 
feeling." Ebbinghaus passes very lightly over 
the 'gegensatzliche Gliederung' of the affective 
processes: "sie stehen hiermit librigens nicht 
allein," he says, and quotes the three cases given 
by Orth. All this seems to me rather super- 
ficial. 

What we mean by maximal differences of sen- 
sation is clear enough. The attributes of sen- 
sation are, as we saw in the last Lecture, either 
qualitative or intensive. If they are intensive, 



58 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

they range — so to say, vertically — between 
zero and infinity, or rather between a lower and 
an upper limiting value. If they are qualitative, 
they range — so to say, horizontally — between 
extremes that are equally remote from both of 
these limiting values. How can there be an 
' opposition ' of sensory qualities ? We are re- 
ferred to the sense of temperature : but there is 
no sense of temperature. There are a cold sense 
and a warmth sense, — different senses. The 
thermometric scale is continuous; but that has 
nothing to do with the case. Years ago I was 
troubled by this antithetical account of warmth 
and cold, and made a series of experiments, 
from warmth to cold and from cold to warmth, 
in order to trace the passage of the one to the 
other through the point of indifference. I never 
found that point. Kulpe, who entirely believes 
in its existence, confesses that he, too, has been 
unable to verify its occurrence. The whole 
construction is artificial ; and the appeal to tem- 
perature is an appeal to physics, not to psy- 
chology. As for hunger and satiety, — try them ! 
Introspect your organic sensations in moderate 
hunger and after a hearty dinner. So far from 
finding opposition, antagonism, you will find a 
very general resemblance. Lastly, the sensa- 
tions of freshness and tiredness, in so far as they 



AFFECTIONS AS OPPOSITES 59 

are muscular in the strict meaning of that term, 
— in so far, that is, as they belong to a single 
sense, — range from bright to dull, from light 
to heavy, from lively to dead : but these are 
qualitative differences, akin to the differences of 
black and white in vision and of high and low 
in audition; there is no opposition or antago- 
nism between them. 

Now look at the other side of the shield. Our 
ordinary speech is very apt to couple words 
which, in a loose way, may be considered as 
^opposites.' We speak of hard and soft, rough 
and smooth, sharp and blunt, wet and dry, 
strong and w^eak, keen and dull, light and heavy, 
warm and cold; we speak of dark and fair, 
hungry and thirsty,* wide-awake and drowsy, 
fresh and tired, good-looking and ugly, clever 
and stupid, good and bad. The list might go 
on indefinitely. It is perfectly clear that, in 
most instances, there is no real opposition be- 
tween the paired terms; they stand simply for 
extremes of possible difference, whether in an 
attribute of sensation or in formations as com- 
plex as character and intelligence. Why, then, 
are two or three of them singled out, as express- 

* When Alice tried to 'quench her thirst' with the Red Queen's 
biscuit, — "and it was very dry/' — the antagonism between 
hunger and thirst was at least as real as the alleged antagonism 
of hunger and satiety ! 



60 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

ing opposition ? Why, indeed, — unless be- 
cause an affective opposition is implied ? Pleas- 
ant warmth and unpleasant cold; pleasant 
satiety and unpleasant hunger; pleasant fresh- 
ness and unpleasant tiredness : is not that the 
opposition ? I think that wherever the opposi- 
tion is conscious, it is affective. Notice, too, 
that it is never absolute; cold may be pleasant 
in summer, unpleasant in winter. Hunger may 
be pleasant, a 'jolly' hunger. Tiredness may 
be a 'comfortable' tiredness. We thus oppose 
degrees of cold, degrees of hunger, degrees of 
tiredness, as well as cold and warmth, etc. On 
the whole, warmth and satiety and freshness are 
pleasant, and cold and hunger and fatigue are 
unpleasant ; here is the general opposition to 
which our authorities appeal: but there are 
special oppositions that, if sensory at all, must 
be intensive and not qualitative. Notice, lastly, 
that other paired terms may be brought into 
conscious opposition if only we grant them an 
affective colouring; a carving-knife may be 
beautifully sharp or horribly blunt, a bed may 
be comfortably soft or dreadfully hard. And 
here as before there are oppositions of degree; 
comfortably soft may contrast with too soft, 
dreadfully hard with just hard enough. 

This interpretation of the facts of * sensory 



INTENSITY OF IDEAL FEELINGS 61 

opposition' squares very well with the system- 
atic doctrine that all ' psychological ' contrast — • 
I use Lipps' phrase — is a matter of feeling : 
that the ordinary man looks small by the side 
of a giant because you are disappointed, and 
looks large by the side of a dwarf because you 
are surprised. To that doctrine I subscribe. 
But neither it nor the considerations which I 
have just been urging tell us what affective 
opposition is. Is it mutual incompatibility in 
consciousness ? Those who — like Lipps, in 
his earlier writings — deny the possibility of 
mixed feelings might agree to such a definition, 
and we have seen that the evidence against 
mixed feelings is fairly strong. Only, we saw 
also that it is not conclusive.^ 

(4) A fourth criterion of affection is suggested 
by Kiilpe. You will remember that Kulpe classi- 
fies sensations as peripherally excited and cen- 
trally excited ; the distinction corresponds to 
that between sensation and image, and we shall 
do well, perhaps, to employ the more familiar 
terms. He classifies feelings in the same way, 
as peripherally and centrally excited. Since, 
however, very few psychologists agree with him 
that affective processes can stand alone in con- 
sciousness, we shall do well, again, to phrase 



62 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

the difference as that between the affection which 
accompanies a sensation and the affection which 
accompanies an image. Now the greatest dis- 
parity between sensation and image, Kiilpe says, 
shows on the side of intensity, and the intensive 
difference between the two processes is ''nor- 
mally recognised in every case by introspection/' 
On the other hand, the affection which accom- 
panies the image is ''usually as vivid'' — that 
means here, as intensive — as that which goes 
with the sensation. "Only the very highest 
degrees of sense-pleasure and sense-pain are 
now able to overpower the centrally excited, 
'higher' feelings." Here, then, is our criterion. 
Image is weaker than sensation, but the image- 
affection is intensively equivalent to the sense- 
affection. 

I wish to avoid all reference to the systematic 
question of affective reproduction, and I shall 
therefore let the phrase 'centrally excited affec- 
tion' pass without comment. We know what 
Kiilpe means. But shall we accept the state- 
ment of fact upon which his criterion rests ? 
Ladd very definitely does not. "In general," 
he writes, "ideal pleasures and pains, when 
measured by a strict standard of quantity, are 
much inferior to those occasioned by strong 
sensations." And more strongly still: "Ideal 



INTENSITY OF IDEAL FEELINGS 63 

pains and pleasures are not comparable in mere 
intensity with sensuous pains and pleasures." 
Contradiction could hardly be flatter. And con- 
tradiction is what we shall have, here and else- 
where in the psychology of feeling, until we can 
work out an experimental control of introspec- 
tion. As Wundt said long ago, ''Selbstbeo- 
bachtung ist ausfuhrbar, sie ist es aber nur unter 
der Bedingung der experimentellen Beobach- 
tung." 

We cannot, however, leave the matter at this 
point, since Stumpf has taken Kiilpe's sugges- 
tion seriously, and has brought two arguments 
against it. First, of course, he rules out the 
appeal to emotion ; he denies the continuity of 
sense-feeling and emotion. Then he says : sup- 
pose that Kulpe's statement were literally and 
universally true; still, the difference that he 
signalises would not be very important. ''Denn 
wir finden unter den verschiedenen Sinnen doch 
auch bei allem Gemeinsamen genug charakter- 
istische Verschiedenheiten : der eine zeigt Simul- 
tankontrast, der andere nicht, der eine zeigt 
messbare Ausdehnungsunterschiede, der andere 
nicht, u.s.w." He points out, also, that if you 
regard sensation and image as the same in kind 
and different only in degree, then Kulpe's dis- 
tinction loses its theoretical significance. 



64 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

The second objection offers an alternative to 
Kulpe's view. May it not be, Stumpf asks, that 
the image-affection is normally weaker than the 
sense-affection, — just as the image is normally 
weaker than the sensation, — but that the 
image-affection is very easily transformed into 
a sense-affection ? In other words, may we not 
be liable ''in ganz gewohnlichen Fallen'' to 
affective hallucinations, just as ''unter beson- 
deren Umstanden" we are liable to hallucinatory 
images ? No doubt, cause must be shown ; but 
cause can be shown, Stumpf thinks, in terms of 
his own theory of Gefuhlsempfindungen, — the 
theory which we are to discuss in the next 
Lecture. 

I do not know how to meet the first objection. 
If the attributes available for definition are 
merely quality, intensity, extent, and duration, 
and if extent is not an universal attribute of 
sensation, then we might, certainly, classify the 
mental elements at large as spatial and non- 
spatial. The classification would, indeed, be 
superior to Kiilpe's distinction of sensation and 
affection, in the sense that it is based upon a 
difference observable in the single element, 
whereas Ktilpe's intensive criterion requires the 
presence, along with affection, of sensation or 
image. We should grow accustomed, after a 



AFFECTIVE HABITUATION 65 

while, to placing sight and touch in a class by 
themselves, and bracketing pleasantness-un- 
pleasantness with tones and odours and the 
rest. At the same time, I hardly suppose that 
Stumpf meant his argument to be worked out 
in detail; the gist of it is, simply, that Kiilpe's 
difference is unimportant. And to that we can 
only reply that Kiilpe thinks it important, and 
that Ladd denies its existence. 

The second objection stands or falls with 
Stumpf 's personal views : its consideration must, 
therefore, be postponed. "^ 

(5) It has been said that the fact of habitu- 
ation, the loss or change of quality with lapse 
of time, marks off affection from sensation. 
The habitual sensation is indifferent, has ceased 
to affect us, while its sense-quality remains 
unchanged. 

The obvious reply is that affective adaptation 
has its direct analogue in sensory adaptation. 
As we become adapted to colours, tastes, odours, 
pressures, so do we become habituated to pleas- 
antness and unpleasantness. This is Stumpf 's 
position. Ebbinghaus, on the contrary, finds 
only ''eine verhaltnismassig schwache Analogic'' 
between the two sets of phenomena. We must 
therefore inquire further. 



66 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

The statements in the text-books are conflict- 
ing. Kiilpe says that habituation means in- 
difference. ''There is no evidence that unpleas- 
antness passes into pleasantness. Observations 
that seem to point towards any such process are 
referable to other causes. At least, the reverse 
passage, of pleasantness into unpleasantness, will 
be found to be of hardly less frequent occur- 
rence; and no one would attempt to explain 
it by habituation.'' Ebbinghaus declares that 
''diese blosse Abschwachung der Gefuhlswerte 
erst eine Seite der Sache ist," and seeks to show 
how, in terms of adaptation, pleasantness may 
pass through indifference to unpleasantness and 
unpleasantness through indifference to pleasant- 
ness, — the very occurrences that Kiilpe ex- 
cludes. Both authors, I suppose, have Leh- 
mann in mind ; but they put a different estimate 
upon Lehmann's conclusions. 

Lehmann distinguishes between affective ha- 
bituation to continuous and to intermittent 
stimuli. Where the stimulus is continuous, 
affective blunting is ''ein rein scheinbares Pha- 
nomen," pure illusion. You begin, we will say, 
with a pleasantness. As time goes on, the sense- 
organ becomes adapted; you have an "Ab- 
stumpfung der Empfindung" which naturally 
means also an '' Abstumpfung des Gefuhls/' 



AFFECTIVE HABITUATION 67 

If the stimulus persists, unpleasurable sensations 
from foreign stimuli make incursion into con- 
sciousness, and the indifference becomes un- 
pleasantness. The two factors, of sensory adap- 
tation and foreign interference, may operate 
singly or in various combinations. Or you 
begin with an unpleasantness. This continues, 
with increasing intensity, until the onset of 
sensory adaptation in the form of nervous ex- 
haustion. If indifference occurs, it occurs only 
when and because the sensory side of your ex- 
perience drops out of consciousness; as soon as 
the sensation reappears, the unpleasantness re- 
appears with it. You may, then, reach a stage 
of indifference, of forgetfulness, but the original 
unpleasantness never changes to the opposite 
quality. 

Now turn to intermittent stimuli. You have, 
according to Lehmann, precisely the same phe- 
nomena as before: either the sensory side of 
the experience becomes obscure, through diver- 
sion of attention, or unpleasurable sensations 
from foreign sources invade consciousness, or 
both factors cooperate to change the original 
affective quality. But he goes on to point out 
that the intermittently repeated stimulus does 
not wholly lose its affective significance ; there is 
a law of the ' indispensableness of the habitual.' 



68 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

General sensory adaptation, the "Gewohnung 
des Organismus/' leaves a need, a ''Bediirfnis." 
As the satisfaction of a need is pleasurable, you 
may have, in terms of this law, a shift of affective 
quality from unpleasant to pleasant; only, the 
shift is indirect, from unpleasantness of stimulus 
to indifference, from that to the unpleasantness 
of need, and from that again to the pleasantness 
of satisfaction. The converse change, from 
pleasant to unpleasant, is not mentioned by 
Lehmann. 

Kiilpe, then, repeats Lehmann exactly. There 
is no evidence of the change, under habituation, 
from unpleasantness to pleasantness; Lehmann 
shows that the passage is indirect. No one 
would think of ascribing to habituation the 
change from pleasantness to unpleasantness; 
Lehmann says nothing of such change. Eb- 
binghaus, on the contrary, reinterprets Lehmann. 
He accepts the law of custom, of the indis- 
pensableness of the habitual, but makes the 
unpleasant stimulus pass directly, through in- 
difference, to pleasantness. And he parallels 
this law by a law of tedium or ennui, which is 
realised when an originally pleasant stimulus 
passes directly, through indifference, to un- 
pleasantness. 

In my own opinion, affective habituation is 



AFFECTION AND CLEARNESS 69 

a phenomenon of the same order as sensory 
adaptation, and results always and only in in- 
difference. Even if Ebbinghaus is correct, and 
quality passes into opposite quality, we have a 
sensory analogy in the case of vision : adapta- 
tion to yellow means blue-sightedness, local 
adaptation to green means a purple after-image. 
However, our present concern is with the dif- 
ference between sensation and affection; and 
we have gone far enough with the phenomena of 
habituation to see that, in the present state of 
psychology, appeal to them is hopeless.^ 

(6) I have postponed to the last the discussion 
of a criterion w^hich, to my mind, is the most 
obvious and the most important of all. It is 
this : that affections lack, what all sensations 
possess, the attribute of clearness. Attention 
to a sensation means always that the sensation 
becomes clear; attention to an affection is im- 
possible. If it is attempted, the pleasantness 
or unpleasantness at once eludes us and dis- 
appears, and w^e find ourselves attending to 
some obtrusive sensation or idea that we had 
not the slightest desire to observe. 

Kiilpe emphasises this difference between 
the elementary processes, and at the same time 
forestalls a misunderstanding. " A weakly pleas- 



70 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

urable feeling/' he writes, "'is intensified by the 
direction of the attention upon its concomitant 
sensations, and an impression which stands on 
the border line between pleasantness and un- 
pleasantness may be made unpleasant by an in- 
tense concentration of the attention upon it. 
In a certain sense, then, attention is a favourable 
condition for the feelings as it is for sensation/' 
That is the removal of the possible misunder- 
standing. ''But," Kiilpe goes on, ''curiously 
enough, the result is quite different if attention 
is turned upon the feeling itself. It is a familiar 
fact that contemplation of the feelings, the devo- 
tion of special attention to them, lessens their 
intensity and prevents their natural expression. 
This diminution of intensity ... [is shown by] 
a tendency of the affective contents to disappear 
altogether, to make way for the state of indiffer- 
ence. . . . Attention, then, is adverse to the 
feelings, when concentrated directly upon them.'' 
He then quotes the introspective report which 
accompanied certain experiments made by the 
method of expression. "The subject often in- 
sisted that the feeling had altogether disappeared 
under attention, and that it was very difficult, 
in any case, to attend to pleasantness or unpleas- 
antness. Feeling has too little objectivity and 
substantiality for the attention to be directed 



AFFECTION AND CLEARNESS 71 

and held upon it. It is focussed for a moment, 
and then other processes, especially organic 
sensations, interpose and take possession of 
the conscious fixation-point." And later on, 
when describing the effects of attention, he says : 
''While pleasure and pain {Lust und Leid) are 
brought far more vividly to consciousness by 
the concentration of attention upon their con- 
comitant sensations, they disappear entirely 
when we succeed (and we can succeed only 
for a moment) in making the feeling as such the 
object of attentive observation.'' 

I myself, in 1894, published a brief account 
of experiments which had led to a like result. 
Further evidence is furnished by Zoneff and 
Meumann. These investigators made experi- 
ments in which the observers were instructed 
to attend now to the stimulus, now to the feeling 
aroused by the stimulus. The instruction proved 
to be ambiguous. In certain cases, ''man con- 
centrirt sich, d. h. man behalt das Gefiihl will- 
kiirlich eine relativ langere Zeit im Blickpunkte 
des Bewusstseins und analysirt dasselbe. Es 
wird etwa dartiber nachgedacht, ob das Gefiihl 
mehr oder weniger angenehm bezw. unangenehm 
ist. Hier findet eine wirkliche Analyse des Ge- 
ftihls statt, die von einer gewissen korperlichen 
Spannung begleitet ist.'' In other cases, "der 



72 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

Reagent sucht sich das Gefiihl moglichst zum 
Bewusstsein zu bringen, ohne aber dasselhe zu 
analysiren, oder mit anderen Worten, das Gefiihl 
tritt in den Blickpunkt des Bewusstseins, dabei 
bleibt es aber, es geschieht mit ihm nichts weiter. 
Das Gefiihl wird so zu sagen mit Hingebung 
gefuhlt." As for the result: '^eine blosse Rich- 
tung der Aufmerksamkeit auf das Gefiihl [the 
second case] verstarkt dasselbe, wird dagegen 
das Gefiihl zum Gegenstand einer psycholo- 
gischen Analyse gemacht und in diesem Sinne 
Gegenstand der Aufmerksamkeit, so wird es be- 
deutend geswacht, ja sogar ganz aufgehoben/' 

The general sense of these passages is clear. 
The unpractised observers, when instructed to 
'attend' to the feeling, thought that they were 
to do the best they could for it, to assume the 
mental attitude most favourable to it; to resign 
themselves passively to the feeling, to let it have 
its way with them. Under these conditions, the 
feeling naturally attained its fullest intensity. 
The more practised observers — this distinction 
is drawn by the authors, not by me — sought to 
abstract from the sensible concomitants, and to 
attend strictly to the affective contents as such. 
Under these conditions, the feeling was notably 
weakened, if not entirely destroyed. 

I say that the general sense of the passages is 



AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 73 

clear. The wording, however, is obscure and 
can be justified, if at all, only by the considera- 
tion that Zoneff and Meumann are purposely 
taking a non-committal position as regards sys- 
tematic questions. Thus, the unpractised ob- 
servers certainly did not 'direct their attention 
to the feeling ' in the same sense that one directs 
one's attention to a sensation. So far from at- 
tending, reaching out to the feeling, they sat back 
and let the feeling come. The very fact that 
they did this — that they instinctively refrained 
from attention to the feeling itself, in order to 
give it first place in consciousness — shows how 
unnatural, not to say impossible, the literal in- 
struction was. Again, the practised observers 
are said to 'analyse the feeling.' But how 
could they 'analyse' what a few pages back has 
been called an 'elementary' feeling.^ What 
they did was to ideate the feeling, to reflect 
upon it, to ask themselves questions about it : all 
this, in the vain effort to hold it as a sensation is 
held. Once more : what is meant by the pres- 
ence of a feeling "im Blickpunkte des Bewusst- 
seins".^ The associations that come with the 
phrase are drawn from the sphere of sensory 
attention, so that here Zoneff and Meumann 
seem to have departed from their non-committal 
attitude. You cannot, after all, free yourself 



74 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

from ' Voreingenommenheit ' by a fiat of will; 
you have approached the problem by way of 
certain concepts, and though you deny them 
your speech will betray you. 

In his recently published Experimentelle Pdda- 
gogik, Meumann writes as follows: ''[Es] muss 
noch von emotionaler und voluntionaler [ !] Auf- 
merksamkeit gesprochen werden, denn unsre 
Aufmerksamkeit kann sich ebensogut auf Will- 
enshandlungen und Gef iihle richten und es ist 
ein blosses theoretisches Vorurteil, wenn das 
von manchen Psychologen geleugnet wird. Sie 
konnen sich jederzeit selbst davon iiberzeugen, 
dass wir unsre Gefuhle einer analysierenden 
Beobachtung zu unterziehen vermogen, wie 
jeden anderen Bewusstseinszustand, dann richtet 
sich die analysierende Aufmerksamkeit auf das 
Gefiihl/' I must confess that this passage stag- 
gers me. Anybody at any time may convince 
himself that he can attend to his feelings ? And 
yet, four years earlier, Meumann had attached a 
''quite especial importance" to his and Zoneff's 
experimental work on that point, and had stressed 
the fact that '''die Richtung der Aufmerksam- 
keit' auf ein psychisches Erlebniss ein sehr 
vieldeutiger Ausdruck ist, mit dem ganz hetero- 
gene Vorgange bezeichnet werden." But, you 
will say, he speaks now of 'analytical observa- 



AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 75 

tion/ 'analytical attention/ So he does, — 
without defining the adjective. And then this 
analytical attention to the feelings is of the same 
order as analytical attention to ''any other state 
of consciousness." Four years earlier we were 
told that the feelings were ''bedeutend ge- 
schwacht, ja sogar ganz aufgehoben"! — 

I began this discussion with a reference to 
Kiilpe. I did so, because I know of no experi- 
ments earlier than his. The doctrine which I 
am defending — ^'der Schlendrian der alten 
Auf merksamkeitstheorie " which, according to 
Meumann, is a mere theoretical prepossession 
— is, of course, very much older. It is aptly 
phrased, e,g,, by Hamilton. ''Reflection," he 
says, "is properly attention directed to the phe- 
nomena of mind." "We are, indeed, able to 
constitute our states of pain and pleasure into 
objects of reflection, but in so far as they are 
objects of reflection, they are not feelings, but 
only reflex cognitions of feelings." It is fully 
worked out by Ward. It is implicit in Wundt's 
theory of feeling as the "Reaction der Appercep- 
tion auf das einzelne Bewusstseinserlebniss," 
the " Reactions weise der Apperception auf den 
Bewusstseinsinhalt." Kiilpe's acceptance of the 
Wundtian theory is grounded upon the impli- 
cation ; and Wundt's own language is exceed- 



76 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

ingly careful. Hollands writes : '' Concerning the 
method of feeling-analysis, we find the statement 
that feeling . . . cannot be isolated as an object 
of attention. . . . This is the invariable teach- 
ing of Wundt.'' Even when Wundt slips, he 
furnishes his own corrective. While, e.g.^ he 
speaks incautiously, in one passage, of the 'ap- 
perception' of the affective tone of an obscurely 
perceived sensation, he explains in another that 
well-marked feelings may accompany a ' Vorstel- 
lungsinhalt' which ''wegen der vorwaltenden 
Richtung der Auf merksamkeit " is not apper- 
ceived; and the two accounts refer to the same 
experience. 

I need not multiply quotations. No doubt, 
there are dissentient voices. Saxinger, for in- 
stance, cites Lehmann to the effect that we are 
able, by voluntary direction of attention, to 
bring a feeling to the forefront of consciousness. 
True, this is a misquotation : Lehmann speaks, 
in fact, of the direction of attention upon a 
''betonte Vorstellung,'' not upon a feeling; but 
Saxinger's words show that he, at any rate, has 
no difficulty in conceiving of attention to a feel- 
ing. Indeed, he speaks, a little later on, of the 
' Beleuchtung ' of feelings by the attention. And 
the authors who identify affection with sensation 
must, of necessity, take Saxinger's view, — un- 



THE CRITERIA OF AFFECTION 77 

less they avoid the present issue altogether. 
On the whole, however, I think that this sixth 
criterion stands its ground more firmly than any 
of the others that we have considered.^ 

What, now, is to be our general conclusion ? 
This, I think : that two of the proposed criteria 
of affection must probably be given up; that 
two others are extremely instable ; and that two 
deserve very serious consideration. The two 
that we must apparently discard are those fur- 
nished by habituation and by central intensity. 
The two that we pronounce doubtful are those 
of subjectivity and of non-localisableness. The 
two that, at any rate, give us pause are those of 
qualitative antagonism and lack of clearness. 

This statement is as near as I can get to an 
impartial verdict. The whole discussion illus- 
trates the difficulty of discriminating between 
elementary processes in any other way than by 
appeal to experience itself. And I would ask 
you to remember that that appeal still remains. 
All of the distinctions between sensation and 
affection profess to be drawn from experience; 
the wording may be clumsy, or suggestive, or 
individually coloured; but the difference itself 
is either there or not there, in your own intro- 
spection. 



78 SENSATION AND AFFECTION 

I would ask you, also, to remember one other 
thing. A psychologist who definitely accepts 
any single criterion, and so makes affection an 
independent mental element, may very well 
revise our conclusion, and ascribe value to cri- 
teria that we have disputed or rejected. We have 
proceeded serially, taking each distinction by 
itself. That was necessary, in the interests of 
clearness ; but I do not know that it was quite 
fair. If, for instance, we were to consider sub- 
jectivity and coextension with consciousness along 
with antagonism and lack of clearness, making 
the four characters interdependent, as, to a large 
extent, they really are, we could, I believe, con- 
siderably strengthen the case for an elementary 
affection. I can do no more than mention the 
point here ; I shall recur to it, briefly, in my con- 
cluding Lecture/^ 



Ill 

THE AFFECTIONS AS GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 



LECTURE III 

THE AFFECTIONS AS GEFUHLSEMP- 
FINDUNGEN 

MANY attempts have been made, and for 
various reasons, to identify affection with 
sensation, and thus to reduce all the mental ele- 
ments to a single kind. We must rule out of con- 
sideration here, as we did also in the previous 
Lecture, anything that savours of epistemology. 
For that matter, there is more than enough to 
occupy us on the purely psychological plane ; the 
introspective resemblance between pleasantness- 
unpleasantness, on the one hand, and certain 
sensations, on the other, has been urged again 
and again in the history of psychology. I take 
two modern instances. Bourdon, in 1893, iden- 
tifies pleasure with the sensation of tickling. 
''Le plaisir est une sensation speciale et non pas 
une sensation commune ni une propriete de 
toutes les sensations ; et il est de meme nature 
que la sensation speciale de chatouillement.'' 
''Le plaisir serait un chatouillement diffus, 
de faible intensite, tandis qu'au contraire le 
chatouillement serait en quelque sort un plaisir 
G 81 



82 GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

bien localise et de grande intensite/' ^ In 1894 
von Frey, working from the opposite direction, 
identifies unpleasantness with pain, while he 
makes pleasantness a negative matter, absence 
or cessation of pain. ''Der Schmerz,'' he says, 
''[ist] die einfachste Form des Unlustgefiihls''; 
and ''die tagliche Erfahrung lehrt, dass es die 
Aufhebung des Schmerzes ist, welche uns Lust 
bereitet." ^ Bourdon is able to quote, on behalf 
of his theory, authorities as high as Descartes 
and Bain ; ^ and von Frey, though he does not 
say so, is championing a doctrine of pleasure 
which is as old as Plato. ^ 

I do not, however, intend to enter upon the 
history of our subject ; that would take me too 
far afield. I intend only to expound and criti- 
cise one notable attempt, made very recently, 
to bring the sense-feelings, all simple affective 
experience, under the rubric of sensation. I 
refer to Stumpf's paper Ueber Gefiihlsempfin- 
dungen, which was read before the Society for 
Experimental Psychology at Wtirzburg in April, 
1906, and was published in December of the 
same year, with slight additions and modifica- 
tions, in the Zeitschrift fiir Psychologie.^ 

The range of Stumpf's inquiry is limited to 
what are ordinarily called the 'sense-feelings,' 



SENSATION AND AFFECTION 83 

die sinnlichen Gefuhle. These include, ^' first, 
the purely bodily pains (that is, those which 
appear without any essential concernment of 
intellectual functions *), whether they are set 
up from without or from within the organism; 
secondly, the feeling of bodily well-being in its 
more general and its more special forms, the latter 
including the pleasure-component in tickling, 
the feeling produced by itching, and the sexual 
feelings; and lastly the agreeableness and dis- 
agreeableness that may be connected, in the 
most various degrees or gradations, with the 
sensations of all or nearly all the 'special' senses, 
with temperatures, odours, tastes, tones, colours/' 
The point of view which the inquiry adopts is 
primarily descriptive.^ 

We begin with a discussion of the three pos- 
sible views of elementary affective process.^ 
The affection may be an attribute of sensation, — 
an * affective tone' of sensation. Or the affec- 
tion may be a mental element, distinct from and 
coordinate with sensation. Or, lastly, the affec- 
tion may be itself a sensation, a sensation of a 
special kind, like the visual or the kinsesthetic. 

The first of these three views Stumpf disposes 
of as it deserves. It is a view which received its 

* I take this to be the meaning of the phrase "ohne integrier- 
ende Beteiligung intellektueller Funktionen.'' 



84 GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

coup de grace at the hands of Kiilpe in 1893,^ — 
the year of publication, be it remembered, of 
the fourth edition of the Physiologische Psy- 
chologies in which affection still figures as a 'third 
attribute' of sensation.^ Kiilpe points out that 
affection cannot be an attribute of sensation of 
the same sort as the recognised attributes, be- 
cause it has attributes of its own. Sensations 
show differences of intensity, quality, time, and 
(in some instances) space ; affection shows dif- 
ferences of intensity, quality, and time. Ziehen, 
in the 1906 edition of his Leitfaden, seeks to meet 
this argument. ^'Dem gegeniiber verweise ich 
Sie auf das Beispiel eines chemischen Prozesses 
(z. B. einer Oxydation), welche selbst eine be- 
stimmte Intensitat und Qualitat hat und oft 
zugleich noch von einem Licht von bestimmter 
Intensitat und Qualitat begleitet ist.'' ^^ Stumpf 
replies, rightly, that the attribute of an object, 
as these terms are employed in everyday life, 
is one thing; and that the attribute of a sensa- 
tion, as these terms are employed in psychology, 
is another and a very different thing. An 
'object' is an empirical collocation of attributes 
which are themselves sensations or sense-deriva- 
tives ; we can think away the scent of a flower, 
and leave the flower a concrete object as it was 
before. But the attributes of sensation are 



THE DOCTRINE OF AFFECTIVE TONE 85 

known only by abstraction ; they are the modes 
of variation of a wholly simple contents; we 
cannot think any one of them away without at 
the same time thinking away the sensation/^ 
Stumpf's rejoinder thus leads us to Kiilpe's 
second argument : that the annihilation of an 
attribute of sensation carries with it the disap- 
pearance of the sensation, whereas a sensation 
may be non-affective, indifferent, and still be 
far removed from disappearance. I do not see 
how these arguments can possibly be answered, 
and I agree with Stumpf that "man sich wundern 
muss, wie [die betreffende Anschauung] immer 
noch von manchen festgehalten werden kann/' ^^ 
Yet we find Marshall, in January of the present 
year, positing an ' algedonic quality ' of sensation : 
''each elementary presentation must display 
either agreeableness or disagreeableness, or 
indifference which is a mode of transition be- 
tween the other two." ^^ What is this 'mode of 
transition ' ? If it is really indifference, neither 
pleasantness nor unpleasantness, it is nothing 
at all ; and how can nothing at all be a ' qual- 
ity'.^ If it is indifference in the affective sense, 
the indifference of satiety, of ' having had enough 
of a thing,' of 'being tired of it,' then — as 
Ziegler says — "hat das Gleichgiiltige stets etwas 
vom Unangenehmen an sich";^^ indifference 



86 GEFJJHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

is a stage on the road to aversion, nausea, dis- 
gust; it is already unpleasant, not a 'mode of 
transition' from pleasantness to unpleasantness. 
I have been told that, in philosophy, errors never 
die; and it may be that they die hard, in psy- 
chology, because that earlier habit of immortality 
is still strong upon them. 

There remain, then, the alternatives: that 
affection is a second mental element, and that 
it is a kind of sensation. Stumpf here throws 
the burden of proof upon the advocates of affec- 
tive independence. Unless the differences be- 
tween sensation and affection are primary and 
universal, the separation of the processes runs 
counter to the scientific principle of economy.^^ 
He accordingly reviews the three principal argu- 
ments of his opponents : the relation of sense- 
feeling to emotion, the subjectivity of feeling, 
and its lack of spatial localisation and extension. ^^ 
What he has to say on these topics we already 
know; his objections were mentioned and al- 
lowed their due weight in the preceding Lecture. 
You will remember that he makes a sharp divi- 
sion, in his own system, between sense-feeling 
and the higher, intellectual feelings, the Affekte 
oder Gemutshewegungen, and that he definitely 
rejects the two remaining criteria. I will only 
add now that he has, in my opinion, passed too 



CUTANEOUS AND ORGANIC PAIN 87 

lightly over certain other proposed criteria ; and 
that the appeal to a 'principle of economy' is 
worth very little, because the appeal in science 
lies always to the facts of observation. How- 
ever, it is precisely to the facts that Stumpf 
next takes us. 

He opens with a section on 'sensations of 
pain, and the sensations of pleasure (Lustemp- 
jindungen) that take their origin from cutaneous 
stimulations or from vegetative states/ ^^ And he 
makes every effort, at the outset, to prove that 
pain is a department of sense, and the pain-qual- 
ity a quality of sensation. '' Es ist also die Isolie- 
rung dieser Empfindungsqualitat, sozusagen die 
Reinziichtung des Geftihlssinnes, gelungen." ^^ 
''Die principielle Frage, auf die es fur uns 
gegenwartig ankommt, ist . . . ob es Schmerz- 
empfindungen in der gleichen Bedeutung wie 
Farbenempfindungen , Geruchsempfindungen 
gehe, als echte und eigentliche Sinnesqualita- 
ten." ^^ Let me say at once that nobody, who 
knows anything at first hand of the psychology of 
cutaneous sensation, would be tempted nowadays 
to traverse this position. That there is a sense 
of pain is a fact as well established as that there 
is a sense of pressure. So far, I agree entirely 
with Stumpf. Nevertheless, there are two points 
in his exposition, two very closely related points. 



88 GEFUHLSEMPPINDUNGEN 

that seem to invite criticism. The first concerns 
the nature of the pain-quality, and the second 
the nature of the unpleasantness of pain. 

Stumpf is fully convinced of the painfulness 
of the pain-quality. ''Der Schmerz ist eben 
schmerzhaft, dass ist seine berechtigte Eigen- 
tiimlichkeit, daran kann, glaube ich, selbst die 
feinste Psychologic nichts andern." ^^ Believers 
in a separate affective process regard the under- 
lying sensation in the experience of pain as pain- 
less, schmerzlos; ''wahrend wir uns zu der 
Ansicht gefuhrt sehen, dass das sogenannte 
Schmerzgefiihl die sinnliche Qualitat selbst ist, 
und dass der Schmerz in jener angeblichen 
nur zugrundeliegenden Sinnesempfindung schon 
durchaus komplett gegeben ist." ^^ A difficulty 
arises, of course, in connection with the sensation 
of prick or sting. Goldscheider expressly re- 
marks that his 'secondary sensation' need not 
be painful ; under the most favourable conditions 
it is a '' ieiii-stechendes Gefuhl von nicht schmerz- 
haftem Charakter." ^^ And the ' Stichempfind- 
ungen ' aroused directly by cutaneous stimulation 
are not painful. Stumpf meets the difficulty by 
suggesting that the sensations in question may 
belong to the sense of pressure. But he does 
not, in any case, regard it as momentous ; whether 
the ' Stichempfindung ' is mediated by the nerves 



PAIN AND UNPLEASANTNESS 89 

of pressure or by the nerves of pain, the important 
thing is the appearance of pain as a sensible 
quality. 

That is the first point. In the second place, 
Stumpf looks upon the unpleasantness of pain, 
not as concomitant affective process, but as the 
qualitative character of pain itself. To add an 
affective tone of unpleasantness, he says, "scheint 
mir zwecklos." ^^ Why should you call upon 
a second genus of mental elements to make a 
thing what it is in its own right, — to make a 
pain painful ? ^^ We hear sometimes of pleas- 
urable pains; but the phrase is misleading. 
You may, perhaps, have pain-sensations and 
ao;reeable sensations at one and the same time 
from different regions of the skin, and the two 
qualities may possibly enhance each other,^'by a 
kind of contrast" ; but that is not the same thing 
as feeling an agreeable pain. The pleasures of 
asceticism and of martyrdom are matters of emo- 
tion ; the sensible pain either persists, but is 
held in check by intellectual rapture, or disap- 
pears in the analgesia of the ecstatic state. 
Pain, then, falls into line with the other sensa- 
tions just by reason of the fact, paradoxical as 
it may seem, that it has no affective tone.^^ — 

I pointed out in my first Lecture that stimu- 
lation of a paiu-^pot gives qualitatively different 



90 GEFiJHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

sensations, according to the intensity of the 
stimulus. At a very low intensity we have itch; 
then prick or sting; and lastly, at higher inten- 
sities, pain. The observation demands a certain 
amount of technical skill, and calls for a respon- 
sive pain-spot ; but I cannot doubt its accuracy. 
It seems, then, doubly unfortunate that Stumpf 
has claimed the sensation of itch as a sensation 
of "pleasure?^ Psychophysically, it is a weak 
sensation of pain; itch passes into sting, and 
sting into pain, within the same peripheral 
organ. Psychologically, itch is not pleasure, 
but itch; its quality is not pleasurable, but 
itchy. The psychophysical question was raised 
by Stumpf only in order to be dismissed, and 
I do not wish on my side to intrude psy- 
chophysical considerations into a piece of 
descriptive psychology. I merely note that 
''identische Nervenfasern'' ^^ presumably medi- 
ate ^ Lustempfindungen ' as well as pain and 
painless sting. But the psychological argu- 
ment is important. In a passage already 
quoted, Stumpf speaks of '*das durch Jucken 
entstehende Gefiihl" and of the ''Lustkom- 
ponente des Kitzels." In both expressions, 
the pleasure seems to be something additional 
to, superadded upon, the sense-quality proper. 
The feeling produced hy itching, or arising 



PAIN AND UNPLEASANTNESS 91 

through itch, is not — if language means any- 
thing — the itch-quality itself ; and if itch is a 
special form of pleasurable sensation, there 
must be some mark or sign upon it to inform 
us of the fact. In pain, the quality tells its 
own story; pain is painful. How does itch 

— which, by the same reasoning, is just itchy 

— tell us that it is pleasant ? 

Let us see how the psychologist of affection 
would read the facts. Itch, he would say, is a 
sensible quality which is ordinarily attended by 
pleasantness. Itch passes into sting, which 
may be weakly pleasant, or indifferent, or slightly 
unpleasant. Sting passes into pain, which is 
ordinarily attended by unpleasantness. Under 
certain circumstances, itch may be unpleasant ; 
an itch that is widely diffused over the skin, or 
that persists for a long time, and more especially 
an itch that is both widely diffused and of long 
duration, may be distinctly unpleasant. Here, 
as elsewhere in sensation, space and time may 
produce the effect of intensity.^^ Pain is, of 
course, always painful, in the sense that it always 
shows the pain-quality; it is painful, that is, 
just as sting is stinging and itch is itchy. I 
cannot understand how Stumpf reaches the con- 
clusion that, for the advocates of an independent 
affective process, the pain-quality ceases to be 



92 GEFUHLSEMPFINDVNGEN 

pain, becomes schmerzlos. But the pain-quality 
need not always be unpleasant, — that is the 
point upon which issue must be taken with 
Stumpf . It is not easy to find instances, though 
I think that they are not uncommon in daily life. 
Ebbinghaus cites the scratching of an irritated 
area of the skin : ^^ and it is true, in my obser- 
vation, that if you rub the nails of the right-hand 
fingers briskly up and down over the back of the 
left hand you get, particularly when the hand is 
dry and the skin a little rough, lines of pain that 
are undeniably pleasant ; though the consequent 
after-image is sore, and undeniably unpleasant. 
Kelchner says, apropos of one of her experi- 
ments: ''hier macht Vp. die Angabe, dass das 
Abklingen des physischen Schmerzes von schwa- 
cher Lust begleitet sei, — ein Ausspruch, der 
wieder den Empfindungscharakter des Schmerzes 
zu bezeugen scheint.'' ^^ The sensory character 
of pain is above the need of witnesses ; but the 
testimony to the possible pleasantness of weakly 
intensive pain is valuable. Stumpf 's illustration 
of pain-sensations (i.e. disagreeable sensations) 
and agreeable sensations, set up simultaneously 
at different parts of the skin, and enhancing each 
other by a sort of contrast, is, of course, hypotheti- 
cal only; it is not intended to describe an expe- 
rience of his own. For that reason, and also 



CUTANEOUS AND ORGANIC PLEASURE 93 

because it raises further questions of the dis- 
tribution of attention and of the nature of the 
contrast-effect, we need not seriously consider it. 

Which, now, has made out the better case? 
Stumpf, who terms itch a Lustempjindung and 
pain an Unlustempfiiidung, or the affective psy- 
chologist who declares that both itch and pain 
may be, according to circumstances, pleasant, 
indifferent, or unpleasant? — 

I may pass over Stumpf 's mention of the inter- 
nal, organic pains. ^^ When we turn to his dis- 
cussion of the sensations of pleasure, we find 
the same general difficulty that I have just re- 
marked in the special instance of itch. "An- 
nehmlichkeit, Wohlsein," he says, ''[ist] die 
zweite Hauptqualitat des Gefiihlssinnes.'' ^^ And 
he distinguishes, among cutaneous pleasures, 
tickling, itch, and lust ; among vegetative pleas- 
ures, satiety, repose, and general comfortable- 
ness (allgemeines Wohlhehagen). Yet he says 
that the question of the '' Gleichartigkeit aller 
Lustempfindungen " may be left open ! ^^ Now, 
if Annehmlichkeit is a sensible quality, there 
must obviously be different kinds of it ; how do 
we distinguish itch from tickling, tickling from 
lust, lust from satiety, and so on, save by their 
qualitative differences ? If, on the other hand, 
all the sense-pleasures are of the same kind, then 



94 GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

certainly such diverse things as lust and satiety 
cannot be exhaustively described as 'sense- 
pleasures ' ; they are that, and they are something 
that is qualitatively differentiated as well. Is it 
not clear that, with the best will in the world, 
Stumpf cannot wholly rid himself of the doctrine 
that he is combating, — that this doctrine creeps 
into the argument with all the seeming inevitable- 
ness of fact ? ^^ 

Stumpf 's second section deals with the 'affec- 
tive tone' of the remaining senses, the agreeable- 
ness and disagreeableness of temperatures, press- 
ures, odours, tastes, colours, tones. ^ He begins 
by drawing a valid distinction between very 
intensive and moderate or weak stimulation. 
Where the stimulus is very strong, or abnormally 
strong, he says, it is likely to involve pain-organs, 
over and above the organ to which it is specif- 
ically addressed. Temperature-pains and press- 
ure-pains are pains proper, due to stimulation 
of the cutaneous pain-spots. The pains of 
blinding light and of deafening noise are, intro- 
spectively, of essentially similar character, and 
may be referred, with a high degree of probability, 
to contraction of the iris and of the muscles of 
the middle ear.^^ All this we may cheerfully 
grant ; and its result is that certain experiences, 



THE SPECIAL SENSES 95 

which at first thought would seem to fall within 
the sphere of pressure or temperature, sight or 
hearing, are in reality phenomena of cutaneous 
or organic pain, and thus have already received 
implicit consideration in the foregoing section. 
We stand, theoretically, where we stood at the 
completion of that section. ''Aehnliche Be- 
trachtungen," Stumpf goes on, ''lassen sich auch 
liber die peripherisch durch starke Reizungen 
erregten Lustempfindungen anstellen." ^^ Here, 
I think, he falls into that schematism as regards 
pleasure which is one of the besetting sins of the 
sensationalists. Are they not all apt to give full 
details concerning pain, and then to say, offhand, 
'Just the same thing holds, mutatis mutandis^ 
of pleasure ' ? The passage must mean that 
pleasures of touch or temperature, sight or sound, 
aroused by intensive peripheral stimulation, de- 
pend for their pleasurableness upon the coexci- 
tation of the organs of tickling, itch, lust, etc. 
What is Stumpf thinking of? The 'feeF of 
silk next the skin is exceedingly pleasant, — but 
largely so, most of us would say, because it does 
not tickle. And silk is not an intensive stimulus. 
It is pleasant to come into a warm room when 
one is chilled with the cold. But while, under 
such circumstances, we may get circulatory sen- 
sations of tingling, it is not necessary, in my expe- 



96 GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

rience, that we have either tickle or itch. It is 
pleasant to turn the eyes from the white glare of 
snow to the dull green of fir, and it is a relief 
to the ear when a factory whistle ceases to 
sound. But the evergreens and the silence are 
not intensive peripheral stimuli. Perhaps 
Stumpf has in mind such things as the pleasure 
of violent bodily exercise and the supreme 
comfort of a Turkish bath, — organic rather 
than peripheral pleasures. But where is the 
analogue of these pleasures in the domain of 
sight or hearing ? — 

We come now to the crux of the whole argu- 
ment: to the explanation of the agreeableness 
and disagreeableness of moderate or weak 
stimulation in the departments of vision and 
audition, taste and smell. This 'affective tone' 
Stumpf regards as a * concomitant sensation' 
C'das Wort Mitempfindung im weitesten Sinne 
genommen'').^^ Psychologically, a concomitant 
sensation is, of course, a sensation like any 
other, an elementary mental process with a cer- 
tain status in consciousness and a certain set of 
attributes. We should therefore expect, since 
on Stumpf's own admission there is no such 
thing, in strictness, as indissoluble association,^^ 
that he would at once cast about for instances of 
dissociation, and would seek to show us the 



THE SPECIAL SENSES 97 

* affective sensation' in isolation. Instead of 
doing this, he offers us reasons for shifting the 
scene of our debate from sensation to idea. 
Why is it, he asks, that we can not sense the 
agreeableness of a colour or a scent alone, 
without being obliged at the same time to sense 
the colour as visual and the scent as olfactory 
quality ? ^' 

Well ! Stumpf replies, there might be anatomi- 
cal reasons. It might be a matter of physio- 
logical fact that the excitation underlying agree- 
ableness cannot be set up independently of the 
excitation underlying colour or odour. And after 
all, it was only the other day that physiologists 
succeeded in separately stimulating the cutane- 
ous pain-organs ; here too, then, the future 
may bring results that we cannot now foresee. 
Or, again, we might think that colour and the 
agreeableness of colour are intimately fused, as 
are, e,g.^ taste and smell, or the two tones of the 
octave. Or, lastly, it is possible, even prob- 
able, that the concomitant sensations of agree- 
ableness and disagreeableness are sensations of 
central origin. In that case, we can separate 
them from their companions, if at all, only by 
change of central conditions, not by modifica- 
tion of peripheral stimulation. 

I would call your attention to the fact that two 



98 GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

of these arguments are psychophysical, and that 
the third, if it is not psychophysical, is irrelevant. 
To talk of anatomical reasons for the conjunc- 
tion of colour with agreeableness of colour, and 
to talk of that agreeableness as a centrally excited 
concomitant sensation, — to talk in this way is 
to leave the field of descriptive psychology for 
the field of psychophysics. And it seems to me, 
in general, that Stumpf is inclined to bar out 
psychophysical reference where it does not sup- 
port his views, and to bring it in, without apology, 
wherever it can furnish him with even a specu- 
lative confirmation.^^ I know very well that 
sweeping criticism of this kind is likely to be both 
unfair and ineffective. I have, however, too 
much respect for Stumpf to be consciously un- 
fair, and too serious a concern for my own posi- 
tion to be consciously ineffective. My general 
impression is as I have stated ; and I believe that, 
if you read Stumpf's paper for yourselves, you | 
will come to the same conclusion. At all events, 
the appeal in these two cases lies, frankly, to 
psychophysics. So it does also in the third 
argument, if that is relevant. Psychologically, 
the fusion of the octave, under the most favour- 
able conditions, is analysable into its two con- 
stituent tones : here, then, is no analogy. Psy- 
chologically, the blends of taste and smell are 



THE SPECIAL SENSES 99 

not analysable; the most experienced psycholo- 
gist cannot tell, by introspection, that the 'taste' 
of his coffee is partly taste and partly smell. 
Only by psychophysical procedure — by hold- 
ing the nose, or what not — can the components 
in the blend be separated. In other words, it 
is only as subject-matter of psychophysics that 
the taste-smell blend may be termed a fusion. 
And the analogy that it affords to the fusion of 
colour and agreeableness of colour is, therefore, 
a psychophysical analogy. There remains the 
possibility that we may some day isolate the 
pleasure-organs of vision as we have already iso- 
lated the pain-organs of the skin. How serious 
that is, I leave you to judge for yourselves. 

My objection is not by any means to psycho- 
physics as such. I do object, however, to the 
basing of a psychological argument upon a 
speculative psychophysics. And we have a 
peculiar right to object, in the present instance, 
because Stumpf promised us a descriptive psy- 
chology. " Wir wollen nicht," he says, '' Behaupt- 
ungen uber die anatomischen Gebilde oder die 
physiologischen Prozesse aufstellen, die den 
sinnlichen Gefiihlen zugrunde liegen."^^ What 
else, then, is he now doing ? His text stands as 
I have given it ; psychological considerations are 
relegated to a footnote. In the text, Stumpf has 



100 GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

accepted the inseparability of colour and agree- 
ableness of colour as a fact ; in the note, he cites 
four cases which appear to tell against the fact, 
— though he himself practically reduces them to 
two. Scripture infers, from his experiments on 
association of ideas, that feeling may stand alone 
in consciousness ; but the results, we are told, 
admit of very various interpretations. Vogt 
reaches the same conclusion by way of his method 
of hypnotic suggestion; ''iiber die Brauchbar- 
keit dieser Methode," says Stumpf, ''habe ich 
kein Urteil." There remain Kiesow's investi- 
gation of the taste-feelings, in which sensible 
was paralleled by affective discrimination, and 
Stumpf's own work with beating and dissonant 
tones. Kiesow, however, was simply attempt- 
ing a quantitative form of the method of im- 
pression ; and Stumpf 's experiences simply illus- 
trate the occurrence of affective habituation or 
adaptation. ^^ 

We are still only on the threshold of the dis- 
cussion. The essential thing in Stumpf 's view, 
you remember, is not that colour and agreeable- 
ness of colour should be separable in sensation, 
but that they should be separable in idea. He 
clearly sees — no doubt, he saw very early in 
the course of this inquiry — that the agreeable- 
ness and disagreeableness of tone and colour, 



IS THERE AN AFFECTIVE IMAGE? 101 

taste and smell, cannot possibly be constituted 
a class of sensations in the ordinary meaning of 
that term, — cannot possibly be put on a level 
with pain and tickle and itch. The psycho- 
physical hypotheses which I have just been 
criticising are therefore introduced to explain 
how two mental processes, possibly separate in 
idea, may be altogether inseparable in sensa- 
tion. If the explanation is accepted, if we waive 
the objection that something which is termed 
a sensation cannot be separately sensed, then we 
are free to enter upon the argument which will 
lead us through separateness in idea to the theory 
of central concomitance. You see, I hope, how 
pivotal those psychophysical hypotheses were, 
although Stumpf brings them in as it were paren- 
thetically, by way of excursus. A little specula- 
tive physiology — and we are prepared to revise 
our definition of sensation, and to look for proof 
of sensory character in the realm of ideas ! 

This whole question of ideation, or (to put it 
in more elementary terms) of the existence of an 
affective image, is very thorny. More than a 
decade ago I argued, as against Ribot, that there 
is no such thing as affective reproduction, but 
only affective renewal or revival. ^^ I should 
argue to the same effect to-day, though wnth 
greater caution in statement and with less as- 



102 GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

surance of carrying conviction. For before the 
question can be settled, we must, I think, know 
a great deal more than we do of sense-imagery, 
and particularly of the range of images of organic 
sensations. In an early number of Wood- 
bridge's Journal I gave an account of my own 
organic images, such as they are; expressed 
myself as rather sceptical of any great freedom or 
variety of organic imagery in general ; and urged 
the importance of further work.^^ Let me repeat 
here that further work — systematic observa- 
tion by competent observers — is badly needed. 
Stumpf, now, takes a positive attitude, while 
he admits the fact of individual differences. 
"Die Schmerz- und Lustempfindungen, die 
durch Hautreizungen oder durch die Tatigkeit 
der vegetativen Organe bedingt sind, hinterlassen 
zweifellos auch Gedachtnisbilder, blosse Vorstel- 
lungen.'' ^^ He is apparently speaking from 
personal experience, since he says later: ""auch 
mir scheint z. B. die Vorstellung eines Stich- 
schmerzes moglich, und zwar mit dem Charak- 
ter einer reproduzierten Vorstellung in dem- 
selben Sinne, wie wir von Farben- und Tonvor- 
stellung reden." ^^ I wish that we had been 
given more details. The passage from which the 
first quotation is taken goes on to point out the 
occurrence of hallucinations of pain, — another 



i 



IS THERE AN AFFECTIVE IMAGE? 103 

subject, surely, which invites psychological in- 
vestigation. The paragraph ends, rather curi- 
ously, with the words, ''ahnliches auch bei den 
Vorstellungen der Wollustigen." I say 'curi- 
ously,' because the words ought to mean that the 
voluptuary has images, or even hallucinations, of 
his own lust-sensations, whereas it seems obvious 
that the images must be images of some voluptu- 
ous situation, and that lust itself is present, not 
as image, but as sensation. 

On the topic of what I should call the affective 
image proper, the image or reproduced idea of the 
agreeableness and disagreeableness that attach to 
scents and colours and tones, Stumpf's attitude 
is similarly positive. He speaks again from 
personal experience; the affective image which 
accompanies the memory-image of a major 
triad or of a Bocklin picture seems to him to 
be distinct and vivid. ^^ Since he says on the 
same page, ''natiirlich miissen die Falle, in 
denen offenbar Denktatigkeiten und Affekte mit 
im Spiele sind, wie das Wohlgef alien an einer 
Melodic oder einem Bildwerk, beiseite bleiben,'' 
we must suppose that he is, in reality, thinking 
of the constituent tones in the chord and the con- 
stituent colours in the picture, not of the chord as 
harmony and the picture as work of art. He 
further remarks that these affective images ''sehr 



104 GEFiJHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

leicht in Gefiihlsempfindungen iibergehen^' ; that 
is, that we are ordinarily liable in their case to 
affective hallucinations, such as occur only occa- 
sionally in the case, e.g.^ of peripheral pain. 
If you ideate the sound of a friend's voice, or of 
a musical chord, the affective quality may be 
as vivid as in actual hearing, while the tonal 
quality has all the marks of a representation. 

There are, then, images of the agreeableness 
and disagreeableness which come with the sensa- 
tions of the higher senses. They are fleeting; 
to illustrate them, Stumpf has to cite complex 
ideas like those of a chord or a picture : ^^ but 
they exist. Now, then, we may raise the critical 
question, and ask whether colour image and im- 
age of agreeableness are separable, — whether, as 
we put it just now, a colour and its agreeableness 
are separate in idea. 

We need not expect, Stumpf says, that the 
separation will be easy. Think of odours : 
the people who have smell-images can rarely 
evoke them without at the same time evoking 
the memory picture of the flower or fruit or what- 
ever it is that the scent connects with in sensation. 
"Ich selbst kann mir u. a. den Heliotropgeruch 
gut vorstellen, aber nur unter dieser Bedingung.'' 
The separation, then, will be difficult: only, it 
should not be impossible.^^ 



COLOURS AND TONES 105 

Let us look at the senses in order. For most 
men, the smgle colour and the single tone are, in 
sensation, practically indifferent. ''Es wird uns 
oft reclit scliwer, zu sagen, ob eine Farbe mehr 
angenehm oder mehr unangenehm ist, oder ob 
sie angenehmer ist als eine andere." ^^ Indi- 
vidual organisation and temporary disposition 
may afford exceptions to this rule: "aber im 
ganzen sind die rein sinnlichen Gef tihlswirkungen 
isolierter Farben (einschliesslich der Graunu- 
ancen) und isolierter Tone (einschliesslich der 
Gerausche) relativ gering." I think that Stumpf, 
even with the allowances that he makes, is here 
arguing too schematically. No doubt, a patch 
of red on the book-shelf and the sound of middle 
C from the piano, as they break into our everyday 
consciousness, leave us '^most uncommon calm." 
But many men — Wundt is an example, among 
psychologists — are extraordinarily sensitive to 
the affective value of single colours and single 
tones ; and one is surprised that Stumpf himself 
should so lightly brush aside the TongeJiXhle. 
Again, when colours and tones are presented 
methodically, as by the serial method or the 
method of paired comparisons, it is the ex- 
ception that they are indifferent; the rule is 
definitely the other way. Perhaps, however, 
this is what Stumpf has in mind, when he 



106 GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

refers to ^'augenblickliche Nervendisposition/' 
as he may have Wundt and himself in mind when 
he refers to ''individuelle Organisation." Take, 
then, more obvious cases. If isolated patches 
of colour and isolated tones are usually indiffer- 
ent, what of masses of colour: the carmine or 
purple or orange sweep of an uniformly coloured 
sunset sky ? the high blue of a tropical sea, the 
white of extended snow, the yellow-brown of a 
sandy shore, the dull lead or slate of lake or 
ocean ? I am not thinking of landscape and sea- 
scape, of emotion and reflection, but of the col- 
ours themselves, given sensibly to the eye. And 
what of certain noises : harsh, rough, grating, 
scraping, crunching, sickening noises ? Surely, 
there is case upon case, instance upon instance, 
in which colours and sounds possess a high degree 
of agreeableness or disagreeableness. Stumpf 
ignores them all, and concludes that the affective 
tone is too weak, in sensation, to come separately 
into consciousness as idea. But — cannot weak 
sensations, then, be ideated ? Fechner believed 
and Ebbinghaus believes that you can ideate the 
just noticeable sensation and the just noticeable 
difference between sensations ; ^^ is there any- 
thing weaker.^ And apart from that, which is 
a technical matter, is it not a fact of daily expe- 
rience that weak sensations may be imaged ? 



TASTE AND SMELL 107 

Think now of a diminuendo on the violin, of the 
faint anticipatory glow of a rising moon, of the 
suspicion of a breath of garlic in a savoury salad : 
if you have images in these sense-departments at 
all, you will have no difficulty in imaging such 
weakest sensations. 

Stumpf , nevertheless, has disposed of sight and 
hearing. He turns to taste and smell, and first 
of all quotes Nagel's very definite statement with 
regard to smell. ''So leicht es mir ist," we read 
in the Handbuch, " das mit einer Geruchsemp- 
findung verbundene Lust- oder Unlustgefuhl 
zu reproduzieren, so unmoglich ist es beziiglich 
der eigentlichen Geruchsqualitat." ^^ The state- 
ment is definite, but none the less ambiguous; 
for the term 'reproduction' may cover a multi- 
tude of possible experiences. Stumpf finds, by 
personal inquiry, that Nagel's 'reproductions ' are 
always mediated by association ; Nagel can call 
up, e,g,^ the agreeableness of the smell of tar, 
without reproducing that odour itself, but the 
pleasantness appears to depend "auf den, wenn 
auch unbewussten, Nachwirkungen von Schif- 
fahrtserlebnissen." ^^ The revised statement is 
not wholly clear ; but Stumpf concludes that the 
feeling in question is rather a mood, a Stim- 
mung, than an elementary GefUhlsempJindung, 
and so rules it out of the discussion. Nagel's 



108 GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

reproductions of the disagreeableness of odours 
are always connected with other images (the 
disagreeableness of ammonia, e.g., with prick- 
ing and stinging in the nose), so that they furnish 
no proof of separability in idea. And notice 
that, all through, we have no strict guarantee of 
the arousal of an affective image; Nagel's 're- 
productions' may very well be renewals, rein- 
statements of feeling, — what Stumpf calls ' hal- 
lucinations/ 

That is all that we hear about smell. As for 
taste, Stumpf suggests that the mere sight or 
name of oysters may arouse in the epicure 
^'einen Anflug des korperlichen Wohlbehagens, 
das sonst mit dem Genuss verkniipft ist, ohne 
dass der Geschmack selbst ihm zum Be- 
wusstsein kommt." ^^ It might, of course, be 
objected that the feeling in this case is not sepa- 
rately ideated ; it is ideated along with visual sen- 
sations, the sight of the shell-fish or of the printed 
word. Stumpf replies, and from his standpoint 
justly, that at all events the feeling is ideated 
separately from the taste, and that that is the 
important point. ^^ However, he invalidates his 
own example in a way that, I confess, I should 
not have thought of: ''es ist mir nicht sicher,'' 
he says, ''dass das namliche Gefiihl, wie es an 
die Geschmacksempfindung oder Geschmacks- 



FEELING OR EMOTION? 109 

vorstellung gekniipft ist, audi die blosse Gesichts- 
vorstellung begleitet"; " he is not sure that the 
affective image aroused by sight is the same affec- 
tive image that accompanies taste. My own 
objection would be, again, that there is no evi- 
dence of affective image, but only of affective 
reinstatement. Be this as it may, we hear no 
more of taste. 

In his eagerness for further instances, Stumpf 
quotes the colour-feelings aroused in the artist 
by the sight of an etching, the feelings which 
attach to poetic expressions, and various expe- 
riences of himself and of his co-workers in the 
sphere of tones, — feelings accompanying the 
sight of musical phrases and harmonies and 
rhythms, the effort to recall a modulation, the 
mere thought of the tone-colour of different 
pianos. ^^ Now it is perfectly clear that in most 
of these cases we are dealing, not with the affec- 
tive tone of sensation, but with something much 
more complicated, — with Affekt or Gemuts- 
bewegung. Stumpf, it is true, avers that the 
look of a ''nichtswiirdige Tonverbindung " gives 
him ''einen Stich" of sensory disagreeableness, 
and that the look of ''langgehaltene konsonante 
Akkorde" affects him in somewhat the same way 
as a warm bath. But it is, surely, very difficult 
to think that we are here in presence of anything 



110 GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

else than aesthetic feelings, — feelings that, from 
long and expert familiarity with the subject- 
matter, have the promptness and immediacy of 
sense-feelings, but that nevertheless are in origin 
aesthetic. How can you tell, by eye, that a Ton- 
verbindung is nichtswurdig, save as the result of 
musical training? The Tonverbindung is not 
a sensation, and no amount of practice can make 
it a sensation. And how can you recognise 
long-drawn consonant chords in the musical 
score ? Not by sensation. Stumpf , however, is 
very far from dogmatic. ^'Alle diese Beobach- 
tungen fiihre ich mit einer gewissen Reserve an, 
da in Fallen, wo die Tonvorstellung nicht merk- 
lich ist, doch auch das sinnliche Gefiihl meist nur 
fliichtig und schwer zu fassen ist," and contrari- 
wise.^^ Affective image, that is, is at least very 
largely a function of tonal image; clear-cut 
separation of the two is doubtful. 

I conclude, then, — I have no choice but to 
conclude, — that the proposed demonstration of 
the separateness, in idea, of sensation and sense- 
feeling has broken down. There is no atom of 
reliable evidence. Remember that the refusal 
to consider the 'higher' feelings, the rigorous 
restriction of the argument to the isolated, single 
sensation, are Stumpf's refusal and Stumpf's 
restriction, not the critic's. Stumpf marked out 



THE DUALISTIC THEORY 111 



his own ground; and though, in my judgment, 
he has more than once shifted his position,^^ 
he finds himself obliged to retire. He retires, 
however, with a very clever riposte. There are 
psychologists, he says, — Kulpe is one of them, 
— who posit a simple duality of feeling, a single 
quality of pleasantness and a single quality of 
unpleasantness. Now we have seen that cu- 
taneous pain, which is unpleasantness, may be 
isolated and imaged ; and we have seen that the 
cutaneous pleasure-sensations may be isolated 
and imaged. Ergo, these psychologists must 
admit, in general, the possible occurrence of the 
separate affective image as of the separate affec- 
tion itself ; when they reproduce the unpleasant- 
ness of a bad smell, they have an image of 
cutaneous pain ; and if they wish to know, pre- 
cisely, what the unpleasantness of a bad smell is, 
per se, they have only to isolate a cutaneous 
pain-sensation.^^ It is needless to work out the 
reply. Pain and itch, for these psychologists 
as for Stumpf himself, are sensations. Only, 
for that very reason, they are not affections. 
Stumpf has covered his retreat ; but we must not 
let ourselves be blinded to the essential thing, — 
the fact that he has retreated. 

Now^ for the rally ! Stumpf rallies — on what ? 
on descriptive psychology ? Not at all ! — on 



112 GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

psychophysics. Our principle of scientific econ- 
omy forbade us to make a separate class for the 
affective elements unless the facts positively 
constrained us to that conclusion. Now let us 
grant that the agreeableness of colours and tones 
and scents is separable from the colours and tones 
and scents themselves neither in sensation nor in 
idea. We are not really forced to the admis- 
sion ; but let us bow to the equivocal nature of 
the evidence, and make it. Are we thereby con- 
strained to recognise the independence of the 
affective process ? Surely not : the purporting 
affective element may still be a concomitant or 
accessory sensation of central origin. ^^ The 
central physiological mechanism may be of 
such a kind that the excitation of colour-feeling 
necessarily implies the coexcitation of colour- 
sensation. This view becomes, indeed, physio- 
logically probable if we assume, as many do, 
that the feeling-qualities of any one sense-de- 
partment are different from the feeling-qualities 
of the rest, that the colour-feelings and the tone- 
feelings are qualitatively distinct. Ebbinghaus, 
who places the affective elements in a class of 
their own, nevertheless regards them, physio- 
logically, as ''Nebenwirkungen derselben Ur- 
sachen, die den begleitenden Empfindungen und 
Vorstellungen zugrunde liegen." ®^ It is but 



SUMMARY 113 

a short step from this to the view that makes 
them sensations, ''zentrale Mitempfindungen/' 
To appreciate this final stand, we must look 
back over Stumpf s whole essay. He started 
out on a question of descriptive psychology; 
we were to hear nothing of genetic psychology 
or of psychophysics. He began by examining 
three of the alleged criteria of affection — the 
three that he himself took to be the most note- 
worthy — and found them wanting. He then 
turned to the consideration of the sense-feelings 
in detail; dealing first with pain, and the cu- 
taneous and vegetative pleasures, and secondly 
with the 'affective tone' of the remaining senses. 
He had no difficulty in showing that pain, itch, 
tickle, lust, and so forth are sensational in 
character, — though, as I pointed out, his inter- 
pretation leaves many facts out of account (the 
varying pleasantness and unpleasantness of itch, 
the possible pleasantness of pain, etc.). He 
had no particular difficulty, on the side of pain, 
with the affective tone of intensive sensations of 
the other senses, — though I showed that there 
were distinct difficulties on the side of pleasure. 
His real difficulty, the difficulty which he himself 
feels and acknowledges, arose in connection 
with the affective tone of moderately and weakly 
intensive sensations of sight and sound, taste 



114 GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN j 

and smell. And this difficulty, insurmountable 
on the plane of descriptive psychology, is twice 
avoided by appeal to speculative psychophysics. 
Now, then, if I ask you: 'What is Stumpf's 
psychological evidence for the existence of a 
class of Gefiihlsempfindungen which shall replace 
the affective elements of current psychology?' 
— what have you to reply ? Stumpf offers his 
whole article in evidence. I grant that the article 
is subjectively persuasive and objectively im- 
portant; otherwise I should not have devoted 
this hour to its criticism. But I affirm that, when 
critically reviewed, it contains no stronger evi- 
dence than the principle of economy and the 
demonstration that, as our knowledge of nerve- 
physiology goes, the existence of centrally excited 
accessory sensations is a psychophysical possi- 
bility. The persuasiveness of the essay, then, 
I discount altogether. Its objective importance 
lies, I think, not in what it has shown, but in the 
example which it has set. Stumpf lends the 
weight of his name to a sensationalistic theory of 
affection ; and we may expect in the near future, 
both from adherents and from opponents of that 
theory, an industrious collection of psychological 
facts, psychological observations, which will 
finally sway the balance in the one direction or 
in the other. 



APPLICATIONS 115 

However, the proof of the pudding is in the 
eating. Stumpf adds a final section, in which he 
deals with 'applications' of his psychophysical 
theory.^ In the domain of sensation we have, 
he says, well-developed methods and well-estab- 
lished results. If, then, we can only bring our- 
selves to look upon affections as sensations, we 
can attack them directly by sensation-methods, 
and can check or control our data by sensation- 
results. In particular, we may expect by this 
means to bring light into the dark places of 
genetic psychology.^ 

The point is well taken. If, as a matter of 
fact, the theory of central concomitant sensations 
helps us to a stable affective psychology, then let 
us welcome it gladly, without waiting to ask 
whether its foundation is in psychology or in 
physiology, and whether its author has or has 
not adduced at the outset valid arguments in its 
favour. A good working hypothesis is valuable 
for its own sake, and the facts whose discovery it 
assures soon become strong enough to furnish 
the required corrective. Stumpf, now, devotes 
seven pages — one-seventh of his whole paper — 
to the test of the theory from this point of view. 
Let us see what the outcome is. 

In the first place, Stumpf points out that the 
theory accounts for the various analgesias, for 



116 GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

the cases of anaesthesia in which pain-sensation 
persists, and for the occurrence of ' unnoticeable ' 
sensations of pain and pleasure, — sensations 
which are above the limen of stimuhis but below 
the limen of attention.^® As we agree that pain, 
itch, tickle, etc., are sensations, we have no 
quarrel with him on their behalf. It need only 
be said that his theory has, here, no advantage 
of any kind over the orthodox affectional theory. 
Secondly, Stumpf instances the fact of 'indif- 
ferent ' sensations. An affectional theory, he says, 
has, by a sort of a priori necessity, to postulate 
the presence of affective process in conscious- 
ness, even where introspection is unable to dis- 
cover it, — witness Lotze's doctrine of the '^ All- 
gegenwart der Geftihle." If, on the other hand, 
that process is an accessory sensation, "'so liegt 
nicht der mindeste Grund vor, warum eine solche 
Begleitung vollig allgemein und ausnahmslos den 
Empfindungen zukommen miisse"; while we 
can readily understand how it comes about that 
extensive and intensive stimulation of any sort 
brings the accessory sensation into consciousness.®^ 
This argument, however, is unconvincing. An 
affectional theory is a theory of affective facts; 
and the fact that some sensations are indifferent 
is ordinarily explained by reference either to 
habituation or to insuflScient intensity of stimulus. 



APPLICATIONS 117 

It seems to me that there is small choice, on this 
topic, between the opposing views. One might 
argue, against Stumpf , that a concomitant sensa- 
tion which is rarely if ever isolable in conscious- 
ness, which can hardly be separated from its 
companion, whether as sensation or as image, 
ought a priori always to accompany its pair; 
and, indeed, I am inclined to think that this 
objection is stronger than that which Stumpf 
urges from the other side. Lotze's view is in- 
trospectively grounded, and may, perhaps, have 
been due to ''individuelle Organisation.''®^ 

Thirdly, Stumpf declares that his theory 
accords better than its rival with the facts of the 
dependence of affective tone upon the quality 
of sensation, as set forth, e.g., by Ebbinghaus.®^ 
I might reply that this dependence is itself in 
dispute ; Klilpe, e.g., denies it.^^ All that Stumpf 
could then assert would be that his theory accords 
with a particular view entertained by Ebbing- 
haus, — a view, be it remembered, which Ebbing- 
haus himself regards as compatible with an affec- 
tional theory. If, however, this is unduly to 
press the sense of the term 'dependence,' — 
though Ebbinghaus heads his section, ' Die 
seelischen Gefiihlsursachen " ! ^^ — and if Stumpf 
has in mind simply the factual connections of 
sensation and affection, then I do not see, and 



118 GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

Stumpf makes no effort to show, in what way his 
theory is superior. The facts are ''eine weitge- 
hende Konstanz, . . . aber doch wieder Aus- 
nahmen von dieser Regelmassigkeit." To say: 
''die Auffassung der Sinnesgefiihle als Mitemp- 
findungen . . . fiigt sich diesen Bedingungen 
ohne weiteres," as if there were something in the 
very nature of concomitant sensations that indi- 
cated a rule with salient exceptions, is of little 
avail; we must know in detail the conditions 
of the rule and the conditions of the exceptions. 

The argumentation on these two points is very 
much 'in the air.' It may well be the case that 
Stumpf has thought out his position with all 
necessary fulness, and that as he writes a crowd 
of confirmatory associations press in upon him. 
But the statements actually made are schematic 
to a degree. I have tried, working on the hints 
which Stumpf has earlier given, to think out a 
physiological mechanism that should behave, 
naturally and normally, as the substrate of the 
concomitant sensations is required to behave : 
but the deeper I go, the farther do I seem to 
travel from anything like our current conception 
of the substrate of sensation. 

There is a fourth point. Stumpf thinks that 
his theory brings us nearer than any other to 
an understanding of the vast and unsettled prob- 



APPLICATIONS 119 

lems of affective genesis, of the individual de- 
velopment and generic evolution of the sense- 
feelings, — and also of the related problem of the 
striking diversity of affective reaction to the same 
stimulus. '^^ He illustrates this thesis by reference 
to the senses of taste '^^ and hearing. ^^ As the 
psychology of tone is Stumpf's special field, and 
as he gives more space to hearing than to taste, 
I may confine myself to his discussion of the tonal 
feelings. 

We have at our disposal a mass of facts from 
history, from individual psychology, and from 
ethnography. We have also a number of facts 
gained from psychological experimentation : ''the 
existence and the peculiar character of the 'feel- 
ing of purity' with consonant intervals, the shift 
of this feeling within certain limits under the 
influence of aesthetic and other motives, as well 
as its dependence upon recently formed habits; 
the great secular changes as regards the pleasant- 
ness of consonances at large, the origin and de- 
velopment of the modern feeling of harmony, 
the possibility of its temporary annulment by 
intensive occupation with divergent tone-struc- 
tures." ^^ Now, Stumpf says, the theory of 
concomitant sensation gives us the right atti- 
tude to all these facts. For brief periods of time, 
the same stimuli will evoke a constant affective 



120 GEFUHLSEMPFINDUNGEN 

reaction ; but in long periods of time the sense- 
feelings are exposed to transforming influences, 
both of an individual and of a generic sort, more 
especially to the influence of habitual direction 
of attention, of disposition of judgment, of habits 
of all kinds. Let such factors operate through 
generations, and we may have inheritance, con- 
nate peculiarities of feeling-effect. These pecu- 
liarities are perhaps, in some instances, residua 
of sense-feelings which originally appeared in 
connection with emotions; and Stumpf here 
broaches a subject of fascinating interest, — the 
possibility of expert reconstruction of those 
emotions themselves. "Die Ausfiihrung muss 
freilich einer anderen Gelegenheit vorbehalten 
bleiben.'' ^« 

Here I am less inclined to criticise than to re- 
gret. We are given a skeleton, an outline — 
less than that : a bare suggestion of Stumpf 's 
doctrine of the 'Ton- und Musikgefiihle.' ^^ 
Would that we had the completed work ! Until 
that appears, it is hopeless to argue under this 
heading, whether for the affective element or for 
the concomitant sensation. 

The paper ends with a brief comment on the 
inadequacy of the teleological principle as a 
principle of explanation.^^ On this matter I 
not only agree with Stumpf, but I should even 



APPLICATIONS 121 

be inclined to go farther, and to rule the teleo- 
logical principle out of affective psychology 
altogether. — 

Has, then, this section on 'applications' shaken 
our previous conclusion ? My own feeling is that 
Stumpf's presentation would have been stronger 
without it. These brief and summary statements 
read like the formularies of a faith; their dog- 
matism stands in marked contrast to the careful 
and elaborate argument that has gone before. 
On the evidence, we must still say that the 
theory of concomitant sensation, as a psycho- 
logical theory, has little to commend it. When 
the evidence is all in, and the explanatory power 
of the theory has been tested along the whole 
line of observed fact, then I, for one, shall be 
ready to revise, and if necessary to reverse, this 
judgment. May the day come quickly that 
brings us the long-delayed volume on the Tonge- 
fithle ! 



IV 

THE TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 



LECTURE IV 

THE TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING * 

A LECTURER who had expounded Wundt's 
elementary doctrme of feeling in the year 
of grace 1893 would have called attention to two 
principal points : the status of feeling in con- 
sciousness, and the number and nature of the 
affective qualities. Feeling, Wundt says in the 
fourth edition of the Physiologische Psychologic^ 
is a third attribute of sensation, ''eine dritte 
Eigenschaft der Empfindung/' ''Neben In- 
tensitat und Qualitat begegnet uns mehr oder 
minder ausgepragt in jeder Empfindung ein 
drittes Element. . . . Wir nennen diesen drit- 
ten Bestandtheil der Empfindung den Gefiihlston 
oder das sinnliche Gefiihl.'' And feeling or 
affective tone ranges between qualitative oppo- 
sites, which ""wir als Lust- und Unlustgefuhle 
bezeichnen.'' Pleasantness and unpleasantness 
are the ultimate simple forms of sense-feeling, 
the irreducible qualities of the pure affective tone 
which is immanent in the simple sensation. At 
the same time, the terms ' pleasantness ' and ' un- 

* This Lecture has been printed in the American Journal of 
Psychology, April, 1908. 

125 



126 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

pleasantness' are not adequate to describe the 
affective tone of any and every sensation that we 
obtain by psychological analysis. The qualities 
of the higher senses, sight and hearing, play an 
important part in the compound ideas which 
appeal to the aesthetic side of our nature. Prob- 
ably for this reason, their affective colouring is 
approximately, anndhernd, identical with that of 
such compound ideas; they have taken on a 
Stimmungscharakter, "der nicht mehr schlecht- 
hin auf Lust und Unlust zuriickgefxihrt werden 
kann, sondern in andern, in gewissen Affecten 
deutlicher ausgepragten Gegensatzen einen ada- 
quateren Ausdruck findet/' Tones, e.g.^ may 
be grave or cheerful, colours may be calming 
or exciting. The passage from pure affective 
tone, pleasantness or unpleasantness, to these 
aesthetic, emotional shades of feeling may be 
traced through the series of the senses. Touch 
and the common sensations show pleasantness- 
unpleasantness with only a trace of ''qualitative 
Farbung''; tastes and smells are predomi- 
nantly pleasant or unpleasant, but nevertheless ad- 
mit of ''verschiedenartigere Gefuhlsfarbungen." 
Tones and colours, which are strongly pleasant 
or unpleasant to children and savages, have al- 
most lost these attributes for the civilised adult, 
— though even for us the seriousness of deep 



THE THEORY OF 1893 127 

tones and of black surfaces leans towards un- 
pleasantness, and the excitement of high tones 
and of white towards pleasantness, — and have 
assumed an affective colouring whose general 
affinity to pleasantness-unpleasantness is, in 
extreme cases, proved only by its movement 
between qualitative opposites/ 

That, then, was Wundt's doctrine, taken at the 
purely descriptive level: sensations with an 
immanent attribute of pleasantness-unpleasant- 
ness, the original simplicity of which appears 
clearly enough in the lower sense-departments, 
but in the higher is obscured by aesthetic or quasi- 
sesthetic reference. 

Now suppose that, as the novelists say, three 
years have elapsed, and that the same lecturer 
is discussing the same subject in 1896. He has 
in his hands the first edition of Wundt's Grund- 
riss der Psychologie. And there he reads of 
''zwei Arten psychischer Elemente, die sich als 
Producte der psychologischen Analyse ergeben, 
. . . Empfindungselemente oder Empfindungen 
[und] Gefiihlselemente oder einfache Gefiihle.'" 
The constitutive attributes (''unerlassliche Be- 
stimmungsstiicke") of sensation are quality and 
intensity. Affection, too, possesses these attri- 
butes. But there is a difference. While sensible 
qualities are limited by maximal differences, 



128 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

affective qualities range between maximal oppo- 
sites. While the number of sensible qualities is 
fixed, by the differentiation of the sense-organ, 
the number of affective qualities is indefinitely 
large; for simple feelings are the subjective 
complements, not only of simple sensations, 
but also of compound ideas and of still more 
complicated ideational processes. And while 
sensations fall into a number of separate systems, 
there is but one affective system ; tone and colour, 
warmth and pressure, are disparate, but ''alle 
einf achen Gefiihle bilden eine einzige zusammen- 
hangende Mannigfaltigkeit, insofern es kein 
Gefiihl gibt, von dem aus man nicht durch 
Zwischenstufen und Indifferenzzonen zu irgend 
einem andern Gefiihle gelangen konnte/' 

Do, then, all these many affective elements 
fall within ''dem allgemeinen Rahmen einfacher 
Lust und Unlust" ? By no means ! There are 
three Hauptrichtungen der Gefiihle, three di- 
mensional categories, "innerhalb deren unend- 
lich viele einf ache Qualitaten vorkommen." 
These are pleasantness-unpleasantness, excite- 
ment-inhibition or excitement -tranquillisation, 
and tension-relaxation. As a rule, Wundt says, 
psychologists have paid regard only to pleasant- 
ness and unpleasantness, and have relegated the 
other two affective classes to the emotions. 



THE THEORY OF 1896 129 

But as emotions arise from the combination of 
feelings, the fundamental types of emotion must 
be preformed, vorgehildet^ in the affective ele- 
ments.^ 

In cases like this, I always want to trace the 
motive. Like the lawyer in David Copper- 
field, I assume that in all such cases there is a 
motive. What was it, then, that led Wundt to 
his change of opinion ? 

If my reading of Wundt is correct, the changes 
that he has made, from time to time, in his 
various systematic works have never been due, 
in any real way, to external causes, but have 
always represented the climax or culmination of 
a stage of internal development. The germs 
of the changes are invariably, I think, to be found 
in the prior Wundt, and the changes themselves 
are but the full and self-conscious maturity of 
ideas that had long been 'incubated,' had long 
been held in the obscure margin of consciousness. 
On the other hand, it is possible, at least in most 
cases, to point with a fair degree of probability 
to the external cause that brought these obscure 
ideas to the attentive focus. In the present in- 
stance, that external cause appears, very obvi- 
ously, in the publication of Kiilpe's Grundriss. 
Let me be clear on this matter, even if I am repe- 



130 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

titious ! I believe that Wundt would have for- 
mulated his new affective theory in any event; 
the theory was implicit in him and in his pre- 
vious writings. If Kiilpe had not given the 
touch that led to crystallisation, some one else 
would, sooner or later, have performed the same 
office. In fact, however, Kiilpe undoubtedly did 
furnish the external stimulus, — so that, indeed, 
we have to thank him, not only for his own 
Grundriss^ but in a certain special and limited 
sense for Wundt 's as well.^ 

Let me take you, now, to the first edition of the 
Physiologische Psychologic^ the edition of 1874. 
In general, the exposition is very like the exposi- 
tion of 1893. But, in 1893, we are told that the 
affective tone of sensations of the higher senses 
is a Stimmungscharakter^ a colouring that they 
have 'taken on' in virtue of their constant par- 
ticipation in aesthetic ideas. In 1874, the ref- 
erence to aesthetics comes at the end of the dis- 
cussion; the fact that sight and hearing have 
freed themselves of sense-pleasurableness and 
sense-unpleasurableness fits them to serve as 
elements in aesthetic effect. They are not grave 
and dignified and happy and cheerful because 
they have been aesthetically employed, but their 
gravity and cheerfulness are what enables us to 
employ them with aesthetic result. ^'Lust und 



THE THEORY OF 1874 131 

Unlust," Wundt concludes, ''sind, wie es scheint, 
nur die von der Intensitdt der Empfindung her- 
riihrenden Bestimmungen, walirend an die Quali- 
tdten Gegensatze anderer Art gekniipft sind, 
welche zwar zuweilen in eine gewisse Analogic 
mit Lust und Unlust sich bringen lassen, an 
sich aber doch von diesen letzteren nicht beriihrt 
werden." Here is the doctrine of the plurality 
of affective dimensions plainer and more definite 
than it was twenty years later ; here is, evidently 
enough, the germ of the doctrine of 1896.^ 

Once more : the chapter from which I have 
been quoting is entitled, in 1893, ''Gefiihlston 
der Empfindung," — in 1874, ''Sinnliche Ge- 
fuhle/' Is not that significant also ? Affection, 
in 1874, is not an attribute of sensation; it ap- 
pears in that role for the first time in 1880, 
Affection, in 1874, is a relation, the relation 
which sensation sustains to consciousness at 
large. ''Als ein nach Qualitat und Intensitat 
bestimmter Zustand ist die Empfindung nur im 
Bewusstsein gegeben ; in Wirklichkeit existirt sie 
daher auch immer nur in ihrer Beziehung zu 
demselben. Diese Beziehung nennen wir das 
sinnliche Gefuhl/' ^ 

Clearlv, then, the whole of the new affective 
theory is implicit in the original edition of 
Wundt's great work. So far from suddenly 



132 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 



GROSSE KLANGSTARKE 



Klange mit tiefen Obertonen. Klang^e mit tiefen und Klange mit hohen Obertonen, 

hohen Obertonen. 



Tiefe Tone.i 



.,Hohe Tone. 



Klange mit tiefen Obertonen. 



Klange mit tiefen und 
holien Obertonen. 



Klange mit hohen Obertonen. 



GERINGE KLANGSTARKE 

Fig. 3. Wundt's Schema of the 'System der Klanggefiihle' : Physi- 
ologische Psychologie, 1874, 446. '* Jedem dieser Ton- und Klanggegen- 
satze entsprechen Contraste des Gefiihls, die allmalig durch vermit- 
telnde Zwischenstufen einem Indifferenzpunkt sich nahern, durch 
welchen sie in einander iibergehen. Den tiefen Tonen und Klangfarben 
zur hnken Seite entsprechen die ernsten, den hohen zur rechten die 
heiteren Stimmungen, bei grosserer Klangstarke sind alle Stimmungen 
mit einem gehobenen, energischen, bei geringerer Klangstarke mit 
einem gedampften, sanften Gefiihlston verbunden. Da zwischen den 
hier herausgegriffenen Strahlen alle moglichen Uebergange sich denken 
lassen, so kann man sich vorstellen, alle durch die Klangfarbe bestimmten 
Gefiihlstone seien in einer Ebene angeordnet, deren eine Dimension, dem 
Continuum der einfachen Tone entsprechend, die Contraste von Ernst 
und Heiterkeit mit ihren Uebergangsstufen enthalte, wahrend die zweite, 
welche die Starke der Theiltone abmisst, die Gegensatze des Energischen 
und Sanften vermittelt." — Cf. ibid., ii., 1902, 327 f. 



THE THREE DIMENSIONS 133 

reversing his attitude to affective processes, he 
has, in reality, returned to his first systematic 
position. In other words, the problem with 
regard to Wundt is not so much that he now 
makes affection an independent element with a 
plurality of dimensions and qualities, as rather 
that he ever did anything else. This problem, 
too, can be solved ; but it is foreign to our pres- 
ent consideration. 

We are to examine, in this Lecture, the theory 
which I briefly outlined a moment ago on the 
basis of the Grundriss of 1896. The theory has 
been widely and variously discussed, and I can- 
not attempt to cover the w^hole of the relevant 
'literature.' I shall refer, for the most part, to 
the earliest statements of it, in the Grundriss 
of 1896 and the Vorlesungen of 1897, and to the 
latest systematic statement in the Physiologische 
Psychologie of 1902. 

First of all, then, how does Wundt arrive at 
his three affective dimensions ? How does he 
prove that there are three, and that these three 
are pleasantness-unpleasantness, excitement-in- 
hibition, and tension-relaxation ? Well ! his 
main reliance is on his own introspection. 
Wundt is a man of keen sensibility. He writes 
of feeling con amore; he is fond of quoting 



134 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 




rND|GOBll» 



Fig. 4. Wundt's Schema of the 'System der Farbengefiihle' : Physi- 
ologische Psychologie, 1874, 448. The affective opposition, "der einer- 
seits im Gelb, anders^its im Blau am starksten ausgepragt zu sein scheint, 
. . . ist der der Lebhaftigkeit und der Ruhe . . . Zwischen dem. Gelb 
und dem Blau gibt es aber zwei XJebergange : der eine durch das Grun, 
der andere durch die rothlichen Farbentone. ... In dem Roth und 
den ihm verwandten Farben ist die Bewegung des Gelb und die Ruhe 
des Blau zu einem zwischen Bewegung und Ruhe hin- und herwogenden 
Zustand der Unruhe geworden. Diese Vermittlung durch den Zwiespalt 
ist am deutlichsten in den blaurothen Farbentonen, wie im Violett, rep- 
rasentirt. Das Griin dagegen driickt ein wirkliches Gleichgewicht aus. 
Im Vergleich mit dem erstarrenden Blau und dem erregenden Gelb 
verbreitet es ein befriedigendes Ruhegef iihl. " These two modes of tran- 
sition make the series of simple colour-feelings a closed curve, analogous 
to the 'colour triangle.' "Mit Riicksicht auf ihre Bedeutung als Ueber- 
gangsstimmungen wird aber hierbei dem Griin angemessener das Violett 
als das Pur pur gegeniiberzustellen sein, und es werden dem entsprechend 
Roth und Indigoblau, Gelb und Blau einander gegeniiber zu Uegen kom- 
men. . . . Denken wir uns die den verminderten Sattigungsgraden der 
Farben bis zum Weiss entsprechenden Gefiihle ahnlich angeordnet, so 
bilden sie alle zusammen die von der Farbencurve umschlossene Ebene, 
in welcher der Punkt des Weiss die indifferente Stimmung bezeichnet, 
wie sie die einfache, weder durch besondere Starke oder Schwache des 
Lichts noch durch einen Farbenton modificirte Lichtempfindung hervor- 
bringt. Rings herum liegen die matteren und darum auch durch 
kiirzere XJebergange vermittelten Gefiihlstone der weissUchen Farben." 
"Fiir jede Farbe gibt es also drei XJebergange der Stimmung zu einer 
Farbe von entgegengesetztem Gefiihlston : der harmonische durch das 
ruhige Griin, der contrastirende durch das zwiespaltige Violett und der 
indifferente durch das gleichgiiltige Weiss." The complete schema of 
visual sensations is, however, tridimensional ; the vertical axis shows 
the colourless sensations aroused by the " Intensitatsgrade des Lichts." 
These have their own feelings. "Zwischen den Gegensatzen der Hellig- 
keit, dem ernsten Dunkel und dem heiteren Lichte, existirt nur der eine 
Uebergang durch das indifferente Weiss von mittlerer Helligkeit. In- 
dem die Lichtstarke der Farben zu- oder abnehmen kann, konnen sie 
auch an diesen Gefiihlstonen der Helligkeit Theil nehmen." — Cf. ibid., 
ii., 1902, 329 f. 



FEELING AND EMOTION 135 

Goethe's Farhenlehre ; feeling has played a 
larger and larger part in his psychological sys- 
tem as time went on ; as early as 1874 he had 
systematised, thrown into diagrammatic form, 
his affective reactions to colours and tones. So 
the new theory appears in the Grundriss without 
preface or apology, — 'Svird einfach als Tat- 
sache eingefuhrt," Orth plaintively remarks,^ — 
takes its place in the exposition with all the 
assurance of established fact. Remembering 
its genesis, its deep-rooted and slow growth in 
Wundt's mind, we need not be greatly surprised. 
Wundt had said in 1874, ''Gelb . . . regt an, 
blau stimmt herab " ; and had emphasised 
^'das eigenthtimliche Geftihl des Aufmerkens^' 
which appears ''im Zustande des Besinnens 
oder der Spannung." ^ No doubt it seemed 
obvious to him in 1896 that the introspective 
evidence, though not expressed, would be un- 
derstood, — if indeed the thought of expression 
ever occurred to him. Now, after several years 
of criticism, he is more explicit; the Physiolo- 
gische Psychologie introduces the theory by way 
of definite introspective analysis.^ 

Even in the Grundriss, however, Wundt is not 
simply dogmatic. He explains (a) that a triple 
classification of the affective elements is required 



136 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

for the distinction of the fundamental types of 
emotion. Later on, it is true, he declares that 
a psychological classification of the emotions 
''nur auf die Qualitat des Gefiihlsinhaltes 
gegrtindet werden kann.'' The argument has | 
a circular look: affections are classified by 
reference to emotion, emotions by reference to 
affection. I think, however, that it is formally 
sound. Theoretically, emotions may be classi- 
fied by quality, by intensity, and by temporal 
course. In practice, intensity and temporal 
course fail to furnish reliable criteria : hence 
emotions must be classified by quality. Quali- 
tative analvsis then reveals certain fundamental 
types of emotion, which must, of course, be pre- 
formed in the affective qualities. Emotive classi- 
fication thus points us back to a particular 
classification of affections, while affective classi- 
fication, to be adequate, must necessarily point 
forward to emotion. Formally, this reasoning 
is rather a matter of what Fechner would call 
the 'solidarity' of a system than an instance of 
merely circular argumentation.^ Whether it is 
materially sound is another question, — a ques- 
tion which Stumpf, e.g,, would answer with an 
emphatic negative. ^^ 

Wundt also brings evidence of an objective 
sort, the evidence {h) derived from the method 



THE METHOD OF EXPRESSION 137 

of expression. He lays but slight stress on pulse- 
correlation in the Grundriss: "es ist unzulassig, 
die Ausdrucks- der Eindrucksmethode in Bezug 
auf ihren psyehologischen Werth gleichzuord- 
nen.'' ^^ In the Vorlesuiigen, too, the pulse- 
records are introduced to prove the physiological 
relationship of the 'lower' to the 'higher' feel- 
ings, some time before we reach the distinction 
of the three affective dimensions. ^^ It is not 
until 1900, in the Bemerkungen zur Theorie der 
Gefiihle^ that the changes in innervation of heart, 
vessels, and respiratory mechanism — ''ein tiber- 
aus feines Reagens auf die leisesten Aender- 
ungen der Starke wie Richtung der Gefiihle"^^ 
— are given anything like an independent place 
in Wundt's argument. Do not fear, now, that 
I shall plunge you into the technical intricacies 
of the expressive method, and that the remainder 
of the hour will be filled with sphygmograph and 
plethysmograph, pneumograph and dynamo- 
graph ! Even if that method came into our 
discussion, I could pass it over with the re- 
minder that, not so long ago, I gave a critical 
review of it from this platform. ^^ But it does 
not come into our discussion. Grant every- 
thing that the most ardent disciples of the 
method demand, and then ask yourselves : 
Where is the evidence, in these correlations, that 



138 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

we are dealing with elementary mental pro- 
cesses ? What have pulse-curves to say to the 
question of the irreducibility, the ultimateness 
in consciousness, of the experiences of excite- 
ment-inhibition, tension-relaxation ? Wundt him- 
self is careful, in psychological connection, to 
differentiate ''specifische Beschaff enheit " and 
''elementare Natur." ^^ How can pulse and 
breathing be relied upon to make the same dis- 
tinction ? ^® 

Let us, then, dismiss the expressive method, 
and come back to the Grundriss. Had Wundt 
stopped short at the point which we have now 
reached; had he stated his theory, shown its 
usefulness in systematic regard for the classifica- 
tion of emotions, and indicated the correlated 
differences in the pulse-tracings : his position 
would, I think, have been stronger than it actu- 
ally is. But he attempts, further, (c) to connect 
the three dimensions of affection with the three 
relations in which a given feeling may stand to 
the temporal course of mental processes at large. 
Pleasantness and unpleasantness denote a de- 
terminate modification of our present mental 
state; excitement and inhibition exert a de- 
terminate influence upon the next succeeding 
state; and tension and relaxation are qualita- 
tively determined by the preceding state. ''Diese 



TIME-RELATIONS OF FEELING 139 

Bedingungen machen es zugleich wahrschein- 
lich, dass andere Hauptrichtungen der Gefiihle 
nicht existiren." ^^ And yet — quality is the 
criterion for the classification of emotions, and 
the classification of the emotions requires three 
ultimate affective dimensions ! Here, surely, we 
have the fallacy of too many proofs ! Wundt, 
it is true, offers in the Bemerkungen a defence 
of his dual argument. ''Es handelt sich hier 
um Momente, die selbst wieder mit einander 
zusammenhangen : " '' [es] kommt hier tiberall 
nicht ein Verhaltniss von Ursachen und Wirk- 
ungen, sondern lediglich ein solches von Bezie- 
hungen und Bedingungen in Frage, die sich 
wenigstens vorlaufig durch eine voUstandige 
Analyse aus der Gesammtheit der complexen 
Bedingungen nicht isoliren lassen." ^^ If I un- 
derstand these passages aright, Wundt's meaning 
is as follows : ' Consciousness is always exceed- 
ingly complex, so that the affective processes are 
given in complex relations and appear as vari- 
ously conditioned. Causal analysis is, at pres- 
ent, beyond our powers. We can, however, 
trace certain relations and follow up certain 
part-conditions ; and our results, different or 
even incompatible as they may look, are really 
abstractions from — represent moments of — a 
single system of causal interrelations. Hence 



140 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

they may safely be set down side by side/ In 
the abstract, all this may be granted. Still, how- 
ever, I do not see, in the concrete, how the three 
affective dimensions can be guaranteed both by 
temporal relation to the course of consciousness 
and by qualitative differences in emotion. The 
latter are enough, in themselves : the former is, 
at the best, a matter of reflection, of analysis 
above the elementary level; and its obvious 
superfluity tends to cast doubt upon the results 
of qualitative analysis proper, with which it is 
brought into agreement. For the rest, it is 
significant that, in his later writings, Wundt has 
dropped this principle of temporal relation as a 
means of affective classification. 

In the Vorlesungen of 1897 a new principle 
makes its appearance. After distinguishing the 
three dimensions of pleasantness-unpleasant- 
ness, excitement-tranquillisation, tension-relaxa- 
tion, Wundt says : ''dass es noch andere Haupt- 
richtungen ausser diesen gebe, scheint mir nach 
der subjectiven Beobachtung nicht wahrschein- 
lich. Auch durften die genannten den allge- 
meinsten Bedingungen entsprechen, unter denen 
Gefiihle (iberhaupt entstehen.'' ^^ The dimen- 
sions are guaranteed first by introspection, and 
secondly (d) by the threefold character of 
affective conditions. The conditions are found 



THE CONDITIONS OF FEELING 141 

in the ^'Empfindungs- und Vorstellungsele- 
mente, an die [die Gefiihle] gebunden sind." ^^ 
Pleasantness-unpleasantness represent a quality- 
dimension ; excitement-tranquillisation, an in- 
tensity-dimension ; tension-relaxation, a time- 
dimension. "Die Bedeutung von Lust und 
Unlust als ' Qualitatsrichtungen ' liegt darin, dass 
vorzugsweise in ihnen die Wirkungen der quali- 
tativen Eigenschaften des gesammten Bewusst- 
seinsinhalts zum Ausdruck kommen": and 
similarly with the other two dimensions. ^^ In- 
trinsically, of course, every affection is a quality, 
qualitatively different from every other. But 
the affective qualities of the three dimensions 
reflect, express, are determined by the quality, 
intensity, and temporal properties of sensations 
and ideas. 

I am not here concerned with the correctness 
or incorrectness of Wundt's correlation. He has 
himself changed it, in the Physiologische Psy- 
chologie of 1902, where pleasantness-unpleasant- 
ness represents an intensive, and excitement- 
tranquillisation a qualitative dimension, ^^ — just 
the reverse of what was said in 1897. I am con- 
cerned with the correlation as a principle of 
classification. There are, Wundt declares, three 
general conditions of the arousal of feeling : the 
quality, the intensity, and the temporal relations 



142 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

of conscious contents. And the threefold char- 
acter of the conditions furnishes, along with 
introspection, evidence that there are but 
three dimensions of affection. What, then, has 
become of the spatial relations of conscious 
contents ? The chapter-headings of the Physi- 
ologische Psychologie tell us that Sinnes- 
vorstellu7igen are of three kinds : intensive, 
spatial, temporal. Spatial and temporal ideas 
may be grouped together as extensive ; intensive 
ideas differ from sensations by the composite 
nature of their intensity and quality.^^ These 
intensive ideas are therefore responsible for two 
affective dimensions, the intensive and qualita- 
tive; the temporal ideas are responsible for a 
third dimension, the temporal ; only the spatial 
ideas are excused from affective duty. I argue, 
then, in this way. In so far as affective classifi- 
cation is dependent upon the various forms of 
idea, in so far Wundt's classification is inade- 
quate ; for the spatial form of idea is as impor- 
tant, in the mental life, as the intensive or the 
temporal. ^^ And if there is no such thing as a 
spatial dimension of affective qualities, then we 
may justly doubt whether the principle of classi- 
fication is sound, and whether any conclusion as 
to the number of affective dimensions may be 
deduced from it. Remember, I am not arguing 



THE CONDITIONS OF FEELING 143 

on a matter of fact; I am considering the ap- 
plication of a principle. 

Wundt replies, in the Bemerkungen, that he 
has left spatial ideas out of account for two rea- 
sons : first, '' weil sich mir Beziehungen derselben 
zu bestimmten Gefiihlsrichtungen weder in der 
unmittelbaren subjectiven Beobachtung noch 
bei der Analyse der Ausdrucksbewegungen dar- 
boten;'' and secondly, ''weil es mir scheint, 
dass man sehr wohl bei jedem Affect qualitative, 
intensive und zeitliche Eigenschaften unter- 
scheiden kann, wahrend ich mit dem Ausdruck, 
der Zorn oder die Freude habe irgend eine 
raumliche Ausdehnung, keinen rechten Sinn zu 
verbinden weiss." ^^ The first of these arguments 
misses its mark for the reason that, in the 
Vorlesungen, the distinction of three general 
conditions of feeling, their connection with three 
forms of idea, is offered as additional evidence, 
over and above 'subjective Beobachtung,' for 
the finality of Wundt's classification. " Auch 
diirften die genannten Hauptrichtungen den 
allgemeinsten Bedingungen entsprechen, unter 
denen Gefuhle iiberhaupt entstehen." I object 
to Wundt that the one of his two criteria is in- 
valid, and he rejoins that the other is valid ! 
The second argument goes equally wide. I did 
not assert that an emotion possesses spatial 



144 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

attributes, that an affection may be ^extended/ 
but that certain ideas possess spatial attributes 
and relations, — and that, if we are classifying 
affections by reference to the forms of ideas, then 
these spatial characteristics must be taken into 
account, as well as the intensive, qualitative, and 
temporal. I use the phrase 'spatial dimension 
of affective qualities ' precisely as Wundt uses the 
phrase 'temporal dimension,' — to signify affec- 
tive qualities that are dependent upon ideational 
extension. I acquitted Wundt, just now, of the 
charge of circularity; I am afraid that I must 
here charge him with the logical error which is 
known in the vernacular as 'missing the point.' 
In sum, therefore, Wundt's three affective 
dimensions are supported, primarily, by his own 
introspection, while he has appealed, further, 
to the necessities of emotive classification ; to 
the results of the method of expression; to the 
temporal relations of the affective processes; 
and to their general conditions in consciousness. 
The first use of these arguments I take to be 
sound, both formally and materially, though I 
do not arrive by it at the conclusion which Wundt 
has reached. The second must be pronounced 
irrelevant ; the third has been given up by Wundt 
himself ; the fourth we have seen to be logically 
defective and psychologically indefensible. 



TERMINOLOGY 145 

We have now to consider the theory on the 
basis that remains for it : introspection of the 
simple sense-feelings and qualitative analysis of 
the emotions. I find a difficulty, at the outset, 
in Wundt's terminology. You may have been 
surprised that, when I have had occasion to 
mention Wundt's category of 'excitement,' I 
have paired it with 'inhibition' or 'tranquillisa- 
tion,' rather than with the more usual term 
'depression.' I have, throughout, been quoting 
Wundt's own words ; but it is true that, in the 
Grundriss, 'depressing' is given as an alterna- 
tive to 'tranquillising,' and that in the Physi- 
ologische Psychologie 'Depression' is suggested 
for the higher degrees of ' Beruhigung.' ^^ Wundt 
can, of course, do no more than take language 
as he finds it. But I think that his actual choice 
of words bears witness to a conflict, in his 
thought, between two purposes : the purpose 
of transcribing his introspections, and the pur- 
pose of maintaining the typical affective move- 
ment between opposites. Pleasantness and un- 
pleasantness. Lust and TJnlust, are opposite in 
name, as well as in nature. What of Spannung 
and Losung ? In English, ' relaxation ' — which, 
I suppose, is the nearest equivalent of Losung — 
suggests rather the remitting or resolving of 
tension than its qualitative opposite : this latter 



146 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

would be better expressed by 'relief/ Possibly 
Losung has for Wundt an implication of positive 
relief, of Erleichterung , — though it has not for 
me, nor for German friends of whom I have 
made inquiry. Wundt speaks also of the 
Befriedigung, the fulfilment, of expectation ; ^'^ 
but that term brings us perilously near to Be- 
ruhigung. The chief difiiculty, however, arises 
in connection with the remaining dimension. 
What is the opposite of Erregung ? Sometimes 
Wundt says Hemmung, sometimes he says 
Beruhigung, sometimes Depression. The an- 
tithesis Erregung -Hemmung comes from nerve- 
physiology ; ^^ Erregung-D expression comes, evi- 
dently, from observation of the emotions, normal 
and pathological ; Erregung -Beruhigung appears 
to be the analogue of Spannung-Losung and to 
convey the same suggestion. But what is, in 
introspection, the felt opposite of Erregung ? I 
cannot myself identify the feelings of Hemmung, 
Depression, Beruhigung ; I cannot feel them as 
degrees of the same thing, as lying in the same 
affective dimension ; I cannot always distinguish 
between Beruhigung and Losung, Erregung, 
^excitement,' seems to me to feel very differently 
in different contexts, to be an equivocal term. 
It is easy to say that such considerations are mere 
' Wortklauberei ' : but I am trying to express a 
real introspective difficulty. 



VARIANTS OF THE THEORY 147 

If, then, I am to judge others by myself, this 
uncertainty in the meaning of terms may be at 
least a partial reason for the fact that Wundt's 
classification, despite its claim to finality, does 
not always command the assent even of those 
who agree with its spirit and intention. Gure- 
witsch, e.g,, in his Theorie der sittlichen Gefilhle, 
makes a fourth affective category for Streben- 
Widerstrehen?^ Vogt, again, ranges feelings of 
activity and passivity alongside of pleasantness- 
unpleasantness, arousal-depression, tension-re- 
laxation.^^ Wundt identifies Strehungsgefuhl 
with Thdtigkeitsgefuhl, which he regards as a 
total feeling, compounded of strain and excite- 
ment.^^ Royce, on the other hand, is disposed 
to think that two dimensions — pleasantness- 
unpleasantness and restlessness-quiescence — are 
adequate to the facts of the affective life.^^ I 
do not at all mean that these differences of 
opinion are fatal to the theory. But they testify 
— do they not ? — to a lack of precise formula- 
tion. Royce throws tw^o of Wundt's dimensions 
into one; Vogt and Gurewitsch split the same 
two into three. 

The single dimension about which Wundt 
himself seems, from the first, to have felt no 
doubt is that of Spannwig-Losung. The other 
two dimensions, as I pointed out just now, have 



148 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

actually exchanged places in his system. And 
the same uncertainty characterises certain of 
his observations in detail. Let me give you an 
instance. In the Bemerkungen of 1900, Wundt 
writes: "ich wiisste . . ., wenn ich vor die 
Wahl gestellt ware, irgend einen dieser Ein- 
driicke dem andern vorzuziehen, absolut nicht 
zu sagen, ob mir das rein spektrale Blau oder 
das Roth . . . angenehmer sei." This does 
not mean that the two colours would be equally 
pleasant. ''Ich wiirde eben einem solchen Ver- 
langen immer nur die Aussage gegeniiberstellen 
konnen, dass diese Eindriicke an sich mit Lust 
und Unlust nichts zu thun haben." ^^ The 
passage is a little startling, when one remembers 
that work had already been done upon colours 
— and colours that were not spectral colours — 
by the method of impression ! ^^ Two years 
later, now, w^e have the following: ''wenn ich 
zuerst ein spektralreines leuchtendes Roth und 
dann ein ebensolches Blau im Dunkelraum 
betrachte, so kann ich nicht umhin, beide als 
im hohen Grad erfreuende, also lusterregende 
Eindriicke zu charakterisiren.'' ^ True, the sen- 
tence is concessive; the next begins with a 
'gleichwohl'; but it is, nevertheless, in flat con- 
tradiction to the former quotation. If two im- 
pressions are highly pleasant, they can be com- 



THE THREE DIMENSIONS 149 

pared as regards pleasantness, and a judgment 
of greater, less, or equal can be passed upon 
them. Similarly conflicting statements are made 
concerning liigh and low tones. ^^ I readily 
acknowledge, again, that these minor incon- 
sistencies are in no sense fatal to the theory; 
indeed, Wundt has so often emphasised the im- 
portance for feeling of the ''ganze Disposition 
des Bewusstseins " ^^ that I feel reluctant, as it 
were a morsel ashamed, to dwell upon them. 
Still, they are there ! And it is not reassuring to 
find that the dimension Spannung-Ldsu7ig owes 
its exceptional position, the stability of which I 
spoke above, to its systematic connection with 
the doctrine of apperception. It must have 
occurred to many of you, when, earlier in the 
Lecture, I was arguing the claims of space as a 
condition of feeling in consciousness, to ask : 
What, then, after all, are the claims of time ? 
Since, in the psychology of sensation, duration 
and extension are, both alike, to a very large 
extent equivalent to, interchangeable with, in- 
tensity, why should they not be bracketed with 
intensity as the conditions of one and the same 
affective dimension ? We should then have 
something like Royce's classification : pleasant- 
ness-unpleasantness, conditioned upon all the 
'qualitative' attributes of sensation, and ex- 



150 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

citement-quiescence, conditioned upon all the 
'intensive/ Now Wundt recognises the equiva- 
lence, under certain circumstances, of intensity 
and duration. ''Insbesondere kann die Lust- 
Unlustcomponente [bei langerer Einwirkung auf 
das Bewusstsein] ganz dieselben Veranderungen 
erfahren, die auch die Steigerung der Intensi- 
tat mit sich fuhrt." ^^ But feelings of Span- 
nung and Losung are ''die specifischen, fiir die 
Aufmerksamkeitsvorgange charakteristischen 
Elemente/' ^^ "Da aber Apperception und 
Aufnierksamkeit zeitlich sich entwickelnde Vor- 
gange sind, die zugleich in einer bestimmten 
zeitlichen Folge wechseln, indem jede Losung 
eine vorangegangene Spannung fordert, und 
eine neue Spannung wiederum nur auf Grund 
vorangegangener Losungen einsetzt, so sind 
diese Geftihlscomponenten enger als die iibrigen 
an den zeitlichen Ablauf der Bewusstseinsvor- 
gange gebunden." *^ Any serious doubt, there- 
fore, about Wundt's doctrine of attention and 
apperception must at the same time jeopardise 
this third dimension of simple feeling. 

So far, I have spoken only of the three affec- 
tive dimensions; I have said nothing of the 
multitude of elementary qualities which the di- 
mensions are held to include. "Die qualitative 



THE PLURALITY OF QUALITIES 151 

Mannigfaltigkeit der einfachen Gefiihle ist un- 
absehbar gross und jedenfalls viel grosser als die 
Mannigfaltigkeit der Empfindungen." ^^ So the 
Grundriss, — which proceeds to give two rea- 
sons. First, every sensation of the multidimen- 
sional sensation-systems belongs to more than 
one affective dimension. Secondly and more 
importantly, the feelings that attach to sensa- 
tion-complexes, intensive, spatial, and temporal 
ideas, and to certain stages in the temporal course 
of emotion' and volition, are nevertheless them- 
selves irreducible, and must therefore be counted 
among the elementary affective processes. You 
will notice that these reasons are phrased in the 
language of a special psychological system, 
though the appeal to introspection is implied. 
Later on, the appeal becomes explicit; we are 
reminded that, e.g,, the feeling of gravity, Ernst, 
^'in verschiedenen Fallen in seiner Qualitat 
wieder variiren kann.'' ^^ In the Vorlesungen, 
the doctrine of the multiplicity of affective quali- 
ties follows naturally from the doctrine of the 
TotalgefiXhl.'^^ The Physiologische Psychologie 
relies upon an 'aufmerksame Selbstbeobach- 
tung.'^^ We are apt to overlook the great variety 
of the feelings, partly because they are intimately 
bound up with the objective contents of con- 
sciousness, partly because we have no words to 



152 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

express them. ^^Angesiclits der [an der Hand 
des vergleichenden Verfahrens der Eindrucks- 
methode] ausgefiihrten Analyse sclieint es mir in 
liberwiegendem Masse wahrscheinlich, dass die 
sechs Grundformen . . . eben nur Grundformen 
sind, von denen jede einzelne eine sehr grosse 
Mannigfaltigkeit im ganzen verwandter, aber 
dabei doch von Fall zu Fall nuancirter Ein- 
zelgefiihle unter sich begreift." ^^ 

There can be no manner of doubt that, in this 
matter of the number of the affective qualities, 
the psychological pendulum has been swinging, 
of recent years, in the direction that Wundt has 
taken. Ladd emphatically repudiates the view 
that "'pleasure-pains' are exhaustive of the en- 
tire quality of the feeling-aspect of conscious- 
ness.'' The theory is simplicity itself: ''but 
simplicity, in the interests chiefly of biological 
and experimental psychology, 'gone entirely 
mad.'"^^ I do not know whether Ladd felt 
pleased or pained that he had written this last 
sentence, when two years later he read Wundt's 
Grundriss. He says himself, however, that 
"almost all mental states which are marked by 
strong feeling in the case of developed minds 
are mixed feelings." ^^ At any rate, he works 
resolutely through the sense-departments, in 
1894, and makes out a long list of elementary 



THE PLURALITY OF QUALITIES 153 

processes. James, in the same year, remarks 
that "there are mfinite shades and tones in the 
various emotional excitements, which are as dis- 
tinct as sensations of colour are, and of which 
one is quite at a loss to predicate either pleasant 
or painful quality." ^^ This position is, of 
course, entirely compatible with a dual view of 
Lust'Unlust, of ''the primary Gefuhlston'' \ in- 
deed, the two doctrines seem to me to appear, 
side by side, in James' own exposition. Never- 
theless, the passage may fairly be cited in the 
present connection. Lipps, again, working as 
it were from the opposite pole to Wundt, has 
arrived, as we all know, at a very complicated 
classification of the feelings. ^^ Stumpf has ex- 
pressed the opinion, as against Kiilpe, that 
"sinnliche Annehmlichkeit " and ''sinnliche Un- 
annehmlichkeit " cover ''cine grossere Mannig- 
faltigkeit von Geftihlsqualitaten." ^^ This array 
of convictions is imposing, even if there are 
authorities — Hoffding, Ktilpe, Jodl, Ebbing- 
haus, Lehmann, Rehmke ^^ — upon the other 
side. 

The fact is, of course, that the ultimate ques- 
tion of our second Lecture, the question of the 
criteria of affection, has not been settled. The 
parties to the present controversy do not really 
' feel ' differently ; but they approach the problem 



154 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

with a certain attitude towards affective process, 
with a certain general view of the status of feel- 
ings in consciousness. Ebbinghaus says outright 
that Wundt and Jodl, e.g., are 'not talking of the 
same things.' ^^ Orth believes that Wundt 's 
theory is the outcome ''seiner urspriinglichen 
Auffassung des Verhaltnisses zwischen Empfin- 
dung und Gefiihl." ^^ Ladd writes with a sort 
of ethical, even religious, atmosphere upon him : 
how can you compare the pleasure of cheese and 
beer with the pleasure of seeing a good Hamlet ? ^^ 
Lipps considers the feelings as modes of reference 
to the self; feelings are "Ichinhalte oder Ich- 
qualitaten."^^ Stumpf adopts a sensationalist 
view of the sense-feelings; and in sensation 
qualitative differentiation is obvious enough. 
James is concerned with the varieties of emotive 
experience, and his protest against the 'hack- 
neyed psychological doctrine' that pleasure and 
pain are the essence of emotion comports, as I 
have pointed out, with a strictly dualistic view 
of the affective qualities proper. It is not that 
our affective experience is radically different, but 
that we approach it from different directions, see 
it under different angles, assimilate it in terms 
of our systematic associations. 

I do not mean that the point at issue is a mere 
Etikettenfrage, It is much more than that. 



THE TOTALGEFUHL 155 

Our decision 'makes a difference/ as the prag- 
matists say, to the whole structure of our psy- 
chological system. And it must be remembered 
that Wundt does not acknowledge any other 
methods than those employed by the dualists, 
and would not acquiesce in the statement that 
his results are of another order. He comes 
within our universe of discourse ; he invites argu- 
ment. I therefore proceed to argue ; and I take 
as ground for argument an illustration which 
he employs on more than one occasion, — the 
feeling which attaches to the common chord 

Let me remind you, first, of Wundt's doctrine 
of the Totalgefiihl.^^ A compound feeling, a 
feeling due to the confluence of a number of 
elementary feelings, is always psychologically 
simple in the sense that it has its own irreducible 
quality, but may also permit the distinction of 
its various components. ''In jedem derartigen 
Gefiihl lassen sich Gefuhlscomponenten und eine 
Gefiihlsresultante unterscheiden." The compo- 
nents Wundt terms 'partial feelings,' the re- 
sultant, 'total feeling'; we have had an in- 
stance already in the 'feeling of activity' which 
results from the compounding of tension and 
excitement. The compound feeling thus bears 
a close resemblance to the formation which, in 



156 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

the sphere of tonal sensation, is called a fusion ; 
Wundt speaks, in the Physiologische Psychol- 
ogic of 'affective fusions/ There are degrees 
of affective, as there are degrees of tonal, fusion ; 
the partial feelings may appear simply as an un- 
differentiated colouring of the resultant, or may 
maintain their individuality, though in a sub- 
ordinate position, alongside of the total feeling. 
After this preface, we are ready to listen to 
the three tones. To prevent a swamping of the 
partial feelings by the total feeling, — the high- 
est degree of affective fusion, — we take the 
tones separately in succession, and observe how 
they 'feer in isolation. The tone c, heard by 
itself, affects us, Wundt says, by way of a 
' calm seriousness ' or a ' quiet cheerfulness ' ; it 
brings out feelings of two dimensions, pleasant- 
ness-unpleasantness and excitement -tranquilli- 
sation. The other two, e and g, will do the 
same, — though the affective qualities will be 
somewhat different. If, now, we put the tones 
together in pairs, every pair will give us a com- 
pound feeling: we have the three total feelings 
of ce, eg, eg, accompanied or coloured by the 
partial feelings which we have compounded. 
And if the conditions are favourable for obser- 
vation, we should be able to distinguish a five- 
fold feeling in connection with every pair; the 



AN EXPERIMENT 157 

two dimensions of the two partial feelings, and 
the total feeling. Now let us sound all three 
tones simultaneously. We have the total feeling 
of c-e-g ; we have three relative total feelings, 
or 'partials of the second order/ as Wundt calls 
them, — the feelings of ce, eg, eg; and we have 
the 'partial feelings of the first order,' the six 
elementary feelings aroused by c, e, and g. The 
feeling of c-e-g is a tenfold complex. Do not 
forget that such a feeling is, for Wundt, an 
''einheitliche Mannigf altigkeit " ; do not forget 
that the partial feelings may, more or less com- 
pletely, have forfeited their independence. But, 
with all allowance made, ask yourselves if you 
experience anything like the body of feeling that, 
on Wundt's theory, you 'ought' to experience. 
Suppose that, in spite of our precautions, affec- 
tive fusion has reached its highest degree; let 
the partials of the first order disappear alto- 
gether, as separate components, and let them 
remain only as a vague colouring of the whole 
affective impression. Now your compound feel- 
ing should be a fourfold complex. Surely, it is 
not; surely, the feeling lacks the depth, the 
solidity, that a feeling thus compounded must 
possess; surely, you can describe the chord in 
no other terms than 'slightly pleasant,' 'mod- 
erately agreeable.' 



158 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

I think that it is fair to test the theory in this 
way, by the judgment of a group of psychologi- 
cally trained observers, seeing that Wundt has 
laid the observation before the psychological 
public in two of his books. I have, for myself, 
repeated the test often and again, and have 
varied it in half-a-dozen ways : always, while the 
chord remains a single impression, a sensible 
fusion out of musical setting and so far as pos- 
sible freed from musical significance, I get the 
same meagre affective result. ^^ 

If, now, Wundt retorts that in this and like 
instances we are feeling-deaf and feeling-blind, 
may we not suggest, on our side, that he is 
organically anaesthetic.^ The lack of interest 
that Wundt shows in the organic sensations has 
always been a source of wonderment to me. 
Take the new edition of the Physiologische 
Psychologie. Here is a total of 2035 pages. 
Of these, 45 are given to Tast- und Gemeinemp- 
findungen ; the Gemeinempfindungen alone, 
which I now have principally in mind, receive 
four, two and a half of which are devoted to 
pain ! ^^ Of course, there are all sorts of scat- 
tered references. But look in the index under 
Organempfindungen, Gemeinempfindungen, Nie- 
dere Sinne, Gelenkempfindungen, Muskelsinn, — 
what you can think of. Aside from Bewe- 



THE ORGANIC SENSATIONS 159 

gungsempfindiingen and Augenhewegungen there 
is surprisingly little. Meumann makes a similar 
complaint with regard to Nagel's Handbuch. 
^'Vermisst hat der Referent, dass den inneren 
Empfindungen (Organempfindungen) kein aus- 
fiihrlicheres Kapitel gewidmet wird; die gegen- 
wartige Physiologie scheint sich mit der Frage 
der Sensibilitat der inneren Organe nicht mehr 
viel zu beschaftigen." ^^ Now I personally be- 
lieve that the organic sensations play an im- 
portant part, not only in feeling and emotion, 
but in many other departments of the mental 
life : in the formation of sensory judgments, in 
the mechanism of memory and recognition, in 
motives to action, in the primary perception of 
the self. It is true that, as compared with what 
we know of sight and hearing, our knowledge of 
the organic sensations is scrappy in form and 
small in amount; that is why I have said, in 
another connection, that ''of all problems in 
the psychology of sense which are now before 
us, the problem of the nature, number, and laws 
of connection of the organic sensations appears 
j to me to be the most pressing." ®^ Let me add, 
now, that if any one of you is thinking of a piece 
I of work in this general field, he would do far 
j better, in my opinion, to start out from the side 
of the organic sensations than to succumb to 



160 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

the fascinations of pneumograph and sphyg- 
mograph. 

Well ! I believe that organic sensations are 
responsible for the dimensions of excitement- 
depression and tension-relaxation. On this point 
I can claim the support of Ebbinghaus ^^ and, 
I suppose, of all those who accept the James- 
Lange theory of emotion. Stumpf, too, declares 
that he cannot regard them as ''Elementarer- 
scheinungen," though he offers no further 
analysis.^^ But I believe, also, that organic 
sensations are responsible in certain cases for a 
Nuancirung^ a shading and colouring, of feelings 
in the dimension of pleasantness-unpleasantness. 
I say 'in certain cases/ for two reasons. First, 
it is entirely possible that this Nuancirung is 
a matter, not of simple sense-feeling, but of 
association, of emotive residua.®^ Secondly, 
however, I do not think that the colouring and 
shading is as universal as Wundt asserts. Vogt, 
whose method of suggestion led him to the dis- 
tinction of four pairs of feelings, is unable to 
discover it.^^ Orth cannot find it, in the intro- 
spections that he educes by the Reizmethode.^^ 
Storring's observers, on the other hand, report 
a qualitative difference between Stimmungslust 
and Em'pfindungslust ; but though this is, so to 
say, a gross difference, the expressions used are 



THE METHOD OF IMPRESSION 161 

singularly disappointing. We read, in some 
detail, of extensive differences, differences in 
intensive fluctuation, differences of excitement 
and passivity; but on the side of quality we 
have only ''Stimmungslust ist gleichartiger," and 
the dogmatic statement "Zwischen Stimmungs- 
lust und Empfindungslust besteht qualitative 
Differenz/'^^ I myself have never observed a 
qualitative differentiation of pleasantness-un- 
pleasantness, under experimental conditions ; 
and when I observe a difference in everyday 
life, — a difference on the level of the sense-feel- 
ing, — I seem to find a reason for it in concomi- 
tant organic sensations. 

I have sought, on two occasions, to put 
Wundt's theory to an experimental test. The 
method employed was the method of impression, 
in Cohn's form of paired comparisons. The 
procedure, in brief, is as follows. A series of 
stimuli — tones or colours or rhythms — is laid 
out, and the stimuli are presented to the observer 
two at a time, care being taken that every mem- 
ber of the series is paired with every other mem- 
ber. The observer has to decide which of the 
two stimuli shown him is the more pleasant, the 
more unpleasant, the more exciting, the more 
depressing, and so on. If colours are exhibited, 
he points to right or left, as the case may be; 



162 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

if tones are used, he notes down '1' or ^2/ 
according as the first or second stimulus is pre- 
ferred. The work is laborious, and the method 
consumes a large amount of time. We have, 
however, the great advantage of a twofold con- 
trol, objective and subjective. 

The subjective control is afforded, of course, 
by the introspection of the observers. The in- 
trospective task is extremely simple; the ob- 
server has merely to be passive, to let himself 
go, to allow the stimuli to take affective pos- 
session of him ; and then to indicate, in the par- 
ticular instance, which of the two makes the 
stronger impression. Moreover, since the in- 
trospective experience within a series is cumu- 
lative, all of the same kind, the observer is able, 
in the intervals between successive series, to 
give a general account of his method of judg- 
ment, of the nature of his affective reaction. 
The objective control is afforded by the course 
of the affective judgments themselves. If, e.g.^ 
pleasantness and unpleasantness are really affec- 
tive opposites, then the 'curves' or tracings 
which indicate the distribution of judgments in 
parallel 'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' series 
should be diametrically opposed : a colour 
which stands high on the scale of pleasantness 
should stand low on the scale of unpleasantness. 



I 



THE METHOD OF IMPRESSION 163 

and contrariwise. If excitement-depression and 
tension-relaxation also denote affective oppo- 
sites, then their 'curves' should be similarly 
opposed. 

The stimuli chosen were colours, musical 
tones, and groups of metronome beats given at 
varying rates. The two former had been speci- 
fied by Wundt as productive of excitement-de- 
pression, the latter as productive of tension- 
relaxation. My idea was, on the subjective 
side, to test by their means the immediacy of 
reaction in these dimensions. In the case of 
pleasantness-unpleasantness, you cannot say 
what the basis of your judgment is, otherwise 
than that it resides in the stimulus; the one of 
two colours or two tones is more pleasant than 
the other, just as directly as it is bluer or louder. 
Suppose, then, that colours and tones bring out 
equally prompt and unmediated judgments of 
excitement-depression, and that metronome in- 
tervals bring out equally prompt and unmediated 
judgments of tension-relaxation : then we shall 
have some ground for the acceptance of the two 
new affective dimensions. Suppose, on the other 
hand, that the judgments of excitement and ten- 
sion are forced or difficult, mediated by associa- 
tions or by organic sensations : then we shall 
have an introspective differentiation of these 



164 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

judgments from those of pleasantness-un- 
pleasantness. 

On the objective side, I argued in much the 
same way. Suppose that the curves, of which 
I spoke just now, show typical differences, — so 
that the distribution of judgments of pleasant- 
ness takes one course, that of judgments of ex- 
citement another, and that of judgments of 
tension a third, — while still the curves of pleas- 
antness and unpleasantness, of excitement and 
depression, and of tension and relaxation are 
related as opposites: then, again, there will be 
ground for the acceptance of Wundt's dimen- 
sions. Suppose, on the contrary, that the curves 
of excitement and of relaxation agree with the 
curve of pleasantness and the curves of depres- 
sion and of tension with the curve of unpleas- 
antness: then, since the pleasant-unpleasant 
dimension is not in dispute, we have a strong 
indication that that alone is fundamental and 
that the other two dimensions are affective only 
because and in so far as pleasantness and un- 
pleasantness are involved in them. 

The results of the first investigation, in which 
colours and musical tones were tested for 
pleasantness-unpleasantness and excitement-de- 
pression, and metronome intervals for pleasant- 
ness-unpleasantness and tension-relaxation, were 



THE METHOD OF IMPRESSION 165 

published in the Wundt Festschrift; those of 
the second, in which the same tones and intervals 
were tested for all three of the Wundtian dimen- 
sions, were published by Hayes in the American 
Journal of Psychology. They may be summed 
up under three headings. ^^ 

(1) Judgments of pleasantness and unpleas- 
antness are direct, easy, and natural. The 
qualities themselves appear to the observers to 
be simple and homogeneous, identical through- 
out the experiments. Their opposite character 
is vouched for both by introspection and by the 
course of the curves. 

(2) Judgments of excitement are less direct, 
and the term is equivocal. If it is taken as the 
opposite of depressing melancholy, its curve 
agrees with that of pleasantness; if it is taken 
as the opposite of tranquillity or soothing calm, 
its curve agrees with that of unpleasantness : the 
reverse curves then agree with those of un- 
pleasantness and of pleasantness, respectively. 
If, in default of special instruction, the observer 
vacillates between the two meanings of the word, 
the curve shows a vacillating character, — partly 
'pleasant' and partly 'unpleasant'; the period 
and nature of the affective oscillation are vouched 
for by introspection. Judgments of depression 
are, in their turn, distinctly less direct than those 



166 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

of excitement, and are often associatively medi- 
ated. There is no evidence of a dimension of 
excitement-depression, still less of a number of 
exciting and depressing qualities. 

(3) Judgments of tension are easy; but ten- 
sion is described, throughout, in kinsesthetic 
terms. Increasing tension means, uniformly, in- 
creasing unpleasantness, and the curves of the 
two classes of judgment correspond. Relaxa- 
tion may be taken as the opposite of unpleasant 
tension, in which case its curve agrees with the 
curve of pleasantness, or may be identified with 
depression. Nowhere is there evidence, in this 
third case, either of a new affective dimension 
or of specific qualities. 

Naturally, these results are not ^conclusive.' 
For one thing, the experiments are too few. 
For another, they were obtained in a single 
laboratory, and that a laboratory from which 
criticism of Wundt's doctrine had already pro- 
ceeded. For a third, the argument upon which 
the experiments rest is not demonstrably valid. 
It would, I think, be a very strange thing if three 
sets of stimuli should affect a number of ob- 
servers by way of excitement-depression (or 
tension -relaxation) precisely as they do by way 
of pleasantness-unpleasantness, — but nobody 
can prove that such a state of affairs is, on the 



SUMMARY 167 

plural theory, impossible. Were I a champion 
of affective plurality, I should unhesitatingly 
urge these objections to the work, and I have no 
desire to slur them over because I am on the 
other side. Nevertheless, the results are experi- 
mental evidence; Wundt cannot, in the future, 
appeal to the method of impression as confi- 
dently as he has appealed in the past.®^ And if 
our investigations are compared with those of 
Brahn and Gent, upon which Wundt relies in 
the Physiologische Psychologies it will appear, 
I am very sure, that the critical sauce meted out 
to the goose must be considerably strengthened 
for the gander. 



70 



If now, in conclusion, I may give, with all 
due modesty, my own reading of the situation, ^^ 
it is this: that Wundt's tridimensional theory 
of feelings shows, as it were in typical form, the 
peculiar features that distinguish his psychology 
at large. Wundt has, in an eminent degree, the 
power of generalisation, and his generalisations 
cover — as generalisations oftentimes do not ! — 
an encyclopaedic range of detailed knowledge. 
But the exercise of this very power leads him to 
put a certain stamp of finality upon his theories, 
as if questions were settled in the act of systema- 
tisation. You know what I am thinking of: 



168 TRIDIMENSIONAL THEORY OF FEELING 

the theory of space perception, the theory of 
attention, the definition and demarcation of 
psychology itself. The affective theory which 
we have been discussing is typical, then, both 
for good and for bad. It is good, in that it 
gives rounded and complete expression to a 
psychological tendency that, in many minds, has 
been struggling for utterance. It is bad, in that 
it offers a solution, ready-made, of problems 
which in actual fact are ripe only for prelimi- 
nary and tentative discussion. Like those other 
theories of attention and of space-perception, it 
represents the culmination of an epoch of psycho- 
logical thought ; but, like them again, it is rather 
the starting-point for further inquiry than the 
statement of assured psychological result. On 
the whole, I take it as matter of encouragement 
that generalisation has been at all possible. 
What has been done, provisionally, at a lower 
level of knowledge, can be done again, and bet- 
ter done, at a higher. In the meantime, we 
must not be dogmatic, we must not be too im- 
patient for results, we must not set theory above 
observed fact; recognising to the full the diffi- 
culty and the merit of constructive effort, we 
must use all the weapons in our critical armoury 
against ourselves as against others, and against 
others as against ourselves. 



V 

ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 



M, 



LECTURE V 

ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

I SUPPOSE that every experimental psycholo- 
gist has, at one time or another, been con- 
fronted with the sceptical question : ' What, after 
all, has the experimental method done for general 
psychology ? ' As a rule, it is not easy to find an 
answer: first, because the questioner, both by 
the fact and by the manner of his asking, betrays 
an ignorance of psychology at large; but sec- 
ondly, and more especially, because the influence 
of the experimental method has, as a matter of 
fact, made itself felt over the whole extent of the 
psychological system, and instances fail you by 
the very number and urgency of your associa- 
tions. '' Wenn ich zusammenf assend sagen soil,'' 
— this is Wundt's reply to the question, — ''was 
ich selbst an psychologischen Einsichten der 
experimentellen Methode verdanke, so kann ich 
nur antworten : Alles, was ich auf diesem 
Gebiete fur richtig und zum Theil fur unum- 
stosslich halte." ^ That is largely and positively 
said. But if we want details, I think that the 
experimentalists may justly point to three prin- 

171 



172 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

cipal achievements: the complete recasting of 
the doctrine of memory and association,^ the 
creation of a scientific psychology of individual 
differences,^ and the discovery of attention.^ 

To say, however, that experimental psy- 
chology ' discovered ' attention is to make a fairly 
sweeping claim, and a claim that you may 
reasonably incline to dispute. What of Hamil- 
ton ? You will remind me that Hamilton gives 
a long discussion of ''attention as a general 
phenomenon of consciousness";^ you may 
even recall the fact that I myself, in a previous 
Lecture, quoted this discussion.* What of 
James Mill, and the twenty-fourth chapter of 
the Analysis ? ^ What of Bain, and the theory 
of attention that we find in The Emotions and 
the Will ? ^ Well ! I make you a present of 
Hamilton and Mill and Bain. I will do more; 
I will cite a strongly worded sentence from 
Braunschweiger. ''It would be hard,'' says this 
author, a special student of the history of atten- 
tion, 'Ho find a single idea or thought that can 
contribute in any sort of way to the solution of 
this important problem, which does not appear 
at least in nuce during the eighteenth century." ^ 
No doubt ! — and we are told, in the same man- 
ner, that Darwinism goes back to the philosophy 

* P. 75. 



THE DISCOVERY OF ATTENTION 173 

of Ancient Greece. But what I mean by the 
'discovery' of attention is the explicit formula- 
tion of the problem; the recognition of its 
separate status and fundamental importance ; 
the realisation that the doctrine of attention is 
the nerve of the whole psychological system, 
and that as men judge of it, so shall they be 
judged before the general tribunal of psychology. 

In this sense, surely, experimental psychology 
discovered attention. And as we connect the 
name of Helmholtz with the doctrine of sensible 
quality, and the name of Fechner w^ith that of 
sensible intensity, so must we connect the name 
of Wundt with the doctrine of attention, — 
which, as I see it, is that of sensible clearness. 
The experiments which Wundt carried out in 
the early sixties are the beginning of the whole 
matter ; ^ and the system which Wundt has 
WTOUght out is informed and infused with atten- 
tional theory. The veriest beginner knows that, 
if he goes to Wundt, he must read about apper- 
ception ! ^^ 

It is true that the discovery of attention did 
not result in any immediate triumph of the 
experimental method. It was something like 
the discovery of a hornets' nest : the first touch 
brought out a whole swarm of insistent problems. 
We have only to travel beyond the limits of 



174 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

Wundt's system, and we find that 'chaos' of 
which Pillsbury complains. ''Die Aufmerk- 
samkeit/' says Ebbinghaus, "ist eine rechte 
Verlegenheit der Psychologic/' ^^ I think that 
he has felt the Verlegenheit himself; there is a 
marked difference between his accounts of sen- 
sation and association, on the one side, and his 
treatment of attention, on the other. A char- 
acteristic feature, both of Ebbinghaus' sections 
and of Pillsbury's recent book, is the constant 
appeal to casual introspection, to the occur- 
rences of everyday life; and though the appeal 
is useful, as sustaining the reader's interest, it 
is none the less a confession of scientific weak- 
ness. We expect the illustrations in a modern 
work on electricity to lead us, beyond themselves, 
to a severely technical exposition; we do not 
expect to stop short with the illustrations. 

I shall begin my own discussion of attention 
with an attempt to lay a very ancient ghost, — 
the ghost that stalks through current statements 
of psychological method. Kant told us, more 
than a century ago, that psychology could never 
rise to the rank of an experimental science, be- 
cause psychological observation interferes with 
its own object. ^^ We have bowed down before 
this criticism; and, because the facts were con- 



THE METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY 175 

tinually against it, we have tried in all sorts of 
ways to get round the facts, and to save Kant's 
infallibility while we still went on with our ex- 
periments. Let us, now, look the objection 
squarely in the face. Is there anything peculiar, 
anything fatal, about attention to mental 
processes ? 

We are agreed, I suppose, that scientific 
method may be summed up in the single word 
' observation ' ; the only way to work in science 
is to observe those phenomena which form the 
subject-matter of science. And observation 
means two things : attention to the phenomena, 
and record of the phenomena ; clear experience, 
and communication of the experience in words 
or formulae. We shall agree, further, that, in 
order to secure clear experience and adequate 
report, science has recourse to experiment, — 
an experiment being, in the last resort, simply 
an observation that may be repeated, isolated, 
and varied. What, then, is the difference be- 
tween natural science and psychology ? between 
experimental inspection and experimental intro- 
spection ? 

We may set out from two very simple cases. 
(1) Suppose that you are shown two paper discs, 
the one of an uniform violet, the other composed 
half of red and half of blue. Your problem is. 



176 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

SO to adjust the proportions of red and blue in 
the second disc that the violet which appears 
on rotation exactly matches the violet of the first 
disc. You may repeat this set of observations 
as often as you will ; you may isolate the observa- 
tions by working in a room that is free from other, 
possibly disturbing, colours; you may vary the 
observations by working towards the equality 
of the violets first from a two-colour disc that is 
distinctly too blue, then from a disc that is dis- 
tinctly too red: and so on. (2) Suppose, again, 
that the chord c-e-g is struck, and that you are 
required to say how many tones it contains. 
You may repeat this observation ; you may isolate 
it, by working in a quiet room ; you may vary it, 
by sounding the tones first in succession and then 
all together, or by striking the chord at different 
parts of the scale. It is clear that, in these cases, 
there is no difference between introspection and 
inspection. You are using the same method 
that you would use for counting the swings of 
a pendulum, or for taking the readings from a 
galvanometer scale, in the physical laboratory. 
Now let us take some instances in which 
the material of introspection is more complex. 
(3) Suppose that a word is called out to you, and 
that you are asked to observe the effect which 
this stimulus produces upon consciousness : how 



THE METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY 177 

the word affects you, what ideas it calls up, aud 
so forth. The observation may be repeated ; 
it may be isolated, — you may be seated in a 
dark and silent room, free from disturbances; 
and it may be varied, — different words may be 
called out, the word may be flashed upon a 
screen instead of spoken, etc. Here, however, 
there does seem to be a difference between intro- 
spection and inspection. The observer who is 
watching the course of a chemical reaction, or 
the movements of some microscopical creature, 
can jot down from moment to moment the 
successive phases of the observed phenomenon. 
But if you try to report the changes in conscious- 
ness, while these changes are in progress, you 
interfere with consciousness; your translation 
of the mental processes into words introduces 
new factors into the experience itself. (4) Sup- 
pose, lastly, that you are observing a feeling or 
an emotion : a feeling of disappointment or 
annoyance, an emotion of anger or chagrin. 
Experimental control is still possible; situations 
may be arranged, in the psychological laboratory, 
such that these feelings may be repeated, isolated 
and varied. But your observation of them 
interferes, even more seriously than before, with 
the course of consciousness. Cool consideration 
of an emotion is fatal to its very existence; 

N 



178 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

your anger disappears, your disappointment 
evaporates, as you examine it. 

To overcome this difficulty of the introspective 
method, students of psychology are usually 
recommended to delay their observation until 
the process to be described has run its course, 
and then to call it back and describe it from 
memory. Introspection thus becomes retro- 
spection ; introspective examination becomes 
"post mortem examination. The rule is, often- 
times, a good one for the beginner; and there 
are cases in which even the experienced psycholo- 
gist will be wise to follow it. But it is by no 
means universal. For we must remember, first, 
that the observations in question may be repeated. 
There is, then, no reason why the observer to 
whom the word is called out, or in whom the 
emotion is set up, should not report at once upon 
the initial stage of his experience : upon the imme- 
diate effect of the word, upon the beginning of 
the emotive process. It is true that this report 
interrupts the observation. But after the first 
stage has been accurately described, further 
observations may be taken, and the second, third, 
and following stages similarly described; so 
that presently a complete report upon the whole 
experience is obtained. There is, in theory, 
some danger that the stages are artificially sepa- 



THE METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY 179 

rated; consciousness is a flow, a process, and if 
we divide it up, we run the risk of missing cer- 
tain intermediate links. In practice, however, 
this danger has proved to be very small, — wit- 
ness the stress laid by many psychologists upon 
'fringes' and 'relational feelings'; and we may 
always have recourse to retrospection as an 
auxiliary method, and compare our partial 
results with our memory of a like experience un- 
broken. Moreover, — and this is a point too 
often lost sight of, — the practised observer falls 
into an introspective attitude, has the introspec- 
tive habit, so to say, ingrained in the texture of 
his mind; so that it does become possible for 
him, not only to take mental notes while the ob- 
servation is in progress, without interfering with 
consciousness, but even to jot down written notes, 
as the histologist does while his eye is still held 
to the ocular of the microscope. Let me cite 
a parallel case. All of us who are engaged in 
intellectual work, in the study and the teach- 
ing of a science, are obliged to read a very great 
deal, and to read critically and discerningly, 
in the state of selective attention. Now the ex- 
perience that I wish to bring to your minds is 
this : that, as one is reading, one is able to take 
mental note of passages to be remembered and 
employed, without appreciable pause in the pro- 



180 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

cess of reading itself, and without even momen- 
tary loss of the thread of the writer's argument. 
I am not concerned here with the analysis of this 
experience, but with the mere fact, — with the 
fact that, when we close the covers of a book after 
two or three hours' reading, we have marked 
down half-a-dozen passages for further use with- 
out interruption of the main current of conscious- 
ness. That is the technical, critical attitude; 
and the introspective attitude is akin to it. 
There can be no doubt, again, from the results 
of such experiments as those of Solomons and 
Stein,^^ that the writing of notes, brief catch- 
words and symbols, need not in any way inter- 
fere with the introspection of the moment. And 
if we refer the disappearance of affective processes 
to the incompatibility of affection and attention, 
— I have spoken of this matter earlier, — rather 
than to the impossibility of direct introspection 
in general, we have, I think, made out our case 
all along the line ; there is no difference, in 
principle, between inspection and introspection.^^ 
So far, then, as my own psychological thinking 
is concerned, I do not believe that that ghost will 
walk again. Attention in psychology and atten- 
tion in natural science are of the same nature 
and obey the same laws. But now — what is 
attention ? 



THE PROBLEM OF ATTENTION 181 

The analytical study of attention has been 
subject to two adverse influences : the pressure 
of popular psychology, and the obviousness of 
application. Popular psychology regards atten- 
tion, indifferently, as faculty and as manifesta- 
tion of faculty. It is a faculty, whose operation 
produces or prevents certain changes in the 
mental life ; it is also the activity or the state — • 
the activity of remarking, noticing, observing; 
the state of sustained concentration — which 
manifests and attests that operation. ^^ Scientific 
psychology has, in very large measure, fought 
itself clear of the theory of faculties ; but the in- 
fluence of the popular conception is still shown 
in the tendency to treat the attentive conscious- 
ness as a whole, to synthetise objective and sub- 
jective, incidental and essential, in a single view. 
There is, of course, a typical attentive conscious- 
ness, as there is a typical memorial or imaginative 
or expectant or habituated consciousness. Nev- 
ertheless, the road to assured result lies through 
the elements of consciousness, and has conscious- 
ness itself as its goal; ^^ short cuts to synthesis, 
however promising, end always in one-sided 
theory. 

The intrinsic tendency of psychology to deal 
with attention in the large has been further 
strengthened by the practical importance of 



182 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

attention, its importance in educational regard. 
Here, if anywhere, the passage from theory to 
practice has seemed to be short and easy ; here, 
if anywhere, a sound psychology might be of 
immediate service to the responsive teacher. 
Since, however, the problems of education are 
necessarily formulated in terms of a completed 
psychological system, and since they are of the 
kind that requires speedy solution, this obvious- 
ness of application has been a real hindrance 
to psychology; it has held us to the old paths, 
and has discouraged that work of scattered 
exploration by which alone a science is enabled 
to advance. 

I think that these two things — tradition and 
application — are mainly responsible for the 
unsettled state of attentional psychology. But I 
think also that, in spite of these two things, 
analysis has gone far enough to furnish us with a 
clue to the attentional problem. It seems to me 
beyond question that the problem of attention 
centres in the fact of sensible clearness. Let me 
call my witnesses ! 

There are two men who have a special claim 
to be heard in this matter. The first is Wundt, 
and his claim is of long standing. Now Wundt 
declares that there are two " wesentliche Best and - 
theile,'' two essential factors — and the word 



ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 183 

' essential' is used in the sense of 'necessary/ 
not of ' important ' — in every process of atten- 
tion : first, the increased clearness of a particular 
idea or group of ideas, which is connected with the 
characteristic feeling of activity; and secondly 
the inhibition of other available impressions or 
memory-images. Attention, in other words, 
means a redistribution of clearness in conscious- 
ness, the rise of some elements and the fall of 
others, with an accompanying total feeling of a 
characteristic kind. That is the statement of the 
Physiologische Psychologie of 1903; and the 
discussion of attention in 1874 opens, in the same 
spirit, with the now familiar analogy of the 
Blickfeld and Blickpunkt}'^ Our second wit- 
ness is Pillsbury, who writes, without theoretical 
prepossession, from a general review of what 
had been said and done in the field of attention 
up to 1903. Pillsbury's statement is that '' Tatten- 
tion accroit la clarte des sensations sur lesquelles 
elle porte.'' He goes on : ''il est tres difficile de 
preciser . . . ce que Ton entend par clarte. 
Pourtant tout le monde sait ce que le terme sig- 
nifie et tout le monde a eprouve le changement 
qui s'opere pendant Tattention." ^^ If, however, 
we rank clearness as one of the intensive attri- 
butes of sensation, this difficulty is accounted for ; 
we can no more define clearness, in the strict 



184 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

sense of definition, than we can define intensity 
itself. 

You will not thank me, now, if I bring up a 
regiment of psychologists, in single file, each to 
deliver his testimony and disappear. I will fol- 
low a less tedious method. Baldwin's Diction- 
ary distingmshes&ve types of attentional theory ^^ : 
let us, then, find a typical definition of attention, 
under each one of these five headings, and see 
if our emphasis of clearness is confirmed. 

First come the affectional theories, represented 
by Ribot. What is the definition.^ ''L'atten- 
tion,'' says Ribot, '' consiste en un etat intellectuel, 
exclusif ou predominant,'' — ''est un monoide- 
isme intellectuel," — ''avec adaptation spontanee 
ou artificielle de Tindividu." A monoideism 
with adaptation implies, of course, a good deal 
more than clearness, but it very certainly implies 
clearness; and we read in Ribot's text of 'une 
idee maitresse,' 'une representation vive,' 'un 
etat de conscience devenu preponderant,' — 
phrases in which the reference becomes explicit. ^^ 
The theories of ' psychical energy ' or of ' original 
activity ' come next in order ; here we may quote 
Ladd. An 'act of attention in its most highly 
complex form' is defined as "a purposeful voli- 
tion, suffused with peculiar feelings of effort or 
strain and accompanied by a changed condition 



ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 185 

of the field of discriminative consciousness, as 
respects intensity, content, and clearness." Later 
on Ladd speaks of a ''focussing of psychical 
energy upon some phases, or factors, or objects, 
of consciousness, and the relative withdrawal of 
such energy from other phases, factors, objects." ^^ 
So Stumpf , while he defines attention as a special 
kind of feeling, 'die Lust am Bemerken,' notes 
that the primary effect of attention is "die 
langere Forterhaltung [des beziiglichen Inhaltes] 
. . . und die aufmerksame Fixirung wahrend 
dieser Dauer"; or, rather, the primary effect is 
"ein Bemerken," while the longer duration is 
"ein selbstverstandliches Mitergebnis der fort- 
gesetzten Urteilstatigkeiten, in welche der In- 
halt verflochten wird." ^^ This Fixirung, Be- 
merken is, evidently, our 'clearness.' Thirdly, 
we have the 'conative' or 'motor' theories. 
Stout says that "attention is simply conation 
in so far as it finds satisfaction in the fuller 
presentation of its object, without actual change 
in the object." ^^ Baldwin defines attention as 
"the act of holding a presentation before the 
mind"; it increases the intensity of sensation 
and "the vividness of representative states." ^^ 
The next group, theories of 'intensity' and 're- 
enforcement,' is represented by Bradley. "At- 
tention (whatever it may be besides) at any rate 



186 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

means predominance in consciousness. . . . Not 
theorising but applying descriptive metaphors, 
we may call attention a state which implies domi- 
nation or chief tenancy of consciousness. Or 
we may compare it to the focussing of an optical 
instrument, or to the area of distinct vision in 
the retinal field.'' ^^ Lastly, for the theory of 
'inhibition,' we may quote Ferrier. ''Just as 
we can at will fix our gaze on some one object 
out of many appealing to our sense of vision, and 
see this clearly while all others are indistinct or 
invisible, so we can fix our intellectual gaze, or 
concentrate our consciousness, on some one idea 
or class of ideas to the exclusion of all others 
in the field of intellectual vision." ^^ 

You will understand that I am not here con- 
cerned with the validity of the classification of 
theories given in the Dictionary, or with these 
theories themselves considered as explanations of 
the attentive consciousness, or with the authors' 
total descriptions of the state of attention. My 
point is simply this: that, wherever you look, 
you find some form of reference to clearness; 
clearness is, so to say, the first thing that men 
lay hands on, when they begin to speak about 
attention. I do not want to press the point ad 
nauseam. I will add, only, that if you take the 
quite recent books, those that have appeared 



ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 187 

since Pillsbury completed his review, you will 
find just the same thing. ''Die Aufmerksam- 
keit," says Ebbinghaus, ''besteht in dem leb- 
haften Hervortreten und Wirksamwerden ein- 
zelner seelischer Gebilde auf Kosten anderer, 
fiir die gleichwohl auch gewisse Veranlassungen 
des Zustandekommens vorhanden sind/'^^ ''The 
fact that consciousness always has a focal point, 
which reveals the momentary activity of the 
mind, is what is meant by the fact of attention, so 
far as it can be described in terms of the content 
of consciousness ''; that is Angell's statement. ^^ 
And Judd, though his standpoint is different 
from ours, comes to the same conclusion. "The 
word ' attention ' refers more especially to the 
selective character of the organising process, 
whereby one particular group of sensory factors is 
emphasised more than any other group"; "at- 
tention is merely a name for various phases of 
selective arrangement within experience." ^^ Em- 
phasis and selective arrangement are, again, our 
fact of 'clearness' translated into systematic 
terms. Finally, Meumann describes the ' Grund- 
erscheinung des Auf merksamkeitsvorganges ' 
as follows : "in dem Masse, als einige bestimmte 
Bewusstseinsinhalte oder Tatigkeiten in den Auf- 
merksamkeitszustand geraten, haben diese ho- 
here Klarheit, hoheren Bewusstseinsgrad, wer- 



188 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

den voriibergehend der Mittelpunkt des ganzen 
psychischen Lebens . . . wahrend in demselben 
Masse der iibrige Bewusstseinsinhalt in niederem 
Grade bewusst ist und seinen Einfluss auf den 
Gang der psychischen Tatigkeit verliert."^^ 

All this cataloguing is dry work; I can plead 
only that it was necessary. Indeed, I may claim 
your gratitude that there is not more of it; for 
I have, myself, been obliged to turn up a small 
library of references, in order to make sure that 
my position is well taken. With that assurance 
gained, let us proceed to the study of clearness 
as an attribute of sensation. Under what condi- 
tions does a sensation appear with maximal 
clearness in consciousness ? 

We shall do best to approach this question 
empirically, without theoretical bias, and without 
attempt at a systematic classification. Begin- 
ning in this way, we find the most obvious condi- 
tion of clearness in (1) the intensity of stimulus, 
and its sensory equivalents. Loud sounds, 
bright lights, strong tastes and smells, severe 
pressures, extreme temperatures, intense pains, 
— all these things are clear in virtue of their 
intensity; they attract or compel our attention, 
as the phrase goes, in spite of ourselves; they 
force their way to the focus of consciousness. 



THE CONDITIONS OF CLEARNESS 189 

whatever the obstacles that they have to over- 
come. A like value attaches to long durations 
and wide extensions, in so far as these are the 
equivalents of a high degree of sensible intensity. 
The qualification is important, because it reminds 
us of the phenomena of adaptation and fatigue. 
The first really hot days of summer, and the first 
really cold days of winter, constrain our atten- 
tion; but we soon grow accustomed to summer 
heat and winter cold. Enter a family circle, 
one member of which is partially deaf, and you 
are embarrassed by the loudness of the voices; 
but at the end of a week you will cease to notice 
anything unusual. Tire yourself out, and a 
stimulus that would ordinarily attract your atten- 
tion passes unregarded; under the conditions, 
it is no longer an intensive stimulus. Duration, 
then, if it is to mean clearness, must be the psy- 
chophysical equivalent of intensity, as it is, e.g.^ 
in certain forms of auditory rhythm. ^^ And the 
same thing holds of extension. 

I said just now that the appeal to casual intro- 
spection is a confession of scientific weakness, 
and the remark applies in the present connection. 
We do not know at what average degree of inten- 
sity clearness makes its appearance, and we do 
not know within what quantitative limits the 
psychophysical equivalence of intensity and du- 



190 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

ration, intensity and extension, obtains. The 
general dependence of clearness upon intensity 
of stimulus is an evident fact, but it is a fact 
that we must leave in the rough. ^^ 

It is natural to pass from intensity, duration, 
and extension to the quality of stimulus. And I 
think it cannot be denied that (2) form or 
quality of stimulus is one of the conditions of 
clearness of sensation. I gave some illustrations 
in my first Lecture. There are certain pains, 
by no means intensive, that are nevertheless 
urgently, insistently, importunately clear, — 
pains that we 'cannot get away from' by any 
ordinary distraction of attention. There are 
certain organic complexes, also, which in my own 
experience have this power to compel the atten- 
tion ; they are intimate, worrying, wicked things.* 
The taste of bitter, the smell of musk, the sight 
of yellow belong, for me, to the same category; 
the least trace of them fascinates me. No doubt, 
there is here a wide range of individual differ- 
ence. But I cannot doubt that some sensible 
qualities are, intrinsically, clearer than others. 
James comes at least very close to this doctrine 

* My general name for all these experiences is ' quick' — not in 
the sense of 'fast/ but in that of 'intimately vital.' In my child- 
hood ^s speech 'the quick' was the tender flesh beneath the finger 
nails, and the wider use of the term is evidently based upon this 
association. 



THE CONDITIONS OF CLEARNESS 191 

in his chapter on Instinct, and Miiller in his refer- 
ences to Eindringlichkeit. ''Es erscheint mog- 
lich, dass sich zwei Empfindungen, falls sie von 
verschiedener Qualitat sind, hinsichtlich der 
Eindringlichkeit anders zu einander verhalten, 
als hinsichtlich der Intensitat. . . . Man kann 
zwei Empfindungen verschiedener Qualitat, z. 
B. eine Rotempfindung und eine Grauempfin- 
dung, zwar hinsichtlich ihrer Eindringlichkeit 
einigermassen mit einander vergleichen, hat hin- 
gegen nicht in gleicher Weise ein Urteil dariiber, 
ob der Abstand vom Nullpunkte fiir diese oder 
jene beider Empfindungen grosser sei.'' Ebbing- 
haus brings the facts under the heading of inter- 
est, the '' Gefiihlswert der Eindriicke''; but the 
category is evidently too large for them.^ 

In the third place we may consider (3) the 
temporal relations of stimulus, and especially 
repetition and suddenness. A stimulus that 
is repeated again and again is likely to attract 
the attention, even if at first it is altogether unre- 
marked. Pillsbury instances the case of a man 
absorbed in work; you may call his name once, 
and he will not hear you, — but call again and 
again, without raising your voice, and he will 
presently respond. Experiences of this sort are 
common enough, though their analysis is not 
quite easy. There is always the possibility, e.g., 



192 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

that the stimulus may operate at a moment when 
consciousness is free, so that it produces its effect 
less by sheer repetition than by suddenness or 
intensity. On the other hand, there seems to 
be no reason a priori why summation of stimuli 
should not be a condition of clearness. Ebbing- 
haus cites, in this connection, the fact of practice ; 
but that is, surely, a phenomenon of a very differ- 
ent order. ''Der getibte Kliniker sieht an einem 
neuen Fall, der geiibte Techniker an einer neuen 
Maschine sofort cine Menge von ihm bekannten 
und gelaufigen Dingen, die der Ungelibte erst 
allmahlich oder auch gar nicht bemerkt." But 
the previous cases and the older machines were 
attentively examined. No amount of repeated 
visual stimuli would make a surgeon or a tech- 
nician; expert knowledge presupposes attention. 
The question here, however, is whether repeti- 
tion as such renders a stimulus clear, brings it 
to the focus of attention. I think that it may; 
but I should like to have experimental proof. 
It would also be interesting to know at what 
point the summation-effect gives way to habitua- 
tion, and whether habituation itself is ever pos- 
sible without foregone attention .^^ 

Sudden stimuli and sudden changes of stimu- 
lus exert a familiar influence upon attention. As 
regards the latter. Stern tells us, ''ganz allgemein. 



THE CONDITIONS OF CLEARNESS 193 

dass die Veranderungserregbarkeit mit abneh- 
mender Geschwindigkeit abnimmt/' ^'Lang- 
same Veranderungeii sind weniger geeignet als 
schnelle, . . . eine Reaction der Aufmerksam- 
keit . . . herbeizufiihren." The law rests upon 
a fairly large body of experimental results, ob- 
tained in various sense-departments.^^ 

The mention of change leads us, however, 
(4) to a fourth condition of great moment, the 
condition that Pillsbury sets in the first place: 
movement of stimulus. I quote a few instances 
from Stumpf. ''Sternschnuppen, deren Bild 
auf seitliche Netzhautteile fallt, werden doch in 
Folge ihrer raschen Bewegung sofort bemerkt. 
Halt man einen Bleistift in soldier Entfernung 
von einer brennenden Lampe, dass sein Schatten 
auf einer weissen Papierflache auch im directen 
Sehen eben nicht mehr erkennbar ist, so wird er 
sofort wieder erkennbar, wenn man den Bleistift 
bewegt. Beim Tastsinn fand E. H. Weber, dass 
innerhalb der sg. Empfindungskreise, in welchen 
gleichzeitige Beriihrungseindrucke nicht mehr 
unterschieden werden, doch Bewegungen noch 
leicht wahrnehmbar sind.'^ Movement, indeed, 
is a stimulus of such individuality that some 
authors — Exner, e.g,^ — speak outright of move- 
ment sensations, and Heller and Stern distin- 
guish direct and indirect touch, as we all dis- 



194 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

tinguish direct and indirect vision, in terms of 
sensitivity for resting and moving stimuli. At all 
events, there can be no doubt that the stimulus 
which moves in the field of vision or of touch has 
a remarkable power to draw the attention. 

Since our classification is empirical only, we 
may follow Stumpf 's example, and include under 
the present rubric the phenomena that Kiilpe 
describes as 'partial tonal change,' the ''con- 
tinuous or discrete intensive and qualitative 
variation of a tone or clang within a connection 
of tones or clangs.'' A tone that beats, or re- 
curs intermittently, or fluctuates in pitch, within 
a chord or compound clang stands out clearly 
from its background. "Everyone must have 
noticed how strongly the attention is attracted 
in a concert by the voice which carries the 
melody. The singer's voice, even if compara- 
tively weak, can be heard without special effort 
above a full orchestral accompaniment, in pas- 
sages where it alone has to rise and fall, to execute 
trills and runs. . . . The same voice is obscured 
at once, if it is allowed to rest upon a single 
note." '' — 

We began our list, naturally enough, with a 
reference to the attributes and elementary rela- 
tions of stimulus. It is clear, however, that we 
are breaking away from stimulus. If the 'mov- 



THE CONDITIONS OF CLEARNESS 195 

ing' tone can be so named only by analogy to 
touch and sight, ' movement ' itself has a psycho- 
logical significance that extends far beyond its 
formal definition in terms of space and time. 
And 'suddenness/ in the same way, is more than 
a temporal relation ; the sudden stimulus is likely 
to be the surprising, the unexpected stimulus. 
These remarks apply, now, with still greater force 
to the fifth condition of clearness, — (5) the 
novelty, rarity, unaccustomedness, strangeness of 
stimuli. The value of this category is not undis- 
puted. "Ein ungewohnlicher Sinnesreiz," says 
Mtiller, ''muss, um in besonderer Weise auf uns 
zu wirken, in Folge seiner Starke oder anderer 
Momente die sinnliche Aufmerksamkeit bereits 
auf sich gezogen haben, so dass er und seine 
Neuheit und ungewohnliche Eigenthiimlichkeit 
uns zur Wahrnehmung kommt." While, how- 
ever, there is truth in this statement, I think that 
the truth is partial. Novelty and unaccustomed- 
ness mean, in psychological terms, 'non-asso- 
ciatedness.' The novel impression is the im- 
pression that lacks associative supplements in 
consciousness; that stands alone, in isolation. 
Such an impression, provided that it is at all 
intensive, seems to me to become clear in its 
own right; it is 'startling,' just as the sudden 
stimulus is ' surprising ' and the moving stimulus 



196 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

disturbing.' For the rest, the effect of novelty 
is acknowledged by James, Kiilpe, Ebbinghaus, 
and Pillsbury.^^ 

A sixth condition of clearness, a condition of 
the very widest range, is (6) that described by 
Ebbinghaus as ''the presence in consciousness 
of corresponding, i.e. similar ideas," and by 
Mtiller — under two separate headings — as "the 
likeness of the incoming sensation to the idea, 
sensation, or image already present in the mind" 
and the ''associative relationship between the 
incoming sensation and the existent idea, or 
more generally between the sensation and the 
whole circle of ideas dominant at the moment." 
The condition is of great systematic importance, 
since, for some psychologists, it forms the bridge 
that leads from passive to active, from invol- 
untary to voluntary attention. It is also, as I 
said, of the very widest range; for it covers all 
cases, from precise duplication, so to say, of in- 
coming sensation by preexistent image, up to the 
appeal of stimulus to a dominant psychophysical 
tendency which, at the time, may be unrepre- 
sented in consciousness. 

Classical illustrations of the first kind are 
afforded by Helmholtz' experiments upon stereo- 
scopic vision and the hearing of partial tones. 
Helmholtz found that, when the two halves of 



THE CONDITIONS OF CLEARNESS 197 

a stereoscopic slide were illuminated in a dark 
chamber by the electric spark, he was able to 
see double images at will, ''wenn ich mir vorher 
lebhaft vorzustellen suche, wie sie aussehen miis- 
sen/' So, in the case of partial tones, he devised 
a method to ''obtain a series of gradual transi- 
tional stages between the isolated partial and the 
compound tone, in which the first is readily 
retained by the ear. By applying this process 
I have generally succeeded in making perfectly 
untrained ears recognise the existence of upper 
partial tones." Apart from these experimental 
results we know that, in everyday life, the man 
who finds is the man who knows what to look 
for; the sailor at the masthead, the hunter on 
the trail, the pathologist at the microscope, are 
all cases in point. 

At the other end of the scale stand the per- 
manent adult interests, connate or acquired, 
which — even when not represented in idea — • 
are ready to be touched off by a casual stimulus. 
The collector, the inventor, the expert are aroused 
to keen attention by stimuli which the rest of the 
world pass without notice. I have already men- 
tioned the psychological attitude, the introspec- 
tive habit, which so grows on one with time and 
experience that at last everything — novels and 
games and children's sayings and the behaviour 



198 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

of an audience in a lecture-room — becomes 
tributary to psychology, and one can no more 
help psychologising than one can help breath- 
ing. "Some years ago/' Jastrow writes, ''I 
became interested in cases of extreme lon- 
gevity, particularly of centenarianism, and for 
some months every conversation seemed to lead 
to this topic, and every magazine and news- 
paper offered some new item about old people. 
Nowadays my interest is transferred to other 
themes; but the paragrapher continues quite 
creditably to meet my present wants, and the 
centenarians have vanished.'' It is the vanishing, 
of course, that is the source of danger. If you 
are 'favourably impressed' by a scientific theory, 
the facts that support the theory crowd in upon 
you, while the outstanding facts, those that can- 
not connect with the trend of consciousness, fail 
to present themselves ; you mean to be impartial, 
and the conditions of attention make you one- 
sided. I said, in a previous Lecture, that scien- 
tific theories sit more lightly upon their defenders 
than opponents are apt to suppose.* I must add, 
then, that this result is secured by the cultivation 
of the critical attitude, the scientific habit "par 
excellence^ which becomes as potent as any other 
in the control of attention. ^^ 

* p. 48. 



THE CONDITIONS OF CLEARNESS 199 

Our list of conditions has led us from attributes 
of stimulus to psychophysical disposition. We 
might, possibly, bring under this latter head- 
ing (7) the accommodation of the organs of 
sense, though I incline to think that an empirical 
classification would rank it as a separate factor. 
Wundt gives fixation as one of the external con- 
ditions of visual clearness. Ktilpe expresses 
himself more sceptically. ''We shall, perhaps, 
be more correct in supposing that [these motor 
conditions] are only indirectly conducive to the 
apperception of particular contents, as determin- 
ing the attributes of the contents themselves.'* 
But is not clearness precisely one of these attri- 
butes.^ It is true that the accidental conver- 
gence of the eyes upon some object in the field of 
vision, while we are mentally occupied with other 
things, does not bring that object to the focus 
of consciousness. Nevertheless, in so far as the 
phenomena of 'fluctuation of attention,' of which 
we speak later, are referable to peripheral condi- 
tions, we must admit that accommodation of the 
sense-organ is at least a negative condition of 
peripheral clearness.^^ 

I come, finally, (8) to the much-discussed cases 
in which the absence or cessation of stimulus con- 
strains the attention. We do not notice the 
ticking of the clock upon our wall, but we notice 



200. ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

its silence. We do not notice the ordinary 
noises from the street, but we notice the unusual 
quiet after a snowfall. Fechner gives some sa- 
lient instances. '' Der Miiller erwacht, wenn der 
Gang der Miihle stockt, der Schlafer in der 
Kirche, wenn der Prediger zu sprechen, das von 
der Amme eingesungene Kind, wenn die Amme 
zu singen aufhort, der bei Nachtlicht zu schlafen 
Gewohnte, wenn das Nachtlicht erlischt, der im 
Wagen Fahrende, wenn der Wagen still steht.'' 
How are these effects to be explained ? 

Notice, first, that they are not simply instances 
of the cessation of unnoticed stimuli. In every 
case, foregone attention, and prolonged or fre- 
quent attention, is presupposed. We do, e.g.y 
attend to the ticking of the clock, again and again, 
in the course of the day; we hear it when we 
look up to see the time, and we hear it, with all 
plainness, in intervals of thinking and reading 
and writing. The miller is interested in the run- 
ning of his mill; he has listened, often enough, 
to make sure that things are in good order. 
The traveller, before he dozed off to sleep, was 
made very uncomfortable by the jolting of the 
coach ; he wished more than once that he was at 
home in his comfortable bed. On the other 
hand, the cessation of an unnoticed stimulus, of 
a stimulus that you have not attended to, is not 



THE CONDITIONS OF CLEARNESS 201 

necessarily remarked. Flowers may be put upon 
your mantelpiece, curtains hung across your win- 
dows, — put in place, and taken away again, — 
without your observing either their coming or 
their going. 

But more than this : I doubt if any really un- 
noticed stimulus attracts the attention by its 
cessation. The appeal to sleep is very doubtful, 
and Fechner's examples are general at the best. 
Suppose that the maid breaks an ornament in 
the drawing-room, an ornament that you have 
long ago ceased to think of; you do not notice 
its absence. If it was large, and stood in a con- 
spicuous position, you are struck by the novel 
look of that part of the room, and you cast about 
for an explanation. If it was small and incon- 
spicuous, you do not discover your loss until 
some chance association recalls it to mind, and 
you search and fail to find it. 

Once more : if objective cessation may attract 
the attention, subjective cessation may persist 
under circumstances that would normally bring 
the stimulus to clear consciousness. Delboeuf 
tells us that he was once staying at a country 
house which stood near a waterfall. The noise 
was so great that, on the first day of his stay, he 
was hardly able to follow the conversation at 
table. However, he soon grew accustomed to it. 



202 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

Waking up one night, about a week after his 
arrival, he was surprised to find that he could 
not hear the water, ''meme en y pretant une at- 
tention soutenue ''; only after he had got up and 
looked out of window did he succeed in recover- 
ing the auditory perception of the fall. Here was 
psychophysical disposition, but no clearness ! 
And Delboeuf reminds us of a very common ex- 
perience of the same kind: the experience of 
waking at night, and listening for the tick of the 
clock. Is there anybody who has got out of bed, 
under these circumstances, in the assured con- 
viction that watch or clock has stopped ? 

Evidently, these several cases must be clearly 
distinguished, and referred each to its own special 
set of conditions. If we go back to our original 
instances, the ticking of the clock and the noises 
from the street, it seems to me that we notice 
their cessation, for the most part^ only when we 
are looking for them ; as we glance towards the 
clock, as we pause in our work and listen for 
the familiar noise, we become aware of the si- 
lence. It is not that the absence of stimulus 
commands attention, but that an expectant atten- 
tion, a psychophysical predisposition, is disap- 
pointed, baffled by the silence. This view is 
borne out by the observation that the clock may 
have been silent for a long while before we notice 



THE CONDITIONS OF CLEARNESS 203 

that it has stopped. If, however, you think that 
the explanation goes too far, let us try another. 
It has been shown, experimentally, that we attend 
best under a slight distraction; maximal clear- 
ness requires a little 'effort,' as we say, for its 
attainment. The clock and the street noises 
may be considered as distractions, stimulating 
distractions, of this kind. Their removal would 
then, after the current 'spurt' of energy had 
ceased, make itself felt as a general restlessness 
or unsteadiness, a widespread complex of organic 
sensations. I think you will agree that this 
general restlessness sometimes appears, and that 
we work from it to the cessation of the familiar 
stimulus; though I myself do not find it as fre- 
quently as I find a baffled expectation. A third 
and very similar interpretation derives from 
Lehmann's law of the ' indispensableness of the 
habitual.' According to that law, you will 
remember, the removal of an accustomed stimulus 
leaves a need, a Bedurfnis. This comes to con- 
sciousness, in organic terms, as uneasiness or 
discomfort ; and again we have a positive start- 
ing-point for the attention.^^ 

We must content ourselves with general ex- 
planations, since this little group of facts has 
never been brought under experimental control. 
Indeed, what impresses one most strongly, all 



204 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

through the review which we have now completed, 
is the need of detailed experimental work. I have, 
of course, omitted a good many experimental ref- 
erences that I might have given ; but those of you 
who know what I have left out will realise how 
very much more there is that I could not put in. 
Even as things are, however, there is a ray of day- 
light. Just as we found the various theories of 
attention held together by the central fact of clear- 
ness, so we find that all these empirical conditions 
of conscious clearness may be grouped together 
as conditions of a powerful impression of the 
nervous system. Let us look at them in order. 
Intensive stimuli — and their equivalents in 
space and time — must, naturally, set up psycho- 
physical processes of relatively great strength; 
and intensive excitations will not be easily in- 
hibited or obscured by the other excitatory pro- 
cesses of the moment. So the qualitative stimuli 
that are effective for clearness must make appeal 
to some peculiar susceptibility of the nervous 
system, general or individual. — Repeated stimuli 
produce a cumulative effect, and thus take their 
place, as regards nervous excitation, alongside 
of intensive. Sudden stimuli impinge upon nerv- 
ous elements that have hitherto been free from 
stimulation of their particular kind, i.e. upon 
nervous elements of a high degree of excitability ; 



THE CONDITIONS OF CLEARNESS 205 

and it is probable that the excitations which they 
set up suffer less dispersion and diffusion, within 
the nervous system, than the excitations resulting 
from gradual application of stimulus. — Moving 
stimuli arouse different nervous elements in 
quick succession, so that there is no possibility 
of fatigue or of sensory adaptation ; in a sense, 
therefore, the effect of the moving stimulus is 
cumulative. — Novel stimuli are isolated stimuli; 
they have neither to share their effect with asso- 
ciates nor to hold their own against rivals. 
The excitation set up by the novel is thus of the 
same order as that set up by the sudden. -- As 
for the effect of the anticipatory image, it is clear 
that, the more nearly the excitation correlated 
with the given stimulus coincides with a psycho- 
physical excitation already in progress, the more 
easily will it make its way within the nervous 
system and the more dominant will it become. 
And, in the same way, excitations that coincide 
with modes of excitatory activity habitual to the 
particular nervous system, excitations that are 
in the line of a ^psychophysical disposition/ 
will evidently have a greater effect than others 
that are less accustomed. — Lastly, peripheral 
accommodation opens the gateway to the cortex, 
and permits the stimulus to operate at its full 
strength from the first. ^^ 



206 ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS 

I do not think that it is worth while, in an 
elementary discussion, to go further into physio- 
logical theory. Nor shall I attempt to recast our 
empirical classification of conditions, and make it 
scientific. The list stands very much as Lotze 
left it. It is true that Lotze himself, and later 
psychologists from Wundt to Pillsbury, draw a 
distinction, in more or less definite lines, between 
physiological and psychological, external and in- 
ternal, objective and subjective conditions. But 
what is external in one system becomes internal 
in another, and it is not difficult to argue either 
that all alike are objective or that all alike are 
subjective. All are objective, in that they oper- 
ate by way of the nervous system ; all are subjec- 
tive, in that the specific organisation of the nerv- 
ous system determines their effect. I will only 
suggest, then, that the common element which, 
empirically, holds all the conditions together — 
the ultimate condition of clearness at large — 
may be designated as nervous disposition, pre- 
disposition of the nervous system and its sensory 
attachments.^^ It is the task of genetic psy- 
chology to classify the determinants of attention 
in the order of time, as ordinal, generic, individ- 
ual; it is the task of experimental psychology 
to delimit and quantify their influence; and it 
is the task of physiology to exhibit the mechanism 
of their nervous operation. 



VI 

THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 



LECTURE VI 

THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

MY last Lecture was, in effect, a plea for a sim- 
plification of the psychology of attention. 
Kiilpe tells us, in his Grundriss, that psycholo- 
gists have tended to find ''the real object of in- 
vestigation into the psychology of space, not in the 
spatial attributes, but in the spatial relations. . . . 
The result has been an almost total neglect of the 
perception of extension and figure, and an al- 
most exclusive regard of the perception of dis- 
tance and position." And he remarks further 
that, in the psychology of time, ''interval has 
been given the preference over duration with as 
perplexing results as follow from the preference 
of distance over extension in the psychology of 
space." ^ I believe that much of our difficulty 
in the psychology of attention arises, in the same 
way, from our concessions to tradition and to 
practical demands; and that we should do well 
to sit down in serious earnest to a psychology of 
clearness, — considering clearness as an attri- 
bute of sensation, conditioned upon nervous 
predisposition, just exactly as quality is an attri- 

p 209 



210 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

bute of sensation, conditioned upon nervous 
differentiation. How far this elementary psy- 
chology of attention could be carried it is, evi- 
dently, impossible to predict; but the number 
of experimental problems suggested by the pre- 
ceding Lecture shows that there are many and 
definite points of attack. 

However, a science does not advance accord- 
ing to any prearranged logical plan, but haltingly 
and unevenly, as the interests of individual 
workers prompt, or the claims of practical utility 
dictate. And the experimental psychology of 
attention centres, as a matter of fact, about some 
half-dozen large problems, — in part relatively 
new, in part handed down from the empirical 
psychology of the eighteenth century, — which 
have been discussed again and again, to the neg- 
lect of other and equally important questions. 
We are still inclined to speak, not of ' the ' experi- 
mental psychology of attention, but of Wundt's 
or Stumpf's or James' or Muller's views upon 
attention. I shall not attempt, now, to lay out 
an ideal programme for further work; the at- 
tempt would be overbold, and the programme 
would not be followed. I desire rather to review 
what we know, what has already been done ; and 
I shall therefore treat the elementary psychology 
of attention topically, under those half-dozen 



CLEARNESS AS SENSATION ATTRIBUTE 211 

headings. For the sake of clearness, I shall 
throw each heading into the form of a law, a 
general statement of the behaviour of conscious 
contents given in the state of attention. But 
the statement is not to be understood dogmati- 
cally, for we shall be largely occupied with argu- 
ments and results that make against its universal 
validity; the 'law' is rather a challenge, an 
appeal to the bar of fact. 

My first 'law,' in this sense of the term, runs 
as follows : (1) clearness is an attribute of sensa- 
tion, which, within certain limits, may be varied 
independently of the other concurrent attributes. 
What are the facts ? 

In the first place, there can be no doubt of the 
independent status of clearness as sensation- 
attribute. As Wundt says: ''Klarheit und 
Starke der Eindriicke sind durchaus voneinander 
verschieden " ; "das Klarer- und das Starker- 
werden eines Eindrucks sind . . . subjectiv wohl 
zu unterscheidende Vorgange." ^ There are, in 
my experience, very few departments of psy- 
chological observation in which the distinction 
of clearness from the other attributes of mental 
processes offers appreciable difiiculty. 

Nevertheless, independent status does not 
necessarily mean independent variability. It is 



212 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

true that most sensible qualities may be present 
at any degree of clearness ; but, as I have already 
pointed out, the rule is not universal, — there are 
qualities that appear to be bound up with a 
determinate clearness, or at any rate to admit of 
only a very narrow range of clearness-degree. 
And when we turn to intensity, we are upon de- 
batable ground from the start. Is clearness ever 
independent of intensity ? or, in popular phrase, 
do we ever attend to a sensation without thereby 
making it stronger ? 

You will find all sorts of opinion : that atten- 
tion intensifies sensation, that attention leaves 
sensible intensity unaffected, that attention re- 
duces the intensity of sensation. On the whole, 
however, the trend of psychological belief just 
now seems to favour an interdependence of the 
two attributes. Pillsbury, who devotes a good 
part of his first chapter to a balancing of the evi- 
dence, pro and con, ends with a non liquet: ''il 
semble done que cette discussion sur les rapports 
entrelaclarte et Tintensite reste sans conclusion.''^ 
I think, though, that his own leanings — if one 
may presume to read between the lines — are 
towards a coupling of the two attributes, at least 
within certain limits. This is also Kiilpe's view 
in the Grundriss. '' Within certain narrow limits, 
. . . contents are really intensified in the state 



CLEARNESS AND INTENSITY 213 

of attention." ''The sensation of a loud sound, 
inattentively experienced, may seem equal . . . 
to that of a faint sound, attentively experienced. 
Again, it is interesting to note that the alteration 
of judgment by inattentive observation is al- 
ways precisely the same as the alteration produced 
by a reduction of the intensive, spatial, or tem- 
poral values of the impressions, except that it is 
somewhat more uncertain. . . . This fact re- 
quires further investigation." ^ Wundt writes, 
to the same effect, ''dass beide [Eigenschaften] 
einen gewissen Einfluss auf einander aussern 
konnen. ... So bemerkt man, wenn ein Reiz 
das Bewusstsein bei grosser Unaufmerksamkeit 
trifft und dann in gleicher Starke wiederholt wird, 
wie z. B. beim unerwarteten Stundenschlag einer 
Thurmuhr, dass der zweite Eindruck entschieden 
nicht bloss deutlicher, sondern scheinbar auch 
intensiver wahrgenommen wird. Das namliche 
zeigt sich, wenn man sich willktirlich anstrengt, 
Erinnerungs- und Phantasiebilder zu erwecken 
und moglichst intensiv im Bewusstsein festzu- 
halten." ^ Ebbinghaus admits that the experi- 
mental evidence is doubtful, but argues, from 
general experience, that ''eine allgemeinen Erho- 
hung der Empfindungsstarke durch Zuwendung 
der Aufmerksamkeit durchaus wahrscheinlich 
ist." He gives the illustrations that Wundt had 



214 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

given before him : the varying intensity of the bell 
strokes, heard with attention and with inatten- 
tion, and the hallucinatory character of images in 
a state of sustained and concentrated attention.^ 
Pillsbury and Ebbinghaus both reply to the ob- 
jection that an intensifying effect of attention 
would falsify our perceptions, would jeopardise 
the validity of Weber's Law. Pillsbury suggests 
that the increase of intensity is not absolute, not 
the addition of a constant amount, but relative, 
proportional to the intrinsic intensity of the 
stimulus; and Ebbinghaus points out that nor- 
mal intensity is, after all, intensity in the state of 
attention. ''[Es] beziehen sich alle genaueren 
Angaben iiber Empfindungen, tiber ihre Eigen- 
schaften, Schwellenwerte u. s. w., . . . durchweg 
auf eine erhohte ihnen zugewandte Aufmerk- 
samkeit. Verschiedenheiten aber, die nun noch 
etwa durch verschiedene Grade einer solchen er- 
hohten Aufmerksamkeit hervorgebracht werden 
konnten, werden als unerheblich betrachtet wer- 
den diirfen.'' My impression is that views of this 
sort are gaining ground in psychology, as against, 
e.g., Stumpf's doctrine that only weak sensations 
are intensified by attention. Stumpf, you will 
remember, looks at the operation of attention 
from the negative side ; the weak sensation rises, 
by the removal of counter-influences within the 



CLEARNESS AND INTENSITY 215 

nervous system, to the full (or approximately the 
full) intensity which it would have possessed in 
its own right had those adverse influences been 
absent."^ However, I will quote an authority on 
the opposite side. ^'[Eine] verstarkende Funk- 
tion der Aufmerksamkeit," says Miinsterberg, 
''giebt es nicht; neuere Experimente bestatigen 
die schlichte Erfahrung, auf die schon Fechner 
hinwies, dass ein graues Papier an der Stelle, 
der sich die Aufmerksamkeit zuwendet, nicht 
heller erscheint ; das schwache Licht wird nicht 
intensiver, ein Gewicht nicht schwerer, eine Linie 
nicht langer, ein Ton nicht lauter, wenn unsere 
Aufmerksamkeit die Vorstellung erfasst."^ Miin- 
sterberg's statement is in flat disagreement with 
those which I have just been reading. 

Experiment must decide; but direct experi- 
ment is very difficult. Let me remind you of 
an historical incident which has always seemed 
to me to be characteristic for psychology at large, 
and — if looked at in the right way — encourag- 
ing to the student of psychology. Mach and 
Stumpf sat down together before a harmonium, 
in the physical laboratory at Prague, to decide 
the question whether attention to one of the com- 
ponent tones in an ordinary musical chord does 
or does not strengthen that particular tone. The 
chord was sounded, and the two men listened. 



216 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

^^Wiihrend Mach die Verstarkung ganz deutlich 
zu horen angab/' says Stumpf, who tells the 
story, ''konnte ich nichts davon finden/' ^'So- 
viel ist sicher, dass bei ganz unveranderten TJm- 
standen eine Verstarkung starker Tone neben 
anderen gleichzeitigen starken Tonen fiir mich 
nicht wahrnehmbar ist, wahrend Mach sie auch 
dann wahrzunehmen erklart." And he eon- 
eludes, resignedly, that individuals differ.^ I 
do not know about the individual differences: 
but I call the observation characteristic, because 
it may stand as a typical instance of divergent 
introspections ; and I call it encouraging, because 
the student may take heart from it to hold by his 
own introspective conviction on unsettled points. 
No doubt, both Mach and Stunipf heard what 
they say they heard. 'No doubt,' I say, though 
I myself cannot hear as Mach hears. But since 
we have, in science, to pass beyond individual 
experience, the direct method must be given up 
for an indirect ; we must seek to arrange condi- 
tions in such a way that the introspective dis- 
crepancies disappear. 

The experiments made by the method of 
distraction are exceedingly interesting.^^ But 
though they are not very numerous, I cannot here 
attempt to review them. Criticism of opinion 
may be condensed into relatively few words; 



CLEARNESS AND INTENSITY 217 

criticism of experimental method needs time and 
detail. I will rather give you a brief account of 
experiments recently carried out in the Cornell 
Laboratory by my colleague Professor Bentley,^^ 
— experiments which point quite definitely to 
the positive conclusion that, even in the case of 
strong stimuli, attention has an intensifying 
effect. The stimuli, which were presented in 
pairs, were the sounds produced by the ordinary 
gravity phonometer. To the one stimulus of 
each pair, the observer was maximally attentive ; 
from the other he was distracted. The distrac- 
tion was effected by means of odours, which we 
had found in previous investigations to be su- 
perior to such things as counting, adding, mul- 
tiplying, etc. Suppose, then, that two sounds, a 
weaker and a stronger, are given; and that the 
weaker is the sound attended to, the stronger the 
sound distracted from. If the observer judges 
the two sounds to be of equal intensity, still more 
if he judges that the objectively weaker sound is 
the more intensive of the two, we have an over- 
estimation of intensity in the state of attention. 
Out of 300 preliminary experiments, 285 
were successful. Of these 285 judgments, 136 
showed an overestimation of the stimulus attended 
to, 40 showed an underestimation of that stimulus, 
and 109 reported the relation of the two stimuli 



218 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

correctly. Further experiments came out in the 
same way. And experiments with two pairs of 
intensive stimuli, weak and loud, which might be 
supposed — under Weber's Law — to measure 
equal sense-distances, gave almost identical re- 
sults; the overestimations with the loud stood 
to the overestimations with the weak stimuli in 
the ratio 39 to 40. Pillsbury's conjecture is thus 
confirmed. Lastly, it was found that the per- 
centage of ' right cases ' with distraction was prac- 
tically the same as that with continuous atten- 
tion. Puzzling at first, this result becomes clear 
if we remember that the error of distraction would 
operate as often to increase as to decrease the 
differences of sensible intensity ; so that its effect 
must appear rather in the distribution than in 
the number of incorrect judgments, rather under 
the headings of overestimation and underesti- 
mation than in the column of wrong cases. 

It is clear, then, that strong as well as weak 
sounds are intensified by attention, or, if you 
prefer the negative statement, are reduced in 
intensity by distraction. What this precisely 
means, physiologically and psychologically, it is 
at present impossible to say. Professor Bentley's 
observers certainly did not confuse intensity with 
clearness; and the intervention of reproductive 
or affective influences seems to be ruled out both 



CLEARNESS AS SENSATION ATTRIBUTE 219 

by the conditions of the experiments and by the 
introspections. So far as they go, the results 
tell directly for what I have called the current 
psychological view of the relations of intensity 
and clearness. — 

What, then, of our law ? Why, the law stands, 
under the conditions and with the limitations of 
which we have spoken. Clearness is an inde- 
pendent attribute of sensation. It is also, in 
some measure, an independently variable attri- 
bute. It may vary in entire independence of 
most sensible qualities; it may vary also inde- 
pendently of intensity, in the sense that a very 
weak sound may be as clear as a very loud sound. 
Only it seems bound up with intensity to the 
extent that change of clearness involves always 
a change of intensity as well; very weak clear 
sounds are not as weak as they would be at a 
lower degree of clearness. How far the converse 
of this statement is true, within what limits a 
change of intensity brings with it, normally, a 
change of clearness, cannot be said, though the 
correlation probably extends beyond those ex- 
tremes of intensive stimulation which we dis- 
cussed in the preceding Lecture. I may add 
that there is nothing surprising, from the psy- 
chophysical point of view, in an intimate relation 
between clearness and intensity; all the condi- 



220 THE LAWS 01 ATTENTION : I 

tions of maximal clearness are also, as you will 
remember, conditions for the powerful impres- 
sion of the nervous system. 

I turn, in the second place, to the law which I 
have named — and the name shows my own bias 
and opinion — (2) the law of the two levels. It is 
generally agreed that increased clearness of any 
one part-contents of consciousness implies the 
decreased clearness of all the rest; the 'energy 
of attention,' as we say, is limited and practically 
constant. So the question arises: how many 
levels or degrees of clearness may coexist in the 
same consciousness ? 

Opinions are widely divergent. Baldwin, e.g., 
gives in his Senses and Intellect a ' graphic repre- 
sentation of area of consciousness, after analogy 
with vision,' in which no less than four levels are 
distinguished. At the very centre of conscious- 
ness stands apperception. Beyond that lies 
active consciousness or attention; beyond that, 
again, passive or diffused consciousness ; and be- 
yond that, the subconscious. The whole series 
of concentric circles is then enclosed by the un- 
conscious or physiological, a region of uncertain 
boundary. ''It is well,'' Baldwin says, "to note 
the play of ideas through all these forms of transi- 
tion, from the dark region of subconsciousness, 



THE TWO LEVELS 221 

to the brilliant focus of attention [i.e., to apper- 
ception]. Images pass both ways constantly, 
acting varyingly upon one another and making 
up the wonderful kaleidoscope of the inner life." ^^ 
There is no question that images pass through a 
large number of degrees of clearness — certainly 
many more than four — in their passage from 
maximal to minimal attention; the question is, 
however, whether they show all these degrees 
within a single consciousness. 

Angell seems to accept Baldwin's view in this 
strict interpretation. ^'The field of conscious- 
ness," he says, '' is apparently 
like the visual field. There 
is always a central point of 
which we are momentarily 
more vividly conscious than 
of anything else. Fading 
gradually away from this 

point into vaguer and vaguer ^ig. 5. Area ^Conscious- 

consciousness* is a margin ^^^^- ~~ '^- ^* Baldwin, 

^ Handbook of Psychology: 
of objects, or ideas, of which Senses and Intellect, 1890, 

we are aware in a sort of 

mental indirect vision." ^^ Baldwin's diagram 

is printed in illustration. 

Kiilpe takes the opposite standpoint. He be- 
gins his article on The Problem of Attention by 

* Italics mine. 




222 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

contrasting physiological with psychological clear- 
ness. '^[As I sit] looking at the flowered pattern 
of the paper on the wall in front of me, ... I 
notice that around the spot of clearest vision the 
pattern loses in clearness, at first slowly, then 
more and more quickly, until I reach the limit of 
my field of vision, and cannot make out any pat- 
tern whatsoever. If I did not know that the 
whole wall is covered with the same paper, I 
should suppose that the paper-hanger had chosen 
less and less pronounced patterns, the farther he 
moved from the point upon which my eyes are 
fixed, until finally all pattern and colour were lost 
in an indifferent gray.'' I must interject here 
that I cannot, personally, verify the details of 
this observation ; I think that Kulpe has read 
into the wall-paper a good deal of his own know- 
ledge of sense-psychology. But, at any rate, 
he refers the observation itself to physiology, 
and does not use the analogy as Baldwin and 
Angell use it. On the contrary, he writes of the 
attentive consciousness as follows: ''When we 
ask how the degrees of consciousness are related 
to one another, we find, not an uniform grada- 
tion from the highest to the lowest, but, in most 
cases, a fairly sharp line of distinction. Certain 
contents stand at the level of clear apprehension ; 
and from them our consciousness drops away. 



THE TWO LEVELS 223 

without transition, to the level of obscure general 
impression, above which the other contents of 
the time are unable to rise. And the clearer the 
first group of contents, the more indistinct are 
all the rest. ... If, therefore, at any given 
moment we make a cross-section of the stream of 
consciousness, we shall find represented on it, 
not q,ll conceivable degrees of clearness, but as a 
rule just two groups of processes separated from 
each other by a considerable interval." The 
statements are cautious; Kiilpe puts in the 
qualifying 'in most cases,' 'as a rule'; but the 
caution is plainly due to the lack of experimental 
evidence, and cannot obscure the writer's owm 
opinion. ^^ 

Six years earlier, Kiilpe had argued in a similar 
spirit against Kohn. ''Die Klarheit und die Un- 
klarheit wachsen in entgegengesetzter Richtung, 
und die Zustande, die ihnen entsprechen, konnen 
somit una so leichter voneinander unterschieden 
werden, je ausgepragter die Aufmerksamkeit ist. 
Diese Erscheinung zwingt uns geradezu statt von 
einer einformigen quantitativen Abstufbarkeitdes 
Bewusstseins von zwei gesonderten Zustanden 
desselben zu reden." Kiilpe distinguishes here 
also between physiological and psychological 
distribution of clearness. ^^ 

Ward posits three grades of consciousness in 



224 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

the wide sense : ''a centre or focus of conscious- 
ness within a wider field, any part of which may 
at once become the focus/' and a third grade of 
'subconsciousness/ This subconsciousness is, 
however, literally sub-conscious. The threshold 
of consciousness ''must be compared to the 
surface of a lake, and subconsciousness to the 
depths beneath it/' "Presentations in sub- 
consciousness have not the power to divert 
attention, nor can we voluntarily concentrate 
attention upon them/' " This hypothesis of sub- 
consciousness ... is in the main nothing more 
than the application to the facts of presentation 
of the law of continuity." ^^ Consciousness has, 
then, not three experienceable levels, but two 
only; Ward's subconscious presentations are 
simply Fechner's negative sensations.^ ^ Mar- 
shall, if I understand him aright, inclines to go 
a little farther. "In the moment of reflection," 
he says, "we find in all cases what have been 
called the fields of Attention and of Inattention. 
We find them and nothing more." Neverthe- 
less, "the field of inattention seems to resolve 
itself into an aura, as it were, which aura has 
now a 'feel' of being fuller, and now of being 
narrower. . . . The observation that this aura 
at times seems to be fuller, and again narrower, 
surely points to the existence of something psy- 



THE TWO LEVELS 225 

chic beyond either the fields of attention or of 
inattention, points to the existence of mentality 
out of which consciousness whether of attention 
or of inattention arises." ^^ I do not find that 
Marshall is more logical than Ward, — though 
he does not follow Ward's example of including 
in consciousness what is by definition below the 
level of consciousness, — for a 'feel' of fulness 
and narrowness must be a conscious feel, and 
observation of the feel must be introspective 
observation. However, both Ward and Mar- 
shall are arguing theoretically : Ward for the law 
of continuity and Marshall for a form of psycho- 
physical parallelism ; they are not directly facing 
our present problem. 

Helmholtz, who does face that problem in a 
particular case, affirms that ^'wir fiir das Be- 
wusstwerden einer Empfindung zwei verschie- 
dene Arten oder Grade unterscheiden miissen,'' 
the kinds or degrees which Leibniz named per- 
ception and apperception.^^ And this is, of 
course, the doctrine that we also associate with 
the name of Wundt. Indeed, the representa- 
tion of consciousness in two levels, clear and 
obscure, is so characteristic of Wundt's psy- 
chology that I think we sometimes tend to credit 
him with its invention, — just as we credit him 
with the metaphor of the Blickfeld and the Blick- 



226 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

punkty although Wundt, I suppose, took that 
from Fortlage, and Fortlage may have taken it 
from Lotze, and Lotze from some earlier writer ; 
for it goes back at least as far as Tucker ! ^^ The 
metaphor itself, with its direct implication of 
the two stages of consciousness, stands in 1874 
at the very beginning of Wundt's section on at- 
tention, and in 1903 stands second only to the 
Thdtigkeitsgejuhl?^ ''Sagen wir von den in 
einem gegebenen Moment gegenwartigen Vor- 
stellungen, sie befanden sich im Blickfeld des 
Bewusstseins, so kann man denjenigen Theil des 
letzteren, dem die Aufmerksamkeit zugekehrt ist, 
als den inneren Blickpunkt bezeichnen. . . . 
Der innere Blickpunkt kann sich nun successiv 
den verschiedenen Theilen des inneren Blick- 
feldes zuwenden. Zugleich kann er sich jedoch, 
verschieden von dem Blickpunkt des ausseren 
Auges, verengern und erweitern, wobei immer 
seine Helligkeit abwechselnd zu- und ab- 
nimmt. ... Je enger und heller hierbei der 
Blickpunkt ist, in um so grosserem Dunkel be- 
findet sich das tibrige Blickfeld.'' This is fa- 
miliar teaching. It must be taken in connection 
with Wundt's refusal to grant any psycho- 
logical place to the subconscious or the uncon- 
scious. He freely admits the influence of feeling 
on the course of ideational association, but he 



THE TWO LEVELS 227 

will not allow the feeling to stand alone in con- 
sciousness, the counterpart of an 'unconscious' 
idea. The fact is rather ''dass die betreffende 
Vorstellung im Bewusstsein vorhanden sei, dass 
sie aber zu jenen dunkleren Inhalten desselben 
gehorte, die uberhaupt mehr durch ihre Wirkung- 
en auf andere Bewusstseinsvorgange als durch 
ihre eigenen Bestandtheile erkennbar werden." ^^ 
Hamilton's doctrine of 'mediate association' — 
"one idea mediately suggests another into con- 
sciousness, the suggestion passing through one 
or more ideas which do not themselves rise into 
consciousness" — is treated in the same way. 
''Man hat wohl ein Recht von ' unbemerkten ' 
oder von 'dunkler bewussten' Mittelgliedern 
solcher Associationen zu sprechen, nimmermehr 
aber von 'unbewussten.'" ^^ And Herbart fares 
in like manner : " es gibt keine ' f rei auf steigende ' 
Vorstellungen." ^^ 

Morgan, as we all know, gives a prominent 
place in his psychology to the distinction be- 
tween 'focus' and 'margin' of consciousness. 
"In any moment, . . . there are, in addition to 
and alongside the dominant elements constituting 
the summit of full clear consciousness, dimly felt 
elements which may have little or no direct con- 
nection with those dominant elements. These 
we will speak of as subconscious y'' ^^ — a quite 



228 THE LAWS OF AJTENTION : I 

unnecessary term, since for Morgan the processes 
in question are all conscious. ''Directly we 
begin to examine and measure any part of the 
margin," he says, ''it thereby ceases to be mar- 
ginal and becomes focal;'' but we cannot exam- 
ine and measure the subconscious. You will 
have been wondering, too, why I have not men- 
tioned James' chapter on the Stream of Thought?^ 
I have omitted it, because I think that it belongs 
to another part of our subject, to which I come 
in a moment. 

I do not know, now, how the ' law of the two 
levels' is to be put to any conclusive test. If 
Baldwin and Angell find their three degrees of 
consciousness below the apperceptive level, and 
if Marshall finds his aura below the second level, 
of obscure consciousness, I can only fall back 
upon Stumpf's 'individual differences' and envy 
those whose minds are richer than my own. 
I find nothing of the sort. Working from the 
other end, from the level of clear apprehension, 
I am accustomed to use the following illustra- 
tion. Take one of the familiar puzzle pictures, 
a picture which represents, we will say, a house 
and garden, and somewhere in which is concealed 
the outline of a human face. As you search 
for the face, the contents of the whole picture are 
at the conscious focus. Suddenly you find it: 



THE TWO LEVELS 229 

and what happens ? ' Why, as you do so, the 
picture drops clean away from the focus; the 
face stands out with all imaginable clearness, 
and the house and garden are no clearer than the 
feel of the paper between your fingers. The ex- 
perience is very striking, as I have described it ; 
it is more striking still if the face baffles you, 
and you go off on false scents. For every time 
that you think you have found the hidden out- 
line, the picture slips from you, — slips, to come 
back with a mental jerk as you realise your fail- 
ure. There is no poising of the picture, after the ^ 
riddle has been read, midway between crest and 
base of the wave of consciousness. 

Suppose, however, that we accept the law; 
suppose that we agree upon the dual clearness of 
consciousness. The duality will range from 
maximal to minimal difference, according to the 
degree of 'concentration' of attention. When 
we are totally absorbed, we are also absent- 
minded; the upper level is admirably clear, 
the lower is exceedingly obscure. When we 
are less fixedly attentive, there will be a less 
marked difference between the two conscious 
levels. Now, then, the question arises: Do all 
the part-contents, within the two divisions of 
consciousness, show one and the same degree of 
clearness ? The main division, we will assume. 



230 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

is plain enough ; consciousness is arranged step- 
fashion. But is the surface of consciousness, at 
the two levels, smooth and unwrinkled, or are 
there differences of emphasis both over the area 
of relative clearness and over the area of relative 
obscurity ? 

We will begin at the bottom. Morgan makes 
his 'subconscious' elements ''subconscious in 
different degrees''; he speaks of "a short rising 
slope of dawning consciousness and a longer 
falling slope of waning consciousness." ^^ I am 
not sure, however, how far this purports to be 
matter of observation, and how far it is merely a 
diagrammatic representation, due to the 'wave' 
metaphor. Angell, you will remember, speaks 
of a 'gradual' fading away into 'vaguer and 
vaguer consciousness'; and if he had not 
accepted Baldwin's fourfold arrangement, we 
might, perhaps, interpret these words to indi- 
cate simply relative difference of obscurity 
within a single general obscurity. Wundt seems, 
at first reading, to be quite definite, '^[Es] 
lasst sich experimentell mit Sicherheit nach- 
weisen, dass [die dunklen,] mit dem appercipir- 
ten Inhalt meist nur in einem losen und aus- 
seren Zusammenhang stehenden begleitenden 
Vorstellungen die allerverschiedensten Grade 
der Klarheit darbieten konnen, von einer oberen 



THE TWO LEVELS 231 

Grenze an, wo sie noch als zwar undeutliche, 
jedocli in ihren allgemeinen Eigenschaften noch 
einigermassen erkennbare Objecte erfasst wer- 
den, bis zu einer unteren, wo nur festzustellen 
ist, dass liberhaupt in einem bestimmten Sin- 
nesgebiet irgend etwas vorlianden war, das ina 
Bewusstsein wirksam wurde, aber schon im 
Moment, nachdem der Eindruck voriiberge- 
gangen, nicht mehr zur Apperception gebracht 
werden kann." ^^ I say that this seems definite ; 
and I think there can be no doubt as to Wundt's 
general opinion, — that, within the total ob- 
scurity of marginal consciousness, differences of 
relative position may be made out. At the 
same time, he speaks of the 'passage of the im- 
pression,' and a footnote refers us to his dis- 
cussion of tachistoscopic experiments. I am, 
then, after all not sure that Wundt is not illus- 
trating one thing by another, illustrating mar- 
ginal differences of clearness by reference to dif- 
ferences within the upper level of consciousness. 
For myself, I find the issue very difficult to 
decide. Since the relative clearness of any 
particular process depends upon conditions, — 
the conditions that we listed in the last Lecture, 
— and since our nervous system is an extraordi- 
narily complex mechanism, and may be very 
variously affected at any given time, I see no 



232 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

reason a priori why there may not be differ- 
ences of obscurity in the lower level as there 
undoubtedly are differences of clearness in the 
upper. Nevertheless, I am by no means sure 
that I discover these differences. Observation 
in the large is practically impossible; one must 
catch favourable moments as they occur in the 
course of experimentation. And I mean by 
'favourable' moments occasions when the dif- 
ference between the two main levels is not 
overgreat, — when, for one reason or another, 
the observer's attention is less fixed and con- 
centrated than the experiment properly requires. 
I have caught myself, time and again, slipping 
from the prescribed object of attention to some 
secondary circumstance or obtruding idea; but 
when I ask whether, a few seconds earlier, that 
circumstance or idea was clearer amidst ob- 
scurity than the look of my surroundings or 
the organic background of consciousness, I am 
unable to give a definite answer. The problem 
might, perhaps, be attacked indirectly by an 
inversion of the method of distraction. If, e.g., 
we could show that very various degrees of 
reinforcement were needed to shift the focus of 
attention to contents that were known to be in 
the conscious margin, then we might argue that 
these contents themselves were originally pres- 



THE TWO LEVELS 233 

ent at different degrees of clearness or, rather, 
of obscurity. It is further possible that the 
experiments would give opportunity for the 
introspective verification of the differences thus 
objectively determined. 

We have better evidence to go upon when we 
look at the contents of the upper level, the 
apperceived contents ; for we may appeal to 
the results of all the experiments upon the 
'span of consciousness' or the 'range of atten- 
tion.' I begin with Dietze's determination of 
what Wundt still terms the 'Umfang des Be- 
wusstseins.' ^^ The observer in these experiments 
listened to series of metronome beats, which 
were separated into groups by the sound of a 
bell; the problem was to discover the upper 
limit at which two successive series might be 
discriminated, without counting, as of different 
lengths. We are interested just now, not in 
the numerical results, but in the state of con- 
sciousness. Dietze writes on this topic as fol- 
lows: "Bedingung der Zusammenfassung einer 
gegebenen Anzahl von Vorstellungen in eine 
Reihe ist, . . . dass, wenn nach Ablauf der 
Reihe eine neue, in gleichem Zeitintervall fol- 
gende . . . Vorstellung appercipirt wird, in die- 
sem Moment die erste Vorstellung eben erst auf 
der Schwelle des Bewusstseins angelangt ist. 



234 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

. . . Der Grad der Klarheit der gleichzeitig 
anwesenden Vorstellungen wird nun einmal 
abhangen von der jeweiligen Entfernung der 
Vorstellungen vom Blickpunkt des Bewusstseins 
und zweitens von der Energie, mit welcher die 
Vorstellungen appercipirt worden sind;''^^ the 
ideas show a gradation of clearness, which in 
part is a simple function of time elapsed, in part 
depends on the emphasis of subjective accentua- 
tion. Wundt writes to the same effect, though 
less cautiously, in the Physiologische Psycholo- 
gie. ''In dem Moment, wo ein neuer Reiz 
... in den Blickpunkt des Bewusstseins tritt, 
werden stets die vorangegangenen noch in 
abgestufter Klarheit vorhanden sein.'' ''Die 
unmittelbar vorangegangenen Eindriicke sind 
. . . keineswegs aus dem Bewusstsein, ja die 
nachsten nicht einmal ganz aus dem engeren 
Focus der Aufmerksamkeit verschwunden, son- 
dern sie treten nur allmahlich in den dunkleren 
Umkreis des inneren Blickfeldes zuriick. Hier 
verdunkeln sie sich dann um so mehr, je weiter 
sie durch die inzwischen abgelaufene Reihe von 
dem momentan appercipirten Eindruck getrennt 
sind, bis sie endlich bei einem bestimmten 
Punkte aus dem Bewusstsein verschwinden." ^^ 
I shall not discuss the general question, how 
far or in what sense these experiments serve to 



THE TWO LEVELS 235 

measure the span of consciousness. But I must 
take issue with Wundt's introspective interpreta- 
tion. We are to suppose that the metronome 
beats march out of consciousness, in single file, 
each one growing dimmer and dimmer until it 
finally crosses the conscious limen and dis- 
appears. Now look at that statement logically. 
You remember that the sounds are not all 
equally clear; some of them are subjectively 
accentuated. Suppose, then, that an eight- 
membered rhythmical unit is passing out of 
consciousness. The first member is relatively 
very clear; the second member is relatively 
obscure. Will the first pass out before the 
second ? It ought not to do this ; it is only one 
place ahead in the order of time, while it is three 
places ahead in the order of clearness, of rhyth- 
mical accent. Logically, the prior but clear 
term should remain after the later but obscure 
term has disappeared. 

I know that logic is not psychology ; but then 
psychology is not, either, illogical. You may, 
however, urge that the unit in the present in- 
stance is the complete rhythmical form, not the 
single metronome stroke; and that the rhyth- 
mical units may tail off in consciousness in the 
way that Wundt describes. Wundt speaks, 
definitely, of the individual Schallreiz; but I 



236 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

will accept the amendment. The appeal then 
lies to introspection : do we actually find the 
gradations of clearness, as between unit and 
unit, incoming and outgoing ideas ? Schumann, 
who engaged Wundt in a controversy on this 
matter, finds no trace of them. "'So oft ich 
auch bei den obigen Experimenten versucht 
habe, etwas von den in den dunklen Umkreis 
des inneren Blickfeldes zuriicktretenden Vor- 
stellungen zu bemerken, so ist es mir doch nie 
gelungen und ebensowenig den Versuchsperso- 
nen [among whom was Miiller], welche ich 
darauf aufmerksam machte.'' Schumann's own 
explanation is couched in terms of sensory and 
motor Einstellung, feelings of fulfilled or dis- 
appointed expectation.^^ 

On the negative side, my own introspection 
agrees with that of Schumann and his observers ; 
I cannot put my finger on the train of vanishing 
ideas. On the positive side, I think that Schu- 
mann's account holds under certain conditions, 
— not under all. But even if we accept the 
theory of a 'simultane Gesammtvorstellung,' 
there is no need to assume Wundt 's series of 
graded ideas; all sorts of surrogates are possible. 

I am sorry to have led you so far afield ; but 
there was no alternative. If Wundt's analysis 
were correct, we should have not only to give 



THE TWO LEVELS 237 

up our law of the two levels, but also, I believe, 
to recast a good portion of his own systematic 
teaching. I do not propose to do either, but 
to utilise Dietze's results in another direction. 
The important thing for our present purpose is 
this : that the experiments show, without any 
question, the coexistence of different degrees of 
clearness at the higher level of consciousness. 
While a rhythmical unit may be clear as a whole, 
its constituent elements vary in clearness-degree. 
The same thing holds of simultaneously pre- 
sented visual impressions, all of which fall 
within the area of distinct vision. ''Man be- 
merkt,'' says Wundt, ''ausser den deutlich apper- 
cipirten Eindriicken zunachst eine Anzahl 
anderer, die sich als 'halbdunker bezeichnen 
lassen : hier ist man im stande, einzelne nach- 
traglich durch angestrengte Aufmerksamkeit auf 
das reproducirte Bild des Gesammteindrucks zu 
erkennen. Daneben existirt aber immer noch 
ein weiteres, 'ganz dunkles' Feld, bei dem man 
nur iiberhaupt feststellen kann, dass irgend 
etwas da war." ^^ This last, the 'wholly ob- 
scure ' field, belongs unquestionably — if I may 
trust my own observation — to the lower level 
of consciousness; the 'something there' is a 
something of precisely the same kind as the look 
of the tachistoscope itself, or of the black walls 



238 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

of the observing tube. But the other two grades, 
the 'clear' and the 'half obscure/ belong, as 
certainly, to the upper level. Let us see pre- 
cisely what the distinction means. 

When a tachistoscopic field is exposed for 
the first time to an unpractised observer, he will 
very probably fail to 'make out' anything at 
all; the lines or letters or geometrical figures 
are seen as a general impression, without dis- 
crimination of detail. Was, then, the field 
obscure ? Surely not ! The observer was ' at- 
tending' with all the concentration he could 
summon ; the field was the clearest thing in his 
consciousness. What he failed to do was to 
cognise. Cognition is not clearness; it is an 
associative process of the assimilative kind. 
Apperception and cognition are so usually con- 
joined, in our adult experience, that we may 
sometimes forget to separate them; but psy- 
chologically they are different things. When, 
then, the practised observer tells us that some of 
the details in the exposure-field are 'clear' and 
others 'half obscure,' he means that he has 
cognised the former and failed to cognise the 
latter ; all alike were clear, but the clearness did 
not, in all cases, suffice for cognition. The fact 
that the half-obscure elements are recoverable 
in the 'image of reproduction' shows that they 



THE TWO LEVELS 239 

were well within the field of clearness; the fact 
that they were not directly cognised shows that 
this field is not uniformly illuminated, that parts 
of it are more strongly accented than others, — 
just as, in the temporal field, there are degrees 
of clearness among the members of a rhythmical 
unit.^^ 

We must conclude, therefore, that — whatever 
is the case at the lower level — there are notice- 
able differences of clearness in the processes at 
the upper level of consciousness. It would be 
strange if there were not ! And one of the most 
interesting new departures in experimental psy- 
chology, to my mind, is the work now in progress 
in the Leipsic laboratory upon this very point. 
Attempts are being made to measure the differ- 
ences of clearness in focal contents, whether 
by determining the limen of change at various 
parts of a spatial field or by comparing the times 
of reaction obtained with varying distribution 
of attention. ^^ Here is the beginning of a new 
chapter in scientific psychology; and here is 
Wundt handling the problems of attention as 
masterfully as when he first began to experiment 
nearly fifty years ago. 

We are now, I think, at the point where it is 
fitting to refer to James and his conscious 
'fringes.' Ordinarily, the distinction which 



240 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

James draws is taken to be the same as that 
drawn by Morgan in the terms 'focal' and 
'marginal/ ''The margin of mental processes/' 
says Angell, "outside the focal point of atten- 
tion, constitutes what James calls the 'fringe of 
consciousness/''^^ No doubt there are plenty 
of passages in which this use may be found. 
But if we turn to the locus classicus, the chapter 
on the 'Stream of Thought/ I think it is clear 
that James is dealing throughout with the upper 
level of consciousness, the field of attention. 
He comes to his "psychic overtone, suffusion, 
or fringe" by way of 'transitive states,' 'feelings 
of relation,' 'feelings of tendency.' And his 
point is that "every definite image in the mind 
is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows 
round it." I do not understand that the 'free 
water' is flowing at a lower level, but simply 
that — within the area of attention — it is less 
stable and therefore less clear than the 'definite 
image.' "The fringe ... is part of the object 
cognised, — substantive qualities and things ap- 
pearing to the mind in a fringe of relations. 
Some parts — the transitive parts — of our 
stream of thought cognise the relations rather 
than the things." James is considering the 
'cognitive function of different states of mind/ 
"Knowledge about a thing is knowledge of its 



THE TWO LEVELS 241 

relations. ... Of most of its relations we are 
only aware in the penumbral nascent way of a 
'fringe' of unarticulated affinities about it.'' 
This penumbra is surely the analogue of the 
marginal impressions in tachistoscopic experi- 
ments, the impressions that are apperceived but 
not cognised. I do not want to labour clumsily 
at a thing that James has treated with all his 
accustomed lightness and freshness of touch, — 
but I think it is pretty obvious that, in this part 
of his psychology of cognition, James is primarily 
concerned with the upper conscious level. He 
is distinguishing degrees of clearness within the 
clear, not distinguishing clearness from ob- 
scurity. That distinction he discusses in the 
following section, in its relation to interest and 
attention, accentuation and emphasis.^^ — 

In fine, then, a diagram of consciousness 
would show, in terms of the foregoing analysis, 
a two-level formation, broader below and nar- 
rower above, — the relative width and height 
of the two stages differing at different times. 
The surfaces are not smooth; the upper cer- 
tainly, the low^er probably, is creased or wrinkled. 
The number and depth of the wrinkles will 
depend upon circumstances: upon the condi- 
tions of clearness as an attribute of sensation, 
and upon the more complicated conditions 



242 THE LAWS OP ATTENTION: I 

which govern the degree of clearness of the part- 
contents of ideas. So much we can, perhaps, 
say with a fair amount of confidence.^^ But the 
really hopeful thing, for experimental psy- 
chology, is the programme of further work, the 
long array of definite problems that our review, 
ever so hasty as it is, has already brought to 
light. We can hardly be on a wrong track if 
perspectives open as they are opening to-day to 
the students of attention. 

We may look, in the third place, (3) at the 
temporal relations of attention, as expressed in 
the laws of accommodation and of inertia. ''Die 
Aufmerksamkeit," says Stumpf, ''braucht eine 
gewisse Zeit, um sich dem Eindruck s. z. s. 
zu accommodiren, um ihr Maximum zu er- 
reichen.'' ^^ The fact here alluded to is familiar 
to all of us in connection with the reaction ex- 
periment; for the simple reaction, the optimal 
accommodation-time — the optimal interval be- 
tween signal and stimulus — is about 1.5 seconds, 
while for transit-observations it is apparently a 
little shorter, about 1 second. Attention is, 
however, flexible, labile; we are able, as Wundt 
points out, to adapt ourselves, within certain 
limits, to rhythms of different period, just as we 
can adapt ourselves to different intensities and 
qualities of stimulus.^^ 



ACCOMMODATION OF ATTENTION 243 

It would be quite wrong, however, to identify 
this 'accommodation' of attention with the rise 
of a particular sensation to maximal clearness. 
We have a number of determinations, beginning 
in the early sixties and extending down to the 
present day, of the Ansteigen of sensations ; ^^ 
and as they were all made in the state of con- 
centrated attention, the times which they fur- 
nish may be taken as the times required for a 
stimulus, acting under the most favourable con- 
ditions, to produce its full conscious effect. 
These, therefore, are the times that a psychology 
of clearness must analyse and interpret. The 
accommodation-time is rather the time required 
for peripheral or central Einstellung, — for the 
accommodation of a sense-organ, or for the 
establishment of a psychophysical disposition; 
it gives us the temporal limen, not of clearness, 
but of certain conditions of clearness. 

Let me quote you an observation of Pills- 
bury's. ''Si, tandis qu'on lit, vient un desir 
soudain de savoir I'heure, les images de la 
pendule rappelees a la conscience se presentent 
avant que le mouvement ne commence, et il y 
a un intervalle considerable entre Tinstant ou 
les yeux sont fixes sur la pendule sans adaptation 
complete et celui ou I'image est assez nette pour 
que Ton aitconnaissancede Theure."^^ Pillsbury 



244 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

is arguing that peripheral adaptation is subse- 
quent to attention itself. If, however, we read 
'clearness' for 'attention,' the facts wear a little 
different appearance. I want to know the time, 
and I look across the room at the clock. The 
clock is, at once, the clearest thing in conscious- 
ness; but it is not yet maximally clear, clear 
enough for cognition. To see the position of the 
hands, I must wait for the 'accommodation of 
attention,' i.e. for the adjustment of the mechan- 
ism of visual accommodation. This peripheral 
adjustment is one of the conditions of maximal 
clearness. Before accommodation is effected, 
I am in much the same position as one who is 
listening to a lecturer whose voice is too weak 
to carry across the room. The sounds heard are, 
again, the clearest things in consciousness; but 
they, too, fall short of the degree of clearness 
necessary to cognition, because intensity — one 
of the conditions of maximal clearness — is 
lacking to them. 

The law of 'accommodation of attention' is a 
real law; it covers a large number of facts of 
observation. But it is a law of the conditions 
of clearness, or, if you like, a law of the total 
attentive consciousness, rather than of clearness 
itself ; and in an elementary psychology of atten- 
tion we shall do well to pass it over, and to limit 



INERTIA OF ATTENTION 245 

ourselves to the interpretation of the Anstieg. 
Very much the same thing, I think, holds of the 
law of inertia, to which I now turn. 

The law is formulated by Fechner as follows : 
^'es behagt uns bis zu gewissen Grenzen mehr, 
in einer einmal eingehaltenen Richtung und 
hiemit Beschaftigung der Aufmerksamkeit zu 
verharren, als sie zu verlassen, die Beschaftigung 
zu unterbrechen " ; and by Stumpf, in similar 
terms, as follows: ''die Aufmerksamkeit halt 
leichter etwas bereits Gegebenes fest, als sie 
etwas zu Suchendes findet."^^ It covers a wide 
range of experience : that you can follow the 
movement of a single instrument in the orches- 
tra better, when there has been solo-playing 
before, than when the whole number of instru- 
ments begin together; that you can finish a 
conversation, once begun, at a distance which 
would render the w^ords of an unexpected ques- 
tion altogether inaudible ; that you can trace the 
upward course of a fire-balloon to a point at 
which it would otherwise be quite invisible. 
These are matters of perception ; but there are 
analogies in plenty in the realm of ideas. It is 
difiicult to break away from a current train of 
thought, and to give your full attention to a 
letter or a visitor ; it is difficult to come back to 
your scientific work when you have been bothered 
by details of business or administration. 



246 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: I 

These are important facts; and they have 
been taken account of, in various ways, by ex- 
perimental psychology. But they seem to me 
to be facts which, on the psychophysical side, re- 
late to the conditions of clearness, — peripheral 
adaptation, psychophysical disposition. Perse- 
verationstendenz,'^^ — and, on the psychological, 
to the time relations of the total attentive con- 
sciousness. They are therefore beyond the range 
of our present consideration. An elementary 
psychology will deal with the sensation, under 
its aspect of clearness; it will determine the 
least time interval between two maximal clear- 
nesses in the same and disparate senses; and 
it will measure the carrying power of clearness, 
the amount of fluctuation which may be intro- 
duced into a continuous stimulus without im- 
pairment of sensible continuity. Here, again, 
there are methods ready for our use, and a body 
of experimental results awaiting our interpreta- 
tion.^^ And the law of inertia offers us problems 
of ever increasing complexity. For, since inertia 
is the opposite of motility, and the carrying 
power of clearness is the opposite of our liability 
to distraction, the determinations which I have 
just mentioned must be made under all sorts of 
conditions, and we shall be led on, as it were, by 
force of circumstance, from sensation to the 



INERTIA OF ATTENTION 247 

simpler complexes, and from these to con- 
sciousness itself. 

So far, I think that my proposal of a simplified 
psychology of attention has been justified, — 
although I realise to the full the schematic char- 
acter of this treatment of the subject. In the 
next Lecture we shall see how it fares with still 
other laws of attention. 



VII 

THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 



LECTURE VII 

THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

I HAVE suggested that an elementary psy- 
chology of attention will deal, not with the 
facts of attentional accommodation, but rather 
with the ' rise ' of the single sensation ; that it will 
begin, not with the gross facts of attentional 
inertia, but rather w^ith the absolute temporal 
limen and the carrying power of clearness under 
simple conditions. I have been careful to say 
that the results of experiment in these fields must 
be 'interpreted' by a psychology of attention; 
the factors that make for clearness must be 
separated from the other conditions involved, 
and must if possible be separately estimated or 
'weighted.' We get a hint towards this analysis 
in the fourth law that I shall mention, — (4) the 
law of prior entry. The stimulus for which we 
are predisposed requires less time than a like 
stimulus, for which we are unprepared, to pro- 
duce its full conscious effect. Or, in popular 
terms, the object of attention comes to conscious- 
ness more quickly than the objects that we are 

not attending to. 

251 



252 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION : II 

We have rough-and-ready illustrations of this 
law in various features of the reaction experi- 
ment.^ Many of the effects that we ascribe to 
'practice/ in the most diverse kinds of experi- 
mental work, also fall under the same heading. 
A strict test, of the elementary sort, would con- 
sist in the comparative measurement of the 
Anstieg and of the absolute temporal limen, 
first with complete predisposition, and secondly 
under measurable distraction.^ Unfortunately, 
as we shall see later, measurable distraction is 
still a problem for the future. 

In the meantime, we have a qualitative demon- 
stration of the law of prior entry in Stevens' 
inversion of the complication experiment.^ The 
arrangement is very simple. We take a bell 
metronome, and a cardboard arc whose radius 
is the length of the metronome pendulum. 
Scale divisions of 5° are laid off upon the cir- 
cumference, and the arc — with the zero-point 
of the scale corresponding to the position of 
equilibrium of the pendulum — is impaled upon 
the eye which serves to lock the lid of the metro- 
nome. The white cardboard thus forms a 
background, in front of which the pendulum 
oscillates. A piece of red paper, cut to the 
shape of an arrow-head, is spitted upon the end 
of the pendulum. The metronome is set to the 



PRIOR ENTRY 



253 



rate of, say, 72 in the one minute, and the bell 
rings at every complete oscillation. The posi- 
tion of objective coincidence of bell-stroke and 
arrow-head may be found, approximately, by 
slowly moving the pendulum with the hand 
until the bell sounds; in our instrument, it 
comes at about 22^. The experiment is then 
performed in two ways. First, the observer 




Fig. 6. Simple Complication Pendulum. 

attends to the moving pointer ; the sound of the 
bell is secondary, — it floats, so to say, upon 
the main current of visual change. Under these 
conditions, the pointer carries the bell out; an 
average determination of subjective coincidence 
is 30°. Secondly, the observer attends to the 
bell; the movement of the pendulum is now 
secondary, — the expected bell-strokes stand 



254 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

out upon an indifferent shifting field. Under 
these conditions the temporal displacement of 
the sound is negative, not positive ; the point of 
subjective coincidence lies, on the average, be- 
tween 10° and 15°. It is very clear that the 
stimulus for which we are predisposed has the 
advantage over its rival. 

I call this observation the 'inversion' of the 
complication experiment, because in it the direc- 
tion of attention is prescribed, whereas, in the 
complication experiment proper, there is no 
preliminary instruction, and attention is appealed 
to only after the event, as an explanatory prin- 
ciple. You will, however, expect me to say 
something about the temporal displacement in 
complications, — a fact which, until the appear- 
ance of Geiger's paper in 1903,^ was one of the 
most disputed and least understood in the whole 
range of experimental psychology. I think that 
Geiger's introspective analyses give us a defini- 
tive insight into the mechanism of the 'compli- 
cated' consciousness, although, doubtless, there 
is work of detail still to be done. 

You remember the circumstances. A pointer 
revolves at uniform rate before a scaled clock- 
face. At some moment of its revolution, un- 
known to the observer, a bell is sounded. The 
observer is to report the point of subjective coin- 



PRIOR ENTRY 255 

cidence of sight and sound, the moment of forma- 
tion of an Herbartian 'complication/^ Intro- 
spection varies very considerably with variation 
of conditions; but the important and curious 
result is that, under certain conditions, the bell- 
stroke suffers a negative displacement ; it is 
conjoined, in consciousness, with a division of 
the scale which the pointer has already passed 
when the objective sound is introduced. The 
sound is 'thrown back'; it is heard 'too early/ 
What is the explanation ? 

Very different explanations have been sug- 
gested. One of the first investigators, von 
Tchisch, sought an analogy in the premature 
reaction.^ Theoretically, he says, two things are 
possible : the visual perception may be delayed, 
or the auditory anticipated. Now there is no 
assignable reason for delay. "Es ist dagegen 
leicht zu erklaren, dass moment ane Reize vor 
ihrem Erscheinen appercipirt werden.'' In re- 
action experiments with a constant interval be- 
tween signal and stimulus you find a gradual 
reduction of the reaction time; the values be- 
come very small, and finally reach zero, — "die 
Reactionszeit . . . wird negativ.'' Just the 
same thing happens in the complication experi- 
ment; each recurring bell-stroke is the 'signal' 
for the next following, the 'stimulus.' "Durch 



256 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

dieses Wiederholen wird die Apperception nicht 
nur vorbereitet, sondern dieselbe reproducirt 
unmittelbar den Eindruck. Mithin sind das die 
Bedingungen unter welchen wir horen, fiihlen, 
ehe der Reiz thatsachlich zustandekommt/' 

Ideas of this sort were natural enough in 1885, 
when the psychology of the simple reaction was 
still crude, — though von Tchisch might, per- 
haps, have learned better from the Physiologische 
Psychologie of 1880.'^ But, whether natural or 
not, they are psychologically impossible. ''The 
explanation,"' says James, ''requires us to be- 
lieve that an observer . . . shall steadily and 
without exception get an hallucination of a bell- 
stroke before the latter occurs, and not hear the 
real bell-stroke afterwards. I doubt whether this 
is possible, and I can think of no analogue to it 
in the rest of our experience." ^ We may all 
subscribe to this criticism. Indeed, the ex- 
planation satisfied nobody ; every later psycholo- 
gist who has discussed the complication experi- 
ment has sought to improve upon it. Sometimes, 
recourse has been had to physiological factors, 
the quick rise of auditory and the slow rise of 
visual sensations; sometimes to psychological, 
the interruption of the visual perception of 
movement and the substitution therefor of a 
perception of position; sometimes the explana- 



PRIOR ENTRY 257 

tion has gone still further afield, to the observer's 
desh'e to make a good showing, to do as well 
in observation as his fellows.^ All unnecessary- 
labour ! Wundt had given the right cue, in his 
doctrine of the ''Spannungswachsthum der Auf- 
merksamkeit" ^^; it was only needful to follow 
up the cue into the labyrinth of observational 
detail. 

Suppose that a naive observer takes his place 
before the complication clock; and suppose that 
the rate of revolution is moderate, so that the 
bell-stroke sounds once in every 1.5 seconds. 
The observer follows the pointer with his eye, 
and in the very first revolution refers the sound 
to some region of the circle. Notice that it is a 
region; the sound seems to spread over, to be 
coincident with, a fairly wide range of scale 
marks. The second revolution narrows this 
region ; the third narrows it still more, — and 
so on, until finally there are only a few scale 
divisions, one or two on either side of the objec- 
tively correct position, with which the bell 
appears to coincide. In the meantime, attention 
has been sharpening to the sound; and, more 
than that, an accommodation of attention has 
taken place ; the observer is predisposed to hear 
the bell at a certain instant. The instant ar- 
rives ; the sound is apperceived, rises to maximal 



258 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

clearness, in a minimum of time ; and the result 
is that scale marks which the pointer had trav- 
ersed before the hammer struck are themselves 
apperceived, come to the focus of attention, only 
along with the objectively later complicating 
stimulus. '' [Der Schall] tiberholt gleichsam [die 
Theilstriche] auf dem Wege zur Apperception/' ^^ 
It is all a matter of prior entry, due to definite 
predisposition of the attention; and the puzzle 
arises simply from the continuity of the visual 
movement. Had there been one sound and one 
sight, and had the sound come to consciousness 
before the (objectively simultaneous) sight, no 'one 
would have wondered. It is the backthrow of 
the sound which surprises us ; and yet that back- 
throw is, under the conditions, the inevitable 
result of attention al accommodation. 

I need not go into this question at greater 
length ; you will find a full and clear discussion 
in Geiger's article. I quote only a few sentences 
from the Physiologische Psychologic of the same 
year. " [Die negativen Zeitverschiebungen] sind 
natiirlich nicht so aufzufassen, als wenn man 
einen Reiz wahrnehme, noch ehe er wirklich 
stattfindet ; sondern in eine Reihe von Gesichts- 
eindriicken, die im Bewusstsein die simultane, 
aber stetig fliessende Vorstellung eines Zeitver- 
laufs bilden, tritt ein moment aner Schall- oder 



LIMITED RANGE 259 

Tasteindruck ein, der als solcher nur mit irgend 
einem einzelnen Punkt dieser Zeitvorstellung 
associirt werden kann : mit welchem, dies hangt 
lediglich von den Bedingungen theils des Ein- 
drucks selbst, theils seiner Apperception ab. 
Je mehr die Aufmerksamkeit auf ihn gespannt 
ist, um so mehr wird er an den Anfang der ihm 
zugeordneten Zeitstrecke des Gesichtssinnes ver- 
schoben, je mehr jene Spannung erschwert ist 
oder aus irgend einen Ursachen abnimmt, um 
so mehr riickt er gegen das Ende derselben. . . . 
Es wird stets gleichzeitig gehort und gesehen; 
aber der Umfang, in dem die beiden nebenein- 
ander hergehenden Vorstellungsreihen zusam- 
men im Bewusstsein anwesend sind, lasst der 
Verbindung beider einen Spielraum, innerhalb 
dessen nun theils den ausseren Bedingungen 
theils und vornehmlich der Aufmerksamkeit der 
entscheidende Einfluss zukommt." ^^ 

Unless, then, I am unduly optimistic, the 
negative displacement of the bell-jstroke, in 
complication experiments, need give psycholo- 
gists no further trouble. I pass to a brief con- 
sideration of (5) the law of limited range. 

You recall the facts. If a group of objects, 
all of which lie within the scope of clear vision, 
is momentarily exposed by means of some 



260 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

tachistoscopic arrangement, a practised observer 
is able to cognise from four to six of them 'by 
a single act of attention/ It makes no difference 
whether the objects are lines, or geometrical 
figures, or numbers, or letters, or short words; 
under all these conditions, the range of clearness 
is approximately the same. Hence you find, in 
the current text-books of psychology, the state- 
ment that the grasp of visual attention covers 
from four to six simultaneously presented simple 
impressions/^ 

Ebbinghaus takes issue with this statement. 
"Die so erhaltenen Werte . . . sind als Um- 
fangsbestimmungen der Aufmerksamkeit zwei- 
fellos zu hoch." He points out that "das 
gleichzeitig aufgefasste immer nur ... als ein 
Ganzes mit mehreren Teilen erkannt wird''; 
we are dealing, not with four to six separate 
objects, but with separately distinguished parts 
of an unitary whole. He argues, however, from 
the results of the complication experiment, "dass 
[die Seele] auf zwei voneinander ganz unab- 
hangige Reihen einfacher Eindriicke langere 
Zeit hindurch gleichzeitig aufmerksam bleiben 
kann, ja daneben noch imstande ist . . . man- 
cherlei Ueberlegungen zur besseren Losung der 
Aufgabe anzustellen.'' In simple cases, then, 
"kann die Aufmerksamkeit ohne Schwierigkeit 



LIMITED RANGE 261 

zwei, aussersten Falls vielleicht drei, voneinander 
ganz unabhangigen Dingen zuge wandt werden . " ^* 
If we accept this discussion as it stands, the 
number of objects simultaneously apprehensible 
by the attention reduces from four or six to two 
or three. But I think that Ebbinghaus has mis- 
read his authorities. One would hardly gather, 
from his text, that Wundt, in the Physiologische 
Psychologies had laid equal stress upon the uni- 
tary character of the tachistoscopic field. Yet 
Wundt says, definitely: ''immer bildet dieses 
Feld der Apperception eine einheitliche Vorstel- 
lung, indem wir die einzelnen Theile desselben 
zu einem Ganzen verbinden. So verbindet die 
Apperception eine Mehrheit von Schallein- 
drticken zu eiiiej- Klang- oder Gerauschvorstell- 
ung, eine Mehrzahl von Sehobjecten zu einem Ge- 
sichtsbild." And again : ^^man bemerkt iibrigens 
leicht, dass sich die Eindriicke auch dann, wenn 
sie nicht Bestandtheile einer schon gelaufigen 
Vorstellung sind, doch zu einem zusammenge- 
horigen Bilde vereinigen." ^^ Can anything be 
plainer.^ Ebbinghaus' '^reichhaltige und ge- 
gliederte Einheit,'' which is apprehended as a 
whole while certain divisions or subdivisions 
stand out in clear isolation, — ''mehr oder 
minder deutlich gesondert, " ^^ — is no new dis- 
covery, but a transcript of the Wundtian doctrine. 



262 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

The other side of Ebbinghaus' exposition is 
similarly open to criticism. The bell-stroke and 
the visual impressions of the complication experi- 
ment are, as stimuli, disparate, addressed to diif er- 
ent sense-departments. But psychologically they 
are by no means'' voneinanderganzunabhangig.'* 
On the contrary, the sound, after a very few ob- 
servations, becomes organically related to the 
movement of the pointer; the two things seem 
to go together naturally, to belong to each other ; 
there is no disparateness in idea. There re- 
main the 'mancherlei Ueberlegungen ' ; but so 
far as my experience goes — and Geiger bears 
me out ^^ — these reflections exist only in Ebbing- 
haus' imagination. 

The case stands, therefore, as follows. When- 
ever in the state of attention two stimuli are given 
simultaneously or in immediate succession, they 
form a connected whole; that is the most 
general law of association, in Ebbinghaus' phras- 
ing.^ ^ From this point of view, then, the field of 
attention is limited always to one complex, a 
single associated whole. The question of the 
range of attention thus becomes the question of 
the conscious articulation of the unitary complex. 
In psychological terms it runs : How many part- 
contents are, under the most favourable condi- 
tions, distinguishable within the whole .^ In 



TEMPORAL INSTABILITY 263 

psychophysical terms: How many stimuli may 
become clear in consciousness at one and the same 
time ? And the current answers, although they 
are liable to experimental revision, may be taken 
as valid for their day and generation. 

We are on much more difficult ground when 
we turn (6) to the law of temporal instability, j J 
This law, also, may be approached from the side 
either of descriptive psychology and the atten- 
tive consciousness, or of experimental psychology 
and the attribute of clearness. 

According to Wundt, attention is discontinu-^ I 
ous from force of circumstances and intermittent I 
by its very nature. It is discontinuous because 1 
ideas come and go in consciousness, and atten- / 
tion grasps but one idea at a time : '' zwischen Her 
Apperception je zweier auf einander folgender 
Vorstellungen wird immer eine Zwischenzeit 
liegen, in der die eine schon zu weit gesunken, 
die andere noch nicht zureichend gehoben ist, 
um klar appercipirt zu werden." It is also in- 
trinsically intermittent. "Dauernd eine Vor- 
stellung mit der Aufmerksamkeit festzuhalten ist, 
wie die Erf ahrung lehrt, schlechthin unmoglich : 
. . . ein dauernder Eindruck kann nur festge- 
halten werden, indem Momente der Spannung 
und der Abspannung derselben mit einander 



w 



264 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

wechseln. Auf diese Weise ist die Auimerk- 
samkeit ihrem Wesen nach eine intermittirende 
Function/' '^ 

In his remarks on discontinuity, I think that 
Wundt has in mind what he himself elsewhere 
terms a limiting case, the typical associative 
consciousness of the English school.^^ For, so 
far as introspection goes, we may attend, con- 
tinuously and unremittingly, for very consider- 
able periods: we read a novel or a scientific 
monograph at a sitting, we follow a whole act of 
grand opera, we work at our special subject for 
two or three or four hours at a time, without 
sensible interruption of attention. There are 
objective interruptions, of course : we stop read- 
ing to pursue a train of thought, to work out a 
difficulty, to cut the pages of the book ; we look 
away from the stage to exchange a remark with 
our neighbour; we get up to verify a reference, 
or we pause to slip a fresh sheet of paper into the 
typewriter. And these interruptions illustrate, 
often enough, the labile, instable character of 
attention; we drop from our high level of 
concentration to 'take things easily,' to 'let 
our mind wander' for a while. But instability 
is not discontinuity ; and, in the experiences now 
under consideration, instability itself is not the 
universal rule. We may very possibly give our 



TEMPORAL INSTABILITY 265 

full attention, without lapse of any sort, to the 
question asked of us, or to the accurate adjust- 
ment of the new sheet; or, contrariwise, we may 
hold firmly to our original topic, and speak and 
act automatically. All these cases demand closer 
analysis; but on the whole James' statement — • 
that ''thought is sensibly continuous " ^^ — seems 
to me to be nearer the facts, and nearer also to 
Wundt's general psychological doctrine, than the 
counter-assertion that attention is discontinu- 
ous. I should question the appearance of dis- 
continuity even in extreme instances of successive 
association . ' ' Dauernde Auf merksamkeit , ' ' says 
Ebbinghaus, ''gibt es nur bei einem stetigen 
Wechsel der Inhalte, in deren Hervortreten das 
Aufmerksamsein besteht."^^ The 'nur' we have 
still to discuss; but we may surely agree that 
attention can be sustained, and that the shift of 
ideas is continuous. 

What, then, of the Apperceptionswellen ? Is 
attention intrinsically intermittent, and is it im- 
possible to hold a single, simple content steadily 
in the focus of consciousness ? 

We must not demand too much. Conscious- 
ness is always in flux, and ' dauernd ' is a relative 
term. Sensible quality, for instance, cannot 
maintain itself in consciousness for any length of 
time; wherever there is sensory adaptation — 



266 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

in pressure, in temperature, in sight, in smell, 
to some extent in taste — there is also gradual 
change or disappearance of quality. The condi- 
tions of clearness, central predisposition and 
peripheral accommodation, may be given; but 
the quality will still fade out. Yet we do not 
speak of quality as an intrinsically intermittent 
attribute of sensation ! What is the evidence, 
then, in the case of attention, of clearness itself ? 
It is necessary, at this point, to change the 
venue to the laboratory, because descriptive psy- 
chology cannot distinguish between discontinuity, 
due to the come-and-go of ideas, and intrinsic 
intermittence. The chief and obvious reason 
that we are unable, under the conditions of every- 
day life, to hold fast to a single idea is that other, 
invading and competing ideas oust it from the 
conscious focus. Only experiment, therefore, 
can decide regarding the 'fluctuation' of atten- 
tion. And experiment, as you know, has been at 
work with ever increasing frequency since 1875. 
Investigations have been made by the help of 
'minimal' stimuli, — stimuli that are so small or 
so weak or so little different from their surround- 
ings that the least slip of attention, the slightest 
loss of clearness, will mean their complete dis- 
appearance from consciousness; it is far easier 
to say that we do or do not hear or see something 



TEMPORAL INSTABILITY 267 

than it is to be sure that what we see or hear 
has grown more or less clear. Visual, auditory, 
and cutaneous stimuli have been employed : 
light and colour, tone and noise, mechanical 
pressure and the interrupted current. The ques- 
tions at issue may be formulated, in logical order, 
as follows : Does fluctuation occur in all sense- 
departments ? Are the conditions of fluctuation, 
where it occurs, central or peripheral ? And, if 
they are central, are they the conditions of 'at- 
tention ' ? We begin with the question of sense- 
departments. 

Lange, who was the first systematically to in- 
vestigate the subject, found fluctuation in all 
three, — sight (Masson disc), hearing (watch- 
tick) and touch (inductiqn current). Let 
us confine ourselves for the moment to touch. 
Fluctuations of electro-cutaneous sensations were 
later observed by Lehmann ; and fluctuations of 
areal pressure by Wiersma. On the other hand, 
Ffixn^e ^and Gei ssler, working recently in mj own 
laboratory, have been unable to confirm these 
results. Ferree reports briefly that ''liminal 
pressure stimuli [very smooth cork wafers sup- 
porting minimal weights] were applied to 
several observers, but no fluctuations were expe- 
rienced''; and that with liminal electro-cutane- 
ous stimulation at the tip of the tongue ''no 



268 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

fluctuations of intensity could be detected, al- 
though repeated attempts were made on a num- 
ber of observers." Geissler, who repeated and 
extended the experiments of Wiersma and Fer- 
ree, comes to the same conclusion. "Under 
favourable circumstances, attention focussed 
upon liminal and supraliminal cutaneous sensa- 
tions remains approximately constant for at least 
two to three minutes, provided that physiological 
adaptation of the sense-organ and violently 
obtruding distractions can be avoided for this 
length of time.'' The Hwo to three minutes' is 
a conservative estimate; the time was often ex- 
ceeded, and on one occasion a trained observer 
reported no fluctuation for ten minutes ! How 
much longer he might have attended we do not 
know; at the end of the ten minutes his obser- 
vation was interrupted by the experimenter, 
who thought that something was the matter. 

This absence of fluctuation in the sphere of 
touch — if we may accept it as fact — strongly 
suggests that the conditions of fluctuation at large 
are not central but peripheral. For the skin has 
no special mechanism of accommodation, and 
possesses but a poor substitute in the ' Tastzuck- 
ungen' that Czermak noticed in his blind ob- 
servers. Involuntary tremors in the hand were 
a minor source of disturbance in Geissler's ex- 



TEMPORAL INSTABILITY 269 

periments. We might argue, therefore, that 
fluctuation will appear only where there is a 
peripheral apparatus for accommodation, and 
that the appeal to central conditions is unneces- 
sary. Unfortunately, as we shall see, the issue 
is more complicated.^^ — 

Aside from touch, we have a reported failure 
of fluctuation in the case of auditory stimuli. 
The experimental results are, however, contra- 
dictory; Heinrich, whose observations upon tones 
were in part confirmed in the Cornell laboratory, 
finds no fluctuation, while Dunlap declares that 
''the fluctuations were unmistakably observed 
by each of the five subjects employed." The 
difference is, apparently, a matter of conditions, 
which must be further studied. I return to the 
point presently .^^ 

Our second question was that of the peripheral 
or central seat of the fluctuations; and, in turning 
to it, we shall naturally think, first of all, of the 
mechanisms of accommodation. There can, 
however, be no doubt that their presence is not 
essential. Visual fluctuations have been observed 
by Pace during temporary paralysis of the muscles 
of accommodation, and by Slaughter and Ferree 
in the case of aphacic subjects; auditory fluc- 
tuations occur, according to Urbantschitsch and 
Eckener, despite the lack of a tympanic mem- 



270 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

brane. At the same time, the occurrence of 
fluctuation when the mechanisms are absent does 
not prove that shift of accommodation has noth- 
ing to do with fluctuation in the normal organ, 
where they are present and in working order. 
And Heinrich maintains, as a matter of fact, that 
the fluctuation of visual point-areas corresponds 
with variation in the curvature of the lens, and 
that the fluctuation of minimal noises is due to 
" pulsatorische Aenderungen des tensor tympani 
in seinem Erregungszustande.''^^ 

It is impossible, in the present state of our 
problem, to take a definite stand for or against 
Heinrich's explanations. The peripheral theory 
which he represents obviously requires a central 
supplement; but that is not a decisive argument. 
What compels us to a suspension of judgment — 
perhaps even to a negative attitude, at least so 
far as vision is concerned — is the appearance 
of new observations and a new theory. Ferree 
has published two elaborate investigations, in 
which he seeks to show *'that the intermit- 
tences of sensation resulting from minimal visual 
stimuli . . . are, in reality, simply adaptation- 
phenomena somewhat obscured by the special 
conditions.'' '' Adaptation is, in itself, a continu- 
ous phenomenon, but its continuity is interfered 
with by eye-movement, blinking, etc. Through 



TEMPORAL INSTABILITY 271 

these influences, probably essentially through that 
of eye-movement alone, it becomes an inter- 
mittent process, whether the stimulus be liminal 
or intensive, provided that proper areas be used. 
The conditions are especially favourable for 
short periods of intermittence when the stimuli 
are liminal and of small area." The central idea 
of this theory, the combination of local adapta- 
tion and eye-movement, goes back at least as 
far as 1894 ; but the theory itself, as fitted to the 
phenomena of visual fluctuation, may justly be 
described as new. Ferree has worked it out for 
adaptation and for the converse of adaptation, 
the negative after-image ; he has taken account 
both of voluntary and of involuntary eye-move- 
ment; he has made observations in direct and 
in indirect vision ; he has determined the condi- 
tions under which fluctuation does and does not 
occur. In particular, he has been venturesome 
enough to announce a new discovery in physio- 
logical optics: ''eye-movement . . . determines 
or influences the washing or streaming over the 
retina of some material capable of directly affect- 
ing the visual processes.'' His chain of evidence 
is not yet complete, and I may be prejudiced in 
favour of an investigation which was begun and 
largely carried out in my laboratory; but it 
seems to me that Ferree's principles are likely 



272 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

to give us a dej&nitive solution of the problem 
of fluctuation in the sphere of vision. 

Hammer, like Ferree, appeals to local adapta- 
tion and slipping of fixation: ''doch ist es wohl 
iiberdies nicht unmoglich/' he says, ''dass der 
Adaptationsprozess gleichwie der negativen Nach- 
bilder seiner Natur nach intermittierend ist/' 
Ferree finds, however, that adaptation is 'a con- 
tinuous phenomenon,' and that ''fluctuation is 
not grounded in the nature of the after-image 
process/' Hammer then proceeds to report 
experiments on sound, and concludes — this is 
the point to which I said just now that I should 
recur — that there is no such thing as auditory 
fluctuation. ''Auf dem Gebiete des Gehors- 
sinns existieren iiberhaupt keine Aufmerksam- 
keitsfluktuationen." If that conclusion could 
be accepted, our path would be smooth indeed ! 
— no fluctuations in touch; no fluctuations in 
hearing, — the whole question of the role of the 
tensor in fluctuation shelved for ever; fluctuations 
in sight alone, and due in the case of sight to 
very special conditions residing in the function 
of the peripheral organ. But too many observers 
have recorded auditory fluctuation for us lightly 
to disregard the positive testimony; all that we 
may do, again, is to suspend judgment.^^ — 

We are not even yet out of the wood. For 



TEMPORAL INSTABILITY 273 

peripheral — or at least subcortical — conditions 
of fluctuation may be found, not only in the or- 
gans of sense themselves, but also in those syste- 
mic changes that are studied by the method of 
expression. The influence of the pulse, for in- 
stance, is attested by Stumpf , Mach, and Preyer 
for tones, and by Stumpf for visual stimuli.^'' 
The influence of respiration is mentioned by 
Helmholtz: ''ich erinnere daran, dass selbst die 
Athembewegungen auf das Eigenlicht der Netz- 
haut einwirken"; it has been traced also by 
Lehmann and Slaughter.^^ And within the last 
few years a series of investigations, carried out 
in Pillsbury's laboratory, has emphasised the 
correspondence of sensible fluctuation with the 
Traube-Hering wave of blood pressure. ^^ Exner 
had said, in 1894 : ''es liegt nahe, als Erklarungs- 
grund aller dieser Erscheinungen vasomoto- 
rische Ursachen anzunehmen''; and Pillsbury, 
in 1903, would explain the 'fluctuations of atten- 
tion' as ''a resultant of two physiological pro- 
cesses, of the degree of efficiency of the cortical 
cells, on the one hand, and of the state of excita- 
tion of the vasomotor centre on the other.'' ^^ 
In estimating this position, I feel a strong in- 
clination to shelter myself behind Pace, and to say 
simply : ''the results thus obtained are obviously 
of great importance ; and they are certainly open 



274 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

to various interpretations/'^^ For indeed criti- 
cism at this time and in this place is impossible; 
it must be criticism of detail, — of the interpreta- 
tion of records, of the differential value of control 
experiments, of the probability of rival theories. 
Slaughter uses the vasomotor phenomena in one 
way; but Fechner, and Fick and Giirber, and 
Lehmann, and now Ferree suggest other ways 
in which they may be turned to theoretical ac- 
count .^^ I am by no means convinced that 
Slaughter's hypothesis is the best. — 

Until we know more about these peripheral 
conditions it is, I think, useless to appeal to the 
centre. In particular, it is useless to raise our 
third question, and to attempt any characterisa- 
tion of possible central conditions. There are 
many psychologists who have a predilection for 
the cortex ; my own leaning is towards the sense- 
organ. But apart from that — or, if you like, 
because of that ! — I believe that experimental 
psychology has always made most progress when 
it has worked from without inwards: '^It is 
a healthy instinct," I have said elsewhere, ''that 
sends us back and back again to the channels 
of sense, as we seek an appreciation of the ful- 
ness and richness of the mental life.'' I do not 
deny that the cortex is concerned in the ' fluctua- 
tions of attention'; no one at the present time 



TEMPORAL INSTABILITY 275 



can make such denial. But I look for explana- 
tion from the behaviour of the sense-organs. 



33 



At this level of 'minimal stimuli/ then, the law 
of temporal instability will mean that the pe- 
ripheral conditions of clearness are intermittent. 
Whether the central predisposition persists or 
itself oscillates, during peripheral intermittence, 
is an open question. I think that the predispo- 
sition is sustained. Geissler is of the same 
opinion. Even Pace writes in similar vein. 
The attention, he says, ''must undergo a change 
of some kind when the stimulus disappears. . . . 
When the gray ring or band of light vanishes, the 
attention is divided between the memory-image 
of that which has just disappeared and the im- 
pression actually received from the general field. 
Again, while it may be said that the attitude of 
the attention in both phases of each fluctuation 
is one of expectancy, it is also true that the term 
of this expectation varies : in one phase, the ob- 
server awaits the disappearance of the stimulus, 
in the other, he looks for the reappearance of the 
stimulus." This 'change' of attention, 'divi- 
sion' of attention, shift of expectant attitude, — 
all this is very different from a fluctuation of 
attention, a more or less periodic rise and fall of 
attentional energy. There is nothing in Pace's 



\ 



276 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

language to bear out the Wundtian statement: 
"die Aufmerksamkeit ist ihrem Wesen nach eine 
inter mittirende Function/' ^* 

Let me add, for the avoidance of misunder- 
standing, that the law of temporal instability 
holds, without any question, for central predis- 
position in the large. The instances of continued 
attention that I gave some pages back were ex- 
treme instances; and even they, as I said, 
"'illustrate often enough the labile, instable char- 
acter of attention/'* But these fluctuations of 
the total attentive consciousness lie beyond our 
present horizon. 

There should, now, be a final law (7) of degree 
of clearness, — a law that would stand to clear- 
ness as Weber's Law stands to intensity of sen- 
sation, and as the various discriminative constan- 
cies stand to the qualitative, temporal and spatial 
attributes. ''The discovery of a reliable meas- 
ure of the attention," Ktilpe says, "would appear 
to be one of the most important problems that 
await solution by the experimental psychology 
of the future." ^^ The discovery has not yet been 
made; but we may devote a little space to 
methods. 

There seem to be two possible ways, a direct 

*P, 264. 



DEGREE OF CLEARNESS 277 

and an indirect, of 'measuring attention,' form- 
ing a scale of clearness-degrees, by appeal to the 
attentive consciousness. The first or direct way 
is to utilise the observer's introspections of clear- 
ness itself. Suppose that an observer has at- 
tained to maximal practice in some field, let us 
say, of discriminative sensitivity. Maximal prac- 
tice may, for experimental purposes, be con- 
sidered a constant. Suppose, again, that v^e have 
arranged a series of distracting stimuli, homo- 
geneous in kind but graded in complexity, such 
that we are able to reduce the observer's per- 
centage of right cases from 100 to 95, 90, 85 . . . 
according to the distraction employed. It is 
necessary that the action of the distractors be 
constant ; and it is necessary that they be of the 
same kind, and therefore exert an influence which 
differs only, and differs measurably, in degree. 
Having secured these conditions, we should let 
the observer decide whether the clearness of 
conscious contents was distinguishably different 
under a 5 per cent, and a 10 per cent, distraction, 
or under a 5 per cent, and a 15 per cent, distrac- 
tion, or again under an 80 per cent, and an 85 per 
cent, distraction, and so on, all through the series. 
We should thus finally obtain a scale of notice- 
ably different clearnesses paralleled by a scale of 
measured amounts of distracting stimulus; we 



278 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

should have the materials for formulating our 
law; we should have solved the problem of 
measurement of attention. 

With this idea in mind, I set a number of my 
advanced students to work, years ago, upon the 
preliminary question of the distractor. We dis- 
covered some interesting things : that distraction 
may spur instead of distracting; that intermit- 
tent distractions, the ordinary ' intellectual opera- 
tions,' are unreliable ; that odours are admirably 
constant distracting material, — if only they 
could be measured ! and so forth. But we got no 
farther ; and no one else has got any farther by 
that road. Nevertheless, I am not yet persuaded 
that the road is altogether impracticable, and we 
are now making a renewed attempt to open it up.^® 

The other, indirect way of measuring atten- 
tion is to measure the concomitant sensations of 
strain, the 'effort' of attention. "Wir besitzen 
an gewissen begleitenden Gefiihlen einer gros- 
seren oder geringeren Anstrengung . . . ein Mit- 
tel, uns zu vergewissern, ob unsere Disposition in 
zwei Fallen annahernd dieselbe sei''; that is a 
suggestion of Stumpf's. May we not generalise 
it, and argue that different degrees of effort run 
parallel to the distinguishable degrees of clear- 
ness ? Unfortunately, no ! In the first place, 
the concomitant effort is an indication, not of 



I 



DEGREE OF CLEARNESS 279 

degree of attention, but rather of inertia of atten- 
tion ; strained attention is attention under dif- 
ficulties; we attend best when effort is small. 
May we, then, reverse the parallelism, and make 
degree of effort an inverse measure of degree of 
clearness ? No, not that either ! For, secondly, 
experiment has shown that under certain cir- 
cumstances attention is maximal when we are 
slightly 'distracted'; a modicum of effort is 
favourable to clearness. In a word, the relation 
of effort to degree of attention is equivocal ; even 
if we could accurately measure effort, we should 
have no measurement of clearness. ^^ 

It does not follow, however, because we are as 
yet unable to measure attention, that we may 
not devise objective tests which shall inform us, 
on the one hand, of gross differences in attentional 
degree or attentional capacity as between ob- 
server and observer, and on the other hand of 
approximate constancy or marked fluctuation of 
attention in the same observer. Four kinds of 
test offer themselves at once. We may deter- 
mine the range of attention, simultaneous or 
successive ; we may have recourse to tests of sen- 
sitivity and sensible discrimination; we may 
determine associability, the rate and stability of 
association and reproduction; and we may 



280 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

measure the promptness of voluntary action, the 
time of simple reaction. The application of 
such tests is by no means easy, and I imagine 
that it can rarely be direct. The test will rather 
appear as an incidental feature of some more 
general investigation ; or it will be made an end 
in itself, and its result then carried over by 
analogy to investigations whose main purpose is 
of a different nature. 

A good deal of work has already been done. 
Binet subjected two groups of school children, 
classed by their teachers as intelligent and unin- 
telligent, to a long series of tests: the children 
were required to discriminate sesthesiometric im- 
pressions, to count dots by eye and sounds by ear, 
to memorise letters, to read a word exposed by 
the movement of an instantaneous shutter, to 
perform simultaneous additions, to correct proofs, 
to make reactions, etc. I think that, on the 
whole, the outcome of the inquiry justified the 
time and care devoted to it ; but the results, as 
is only natural, leave us in doubt as to the per- 
manent value of the individual tests and their 
precise relation to the attention. Janet, taking 
the cue from his experience with hysterical sub- 
jects, proposes a perimetrical test of the degree of 
attention. Of a somewhat different order are 
the proposals of Oehrn and Henri, to measure 



TESTS OF ATTENTION 281 

attention by reference to mean variation, and of 
Wiersma and Pillsbury, to utilise for the same 
end the duration of noticeability (or the ratio of 
the periods of noticeability and unnoticeability) 
in experiments on fluctuation. Oehrn's sugges- 
tion, in particular, may very well prove to be of 
value, though it is clear that detailed analysis 
of conditions, a careful sifting out of contributory 
factors, must precede its application.^^ 

The number of possible tests is thus very great. 
And since all psychological observation is done 
in the state of attention, and distracting stimuli 
may always be 'thrown in,' there is no single 
form of experimental procedure that cannot be 
made to afford a rough gauge of concentration. 
It would be strange if, out of this multitude of 
possibilities, there should be no positive gain for 
psychology. There will be, — if analysis is 
pushed far enough, and if recourse is had to the 
observer's introspection ; otherwise, we shall 
remain upon the plane of the roughly practical. 
I gave, at the beginning of this discussion, a 
schematic outline of a psychological distraction- 
method. I remark, in conclusion, that it will 
be wise to combine such a method with the tech- 
nique of the method of expression. I have no 
faith in the power of the expression-instruments 
to tell us of the nature and number of the affec- 



282 THE LAWS OF ATTENTION: II 

live qualities. But they may help — one never 
knows ! — towards an objective differentiation 
of the conscious degrees of clearness.^® 

I am at the end of my review. I have done 
my best to make the review complete, on our 
elementary level, and to disentangle the really 
elementary problems from the problems of the 
total attentive consciousness. In the next Lec- 
ture we must try to gather up the critical threads 
and to weave them into a pattern ; we must con- 
sider the status and the relations of affection and 
attention within a systematic psychology. 



VIII 

AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 



LECTURE VIII 

AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

THROUGHOUT our discussion of attention, 
I have been urging that it is advisable, in an 
elementary psychology, to shift the emphasis from 
total attentive state to sensation and the attribute 
of clearness; the discussion has centred about that 
suggestion. Our treatment of the affective pro- 
cesses, on the other hand, was almost wholly 
critical. Construction is always more difficult 
than criticism, — even when it takes the very 
modest form of making up one's mind in the 
face of rival theories. But you have the right 
to look here also for some positive suggestion; 
and, although I have nothing original to say, I 
shall accordingly begin this final Lecture with 
a brief outline of an elementary psychology of 
feeling. Let me assure you again, as I have 
assured you before, that my position is tentative, 
provisional, not fixed and dogmatic. 

We find, in the history of psychology, two op- 
posed views of feeling, views that I shall dis- 
tinguish as the intellectual and the affectional. 

285 



286 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

The intellectual view considers feeling as a form 
of cognition; the affectional gives it an inde- 
pendent place among the mental faculties. On 
the score of formal expression, the intellectual 
view is undoubtedly the older; human thought, 
in the early stages of its activity, is prone to 
rationalise, and for a long time — for a time, 
indeed, that extends well into the modern period 
— it was also dominant. But the affectional 
view crosses it at many points; and when we 
come to Kant, the traditional status of the two 
theories has completely changed, and the affec- 
tional has gained the day. The faculty of feel- 
ing is added, as intermediary, to the faculties 
of knowledge and of desire. 

Kant's authority was, of course, very great; 
and the affectional view of feeling held its place 
in the writings of those later psychologists who 
escaped the influence of Herb art. Fortunately 
or unfortunately, however, the main current of 
modern psychology takes its source from the 
intellectualism of Herbart and the sensationalism 
of contemporary physiology. Hence — if I may 
change the figure — experimental psychology 
had, from the outset, a strong intellectual bias, 
a definite leaning towards Gefilhlsempfindungen 
or a Gefiihlston der Empfindung. We saw, in 
an earlier Lecture, that Wundt at first resisted 



HISTORICAL VIEWS OF FEELING 287 

the pressure of this tendency, but later for a 
while succumbed to it.* 

In a word, then, the intellectual view of feel- 
ing has been favoured in two ways : by the inertia 
of a settled philosophical tradition, and by the 
nature of the sources from which modern psy- 
chology derives/ But the tradition, after all, 
merely illustrates an inherent onesidedness of 
reflective thought ; and we must remember that 
it w^as successfully overcome by the psychology 
of the eighteenth century. As for Herbart and 
the physiologists, it is — for our immediate pur- 
pose — nothing more than an historical accident 
that the succession of the faculty-systems should 
have devolved upon a rigorous intellectualism. 
What is significant, again, is this : that modern 
psychology, just like the psychology of the eigh- 
teenth century, has finally revolted against intel- 
lectualism, so that the majority of present-day 
psychologists recognise the independence of the 
affective processes, and the doctrine of the * affec- 
tive tone' has well-nigh disappeared. 

But, you may ask, has this second movement 
for affective independence really accomplished 
anything ? Have we not ourselves admitted and 
emphasised the unsettled state of the psychology 
of feeling? Are not the opposed camps, of 

* P. 133. 



288 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

majority and of minority alike, split into num- 
berless factions ? — I will try to answer these 
questions: premising only that ground once 
gained, in the history of a science, is never wholly 
lost, and that our modern movement could not 
have culminated so quickly, had we not had the 
example of the eighteenth century before our 
eyes. And my answer will be twofold. 

Do not let us forget, in the first place, that the 
physiological tradition is unbroken. The theo- 
ries of Bourdon and von Frey can trace their 
descent, in the spirit if not in the letter, from a 
long line of workers in ' physiological psychology ' ; 
and the Gefiihlsempjindungen, whatever may be 
thought of them by the descriptive psychologist, 
will not easily yield their claim on the side of 
explanation. Sensational theories of feeling we 
shall have always with us. But let us reflect, 
secondly, that a period which is sterile in obser- 
vation is, invariably, fruitful in speculation. 
When, a few years ago, I was classifying the con- 
tents of the leading psychological journals, I was 
amazed at the small number of the experimental 
studies of feeling.^ I had known, as we all 
know, that a marked interest in feeling is of quite 
recent growth ; I had not realised how profound 
was the lack of interest that preceded. No won- 
der, then, that every psychologist has his own 



THE STATUS OF AFFECTIOX 289 

hypothesis ; no wonder that no two psychologists 
can agree upon 'the definition of feeling'!^ 
We have a fairly exact parallel in the history of 
psychophysics. There was a time, in that too, 
when all the world was writing theory and no- 
body was doing work, — the time when Merkel 
prayed aloud that his own experiments might 
lead, not to ^'weitere theoretische Discussionen 
von Seiten der vielen Gegner," ^ but to more 
accurate tests, made by better men. We have 
come out of this sterile period in psychophysics, 
and we shall come out of it also in the psychology 
of feeling. For a while yet we shall go on wran- 
gling about opinions; but every experimental 
study helps to clear the air, and as observations 
multiply, theory will reshape itself to accord 
with fact. 

My personal opinion is, as I have shown plainly 
enough, that affection must be given elemental 
rank in consciousness, as a process coordinate 
with sensation. I rely, primarily, upon the lack 
of the attribute of clearness; all sensations may 
become clear, while an affection — however pro- 
longed or intensive — is never clear, never comes 
to the focus of attention. I rely also upon the 
criterion of ' movement between opposites ' ; 
it seems to me that conscious opposition is al- 
ways a matter of affection, never of sensation. 



290 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

And I rely, to some extent, upon the concurrence 
of these distinguishing characters, and upon their 
implication — or, at least, suggestion — of cer- 
tain other differences between the two modes of 
conscious process. On the whole, I am con- 
vinced that a generic difference can be made out, 
in the adult human mind, between sensation and 
affection. I therefore believe that Stumpf's 
proposal, to treat affective processes as if they 
were sensations, to bring all the machinery of 
sensation-method to bear upon the feelings, is 
a mistaken proposal; I do not think that it is 
worth while to assume after-images and memory- 
images, and contrasts and inductions, in the 
sphere of feeling. What do you gain by the 
assumption, if you cannot find the facts ? 

On the question of the number of the affec- 
tive qualities, I have no choice but to abide by 
my experimental results. The situation has its 
humorous side; for I have tried, I suppose, as 
hard as any one to discover the pluralists' variety 
— with 'vorgefasste Meinung' and 'leere Schab- 
lone ' and ' Dogma der Lust- Unlusttheorie ' and 
' vollig haltlose Behauptung ' all the while buzzing 
about my ears. I do not know why Wundt 
should be so severe upon those who differ from 
him, seeing that his own opinion has more than 
once changed, and that what he himself terms the 



A THEORY OF FEELING 291 

"erste, vorlaiifige Darstellung des dreidimension- 
alen Systems der Gefiihle" ^ was not given to the 
world until 1896. I do not think, either, that the 
' Lust-Unlusttheorie ' is a dogma. It has been a 
dogma; it was allowed to become a dogma by 
the supineness, not of the dualists (for we were all 
dualists together), but of the experimentalists in 
general; and, as I have pointed out, this dog- 
matic slumber of experimental psychology is re- 
sponsible for the current hypertrophy of theory. 
But to charge the dualist with dogmatism, in the 
year 1908, is simply to charge him with accep- 
tance, in a modern version, of the traditional doc- 
trine of pleasure-pain. Is a man dogmatic every 
time that his experiments lead him into agree- 
ment with Aristotle ? 

I will now venture to sketch a theory of feel- 
ing which seems to me to be sufficiently plausible, 
and which serves to round out, by explanation, 
the remarks of the preceding paragraphs.^ It 
is natural to suppose that the material of con- 
sciousness, the stuff out of which mind is made, 
is ultimately homogeneous, all of a piece. Let 
us make that supposition. The affections then 
appear — I do not like to say, as ' undeveloped 
sensations,' for an undeveloped sensation is still 
a sensation ; but at any rate as mental processes 
of the same general kind as sensations, and as 



292 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

mental processes that might, under favourable 
conditions, have developed into sensations. I 
hazard the guess that the 'peripheral organs' 
of feeling are the free afferent nerve-endings dis- 
tributed to the various tissues of the body ; * 
and I take these free endings to represent a 
lower level of development than the specialised 
receptive organ. Hence we have peripheral 
organs of sense, but no 'organs,' in the strict 
meaning of the term, for affective processes. 
Had mental development been carried farther, 
pleasantness and unpleasantness might have 
become sensations, — in all likelihood would 
have been differentiated, each of them, into a 
large number of sensations. Had our physical 
development been carried farther, we might have 
had a corresponding increase in the number of 
internal sense-organs. 

What does this theory explain ? It explains, 
first, the obscurity of feeling, the absence of the 
attribute of clearness. Affective processes are 
processes whose development has been arrested ;* 
they have not attained, and now they never can 
attain, to clear consciousness. Affective expe- 
rience is the obscure, indiscriminable correlate 
of a medley of widely diffused excitatory pro- 

* We must, of course, except the free nerve-endings at the 
periphery of the body, which are probably the 'organs' of pain. 
I do not think that the exception hurts the theory. 



A THEORY OF FEELING 293 

cesses.*^ The theory explains, secondly, the 
movement of affective process between opposites, 
and the relation of this movement to the health 
and harm, the weal and woe of the organism.^ 
For the excitatory processes will report the 'tone' 
of the bodily systems from which they proceed, 
and the report will vary, and can only vary, be- 
tween ' good ' and ' bad/ At this point, of course, 
the theory takes account of 'mixed feelings.' 
It explains, thirdly, the lack of qualitative dif- 
ferentiation within pleasantness-unpleasantness. 
The report of 'good' or 'bad' may show varia- 
tion in degree, but cannot change in kind. And, 
lastly, the theory explains the introspective resem- 
blance between affections and organic sensations. 
Genetically, the two sets of processes are near 
akin; and it is natural that they should be in- 
timately blended in experience. 

I shall not attempt further details. If the 
theory appeals to you, you will work out details, 
applications and corollaries, for yourselves. If 
' it does not, you will pursue some other path, — 
and we shall see presently who has made the wiser 
choice. A distinguished physicist remarked the 
other day that theories are matters, not of creed, 
but of policy; ^ and it seems to me that it is 
better policy to look at the affective processes 
in the manner here outlined than to think of 



294 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

them as apperceptive reactions, or as centrally 
aroused concomitant sensations, or as indices of 
the state of nutrition of the cerebral cortex, or as 
symptoms of the readiness of central discharge. 
But every one cannot be right ; and where our 
positive knowledge is practically m/, there is no 
disgrace in being wrong. 

I pass on, then, to another question. Let us 
take it as agreed that affection is an independent 
mental process, inherently obscure, and evincing 
a qualitative duality. What, now, is the rela- 
tion of affection to attention.^ 

When I read Ebbinghaus' chapter on Atten- 
tion in 1902, I was greatly surprised at the men- 
tion, among the 'Bedingungen der Aufmerk- 
samkeit,' of the affective value of impressions. 
"'Diejenigen TJrsachen, die einen stark lustbe- 
tonten oder unlustbetonten Bewusstseinsinhalt 
zur Folge haben, setzen diesen Inhalt leichter 
durch als andere TJrsachen ihre indifferenten 
Wirkungen.'' I had supposed that 'interest' 
still figured as a condition of attention only in 
quite popular psychologies; yet Ebbinghaus 
said in 1902, and repeats in 1905, that "Interesse 
. . . besonders haufig ein starkeres Hervortre- 
ten [eines] Eindrucks in der Seele bewirkt."' 
This doctrine implies, first, that feeling precedes 



ATTENTION AND INTEREST 295 

attention, that sensory clearness follows in the 
train of pleasantness-nnpleasantness. Indeed, 
the point is explicit; for interest bewirJd, effects 
or induces clearness, and interest (Ebbinghaus is 
properly careful to define it) is itself '"[eine] 
Lust, die hervorgebracht wird durch das har- 
monische Zusammengehen eines gegenwartig 
der Seele nahep:eleo:ten Eindrucks mit friiher 
erworbenen, jetzt durch ihn geweckten Vorstel- 
lungen." ^^ Pleasure, then, comes first, and atten- 
tion afterwards. The doctrine implies, secondly, 
that certain of the conditions of attention are 
non-affective, that sensory clearness may be 
established in the absence of pleasantness- 
unpleasantness. On the former issue, Ebbing- 
haus comes into direct conflict with Stout. ''The 
assumption that attention depends on pleasure- 
pain seems to have no sufficient basis. . . . In- 
terest and attention do not seem to be related as 
antecedent and consequent, but rather as differ- 
ent aspects of the same concrete fact. . . . 
Feelings of pleasure and pain ... do not de- 
termine attention as antecedent conditions." ^^ 
On the latter, he comes into conflict with Wundt's 
well-known definition of feeling as ''the reaction 
of apperception upon sensations." ^^ 

Ebbinghaus supports his assertion, that atten- 
tion is conditioned upon feeling, by reference to 



296 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

incidents of everyday life : the attraction of a 
pretty face or a bad accident, the fascination 
of anything connected with a man's particular 
hobby, etc.; he offers no experimental evidence. 
Now Stout and Pillsbury have analysed a num- 
ber of precisely such instances, and have been 
led to precisely the opposite conclusion. Stout 
I have already quoted. Pillsbury declares, in 
the same sense : ''les choses ne sont interessantes 
que parce que nous portons sur elles notre atten- 
tion, et nous ne portons pas sur elles notre atten- 
tion parce qu'elles sont interessantes.'' ^^ Unless, 
then, there are outstanding facts, which refuse 
to be analysed in this way, we must, I think, 
decide against Ebbinghaus. Personally, I con- 
fess that, after the discussion as before, I find it 
difficult to take his position seriously. 

The second question that he raises for us is, 
on the contrary, of very great systematic impor- 
tance. Do we ever attend without feeling.? 
Or is it rather true that whenever we attend we 
feel, and whenever we feel we attend ? 

In so far as Ebbinghaus' treatment implies 
that we may attend without feeling, I am in 
agreement with it. I am afraid, however, that 
that bare statement is misleading; and I shall 
accordingly try to give it a systematic setting. 
Consider the attentive consciousness in the large : 



ATTENTION AND WILL 297 

what Is its place in a psychological system ? 
Wundt, of course, places it under the heading of 
*will/ "'Die Apperception ist gleichzeitig ele- 
mentarer Willensact und constituirenderBestand- 
theil aller Willensvorgange." ^^ Stumpf takes a 
similar view, though he seems to have felt a 
difficulty (as Wundt does not) in bringing in- 
voluntary and voluntary attention under a 
single heading. ^^ Ebbinghaus finds that, in 
voluntary attention, ''der Gesammtzustand 
durchaus gleich dem . . . als Wollen beschrieb- 
enen ist;" but he distinguishes involuntary from 
voluntary attention, as he distinguishes Trieb 
from Wille. Since, however, will is a develop- 
ment from impulse, — ''der Wille ist der voraus- 
schauend gewordene Trieb," — the distinction 
is merely terminological.^^ 

Other psychologists have held other opinions. 
I cannot here discuss them ; I can only say that, 
so far as I see, the term 'will' affords the best 
general title for two great groups of psychologi- 
cal facts : the facts of attention and the facts of 
action. There can, I think, be no doubt that 
these two groups are intimately related, that ac- 
tion is simply a special case of attention. But, 
if that is the case, we may use our knowledge of 
either one to throw light upon the other. Thus, 
psychologists and moralists alike have long dis- 



298 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

puted whether 'pleasure and pain' are the sole 
conditions of action. I do not consider that 
they can be numbered at all among the condi- 
tions of action; I believe that the conditions 
of action are to be learned from a study of the 
conditions of attention; and I should analyse 
the alleged positive instances on the lines of 
Stout's and Pillsbury's analyses in the sphere of 
attention. On the other side, our immediate 
question — ' Do we ever attend without feel- 
ing ?' — is answered as soon as we appeal to 
action. Do we ever act without feeling ? Very 
certainly we do ! Actions may be classified in 
various ways, and I shall not try to impose upon 
you a classification of my own; but we shall 
agree that there are many types of action, reflex 
and automatic and ideomotor and what not, 
that are performed without the arousal of pleas- 
antness-unpleasantness in consciousness. In just 
the same way, as it seems to me, may we have an 
automatic or instinctive or mechanised attention 
that is altogether free of feeling. No one will 
deny that pleasantness and unpleasantness ap- 
pear often and often again — 'besonders haufig,' 
as Ebbinghaus says ^^ — as the accompaniments 
of attention ; it would be strange if our experience 
were otherwise, since all the conditions of atten- 
tion are at the same time conditions of a powerful 



ATTENTION WITHOUT FEELING 299 

impression of the nervous system. The connec- 
tion is, indeed, so obvious and so widespread 
that it is only natural to regard it as universal; 
I have myself for many years subscribed to this 
belief, and have taught that affection and atten- 
tion are simply back and front, obverse and re- 
verse, of the same consciousness. But, after all, 
views must give way before observations; and 
though I have, for clearness' sake, thrown our 
discussion into systematic form, my reliance 
throughout is, as you will have understood, upon 
observed instances of feelingless attention. Now 
that I have once noticed such cases, they prove 
to be of fairly common occurrence; and I am 
sure that you will have no especial difficulty in 
discovering their like : — only you must not look 
for them in the professional spirit, but keep your 
eyes open to mark them as they come. 

You may, perhaps, demur to my proposal 
that all these phenomena of attention and action 
be brought under the heading of 'will.' Reflex 
actions and instinctive attentions are, indeed, 
from one point of view, the antipodes of will. 
If, however, I adopt the term, it is because I 
accept the genetic theory of Wundt and Ward. 
I believe, with Wundt, that ''die zweckmassigen 
Reflexbewegungen stabil und mechanisch ge- 
wordene Willenshandlungen sind";^^ I be- 



300 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

lieve, with Ward, that ''vdlition or something 
analogous to it" has, in the race as in the indi- 
vidual, invariably ''preceded habit" ;^^ and I 
believe, with Cope, that even ''the automatic 
'involuntary' movements of the heart, intes- 
tines, reproductive systems, etc., were organised 
in successive states of consciousness." ^^ Argu- 
ment, on so large a subject, is here out of the ques- 
tion; but I am glad of the opportunity to recite 
my credo. And the more strongly you react 
against it, the more earnestly do I beg you to give 
it a fair examination.^^ — 

So far, then, the relation between affection 
and attention is hardly more than external. 
Affection reports the tone of the great bodily sys- 
tems that lack organs of sense ; attention means 
the clarifying of sensory contents under the in- 
fluence of powerful nervous stimuli. The or- 
ganism may, with time, become adapted to these 
attentional stimuli, — so that, while the corre- 
sponding sensations appear, at least momentarily, 
at the conscious focus, there is no felt shock or 
tilt of the whole living body, no concomitant 
pleasantness or unpleasantness. We may at- 
tend without feeling. May we, on the other 
hand, feel without attending.? Can there be a 
change in general organic tone, sufiiciently 
marked to reveal itself as feeling, while the 



NO FEELING WITHOUT ATTENTION 301 

sensory contents of consciousness are still ob- 
scure? Wundt answers this question with a 
decided affirmative. ^'[Die Gefiihle] konnen 
auch dann, wenn ihre Vorstellungsgrundlage 
ausserordentlich dunkel bleibt, eine relativ grosse 
Intensitat gewinnen." ^^ And again: ''erhebt 
sich irgendein psychischer Vorgang iiber die 
Schwelle des Bewusstseins, so pflegen die Ge- 
fiihlselemente desselben, sobald sie die hinreich- 
ende Starke besitzen, zuerst merkbar zu werden, 
so dass sie sich bereits energisch in den Blick- 
punkt des Bewusstseins drangen, ehe noch von 
den Vorstellungselementen irgend etwas wahr- 
genommen wird.'' ^^ Here, I think, Wundt is 
working with 'feelings' where he should be 
working with organic sensations and pleasant- 
ness-unpleasantness ; and, in so far forth, his 
statements are unconvincing. But this objec- 
tion does not fully meet the issue; we have to 
consider the question on its psychological merits. 
Notice, then, that the question itself takes two 
forms, a popular and a scientific.^ I gave them 
just now as if they were interchangeable; but 
a very little reflection brings out their difference. 
The popular form of the question is : ' May we 
feel without attending.^' And the implication 
here is that attention, the attentive consciousness, 
is something sporadic and occasional; that the 



302 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

two-level consciousness alternates with a one- 
level, wholly 'inattentive' consciousness. Now 
it is possible that this state of inattention exists, 
though I confess myself sceptical in the matter; 
I doubt whether inattention, in the waking life, 
is not always 'attention to something else.' ^^ 
But, at all events, I do not think it likely that 
any one will argue for the affective character 
of inattention ; the very word suggests a state of 
indifference. 

In its second and scientific form the question 
asks whether the obscure contents of a two-level 
consciousness may be as strongly 'toned' as 
the clear. Wundt declares that they may; my 
own analysis leads me to the opposite conclu- 
sion. I grant that we attend without feeling; 
and this admission seems to me to bring with it 
a very welcome 'loosening up' of systematic 
psychology. But I cannot grant that — in the 
sense of this paragraph — we feel without at- 
tending. I incline rather to find a fairly close 
parallel between degree of clearness and degree 
of pleasantness-unpleasantness, and thus to 
regard the relation between affection and atten- 
tion, on this side, not as external, but as intrinsic. 
Wundt has missed the organic sensations alto- 
gether; and we, who emphasise them, must 
ourselves be careful not to confuse the clearness 



FEELING AS REACTION 303 

of a sensory fusion either with qualitative articu- 
lation or with definiteness of localisation. Bear- 
ing this caution in mind, you will surely agree 
that, whenever we are moved and stirred to feel- 
ing, the sensible factors in the total process are 
relatively clear. 



25 



It is now necessary to go back a little way, 
in order to remove a possible misapprehension. 
I said that the list of conditions of attention, 
in Ebbinghaus' Grundzuge, implies that we may 
attend without feeling. And I said that that 
implication is in conflict with Wundt's familiar 
definition of feeling as the reaction of apper- 
ception upon the sensory contents of conscious- 
ness. How can we attend without feeling, if 
feeling is generated in the act of attention ? But 
I have just now quoted from Wundt sentences 
which affirm that feeling may be present, at a 
relatively high intensity, while its sensory sub- 
strate is still 'extraordinarily obscure.' Do not 
these sentences suggest that feeling may be gen- 
erated without attention ? And is not Wundt, 
therefore, inconsistent ? 

When Wundt wrote, in 1893, that feeling is 
'Mie Reactionsweise der Apperception auf die 
sinnliche Erregung," he meant that statement 
to be understood in its obvious and literal sense. 



304 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

''Der Gefiihlston'' — we are in 1893 ! — ''kommt 
liberhaupt nur zu Stande, insofern wir die 
Empfindungen appercipiren^ und er kann daher 
als die subjective oder psychische Seite jenes cen- 
traleren Voranges der Apperception angesehen 
werden, der zu der centralen Sinneserregung 
hinzukommt, wenn sich die Thatigkeit des 
Bewusstseins ihr zuwendet/' ^^ In 1902 he has 
kept the phrase, — feeling is still the ''Reaction 
der Apperception auf das einzelne Bewusstseins- 
erlebniss''; it is of the essence of feeling "'Re- 
actionsweise der Apperception auf den Bewusst- 
seinsinhalt zu sein/'^"^ — but he has changed its 
meaning. Feeling is no longer confined to those 
sensory contents that are the 'object' of atten- 
tion; on the contrary it may accompany any 
contents, clear or obscure. " [Die] centrale 
Function der Apperception ist in jedem Augen- 
blick auch f iir den ganzen iibrigen Bewusstseins- 
inhalt bestimmend, indem dessen sammtliche 
Elemente nach ihrem Verhaltniss zu den apper- 
cipirten Elementen geordnet werden. So er- 
scheinen denn auch die an die einzelnen Bewusst- 
seinsinhalte gebundenen Gefiihle durchaus als 
subjective Bestimmungen, die jedes einzelne Be- 
wusstseinserlebniss durch seine Einwirkung auf 
die Function der Apperception empfangt. In 
diesem Sinne" — in this new and modified sense 



THE ATTENTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS 305 

— '' ist jedes Gefiihl . . . Reaction der Apper- 
ception auf das einzelne Bewusstseinserlebniss." 
I do not understand how conscious contents can 
be reacted upon by apperception without thereby 
becoming clear. But, however that may be, this 
reaction, which evokes feeling over the whole of 
the obscure background of consciousness,^^ is 
something entirely different from the direct reac- 
tion of attention upon its object. The tridi- 
mensional theory of feeling has compelled Wundt 
to change his exposition ; and he has changed it 
in such a w^ay that, so far as the phrases go, he 
is not inconsistent. At the same time, his revised 
doctrine is, I am sure, only transitional, and I 
hope that we may presently have an essay in 
which it is fully worked out. 

That was a digression. We have next, pick- 
ing up again the main thread of the discussion, 
to attempt a rough characterisation of the atten- 
tive consciousness. Its central feature, the two- 
level formation, has already been described.* 
But besides the ''Klarheitszunahme einer be- 
stimmten Vorstellung oder Vorstellungsgruppe'' 
and the ''Hemmung anderer disponibler Ein- 
driicke oder Erinnerungsbilder," — besides, that 
is, the appearance of the two levels, — Wundt 

* P. 241. 



306 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

finds an essential constituent of every process of 
apperception in the concomitant Thdtigkeitsge- 
filhl?^ What are we to say with regard to the 
feeling of activity ? 

Wundt has often been charged with circularity 
of statement. Feeling is the reaction of apper- 
ception upon sensation; yet apperception itself 
comes to consciousness as a feeling. Or again : 
apperception is the primitive act of will; acts 
of will are feelings; yet feeling presupposes the 
direction of an act of will upon sensation. ^^ 
I have been accustomed to meet this charge by 
the reply that the feeling of activity is the dis- 
covery of introspection. Let me quote a parallel 
case. James has told us that ''the acts of attend- 
ing, assenting, negating, making an effort are 
felt'' by him ''as movements of something in the 
head.'' "Whenever my introspective glance 
succeeds in turning round quickly enough to 
catch one of these manifestations of spontaneity 
in the act, all it can ever feel distinctly is some 
bodily process, for the most part taking place 
within the head." ^^ Kohn objects to this de- 
scription that "if the feelings were present while 
the attention is directed upon some other object, 
there would be no need at all of the 'turning 
round' or the 'introspective glance.' We should 
be conscious of them without this." ^^ To which 



THE FEELING OF ACTIVITY 307 

the obvious rejoinder is that we are conscious of 
them 'without this'; otherwise there would be 
no cue for introspection. We do not attempt to 
introspect the non-existent. But, when we are 
giving a psychological account of any contents, 
we examine it in the state of attention.* 

Apply that, now, to Wundt. The typical form 
of attention, if one induces it for purposes of 
introspection, is voluntary attention. Conscious- 
ness in the state of voluntary attention is com- 
posed, in part, of 'muskulare Spannungsemp- 
findungen.' When, then, one seeks to introspect 
the attentive consciousness, one comes naturally 
upon these sensations of strain ; they are made 
focal; and, in the process of their focalisation, a 
'feeling of activity' must, on Wundt's view, be 
struck out. Hence it is impossible to introspect 
the state of voluntary attention without discover- 
ing a Thatigkeitsgefichl. 

I think that this explanation heads off the 
charge of circularity ; and it seemed worth while 
to lay it before you because, as I said, the charge 
has often been made. It must, how^ever, be 
pointed out that the independent status of the 
feelings in Wundt's recent writings changes the 
whole situation. The Thdtigkeitsgefuhl has now 

* It must be remembered that James and Kohn use ' feel ' and 
'feeling^ where we should employ 'perceive' and 'perception.' 



308 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

to stand on its own feet, without aid from intro- 
spection ; we either experience it — as feeling — 
in every instance of attention, or we do not. My 
own opinion is that we do not.^^ In frequent 
cases of what I have called reflex or instinctive or 
mechanised attention I find no trace of feeling at 
all. The depressing Gefuhl des Erleidens and 
the subsequent exciting Gefuhl der Thdtigkeit 
are both, in my experience, conspicuous by their 
absence. Wundt's schema for voluntary atten- 
tion is expectation, followed by a very brief feel- 
ing of satisfaction or fulfilment, followed again 
by the feeling of activity .^^ But everything de- 
pends, surely, upon what you mean by voluntary 
attention. Wundt is thinking of reaction ex- 
periments ; ^^ and there are, I admit, — though 
with a reservation to be made in a moment, — 
certain forms of compound reaction in which 
that sequence of feelings is realised. On the 
other hand, I have noted many instances of what 
would pass, in ordinary psychological usage, for 
voluntary attention, in which one or two or all 
three of the feelings were lacking. 

My reservation is not serious; it concerns 
merely the naming of the processes in question. 
Expectation and effort are not, in my view, 
necessarily affective, though both of them may, 
under certain circumstances, be accompanied by 



THE MOTOR THEORY OF ATTENTION 309 

pleasantness-unpleasantness. It is more im- 
portant, however, to examine the part that effort 
actually plays in the attentive consciousness. 
Such an examination brings us face to face with 
two large questions: the 'motor' interpretation 
of attention, and the distinction of attentive states 
as active and passive, voluntary and involuntary. 
On these two questions I can only repeat what 
I have said elsewhere. I have always regarded, 
and I probably shall always regard, the motor 
interpretation of attention as one-sided. We have 
already seen, on the plane of descriptive psy- 
chology, that kinsesthetic sensations stand in an 
equivocal relation to 'degree' of attention.* 
And it may be seriously doubted whether they 
are a necessary and integral part of the attentive 
consciousness. Kinaesthesis is, I suppose, al- 
ways present in the obscure background of 
consciousness; but I question if, in states of 
what I term 'secondary passive attention,' these 
kinaesthetic processes are necessarily intensified, 
or new kin aesthetic sensations introduced. Wundt 
remarks that the 'muskularen Spannungsemp- 
findungen,' which are a frequent partial contents 
of apperception, may "fehlen oder von sehr 
geringer Starke sein." ^^ What we need, in this 
matter, is less theory and more observations of 

* P. 279. 



310 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

fact. On the side of explanation, I suggest that 
a like one-sidedness is shown in the constant in- 
sistence on the reflex arc as the functional unit 
of the nervous system. It seems to be forgotten 
that, from another point of view, the oflBce of the 
cortex may properly be described as the disjunc- 
tion of the reflex arc, the interposition of resist- 
ance between sensory stimulus and motor re- 
sponse. The result of this disjunction is that 
the attitude of the organism may be typically re- 
ceptive, typically elaborative, or typically execu- 
tive. In sensible discrimination, the attitude is 
mainly receptive ; there are no known muscular 
adjustments that can keep pace with the just 
noticeable differences of colour and tone. In 
concentrated thought the attitude is mainly elab- 
orative; and where is the evidence of motor 
outflow here ? I am not disputing the neurone 
theory; but I argue that the longer a principal 
path is made, the more synapses there are in its 
course, and the more numerous the bypaths be- 
come, the more difficult will it be for an excitatory 
process to find its way out in the straightfor- 
ward sensorimotor fashion. McDougall writes, 
to the same effect, that the ''physiological 
basis of the ' Lebhaftigkeit ' of the presentation'' 
is to be found in ''the complexity of the upper 
levels" of the nervous system ;^^ and Ebbing- 



PASSIVE AND ACTIVE ATTENTION 311 



haus, too, lays great stress upon the 'Querver- 
bindungen' in his theory of attention.^^ 

Whether, then, we consider it psychologically 
or physiologically, the motor interpretation of 
attention appears to be one-sided. How does 
it gain acceptance ? Pillsbury gives a reason ; 
he suggests that all the motor theories derive, in 
the last resort, from ''la tendance populaire a 
regarder I'activite accompagnant le processus de 
Tattention comme sa cause/' ^^ If, however, 
this is correct reasoning, the theories are doubly 
suspect: they stand committed, from the out- 
set, to a partial view of the facts. We may 
cheerfully grant that, for this very reason, they 
have done psychological service; where the 
problem is complex, exaggeration in one quarter 
may be necessary to prevent neglect in another. 
But this does not mean that exaggeration is it- 
self laudable; and I can see nothing but a 
palpable exaggeration in the definition of atten- 
tion as a motor reaction. ^^ 

I must hurry on to our second question, — 
the question of the distinction between passive 
and active, involuntary and voluntary attention. 
''La distinction entre I'attention passive et Tat- 
tention active est basee," Pillsbury says, "sur 
Tabsence ou la presence de sensations d'effort. 
... Mais comme les sensations d'effort sont 



312 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

des accompagnements fortuits, ne correspondant 
ni aux conditions, ni au degre de Tattention, il 
semble impossible de retenir une partie de cette 
classification sans compliquer considerablement 
la terminologie, et cela sans grand profit/' ^^ 
On the historical issue, Pillsbury is undoubtedly 
right; and I have already expressed my agree- 
ment with the view which he takes of sensations 
of strain. But I doubt very much whether we 
can afford to discard altogether the use of the 
terms active-passive or voluntary-involuntary. 
Better a poor terminology than the slurring of 
an observed difference ! And, at any rate, it is 
interesting to note that neither Wundt nor Eb- 
binghaus relies for the distinction — which both 
draw, though in characteristically different ways 
— upon strain sensations. According to Ebbing- 
haus, ' sensations of activity ' are marks of atten- 
tion in general. ^^ Wundt, on the other hand, 
is so largely occupied with the feelings that sen- 
sations of strain play a very minor part in his 
account. 

How, then, are the two forms of attention dis- 
tinguished ? For Wundt there is, first of all, the 
difference of feeling. Further: ^^die active Ap- 
perception ist im allgemeinen eine durch die 
Gesammtlage des Bewusstseins vorbereitete, die 
passive ist in der Regel eine unvorbereitete.^^ 



PASSIVE AND ACTIVE ATTENTION 313 

And this means, again, that passive attention is 
"'im allgemeinen eine Willenshandlung unter der 
Wirkung eiiies Motivs, oder . . . eine Trieb- 
handlung.'^ Active attention, on the contrary, 
is equivocally conditioned; it is a Willkurhand- 
lung^ subject to the interplay of primary with 
secondary motives, or a W ahlhandlung , the re- 
sultant of a conflict of primary motives. The 
two criteria (prepared, unprepared; univocally 
conditioned, equivocally conditioned) are coordi- 
nate, — or rather represent two aspects, the 
descriptive and the causal, of one and the same 
general difference. ^^ 

I think that these distinctions hold; and I 
think that, if we have recourse to our general 
law of the rise and fall, the expansion and reduc- 
tion of conscious formations,^^ and classify atten- 
tions accordingly as primary passive, active, and 
secondary passive, we are able to do rough and 
ready justice to the facts. This classification is, 
in the first instance, genetic. We may assume 
that attention, in its beginnings, was a definitely 
determined reaction — sensory and motor both — ■ 
upon a single stimulus. As sense-organs multi- 
plied, two or more disparate stimuli might, each 
one in its own right, claim the organism's atten- 
tion; here, in sense-rivalry and the conflict of 
motor attitudes, we should have the birth of ac- 



314 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

tive attention. When, later on, image super- 
vened upon sensation, conflict and rivalry were 
largely transferred to the field of ideas, and we 
find in consequence that separation of the recep- 
tive, elaborative, and executive attitudes of which 
I spoke just now. So far, there has been a pro- 
gressive increase in the complexity of the atten- 
tive consciousness. At this point reduction sets 
in; choice and deliberation give way to secon- 
dary impulses, and active gives way to secondary 
passive attention. The ground is thus cleared 
for further growth ; new formations appear in the 
state of active attention, to be simplified in their 
turn, - — and the cycle recurs, with constant al- 
ternation of habit and acquisition, so long as the 
organism retains its flexibility. This account 
shows, in barest outline, my own systematic use 
of the distinction; and you see that the whole 
schema is implicit in Wundt's doctrine, and fol- 
lows naturally from it.^^ 

Genetic psychology lends itself to a summary 
exposition of this kind; to its wider view the 
principle stands out, clear of confusing details. 
But Wundt himself is writing descriptive psy- 
chology; and descriptive psychology is always 
in the grip of details. This is a fact that we 
must bear in mind when we seek to appraise the 
distinction of voluntary and involuntary atten- 



PASSIVE AND ACTIVE ATTENTION 315 

tion in Ebbinghaus' system. ''Die willkiirliche 
Aufmerksamkeit/' he says, ''ist die vorausschau- 
end gewordene un willkiirliche. . . . Sie verhal- 
ten sich also zueinander wie Trieb und Wille."^® 
I remarked, a little while ago, that the difference 
between Wundt and Ebbinghaus, in regard to 
the will, is at bottom no more than a difference 
of terminology. Very much the same thing 
may be said here, except that Ebbinghaus con- 
fines himself wholly to description, and rejects 
the coordinate causal explanation, while at the 
same time his descriptive distinction is cleaner 
cut, more dogmatic, than that of Wundt. I 
should give the preference, on both counts, to 
Wundt 's exposition. ^^ It must be remembered 
that we are dealing with formations of bewilder- 
ing complexity, with total consciousnesses; and 
that we have little more to guide us than psycho- 
logical tradition and the casual observations 
made in the course of experimental work or in 
everyday life. Under these conditions, we ought 
to follow up every clue that offers, and we 
ought also to leave room in the system for doubt- 
ful cases, intermediate forms, transitional modes. 
No doubt, the hostile critic will at once raise the 
cry of inconsistency. Comfort yourselves with 
the reflection that the hostile critic is generally 
superficial ! It is the sympathetic critic who dis- 



316 AFFECTION AND ATTENTION 

covers your real weaknesses, and helps you by 
showing where they lie; and the sympathetic 
critic is less likely to charge inconsistency than 
to probe for its underlying reasons. 

I am now at an end. I finished writing the 
last paragraph with a feeling compounded, in 
Wundtian terms, of pleasantness, relaxation, 
and tranquillisation. We set out from uncer- 
tainty and chaos ; and we have at least achieved 
a fairly definite point of view, and have laid out 
a programme of experimental work for the future. 
Unfortunately, affective processes move between 
opposites : and that first feeling — which in my 
own poverty-stricken terminology would be 
merely a feeling of relief — soon gave way to a 
feeling of unpleasantness, tension, and depres- 
sion. We know so very little of the subject of 
these Lectures, and the work that we have found 
to do will take so long in the doing ! But feel- 
ings, again, are subject to Abstumpfung, show the 
phenomena of adaptation ; and the feeling of de- 
pression passed as the feeling of relief had passed 
before it. The professional attitude came to its 
rights. And that attitude, in the case of the 
experimental psychologist, is — how shall I 
describe it .^ — an attitude of patient confi- 
dence. We must be patient, because of all the 



CONCLUSION 317 

objects of human inquiry mind is the most 
baffling and the most complex; we must expect 
that the systems of to-day may have only an his- 
torical interest for the next generation. But 
we may have absolute confidence in our method, 
because the method has proved itself in the past ; 
it has done far more for psychology than is 
generally acknowledged, far more even than is 
recognised in the ordinary text-book of psychol- 
ogy: for the law of attentional inertia holds in 
science as it holds in ordinary life. There is 
not the slightest doubt that the patient applica- 
tion of the experimental method will presently 
solve the problems of feeling and attention. 



NOTES 



NOTES TO LECTURE I 

^ It is, of course, an open question whether the sensation 
and the image may be bracketed under a single heading 
(Klilpe) or must be treated as distinct elements (Ebbing- 
haus). I am not here prejudging this question. Which- 
ever view one holds, the combined doctrine of sensation 
and image is set off, in systematic regard, from the doctrines 
of affection and attention. 

^ W. Wundt, Grundzuge der physiologischen Psychologies 
i., 1902, xiv. ; ii., 1902, v. Cf. also i., 353. — H. Ebbing- 
haus, Grwidzilge der Psychologies i., 1905, 183 f., 432. 

The difference might, no doubt, be moderated. Thus 
Wundt wrote as early as 1896: "Kommt daher auch die 
Grosseneigenschaft als solche, und zwar im allgemeinen in 
verschiedenen Formen, namlich als Intensitat, als Qualitiit, 
als extensiver (raumlicher oder zeitlicher) Werth, und 
eventuell, namlich wenn die verschiedenen Bewusst- 
seinszustiinde beriicksichtigt werden, als Klarheitsgrad, 
jedem psychischen Element und jedem psychischen Ge- 
bilde an und fur sicli schon zu, u.s.w." (Grundri^s der 
Psijchologie, 1896, 296 f . ; 1905, 312 [Engl., 1897, 252; 
1907, 288 f.]). And Ebbinghaus declares that the general 
attributes appear " in der Regel je mit mehreren einer be- 
stimmten Klasse von [den spezifischen Empfindungen] auf 
einmal" ; difference and multiplicity, for instance, presup- 
pose at least two sensations (op. cit., 433 f.). At the same 
time, the two systems cannot be brought into accord. 

^ Volkerpsychologie, eine Untersuchung der Eniwick- 
Y 321 



322 NOTES TO LECTURE I 

lungsgesetze von Sprachey Myihus und Sitte, I. Die 
Sprache, i., 1900, 37 ff. Also 1904, 43 ff. 

It may be urged that, for Wundt's constructive purposes, 
it matters little whether the dimensions of strain-relaxation 
and excitement-depression represent ''einfache Gefuhls- 
formen" or simple syntheses of affective process with or- 
ganic sensation. The reply is twofold. If such a change 
of standpoint is immaterial, then the system cannot be very 
closely articulated ; the superstructure (to change the fig- 
ure) must sit rather loosely upon its foundations. And 
again, if the change of standpoint is psychologically neces- 
sary, then it also becomes necessary to inquire whether there 
are not other, fundamental and typical syntheses, over and 
above strain-relaxation and excitement-depression, which 
have an equal claim to recognition. 

^ W. B. Pillsbury, V attention, 1906, v. " Dans Tetat cha- 
otique oil se trouvent les theories contemporaines de 
Tattention," etc. Attention, 1908, ix. 

^ E. Mach, Beitrdge zur Analyse der Empfindungen, 1886, 
121 f., 134; Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das 
Verhdltniss des Physischen zum Psychischen, 1900, 180 f., 
193. 

^ See, e,g,, the discussion of the Method of Limits in my 
Experimental Psychology, II., ii., 1905, 99 ff. 

On the general topic of elements and attributes it may 
suffice here to refer the reader to A. Meinong, Ueber Be- 
griff und Eigenschaften der Empfindung, Vjs, f. wiss. 
Philos., xii., 1888, 324 ff ., 477 ff. ; xiii., 1889, 1 ff. ; Be- 
merkungen Uber den Farbenkorper und das Mischungsge- 
setz, Zeits. f, Psychol, u, PhysioL d, Sinnesorgane, xxxiii., 
1903, 1 ff., esp. § 6; E. B. Talbot, The Doctrine of Con- 
scious Elements, Philosophical Review, iv., 1895, 154; 



NOTES TO LECTURE I 323 

I. M. Bentley, The Simplicity of Colour Tones, American 
Journal of Psychology, xiv., 1903, 92; M. Meyer, On the 
Attributes of the Sensations, Psychological Review, xi., 
1904, 83. Of the systematic treatises I mention only C. 
Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, i., 1883, 108. The departure 
from psychological tradition in H. Munsterberg's Grund- 
ziigeder Psychologic, i., 1900, is noteworthy; but its discus- 
sion would take us too far afield. See M. F. Washburn, 
Some Examples of the Use of Psychological Analysis in 
System-Making, Philos, Review, xi., 1902, 445 ff. — Fur- 
ther references are given in later Notes. 

^ G. E. Mliller, Zur Psychophysik der Gesichtsempfin- 
dungen, Zeits. f, Psychol, u, PhysioL d, Sinnesorgane, x., 
1896, 2 f., 25 ff. 

^ G. T. Fechner, Elemente der Psychophysik, i. (1860) 
1889, 15. 

^ W. James, The Principles of Psychology, ii., 1890, 136. 

^^ See, e.g., the discussion in Wundt, Physiologische 
Psychologic, i., 1902, 14 f. (Principles, i., 1904, 12 ff.), 
339 ff., 350 ff. It is needless to multiply references, as 
the usage of the experimentalists is now strict and con- 
sistent. James himself often employs the term 'sensa- 
tion' very loosely (cf. the discussion in Principles, ii., 1), 
though he offers two definitions. On the one hand, 
(1) sensation is a limiting form of cognition, the form in 
which "the object cognised" comes nearest "to being a 
simple quality like 'hot,' 'cold,' 'red,' 'noise,' 'pain,' 
apprehended irrelatively to other things" (loc. cit.). Sen- 
sation is realised only in the earliest days of life; it 
is impossible, or all but impossible, to adults whose cog- 
nitive function has passed from acquaintance-with to 
knowledge-about {ihid., 3, 7 f . ; cf. i., 221 ff., 478 f. ; Text- 



324 NOTES TO LECTURE I 

hooh, 1892, 12 ff.). On the other hand, (2) sensation is 
"the object cognised" in this Hmiting form of cognition, 
"namely, simple qualities or attributes like hard^ hoty 
fain " themselves. In this sense, too, a pure sensation 
is known to the adult only by way of abstraction (Prin- 
ciples, ii., 3 ; cf. i., 195, 224, 478 f. ; Text-book, 40 ff., etc.). 
It is clear, I think, that on either of these definitions the 
statement of the text is valid. 

^^ With this whole discussion, cf . C. Stumpf, Tonpsy- 
chologie, i., 1883, 207 ff. ; ii., 1890, 56 ff., 535 ff. Ebbing- 
haus regards volume merely as a 'characterisation' of 
pitch, and thus endows tonal sensations with but a single 
qualitative attribute: Grundzilge, i., 1905, 294 f., 445. 

^^ The preceding paragraphs are the outcome of personal 
observations, taken especially during the year 1906-1907. 
The views which they embody are stated in more detail 
in the forthcoming edition of my Outline of Psychology. 
On the question of itch and its relation to pain I may also 
refer to L. Torok, Ueber das Wesen der Juckempfindung, 
Zeits.f. PsijchoL, xlvi., 1907, 23 ff. 

^^ E. Ilering, Zur Lehre vom Lichtsinne, 1878, 55 f . ; 
Grundzilge der Lehre vom Lichtsinn, 1907, 111. F. Hille- 
brand, Ueber die specifische Helligkeit der Farben, 
Sitzungsber. d, kais. Akad. d. Wiss, in Wien, mathem,- 
naturw. Classe, xcyiii., 3, 1889, 89. O. Klilpe, Outlines 
of Psychology, 1895, 30, 114, 119; Ueber die Objectivirung 
und Subjectivirung von Sinneseindrlicken, Philos, Studien, 
xix., 1902, 509. E. B. Titchener, An Outline of Psy- 
chology, 1896, 68, 71, 77. G. E. Muller, Zur Psychophysik 
der Gesichtsempfindungcn, Zeits, f Psychol, u. Physiol. 
d. Sinnesorgane, x., 1896,30 ff., 411 f . ; xiv., 1897,40 
ff., 60 ff. 



NOTES TO LECTURE I 325 

The psychophysical argument which Muller urges 
against Hillebrand {Zeits., x., 33) is, I suppose, impHed in 
one form or another by the taper of the colour pyramid. 
I do not see, however, how it can be translated into psy- 
chological terms, as an introspective argument for the 
intensity of visual sensation. Wundt constructs the col- 
our pyramid from hue, chroma, and intensity {Physiol. 
PsychoL, ii., 1902, 159 ff .) ; but this procedure necessarily 
leads to confusion. 

^^ Duration has been discussed by M. W. Calkins, 
Attributes of Sensation, Psychological Review^ vi., 1899, 
506 ff. (cf. xi., 1904, 221 f.), and M. F. Washburn, Notes 
on Duration as an Attribute of Sensations, ihid,^ x., 1903, 
416 ff. 

A few additional words may, perhaps, prevent mis- 
understanding of the text. When I say that extension 
and duration are the attributes to which we attend when 
we are asked certain questions, I do not mean that exten- 
sion, as such, is or has a definite form or a definite magni- 
tude or a definite local arrangement of parts, or that 
duration, as such, is or has a definite length or a definite 
serial arrangement of parts. I mean only that there are 
questions which direct us to the fundamental spreading- 
out character of the sensation, and that there are other 
questions which direct us to its fundamental going-on 
character ; and that we are able to attend, by abstraction, 
to these attributes and to neglect the rest. I have never 
believed, in particular, that locality and order, place in 
space and position in time, are attributes of sensation. 

A discussion with which I am in essential agreement will 
be found in H. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge der Psychologic, 
i., 1905, 445 ff., 480 ff. 



326 NOTES TO LECTURE I 

^^ Kiilpe says, in Outlines, 30, that " extension belongs only 
to the visual and cutaneous sensations (Hautsinn) " ; and, 
in Outlines, 335, that it belongs to " the visual and ' tactual,' 
— the latter term embracing both cutaneous sensations 
proper and the articular sensations set up in the motile 
parts of the body (sowohl die Hautempfindungen als auch 
die Gelenkempfindungen)." Ebbinghaus (Grundzuge, i., 
445 f.) predicates extension only of visual and cutaneous 
sensations. 

^^ Cf . my Postulates of a Structural Psychology, Philo- 
soph. Review, vii., 1898, 461 f.; I. M. Bentley, The 
Psychological Meaning of Clearness, Mind, N. S., xiii., 
1904, 242 ff. 

^^ C. Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, i., 1883, 202 f.; ii., 1890, 
524 ff. According to the footnote, ifcid., ii., 525, the attri- 
bute of tone-tint was recognised independently in 1885 by 
Stumpf and by G. Engel ; I have not seen Engel's paper. 

J. Passy distinguishes between the 'pouvoir odorant' 
and the intensity of odours. The former is inversely pro- 
portional to the RL. "Tout le monde sent," he says, 
"que le camphre, le citron, la benzine sont des odeurs 
fortes, la vanille, I'iris des odeurs faibles," although the 
'pouvoir odorant' of vanilla is at least a thousand times 
as great as that of camphor : Comptes rendus de la Societe 
de Biologie, [19 Mars] 1892, 240. It is clear that the 
*pouvoir odorant' belongs to psychophysics, not to psy- 
chology; but it is clear also that we must distinguish, 
psychologically, between the intensity and the penetrat- 
ingness of an olfactory sensation. 

G. E. Mliller insists on EindringlichJceit, as distinct from 
Intensitdt, in his Psychophysik der Gesichtsempfindungen, 
Zeits. /. Psychol., x., 1896, 26 ff. Cf. also Die Gesichts- 



NOTES TO LECTURE I 327 

punJcte und die Tatsachen der psychophysischen Methodiky 

1904, 123; J. Frobes, Zeits. f. Psychol., xxxvi., 1904, 
368 ff. ; and see Lecture V., note 33. 

On the Eindringlichkeit of certain pains, see W. James, 
Psychol, Review, i., 1894, 523 note; M. von Frey, Die 
Gefuhle und ihr Verhdltnis zu den Empfindungen, 1894, 15. 

^® Ebbinghaus, Grundzilge, i., 1905, 195; H. Aubert, 
GrundzUge der physiologischen Optik, 1876, 532. Ebbing- 
haus is speaking in general terms ; it is difficult to see the 
basis of Aubert's statement. Cf. also Klilpe, Outlines, 
106 f., 122, 127; Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, 1896, 325. 
I owe to Professor Bentley the suggestion that tonal 
volume may vary without variation of pitch ; the point is 
well worth investigation. Prehminary experiments of my 
own have, so far, yielded a positive result. 

^' R. H. Lotze, Metaphysik, 1879, § 258; 1884, 511 fJ.; 
Outlines of Psych., (1881) 1886, 17; cf. Medicinische 
Psychologic, 1852, 208, and my Exper. Psychol., II., ii., 

1905, xlviii. ff. M. W. Calkins recognises 'sensational 
elements' of brightness or visual intensity, of loudness, 
etc. : An Introduction to Psychology, 1901, 42, 53, 59, 61, 
67, 75, 77. Ebbinghaus writes (GrundzUge, i., 444): 
"Gesehene und getastete Ausdehnung sind ohne weiteres 
miteinander vergleichbar, ebenso die Dauer eines Tones 
mit der eines Schmerzes. Dagegen hell, laut und heiss, 
. . . oder . . . violett, sauer, hart, haben schlechterdings 
gar nichts miteinander gemeinsam." 



NOTES TO LECTURE II 

^ Brent ano is vouched for by Stumpf, Zeits. f. Psychol, ^ 
xliv., 1906, 4. 

^The doctrine of continuity is pithily expressed by J. 
Rehmke in the sentence: "es lasst sich doch garnicht 
leugnen, dass der sogenannte ' Ton der Sinnesempfindung ' 
im 'physischen Schmerze' oder in der 'WoUust' und das 
durch einen Todesfall oder eine Siegesnachricht bedingte 
' Gefuhl ' wesentlich gleiche Bewusstseinsbestimmtheiten 
sind." Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychologiey 1894, 317. 
For my own view, I can refer only to chap. ix. of my 
Outline of Psychology y which unfortunately is both sche- 
matic and, to some extent, out of date. Stumpf's view is 
given in his paper, Ueber den Begriff der Gemiithsbewe- 
gung, Zeits, f. Psychol., xxi., 1899, 47 ff., which has full 
references to the literature. I add only G. F. Stout, A 
Manual of Psychology, 1899, 63. The phrase quoted from 
Stumpf will be found in Zeits., xliv., 7. — A pathological 
case, in which the same conditions were apparently re- 
sponsible for the loss both of feeling and of emotion, is 
reported by G. R. d'AUonnes, Rev, Philos,, Dec, 1905, 
592 ff . ; I confess, however, that I attach no great weight 
to observations of this sort. Cf. P. SoUier, Le mecanisme 
des emotions, 1905, 126 ff. 

^ Tonpsychologie, i., vi. ; ii., vii. ; Zeits., xliv., 1 ff. 

In the article of 1899 (Zeits,, xxi., 63) Stumpf writes: 
"Macht man bei diesen Organempfindungen noch einen 
Unterschied zwischen der Empfindung selbst und ihrem 

328 



NOTES TO LECTURE II 329 

*GefuhIston/ z. B. der Hungerempfindung und der 
Unannehmlichkeit dieser Empfindung, so versteht es sich 
wohl von selbst und ist von James zuletzt auch noch 
besonders hervorgehoben, dass fiir die Natur des Affects 
der Gefuhlston das Ausschlaggebende ist." The 'zuletzt' 
refers to James' discussion of the Physical Basis of Emo- 
tion, Psychol. Review, i., 1894, 516 flF. I am altogether 
unable to read Stumpf's interpretation into this paper. 
James says, when discussing the 'tone of feeling,' ' pleasant- 
ness or unpleasantness of the sensible quality,' that "in 
addition to this pleasantness or painfulness of the con- 
tent, we may also feel a general seizure of excitement, . . . 
which is what I have all along meant by an emotion. Now 
whenever I myself have sought to discover the mind-stuff 
of which such seizures consist, it has always seemed to me 
to be additional sensations . . . localized in divers por- 
tions of my organism" (523). That is, the Gefuhlston \s 
precisely not the important or decisive feature of the emo- 
tion. Again (524) : " I am even willing to admit that the 
primary Gefuhlston may vary enormously in distinctness 
in different men. But speaking for myself, I am compelled 
to say that the only feelings which I cannot more or less 
well localize in my body are very mild and, so to speak, 
platonic affairs. I allow them hypothetically to exist, 
however, . . . where no obvious organic excitement is 
aroused." This is very different from making them das 
Ausschlaggebende where organic excitement, the 'emo- 
tional seizure,' is the very thing to be explained. 

* With the foregoing paragraphs (criterion of subjec- 
tivity) cf . M. F. Washburn, Some Examples of the Use of 
Psychological Analysis in System-Making, Philos, Review, 
xi., 1902, 445 J0F. ; E. H. Hollands, Wundt's Doctrine of 



330 NOTES TO LECTURE II 

Psychical Analysis and the Psychical Elements, and Some 
Recent Criticism: i. The Criteria of the Elements and 
Attributes, Amer, Journ. Psychol.^ xvi., 1905, 499 jff.; 
ii. Feeling and Feeling-Analysis, ibid., xvii., 1906, 206 if. 
(esp. 221, 226) ; J. Orth, Gefuhl und Bewusstseinslage, 
eine kritisch-experimentelle Studie, 1903, 20 ff . ; Stumpf, 
Zeits.y xliv., 8 if., 34; R. Saxinger, Dispositionspsycholo- 
gisches liber Gefuhlskomplexionen, Zeits., xxx., 1902, 399; 
Kiilpe, Outlines y 227 f. ; Wundt, Physiol, PsychoL, iii., 
1903, 110 ff., 514 f., 552 ff . ; G. T. Ladd, Psychology, 
Descriptive and Explanatory: a Treatise of the Phe- 
nomena. Laws, and Development of Human Mental Life 
1894, 181 ; J. Ward, Psychology, Encyc. Britan,, xx., 1886, 
67; W. B. Pillsbury, Attention, 1908, 191. 

I say, on p. 38, that nobody confuses organic sensations 
with properties of external things. This seems to be true 
of all the more specific organic sensations, — hunger, 
thirst, nausea, lust, etc. I am not sure, however, that 
certain organic sensations or organic complexes, of a 
diffuse and general character, are not projected along with 
the accompanying affection into the outer world. What 
do we mean when we speak of ' a pleasant day,' ' very un- 
pleasant weather,' 'a comfortable chair,' 'an uncomfort- 
able waiting room '? I do not find the analysis easy ; but 
I think that these adjectives are applied as objectively, at 
least in many instances, as the adjectives 'green' or 'hot.' 
Von Frey points out {Die Gefuhle und ihr Verhaltnis zu 
den Empfindungen, 1894, 14) that cutting and stabbing 
weapons, instruments of torture, etc. are directly appre- 
hended as ' schmerzhaft ' * ; we speak in English of a 

*Cf. M. Dessoir, Arch. f. [Anat. u.] Physiol., 1892, 230; W. 
Nagel, Handbuch d. Physiol, d. Menschen, iii., 1905, 731, 



NOTES TO LECTURE II 331 

* painful-looking ' instrument. Against the illustration of 
p. 37 we might cite such expressions as : " How pleasant 
your wood fire is ! " 

The appeal to language is always dangerous, because a 
given phrase may mean very different things. Unless I 
am mistaken, however, we do at times objectify our feel- 
ings (diffuse organic sensations and affection) * just as we 
objectify the 'secondary qualities.' It is needless to say 
that this amendment of the text does not at all invalidate, 
but rather supplements, the argument of the paragraph. 
Some sensations, I there say, are subjective. Affection, 
I here add, is sometimes objective. 

^ On the second criterion, of non-localisableness, see M. 
von Frey, Die Gefilhle, 1894, 12; W. Nagel, Handbuch 
der Physiologie des Menschen, iii., 1905, 617; J. R. Angell 
and W. Fite, Psychol. Review, viii., 1901, 245, 451, 455, 
458; J. R. Angell, ibid., x., 1903, 5, 14; A. H. Pierce, 
Studies in Auditory and Visual Space Perception, 1901, 
191 f. ; Orth, Gefilhl und Bewusstseinslage, 1903, 29 ff., f 
117 ff.; Stumpf, Zeits., xliv., 1906, 12 ff.; R. Lagerborg, 
Zur Abgrenzung des Gefuhlsbegriffs, Arch. f. d. ges. 
Psychol, ix., 1907, 460; Kulpe, Outlines, 1895, 264 f., 
274; Ebbinghaus, Grundzilge, i., 1905, 564 f . ; Wundt, 
Physiol. Psychol., ii., 1902, 341; J. Sully, The Human 
Mind: a Text-book of Psychology, ii., 1892, 43; W. 
McDougall, Physiological Psychology, 1905, 80; Ladd, 
Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, 1894, 182, 201, 
536 f., 554; Rehmke, Lehrbuch, 1894, 323 ff.; T. Lipps, 

* In the same way, we objectify the pleasantness and unpleasant- 
ness of tastes and smells. Cf . the discussion of Gefuhlsbetonung 
by E. Freiherr von Gebsattel, Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., x., 1907, 
145 ff. 

t Cf. E. Meumann, Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., ix., 1907, 57 f. 



332 NOTES TO LECTURE II 

Komik und Humor: eine psychologisch-dsthetische Unter- 
suchung, 1898, 114 f . ; E. Kraepelin, Zur Psychologic des 
Komischen, Philos. Studien, ii., 1885, 329, 351; A. 
Lehmann, Die Hauptgesetze des menschlichen Gefuhls- 
lebens, 1892, 177, 201, 214, 216, 258, 267; G. Storring, 
Arch, f, d. ges, PsychoL, vi., 1905, 318 f. ; P. Sollier, Le 
mecanisme des emotionSy 1905, 81 ff. (cf, 75 ff.); N. Alech- 
sieff. Die Grundformen dcr Gcfuhle, Psychol, Studieriy 
iii., 1907, 259 ff. ; C. H. Johnston, The Combination of 
FecHngs, Harvard Psychological Studies, ii., 1906, 159 flF. 
(esp. 175-179) ; cf. Journ, PhiL Psychol. Sci. Meth., iv., 
1907, 215; Psychol. Bulletin, ii., 1905, 163, 166; iv., 1907, 
363 ff. On methodical difficulties and the attitude of 
observation, see F. E. O. Schultze, Arch. f. d. ges. 
Psychol., viii., 1906, 372 ff.; xi., 1908, 151 ff. 

M. Geiger's Bemerkungen zur Psychologic der Gefiihls- 
elemente und Gefuhlsverbindungen (Arch. f. d. ges. 
Psychol., iv., 1904, esp. 262 ff.), and the paper by Saxinger 
quoted in the previous Note, published under the auspices 
of Lipps and of Meinong respectively, rest upon elaborate 
theoretical foundations, and are beyond the range of the 
present discussion. 

® With this discussion of the third criterion cf . Wundt, 
Grundriss der Psychologic, 1896, 40; 1905, 40 (Engl., 
1897, 33 ; 1907, 36) ; Vorlesungen uher die Menschen- 
und Thierseele, 1897, 240; Physiol. Psychol, i., 1902, 353; 
and many other passages. Rehmke, Lehrbuch, 1894, 
295 ff. Stumpf, Zeits., xliv., 1906, 7 note, 17, 22. Orth, 
Gefuhl und Bewusstseinslage, 1903, 28 f. Kulpe, Outlines, 
1895, 93, 242. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, i., 1905, 564. 
T. Lipps, Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens, 1883, 273 ff. 
W. Wirth, Vorstellungs- und Gefuhlscontrast, Zeits. /. 



NOTES TO LECTURE II 333 

Psychol., xviii., 1898, 49 ff. P. Sollier, Le mecanisme des 
emotions, 1905, 244 ff., esp. 253. 

Lipps, if I understand him aright, has recently changed 
his opinion with regard to ' mixed feehngs ' ; see Leitfaden 
der Psychologies 1906, 297 f. 

^ On Kulpe's criterion see Klilpe, Outlines, 1895, 185 f., 
225 f., 238; Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explana- 
tory, 1894, 196, 199; Stumpf, Zeits., xHv., 1906, 23 ff.; 
Pillsbury, Attention, 1908, 190 f. 

On the difference between 'zufaUige innere Wahrneh- 
mung' and 'planmassige Selbstbeobachtung,' see Wundt, 
Essays, 1885, 127 ff. ; 1906, 187 ff. ; Philos, Studien, iv., 
1888, 292 ff. (esp. 301) ; etc., etc. 

On the phrase 'centrally excited sensations,' see E. 
Meumann, Vorlesungen zur Einfilhrung in die experi- 
mentelle Pddagogik und ihre psychologischen Grundlagen, 
i., 1907, 205. It might be objected to Kulpe that the ex- 
periments of H. Miinsterberg (Beitr, z. experiment, Psy- 
chol, iv., 1892, 17 ff.), A. Goldscheider and R. F. MuUer 
{Zeits, /. klin, Medizin, xxiii., 1893, 156 ff.), and W. B. 
Pillsbury (Amer. Journ. Psychol., viii,, 1897, 355 ff.) 
indicate, under certain conditions, an intensive equivalence 
of peripherally excited and centrally excited sensations. 
Kulpe has, however, forestalled the objection in Outlines, 
183. 

^ On habituation, see James, Principles, ii., 475 f. ; 
Stumpf, Zeits., xliv., 1906, 7 note; Bericht iiher d. II. 
Kongress f. exper. Psychologic, 1907, 213 ; Klilpe, Out- 
lines, 261; Ebbinghaus, GrundzUgCy i., 1905, 574 ff. ; 
A. Lehmann, Die Hauptgesetze des menschlichen Gefuhls- 
lebens, 1892, 182 ff . ; Wundt, Physiol. Psychol., ii., 1902, 
332 (with continuous stimulation, initial pleasantness may 



334 NOTES TO LECTURE II 

pass directly, through indifference, into unpleasantness) ; 
Sollier, Le mecanisme des emotions, 1905, 97 ff. "Use 
blunts feeling and favours intellection," says Ward: 
Encyc. Britan,, xx., 1886, 40. 

® On the relation of affection to attention, see Klilpe, 
Outlines, 1895, 258 ff., 430; Titchener, Philos. Review, 
iii., 1894, 429 ff. (the systematic setting of this paper is 
crude, but I think that the observations are reliable) ; 
Psychol Review, ix., 1902, 481 ff. ; P. Zoneff and E. Meu- 
mann, Philos, Studien, xviii., 1903, 4 f., 67 ff. (cf. Lec- 
ture III., note 43) ; W. B. Pillsbury, PsychoL Review, ix., 
1902, 405; Meumann, Experimentelle Pddagogik, i., 1907, 
82; W. Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, 1859, i., 236; 
ii., 432; J. Ward, Psychology, Encyc, Britan,, xx., 1886, 
40 ff. ; Hollands, Amer. Journ, PsychoL, xvii., 1906, 211; 
Wundt, Physiol Psychol, ii., 1902, 357; iii., 1903, 114, 
348; Saxinger, Zeits,, xxx., 1902, 400, 412; A. Lehmann, 
Die korperlichen Aeusserungen psychischer Zustdnde, i., 
1899, 140 ff. ; W. H. Burnham, Amer. Journ, Psychol, 
xix., 1908, 16; F. E. O. Schultze, Arch, /. d, ges, Psychol, 
viii., 1906, 373. 

Sully says definitely {Human Mind, {., 1892, 77) that 
"we can intensify a pain or pleasure by attending to it as 
such," — as definitely as he says (ibid., 143) that "objects 
of attention are either sensations, and their combinations, 
sensation-complexes, or what we call ideas or representa- 
tions." But he counts 'bodily pain,' 'the pain of indiges- 
tion' as an 'affective state,' and admits that "in attending 
to the feeling we necessarily embrace [the presentative 
element] to some extent." It is true, as he remarks, that 
"to listen to a musical sound so as to note its pitch, etc., 
and to listen to it solely for the sake of enjoying it, illustrate 



NOTES TO LECTURE II 335 

two different directions of the attention"; but there is 
here no evidence of direction of the attention upon the 
enjoyment, and the latter's consequent intensification. 
Cf. also i., 67; ii., 12. 

In his Attention, 1908, 187, Pillsbury writes: "as mat- 
ters stand, the introspective evidence is universally favour- 
able to the assertion that attention is antagonistic to the 
pleasantness-unpleasantness process as well as to the 
vague unanalysed processes of consciousness." The first 
part of this sentence, at any rate, confirms my own position. 
On another point, however, Pillsbury seems to disagree. 
"Of Wundt's three pairs," he says, "strain and relaxation 
would not be opposed to attending. ... Of depression 
and exaltation it is diflicult to speak, but it is by no means 
certain that attention to these processes would either 
oppose or favour their presence" (187 f.). I think that 
the disagreement is only apparent. Pillsbury is con- 
sidering the Wundtian processes, so to speak, on their 
merits, as they occur in his experience ; I am setting forth 
Wundt's own doctrine. I believe with Hollands that 
feeling, in Wundt's system, cannot be made the object of 
attention; and I find this teaching in his tridimensional 
theory as in the theory of affective tone. Nevertheless, 
I point out in Lecture VIII. that Wundt's present view of 
the relation of affection to attention is, in my judgment, 
transitional, and I therefore regard it as possible that his 
systematic position may be changed. 

^^ The idea of this paragraph is that the criterion of move- 
ment between opposites may be coupled with that of 
coextension with consciousness, — opposition meaning, in 
fact, conscious incompatibility; and that the criterion of 
lack of clearness may be coupled with that of subjec- 



336 NOTES TO LECTURE II 

tivity, — lack of clearness implying a textural difference 
between sensation and affection, which finds expression 
in the term 'subjective.' We thus reach a twofold char- 
acterisation of affection, to be explained and justified by 
psychophysical theory. I think that this bracketing 
"considerably strengthens the case for an elementary 
affection." We are led by it, e.g., to mistrust the instances 
of localised affection, such as occur in Storring's experi- 
ments. Storring, it will be remembered, secured Stim- 
mungslust and Empjindungslust by the following experi- 
mental procedure : " wahrend man bei der Erzeugung von 
Lust, die an eine Geschmacksempfindung gekniipft ist, 
die Geschmackslosung wahrend der Dauer des Versuchs im 
Munde behalten lasst, gab ich zum Zweck der Erzeugung 
von Stimmungslust der Vp. die Anweisung, die Losung 
zu schlucken und dann von der Empfindung abzusehen, 
mit dem Schlucken den Geschmacksreiz als eine erledigte 
Tatsache zu betrachten" (Arch, f. d. ges, PsychoL^ vi., 
1905, 317). It is clear that the instructions are not paral- 
lel: so long as the fluid is in the mouth, the observer's 
attention is upon it, and the affection is localised along 
with its sensation (cf . Note 4, above) ; when the fluid has 
been swallowed, and the taste is past and done with, the 
affection is not localised. So much depends upon the 
conditions ! But let the instructions be made parallel : 
let the observer be told, in the experiments on EmpJindungS' 
lusty to consider the taste as past and done with so soon 
as it has come clearly to consciousness; let the retention 
in the mouth be merely a matter of convenience, of not 
interrupting the experiment. In this case, if I may trust 
my own introspection and that of three other observers, 
th^re is no localisatioji of the pleasantness; it is of pre- 



NOTES TO LECTURE II 337 

cisely the same character as the pleasantness after swallow- 
ing. However, the subject needs renewed investigation 
of a systematic kind. 

We have an analogy to the argument of the text in the 
position of those psychologists who make the image a dis- 
tinct mental element, coordinate with sensation. 'You 
cannot distinguish sensation and image on the ground of 
quality alone, or of intensity, or of duration, or of exten- 
sion, or of clearness. Can you not distinguish them in 
terms of the consensus of these attributes ? Is there not a 
total textural difference between the two processes ? ' This, 
it seems to me, is the gist of the separatist argument, when 
it is couched in terms of content. No doubt, there is, in 
the case of the image, a further appeal to characteristic 
differences of context or background or setting. 



NOTES TO LECTURE III 

^ B. Bourdon, La sensation de plaisir, Rev, philos,, 
Sept., 1893, 226 f. 

2 M. von Frey, Die Gefuhle, 1894, 14 f., 17. — In this 
connection, mention should also be made, perhaps, of 
Sollier's recent theory of 'cenesthesie cerebrale': Le 
mecanisme des emotions, 1905, esp. 192 ff., 257 f. 

' Op. cit, 227 f. 

^ See, e.g., Rep., ix., 583 D; Phaedo, 60 A; Phil., 51. 

^ Bericht vher den II. Kongress fur experimentelle Psy- 
chologie, 1907, 209 ff.; Zeits., xliv., 1906, 1 ff. On p. 15, 
Stumpf makes the terminological suggestion that Gefuhls- 
empfindung be rendered by 'emotional sensation.' This 
translation seems to me hardly possible; the English 
equivalent would be, I think, either 'affective sensation' 
or 'algedonic sensation.' The adjective 'algedonic' was 
coined by H. R. Marshall (Pain, Pleasure and Esthetics, 
1894, 9), not — as Stumpf and Lagerborg (Arch. f. d. 
ges. Psychol., ix., 1907, 454) say — by Baldwin. In a 
systematic connection I should prefer the phrase ' algedonic 
sensation ' ; for the purposes of this Lecture its introduc- 
tion appeared unnecessary. 

*Pp. 1 ff. 

' Pp. 2 ff. 

' Outlines, 1895, 227 f. 

' i., 282. 

^^T. Ziehen, Leitfaden der physiologischen Psy chologie 
in 15 Vorlesungen, 1906, 162 note. 

338 



NOTES TO LECTURE III 339 

^^ P. 5 note. 

12 P. 4. 

1^ H. R. Marshall, President's Address, American Psy- 
chological Association, Chicago Meeting, December, 1907 : 
The Methods of the Naturalist and Psychologist, Psychol, 
Rev., XV., 1908, 16 f. "If we could isolate psychic ele- 
ments, ... we would [sic] discover in connection with 
them elemental qualities ... of the nature of pain and 
pleasure." 

1^ T. Ziegler, Das Gefiihl: eine psychologische Unter- 
suchung, 1893, 100. Cf. Stumpf, p. 43 note. 

1^ P. 6. — Under the theory which makes the affective 
processes "eine neue Gattung psychischer Elemente, 
Zustande oder Funktionen, die weder Empfindungen noch 
Eigenschaften von Empfindungen sind" (p. 3), falls the 
view which considers them as 'Gestaltqualitaten.' In 
Bericht, 213, Stumpf definitely rejects this view. I must 
say, however, that he seems to me to come very near it 
in his doctrine of the ' Reinheitsgefuhl,' the feeling for the 
purity of consonant intervals: see F. Krueger, Berichty 
212; Psychol Studien, ii., 1906, 371 f., 375 S. (where full 
references are given). At any rate, we are here far re- 
moved from the positive rejection of mental chemistry, 
from the "Aus Nichts wird Nichts," of the Tonpsy- 
chologie (ii., 1890, 209, 525, etc.). 

^' Pp. 6 fi^. 

^' Pp. 15 fl^. 

^« P. 18. 

^^ P. 21. 

2« P. 19. 

^' Pp. 16 f. 

^^A. Goldscheider, Gesam, AbhandL, i., 1898, 411 f. ; 
Stumpf, pp. 19 note, 21. 



340 NOTES TO LECTURE III 

^P. 19. 

2* Pp. 16 f . 

25 Pp. 19 f . 

2« Pp. 2, 22. 

^' P. 21. 

2^ See, e,g., Kulpe, Outlines, 124. 

2^H. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, i., 1905, 581; cf. R. 
Lagerborg, Das Gefiihlsproblem, 1905, 95; P. Sollier, Le 
mecanisme des emotions, 1905, 244, 254 f. 

^^ M. Kelchner, Arch.f. d. ges. Psychol, v., 1905, 86. 

^' Pp. 21 f. 

'' P. 22. 

^^ Pp. 22, 38 f . In the latter passage Stumpf, while still 
leaving the question open, indicates his own belief in a 
plurality of affective qualities. 

^* Let it not be objected that these Lustempjindungen are 
sensations of pleasure for the reason that they "ein in- 
stinktives Annehmen und Begehren mit sich zu fiihren 
pflegen" (p. 22) ! For on p. 16 it is written: "die An- 
nehmlichkeit ist nicht das Annehmen und der Schmerz 
nicht das Ablehnen.'* 

'5 Pp. 26 ff. 

'« Pp. 27 f . 

" P. 28. 

^« P. 29. 

'' P. 31 ; Tonpsychologie, ii., 1890, 209. 

'^ Pp. 29 f . 

*' E.g., pp. 18 note, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 29 f., 36, 39 f. 

''P. 2; cf. p. 41. 

^^ E. W. Scripture, Vorstellung und Geflihl, Philos, 
Studien, vi., 1891, 536 ff. ; O. Vogt, Die directe psycholo- 
gische Experimentalmethode in hypnotischen Bewusst- 



NOTES TO LECTURE III 341 

seinszustanden, Zeits, f. Hypiiotismus, v., 1897, 180 ff. ; 
F. Kiesow, Sul metodo di studiare i sentimenti semplici, 
Rendiconti delta r. Accademia dei Lincei, Classe di scienze 
fis.y mat. e natur,, (5) viii., 1, 1899, 469 ff. 

Kiesow's experiments were made as follows. He first 
determined two areas of the tongue that were equally 
sensitive to sweet, and platted the curve of sensible dis- 
crimination. He then gave his observers preliminary 
practice "a distrarre la loro attenzione dalla sensazione 
e a concentrarla esclusivamente sul tono sentimentale 
(Gefuhlston) che accompagna ogni grado di sensazione." 
The instruction is, evidently, ambiguous (cf. reference to 
Zoneff and Meumann, Lecture H., note 9). Kiesow 
naturally found, in consequence, that "in sulle prime 
queste esperienze sono difficili e affaticanti: in alcune 
persone mi pare di non essere potuto giungere a una 
sufficiente concentrazione dell' attenzione sul tono senti- 
mentale; esse erano sempre distratte passivamente dalla 
sensazione. ... In altri soggetti coll' esercizio si puo 
giungere al punto da poter astrarre dalla sensazione in 
modo sufficiente." After practice, he began systematic 
work upon pleasantness-unpleasantness, and platted an 
affective curve, starting with the RL and employing the 
DL as unit of abscissas. The curve shows, first, a stage 
of indifference ; next, a stage of slowly increasing pleasant- 
ness; thirdly, a second stage of indifference; and lastly 
a stage of somewhat rapidly increasing unpleasantness. 
Kiesow remarks that " nella curva cosi ottenuta le ordinate 
non sono stabilite numericamente con una precisione 
eguale a quella delle ascisse." He gives no further details, 
and does not figure the curves. 

^Affective Memory, Philos, Rev., iv., 1895, ^5 ff. See 



342 NOTES TO LECTURE III 

T. Ribot, The Psychology of the Emotions, 1897, 140 ff. 
A reference to the recent annual bibliographies will show 
that the subject is still in debate. I find it discussed, 
e.g,, by W. Heinrich, La psychologie des sentiments 
{Bull, de VAcad. des Sciences de Cracovie, Jan., 1908, 36), 
which reaches me as these pages are passing through the 
press. 

^^ Organic Images, Journ, Phil. Psychol, Sci, Meth,, i., 
1904, 36 ff. 

'' P. 23. 

^^ P. 25. — The illustration is the more striking since 
G. H. Meyer, a highly practised observer, declares his 
inability to reproduce cutaneous sensations of intrinsi- 
cally brief duration. " Auf der Haut gelingt es mir leicht, 
an welcher Stelle ich will, subjective Empfindungen her- 
vorzubringen. Weil aber langere Unterhaltung der Ans- 
chauung dazu nothwendig ist, kann ich nur solche Emp- 
findungen wecken, welche langere Zeit andauern, wie 
Warme, Kuhle, Druck; schnell voriibergehende dagegen, 
wie von einem St ich, Schnitt, Schlag, etc., vermag ich 
nicht hervorzurufen, weil es mir nicht gelingt, die entsprech- 
enden Anschauungen so ex abrupto in der gehbrigen In- 
tensitdt zu wecken'^ {Untersuchungen uher die Physiologic 
der Nervenfaser, 1843, 238: italics mine).* Personally, 

* Meyer's work is not in the possession of any one of the four 
university libraries to which I am accustomed to appeal. It may, 
however, be procured from the Librarian of the Surgeon General's 
Office, Washington, D.C. I may mention here — since I find that 
the fact is less generally known than it deserves to be — that the 
Surgeon GeneraFs Library is admirably supplied with the older 
and scarcer books that bear upon experimental psychology. A 
postcard from the librarian of any college or university library will 
bring the required volumes, usually by return, and they may be 
held for a fortnight. 



I 



NOTES TO LECTURE III 343 

I can image pressure and, I think, warmth; I cannot 
image pain, and I am very dubious as regards cold. See 
my Organic Images, 38 f., and cf. F. E. O. Schultze, 
Arch, /. d. ges, PsychoL, xi., 1908, 157 f., 185 f. 

'' P. 26. 

^^ See, however, pp. 35 note, 47. I am not sure that I 
understand Stumpf s doctrine as regards rhythmical, 
formal, and harmonic feelings. 

^«Pp. 31 f. 

'' P. 32. 

^^ G. T. Fechner, Elemente der Psychophysiky i., 1889, 
75 (see also refs. given in my Exper. Psychol,, II., ii., 1905, 
Ixviii.); Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, i., 1905, 91. 

^^ W. Nagel, Handhuch d, Physiol, d. Menschen, iii., 
1905, 620. 

^' P. 36. 

^^ Pp. 32 f. 

^ Pp. 33 ff. 

" P. 36. 

'' Pp. 33, 37. 

^^ Pp. 37 f . 

^^ By the admission of instances from the field of emo- 
tion and of aesthetic and intellectual sentiment. See, how- 
ever. Note 49 above; and cf. Stumpf, pp. 33 ff. 

«^ Pp. 38 f . 

I may add that, so far as my experience goes, American libra- 
ries contain practically everything that is needed for historical 
research in experimental psychology. In the preparation of my 
Exper. Psychol. I had to read a great many out-of-the-way things ; 
but there were very few instances in which I was obliged to have 
final recourse to European collections. As the great majority of 
the large libraries — there are a fev/ bad exceptions ! — are 
courtesy itself in the matter of lending, there is no excuse for 
'ignorance of the literature' on the part of the American student. 



344 NOTES TO LECTURE III 

*^ Pp. 39 f. 

«' Orundzuge, l, 1905, 566. 

" Pp. 41 ff. 

•^ Pp. 42, 48 f. 

«"* Pp. 42 f., 44. 

" Pp. 43 f. 

•* See, e.g., R. H. Lotze, Medicinische Psychologic oder 
Physiologic der Seele, 1852, 254 f. ; Stumpf, p. 32. 

•» P. 44 ; Ebbinghaus, Orundzuge, i., 1905, 582 f. 

''" Outlines, 1895, 228 ff. 

" Of. cit., 577. 

'^ Pp. 44 f . 

" P. 45. 

" Pp. 45 flF. 

'* P. 46. 

'• P. 47. 

" Tonpsychologic, ii., 1890, vii. In Note 15 above I 
have expressed a certain misgiving as regards Stumpf's 
doctrine of the Tongefiihle. 

" P. 48. 



NOTES TO LECTURE IV 

' Physiol Psychol, i., 1893, 555 f., 561, 570 f. 

^Grundriss der Psychologic, 1896, 33 f., 36, 39 ff., 97 f., 
100 (Engl., 1897, 28 f., 30, 33 ff., 82 f., 84 f.); cf. 1905, 
34 f., 36, 39 ff., 99 f., 101 (Engl., 1907, 31 f., 32 f., 35 ff., 
91 f., 93). 

^ This is, I am convinced, the true version of a state of 
affairs which James has unwittingly misrepresented in 
Psychol Review, i., 1894, 72 f. 

* Physiol Psychol, 1874, 445. The passage which re- 
lates to the aesthetic value of the higher senses is retained, 
with some modification of context, in the edition of 1893 
(i., 571); but the important thing is the insertion, in that 
edition, of the new paragraph, i., 561. 

^Ibid., 1874, 426; i., 1893, 555. 

® Gefuhl und Bewusstseinslage, 1903, 49 ; Wundt, Grund- 
riss, 1896, 97 ff. (Engl., 82 ff.) ; cf. 1905, 99 ff. (Engl., 
1907, 91 ff.). 

'Physiol Psychol, 1874, 441, 721. 

^Ibid,, ii., 1902, 284 ff. 

^ Grundriss, 1896, 100, 213 (Engl., 85, 181) ; cf. 1905, 
101, 217 (Engl., 1907, 93, 202). 

^"^ Zeits., xliv., 1906, 7 f. note. 

^^ Grundriss, 1896, 103 (Engl, 88). Cf. 1905, 103 ff. 
(Engl., 1907, 95 ff.). 

^^ Vorlesungen iiher die Menschen- und Thierseele, 1897, 
224 ff. 

^^ Philos. Studien, xv., 1900, 151. 

345 



346 NOTES TO LECTURE IV 

^* This Lecture was not printed ; but the material upon 
which it was based may be found in H. C. Stevens' A 
Plethysmographic Study of Attention, Amer, Journ. 
Psychol, xvi., 1905, 482. 

'' Grundriss, 1896, 35 (Engl., 29) ; cf. 1905, 35 (Engl., 
1907, 32). 

^^ Cf. my note in Psychol Bulletin, iv., 1907, 367 f. 

^' Grundriss, 1896, 99 f. (Engl., 84 f.). This § 9 is 
omitted in 1905. 

^^Philos. Studien, xv., 1900, 177. 

^^ Vorlesungen, 1897, 238. 

'' Ibid,, 239. 

2^ Ibid., 239 f. 

^"^ Physiol Psychol, ii., 1902, 311 ff., 318 f., 326, 333, 
336 f. The intensive reference of Lust-Unlust indicates 
a return to the teaching of 1874 ; see Note 4 above. 

'' Ibid., 374. 

^^ Cf. Wundt's own statement in Grundriss, 1896, 96 
(Engl., 81); cf. 1905, 98 (Engl., 1907, 90). 

^'Philos. Studien, xv., 1900, 175. 

'^ Grundriss, 1896, 98 (cf. 1905, 99) ; Physiol Psychol, 
ii., 1902, 286, 295. 

^^ Phijsiol Psychol, 1874, 724; Vorlesungen, 1897, 238. 
In Physiol Psychol, iii., 1903, 253 f., 306 f. (cf. Grundriss, 
1896, 256; 1905, 265), the Erfullungsgefuhl appears as a 
total feeling, based essentially upon relaxation and tran- 
quillisation : cf., however, 347. Bejriedigung (iii., 221) 
is a Lustaffect: the Totalgefuhl will then be based upon 
pleasantness and relaxation. 

""^ Vorlesungen, 1897, 228; Grundriss, 1905, 105. 

^^A. Gurewitsch, Zur Geschichte des Achtungsbegriffes 
und zur Theorie der sitilichen Gefuhle, Wlirzburg dissert., 
1897. 



NOTES TO LECTURE IV 347 

^" O. Vogt, Normalpsychologische Einleitung in die 
Psychopathologie der Hysterie, Zeits. f. Hypnotismus, 
viii., 1899, 212. 

" Physiol. Psychol, iii., 1903, 249. 

'' J. Royce, Outlines of Psychology, 1903, 176 ff. 

^ Philos. Studien, xv., 1900, 172 f. 

^ J. Cohn, Philos. Studien, x., 1894, 562 ff. ; xv., 1899, 
279 ff. D. R. Major, Amer. Journ. Psychol., vii., 1895, 
57 ff. 

'' Physiol. Psychol, ii., 1902, 285. 

^* Locc. citt. 

" Physiol Psychol, ii., 1902, 333. 

^^ Ibid., 332. 

'* Ibid., 335. 

'" Ibid., 336 f. 

" Orundriss, 1896, 96 (Engl., 81) ; cf. 1905, 98 (Engl., 
1907, 90). 

*' Ibid., 99 (Engl., 84) ; cf. 1905, 101 (Engl., 1907, 93). 

^' Vorlesungen, 1897, 235 ff. 

" Physiol Psychol, ii., 1902, 290. 

'"■ Ibid., 290 f. 

^' G. T. Ladd, Psychology, Descr. and Explan., 1894, 
167 ff. 

" Ibid., 537. 

** Psychol Review, l, 1894, 525. 

*^ T. Lipps, Vom Fiihlen, Wollen und Denken, 1902. 

*• Zeits., xliv., 1906, 38 f. 

" H. Hoffding, Psychologic in Umrissen, 1887, 279; 
1893, 305; Eng. tr., 1891, 222. Kulpe, Outlines, 1895, 
232 f. F. Jodl, Lehrbuch d. Psychol, 1896, 378 f. ; ii., 
1903, 1 ff. Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, i., 1905, 564 ff. 
A. Lehmann, Hauptgesetze d. menschl Gcfiihlslebens, 1892, 
32. J. Rehmke, Zur Lehre vom Gemiit, 1898, 47 ff. 



348 NOTES TO LECTURE IV 

^2 Grundzuge, i., 1905, 566. 

^ Gefiihl und Bewusstseinslage, 1903, 39. 

^^ Psychol. y Descr. and Explan., 183. "Nor is he who 
has felt that joy of scientific discovery which Niebuhr 
compared to the divine feehng in view of a new-made 
universe, Hkely to confuse it, as respects distinctive quahty, 
with the sensuous thrill of gratified bodily appetite," etc. 

^^ Das Selbstbewusstsein, Empjindung und Gefuhl, 1901, 
14. 

^ Grundriss, 1896, 188 f . (Engl., 160) ; cf. 1905, 192 f. 
(Engl., 1907, 178 f.) ; Physiol. Psychol, ii., 1902, 344 f. 

^'^ Grundriss, 187 f. (Engl., 159 f.); cf. 1905, 191 f. 
(Engl., 1907, 177 f.); Vorlesungen, 234 ff.; Physiol. 
Psychol., ii., 341 ff. The doctrine varies a little, from 
time to time, but is in principle as I state it in the text. 
It goes back as far as the essay on Gefuhl und Vorstellung 
(Essays, 1885, 213; Vjs. f. wiss. Philos., iii., 1879, 143), 
but appears clearly for the first time in the Vorlesungen 
of 1892. 

^^ Wundt speaks, both in Grundriss and in Physiol. 
Psychol., of the 'musical' tone, the 'musical' triad: my 
demonstration was made with tuning forks. I do not 
think that objection can be taken to the change, since 
musical reference, aesthetic association, must in any event 
be ruled out. Personally, I get the same result with har- 
monical or piano chords, except that the musical reference 
is, with them, much more difficult to exclude. The ob- 
servation, to be strictly valid, should be varied as Wundt 
suggests. 

^^ Physiol. Psychol., ii., 1902, 42 ff. It is very interest- 
ing, in this connection, — and, indeed, in connection with 
the general subject of the present Lecture, — to read 



NOTES TO LECTURE IV 349 

Wundt's account of Gemeingefuhl, in Beitrdge zur Theorie 
der Sinneswahrnehmungy 1862, 376-400. 

^^Arch.f. d. ges, Psychol., ix., 1907, Literaturbericht, 94. 
Meumann himself has recently published an extended 
article on the subject: Arch., ix., 1907, 26 ff. 

^^ Amer. Journ. PsychoL, xvi., 1905, 212. Cf. T. Lipps, 
Das Selhstbewusstsein : Empfindung und Gefuhl, 1901, 24; 
M. Kelchner, Arch./, d. g. PsychoL, v., 1905, 124. 

'2 Grundzuge, i., 1905, 567. 

^ Zeits,, xliv., 1906, 2 note. 

^ Cf. Wundt's doctrine in Physiol. Psychol, l, 1893, 561. 

^ O. Vogt, Zur Kenntnis des Wesens und der psy- 
chologischen Bedeutung des Hypnotismus,Z^i^5. f.Hypno- 
tismus, iv., 1896, 127. Cf. Grundriss, 1905, 102 (Engl, 
1907, 94). 

^^ Gefuhl und Bewusstseinslage, 1903, 129. 

•^ G. Stoning, Arch.f. d. ges. Psychol, vi., 1905, 320 f. 
I am not even sure that the first of the phrases quoted re- 
fers to quality at all ; the complete sentence runs : " Stim- 
mungslust ist gleichartiger, die Lust erfullt mehr das 
Bewusstsein." It may be that these two clauses express 
the same fact in different terms. Storring himself sums 
up in the words: "iiber Qualitat der beiden Lustzustande 
machen alle drei Vp. die Angabe, es liege deutliche quali- 
tative Differenz vor." Why does he not quote their 
words .^ He goes on: "ich lege aber auf diese Ueber- 
einstimmung kein Gewicht, weil diese Aussage von . . . 
der Annahme der Realitat qualitativer DiflFerenzen . . . 
(die ich Ubrigens selbst akzeptiere), abhangig sein kann." 

^^ Ein Versuch, die Methode der paarweisen Verglei- 
chung auf die verschiedenen Geflihlsrichtungen anzu- 
wenden, Philos. Studien, xx., 1902, 382 flF. ; S. P. Hayes, 



350 NOTES TO LECTURE IV 

A Study of the Affective Qualities, i. The Tridimen- 
sional Theory of Feeling, Amer. Journ. Psychol, , xvii., 

1906, 358 ff. I must refer the reader for details to these 
two articles, in both of which the ' curves ' of the affective 
judgments are figured. Criticisms are met in the latter 
article (361 note), and also in my note on N. Alechsieff's 
Die Grundformen der Gefuhle (Psychol, Studien, iii., 

1907, 156 ff.), Amer, Journ, Psychol, xix., 1908, 138 ff. 

""^ Physiol, Psychol, ii., 1902, 287. "So viel man auch 
mit der Eindrucksmethode hin und her experimentiren 
oder die unten zu erorternden Ergebnisse der Ausdrucks- 
methode zu Hlilfe nehmen mag, immer kommt man bei 
der Analyse der concreten Gefuhlszustande oder der 
zusammengesetzteren Gemiithsbewegungen wieder auf 
diese [drei Gegensatzpaaren] zuriick." I read this posi- 
tive statement with surprise when it appeared ; but, what- 
ever grounds Wundt may have had for it in 1902, there is 
small evidence of it in 1908. Possibly for this reason 
Wundt, in his latest exposition {ibid,, i., 1908, 23 ff.), 
speaks very disparagingly of the Reizmethode as an 
affective method. 

^^ M. Brahn, Experimentelle Beitrage zur Gefuhlslehre, 
Philos, Studien, xviii., 1903, 127 ff. ; W. Gent, Volumpuls- 
curven bei Gefuhlen und Affecten, ibid,, 715 ff. Wundt, 
Physiol Psychol, ii., 1902, 274, 291 ff. Orth, Gefilhl und 
Bewusstseinslage, 1903, 58 ff. 

^^ A first critique of Wundt's theory, under the title Zur 
Kritik der Wundfschen Gefuhlslehre, will be found in 
Zeits., xix., 1899, 321 ff. A detailed Kritik der modernen 
Gefuhlslehre (Lipps and Wundt) is given by Orth, op. cil, 
20 ff. 

Lipps' doctrine of feeling may be studied in Grundtat- 



i 



NOTES TO LECTURE IV 351 

sachen des Seelenlehens, 1883, 15 ff., 177 ff. ; Bemerkungen 
zur Theorie der Gefuhle, Vjs. /. wiss, Philos., xiii., 1889, 
160 ff. ; Gottingische gelehrte Anzeigen, 1894, 85 ff . ; 
Komik und Humor, 1898; Das Selbsthewusstsein: Emp- 
findung und Gefuhl, 1901 ; Vom Fuhlen, Wollen und 
Denken, 1902; Aesthetik: Psychologic des Schonen und 
der Kunst, I. Grundlegung der Aesthetik, 1903, Abschn. i., 
vi. ; Psychologische Studien, 1905 ; Leitfaden der Psy- 
chologie, 1906, 281 S.; and numerous articles in psy- 
chological journals. 



NOTES TO LECTURE V 

^ Philos, Stvdien, x., 1894, 124. Wundt gives illustra- 
tions, 123 f. 

^ As seen, e.g., in Kiilpe, Outlines, 1895, 169 S. ; Wundt, 
Physiol. Psychol., iii., 1903, 518 flF. ; Ebbinghaus, Grund- 
zuge, i., 1905, 633 ff. 

^ Meumann says (Exper. Pddagogik, i., 1907, 326 note) : 
"wer den ganzen Fortschritt der experimentellen Psy- 
chologie gegenliber der friiheren Psychologie der inneren 
Wahrnehmung deutlich vor Augen haben will, der ver- 
gleiche die in den folgenden Ausfiihrungen dargestellten 
Methoden und Ergebnisse der experimentellen Forschung 
individueller Unterschiede mit dem, was ein so geistvoller 
Vertreter der alteren Psychologie wie Sigwart liber unser 
Problem zu sagen wusste. Vgl. Sigwart, Die Unterschiede 
der Individualitaten. Kleine Schriften, Bd. ii. [1889] 
S. 212 ff." 

' Cf . my Experimental Psychology, I., ii., 1901, 186; 
W. James, Princ. of Psychol., l, 1890, 402. 

^ W. Hamilton, Lect. on Metaphysics, l, 1859, 237 ff. 

® J. Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human 
Mind, ii., 1869, 369 ff., with the notes by J. S. Mill and 
A. Bain. 

^ A. Bain, The Emotions and the Will, 1880, 370 ff., 540; 
The Senses and the Intellect, 1868, 558. 

® D. Braunschweiger, Die Lehre von der Aufmerksam- 
keit in der Psychologie des 18. Jahrhunderts, 1899, 2. 

® Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology, 1896, 270* 

352 



NOTES TO LECTURE V 353 

^^ Unfortunately, the knowledge often acts as a deterrent, 
— James, here as elsewhere, serving as excuse (Psychol, 
Rev,y i., 1894, 516 note). I had hoped a good deal from 
the publication of Wundt's Grundriss: but that, even in 
English translation, is too difficult for the average under- 
graduate. We sorely need a clear discussion, historical 
and critical, at the text -book level. — 

I do not think that my statements with regard to atten- 
tion are too strong, even in the light of what I said in 
Lecture I. of the threefold root of the psychological system. 
It seems to me that the doctrine of attention is of funda- 
mental importance. And I believe that the strength of 
Wundt's system lies — and will lie, historically — in the 
fact of its being an attentional system, whether its special 
teaching is right or wrong. A system which makes little 
of attention is, in my judgment, foredoomed to failure. 

I do not think, either, that I have entered too strong a 
claim for the modernity of the psychology of attention. 
Braunschweiger makes a great deal of the eighteenth cen- 
tury doctrine (Die Lehre von der Aufmerksamkeit in der 
Psychologic des 18. Jahrhunderts, 1899, 2 f., 38, 69, 95 f., 
124, 150 ff.). But he is a special student within a special 
period, and the judgment of the special student is likely 
to lack perspective. A more impartial witness is M. Des- 
soir (Geschichte der neueren deutschen Psychologic, i., 1897- 
1902), and a cursory glance through Dessoir's index will 
show the approximate place that attention held in eigh- 
teenth century systems. 

No doubt, the older psychologists were acute observers. 
Let me give an instance. I was looking up my Light of 
Nature, to verify the reference given in Note 20 of the 
following Lecture, — and I naturally read on, for a few 

2a 



354 NOTES TO LECTURE V 

pages, as one is apt to do. I came upon the following: 
" It has been generally remarked by schoolboys, that after 
having laboured the whole evening before a repetition day 
to get their lesson by heart, but to very little purpose, when 
they rise in the morning, they shall have it current at their 
tongue's end without any further trouble " (i., 1805, 248 f .). 
Here is a direct anticipation of the modern psychophysics 
of association ! And a few pages further : " in a language 
we are masters of what we read seems wholly to occupy 
the imagination, yet, for all that, the mind can find room 
for something of her own : how quick soever the eye may 
pass along, the thought flies still quicker, and will make 
little excursions between one word and the next, or pur- 
sue reflections of its own, at the same time it attends to 
the reading" (ibid,, 253), — the very illustration that I 
had myself chosen for my discussion of introspection ! — 
It will hardly be argued, now, that Tucker can compare, 
as a student of association and memory, with Ebbinghaus 
and Muller: and what holds here holds, so far as my 
reading has extended, of attention as well. Everything 
depends upon the context, upon the way the problem is 
seen, upon the suggestion of method, upon the fruitfulness 
of the idea for scientific purposes. 

" Grundzuge, i., 1905, 611. So also Klilpe, Outlines^ 
1895, 423. 

^^ I. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naiurwis- 
senschafty 1786, x. f . ; Sdmmtliche Werke, ed. Rosenkranz 
and Schubert, v., 1838-1842, 310. Cf. my Exper. PsychoL, 
II., ii., 1905, cxlv. 

^^ L. M. Solomons and G. Stein, Normal Motor Autom- 
atism, Psychol. RevieWy iii., 1896, esp. 503 ff. 

^* The preceding paragraphs are taken, with some com- 



NOTES TO LECTURE V 355 

pression, from the forthcoming edition of my Outline of 
Psychology. The position agrees, in the main, with that 
of W. B. Pillsbury, A Suggestion toward a Reinterpreta- 
tion of Introspection, Journ. Philos. Psychol. Sci. Meth., 
i., 1904, 225 ff. See also Kulpe, Outlines, 1895, 8 ff.; 
Ebbinghaus, Grundzilge, i., 1905, 66 ff . ; Wundt, Physiol. 
Psychol., i., 1902, 4 ff. (Engl. 1904, 4 ff.), or i., 1908, 
4 ff., 23 ff., with references there given. 

It need hardly be said that the essential similarity of the 
methods of psychology and the natural sciences does not 
necessarily carry with it a corresponding similarity of 
subject-matter and problem. 

^^ Kulpe, The Problem of Attention, The Monist, xiii., 
1902, 42. 

^® Cf. the remarks in Amer, Journ. Psychol., xvi., 1905, 
218 f. 

^''Physiol. Psychol, iir., 1903, 341; 1874, 717 f. 

^^ Uattention, 1906, 2. ; Attention, 1908, 2. 

^^ Diet, of Philos. and Psychol., l, 1901, 86. 

^^ T. Ribot, Psychologic de V attention, 1889, 6, 9, 36, 95. 

2^ G. T. Ladd, Psychol., Descr. and Explan., 1894, 61, 66. 

^^Stumpf, Tonpsychol., ii., 1890, 276 ff.; cf. i., 1883, 
67 ff. 

^ G. F. Stout, A Manual of Psychology, 1899, 65 f. 
Cf. Analytic Psychology, l, 1896, 125 ff., 180 ff. 

^* J. M. Baldwin, Handbook of Psychol. : Senses and 
Intellect, 1890, 69 ff. Cf. Feeling and Will, 1891, 280 ff., 
351 ff. ; Mental Devel. in the Child and the Race: Methods 
and Processes, 1906, 428 ff. 

^^ F. H. Bradley, Is there any Special Activity of Atten- 
tion? Mind, O. S., xi., 1886, 306. 

2^ D. Ferrier, The Functions of the Brain, 1886, 463. 



356 NOTES TO LECTURE V 

2^ Grundzuge, i., 1905, 600, 612. 

^^ J. R. Angell, Psychology: an Introductory Study of the 
Structure and Function of Human Consciousness, 1904, Q5. 

^^ C. H. Judd, Psychology : General Introduction, 1907, 
191, 193. 

^""Exper. Pddagogik, i., 1907, 78 f. 

^^ Cf . C. S. Squire, A Genetic Study of Rhythm, Amer, 
Journ, PsychoL, xii., 1901, 541 f. 

^^ On intensity of stimulus, see Klilpe, Outlines, 1895, 
438; A. Pilzecker, Die Lehre von der sinnlichen Auf- 
merksamkeit, 1889, 19; Ebbinghaus, GrundzUge, i., 1905, 
602; James, Princ, of Psychol, i., 1890, 416 f . ; Pillsbury, 
r attention, 1906, 38 ff . ; Attention, 1908, 28 ff. ; Wundt, 
Physiol Psychol, iii., 1903, 336; G. E. Muller, Zur 
Theorie der sinnlichen Aufmerksamkeit, [1873] 110 ff. 
Muller refers to duration only as a condition of Abstump- 
fung of the attention : 126 ff . 

^^ See James, Princ, of Psychol, i., 1890, 417; ii., 
383 ff. G. E. Muller, Zur Psychophysik der Gesichts- 
empfindungen, Zeits,, x., 1896, 27 f. Muller describes 
Eindringlichkeit as follows : " die Eindringlichkeit betrifft 
die mehr psychologische Seite der Empfindungen, sie 
scheint sich hauptsachlich nach der Macht zu bestimmen, 
mit welcher die Sinneseindriicke unsere Aufmerksamkeit 
auf sich Ziehen, und konnte daher in sachlicher Hinsicht 
nicht unpassend auch als die Aufdringlichkeit der Sinnes- 
eindriicke bezeichnet werden. . . . [Sie] ist, wie es 
scheint, nicht bloss von der Intensitat des psychophysis- 
chen Prozesses abhangig, sondern bestimmt sich zugleich 
auch nach der Haufigkeit der betreffenden Empfindung 
in unserer Erfahrung, nach dem Gefiihlswerte derselben 
und nach anderen derartigen fiir die Erweckung unserer 



i 



NOTES TO LECTURE V 357 

Aufmerksamkeit wichtigen Faktoren." Ihid., 26 f. Fre- 
quency is mentioned incidentally by Muller, in the Sinn- 
liche Aufmerksamkeit y 135, as a condition of involuntary 
attention. — Ebbinghaus, Grundziige, i., 1905, 602 f. 

^'Pillsbury, V attention, 1906, 39 f . ; Attention, 1908, 
29 f.; Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, i., 1905, 603 ff. The 
criticism of the text applies also to Ebbinghaus' treatment 
of expert disregard of irrelevant details (604 f.) and of 
habituation (712 ff.), in so far as these are made to depend 
upon mere repetition of stimulus. — Wundt, Physiol. 
Psychol, iii., 1903, 340. 

In Lecture VIII. I express my personal opinion that 
habit always implies foregone attention. 

^^ Muller, Sinnliche Aufmerksamkeit, [1873] 125 f . ; 
Pilzecker, Sinnliche Aufmerksamkeit, 1889, 20 ; Pillsbury, 
U attention, 1906, 40; Attention, 1908, 30; James, Princ. 
of Psychol., i., 1890, 416 f. ; L. W. Stevn, Psychologie der 
Verdnderungsauffassung, 1898, 211 ff. 

^^ Muller, op. cit., 135; Pilzecker, op. cit., 20; Klilpe, 
Outlines, 1895, 300 f . ; Stumpf, TonpsychoL, ii., 1890, 
337 ff . (with refs. to S. Exner) ; T. Heller, Philos, Studien, 
xi., 1895, 249; Stern, Verdnderungsauffassung, 1898, 143, 
181 ff., 201; James, Princ. of Psychol., i, 1890, 417; 
ii., 173 f. ; Pillsbury, op. cit, 62 ff. (Engl., 48 f.). 

^^ Muller, op. cit., 135; Kulpe, op. cit., 438; James, 
op. cit., i., 417; Ebbinghaus, op. cit., 715; Pillsbury, op. 
cit, 42, 64 f. (Engl., 31 f., 49) ; Wundt, Physiol Psy- 
chol, 336. Cf. the passage in T. Lipps, Suggestion und 
Hypnose, Sitzungsber. der philos. -philol u. der histor. 
Classe der k. hayer. Akad. d. Wiss., ii., 1897, 424: "der 
Reiz des Neuen und Ungewohnten ist nichts anderes 
als der Reiz d. h. die Fahigkeit der Inanspruchnahme 



358 NOTES TO LECTURE V 

und der Festhaltung psychischer Kraft, die einem Vor- 
stellungsinhalte oder Komplex von solchen zukommt, 
ehe diese Fahigkeit durch die auf Erfahrungsassocia- 
tionen beruhende Tendenz der Ausgleichung und des 
Abflusses sich vermindert hat. Der Reiz des Neuen 
ist nichts als der unverminderte Reiz des Objektes." 
At bottom, this doctrine agrees with that of Miiller; the 
stimulus of novelty is the stimulus of the object as such, 
the claim that it has to attention in virtue of its inten- 
sity, quality, duration, etc. While, however, I accept 
Lipps' analysis, I still think that novelty has a special 
place in our empirical classification. 

^^ MuUer, op. cit, 40 ff., 123 if.; Pilzecker, op. ciL, 19, 
34 flf. ; Pillsbury, op, cit, 44 if. (Engl., 32 ff.) ; Kulpe, Out- 
lines y 439 f. ; Monisty xiii., 1902, 46 ff. ; Ebbinghaus, op. 
city 603, 605 f.; Stumpf, TonpsychoL, ii., 1890, 339; H. 
Helmholtz, PhysioL Optik, 1896, 890 f . ; Popular Lectures 
on Scientific Subjects, [First Series] 1885, 294 f . ; On the 
Sensations of Tone as a Physiological Basis for the Theory 
of Music, 1895, 50 f . ; J. Jastrow, Fact and Fable in 
Psychol.y 1900, 89; James, op. cit., i., 437 f. Relevant 
observations are reported by B. B. Breese : On Inhibition, 
1899, 18 ff.; W. McDougall, Mind, N. S., xii., 1903, 
473 ff.; A. Bruckner, Zeits.f Psychol, xxvi., 1901, 45, 53. 

^^Wundt, Physiol. Psychol, iii., 1903, 336; Kulpe, 
Outlines, 1895, 437 f. ; Monist, xiii., 1902, 44. 

^^Muller, op. cit., 132 ff.; Ebbinghaus, op. cit, 622, 
714; Fechner, Elemente d. Psychophysik, ii., 1889, 446; 
J. Delboeuf, Examen critique de la loi psychophysique, sa 
base et sa signification, 1883, 166; Lehmann, Haupt- 
gesetze, 1892, 194 ff.; Pillsbury, op. cit, 38 f. (Engl., 29); 
MUnsterberg, Grundzuge, i., 1900, 228 f. 



NOTES TO LECTURE V 359 

^^ This paragraph follows Mliller, SinnL Aufmerlcsam- 
keiU 110 ff. 

'"Lotze, Med. PsijchoL, 1852, 507 ff . ; Wundt, Physiol. 
Psychol, iii., 1903, 336 ff . ; Kulpe, Outlines, 436 ff.; 
MonisU xiii., 1902, 46 ff . ; Pillsbury, op. cit, 35 ff. (Engl., 
26 ff.); James, Princ, of Psychol, i., 1890, 434 ff . ; J. von 
Kries, Zeits. f, Psychol, viii., 1895, 12 ff. 

Whence Lotze derived his list it would be difficult to 
say. The topic was a favourite one with the eighteenth 
century psychologists: see Braunschweiger, Die Lehre 
von der Aiifmerksamkeit, etc., 1899, 50 ff. ; Dessoir, 
Geschichte, i., 1902, 418. In i., 1894, 238, Dessoir ex- 
claims, apropos of E. Platner (1744-1818): "ware es 
nicht vielleicht besser gewesen, Platner hatte uns gesagt, 
wodurch die Auf merksamkeit nicht gereizt wird } " — 

In Die Lehre von der Aujmerksamkeit, 1907, E. Dlirr 
takes a view of attention (11 f.) which is practically the 
same as my own; he also reaches a like conclusion upon 
various special problems, though in certain cases (e.g., on 
the subject of fluctuation, 131 ff .) his position is different. 
Dlirr, however, is writing of attention *'mit besonderer 
Beriicksichtigung padagogischer Interessen" (4), so that 
the course and contents of his exposition are widely diver- 
gent from those of the present Lectures. 



NOTES TO LECTURE VI 

^ Kulpe, Outlines, 1895, 336 f., 379. 

2 Wundt, Physiol. Psychol, iii., 1903, 339. 

^ Pillsbury, L' attention, 1906, 3 flf. ; Attention, 1908, 2 ff. 

^ Kulpe, op. ci/., 429, 441 f. 

^ Wundt, op. ci^., 339 f. 

^ Ebbinghaus, Grundzuge, i., 1905, 612 ff. 

^Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, I, 1883, 72, 374; ii., 1890, 
293. 

® H. Miinsterberg, GrundzUge der Psychologie, i., 1900, 
227. — The mention of the lengthened line may, at first 
sight, appear gratuitous. The reference is, however, to 
experiments upon "the distances between visible points, 
the distances serving as measures for the intensity of the 
sensations produced by the movement of the eyes." See 
Psych, Rev,, i., 1894, 39; and cf. Amer, Journ. Psych,, 
viii., 1896, 50, 53. 

^ See Stumpf, op, cit,, ii., 293 f. Stumpf does not specify 
the instrument : he speaks only of a ' Zungenpfeifenaccord.' 

It is, perhaps, worth while to add that, even when direct 
observations agree, their interpretation may be extremely 
difficult. Thus, Krueger writes of Stumpf's Reinheits- 
gefilhl: "sicherlich ist die Theorie ausgegangen von 
wichtigen und genau festgestellten Tatsachen. Hoch- 
musikalische Beobachter haben mit uberraschender Fein- 
heit und Konstanz kleine Verstimmungen der ihnen 
gelaufigsten konsonanten Tonschritte als scharf, spannend, 
uberreizt, beziehungsweise (die subjektiv verkleinerten 

360 



NOTES TO LECTURE VI 361 

Intervalle) als matt, schal, stumpf bezeichnet. Dass es 
sich dabei, wie weit und in welchem Sinne, um Gefuhle 
handle, ist natlirlich nicht mehr zweifellos." — Psychol. 
Studien, i., 1906, 381. 

^^ See, e.g., H. Munsterberg and N. Kozaki, The In- 
tensifying Effect of Attention, Psychol. Review, i., 1894, 
39 ff . ; A. J. Hamlin, Attention and Distraction, Amer. 
Journ. Psychol., viii., 1896, 3 ff . ; O. Klilpe, Ueber den 
Einfluss der Aufmerksamkeit auf die Empfindungsin- 
tensitat, ///. Internat. Congress f. Psychol., 1897, 180 ff . ; 
M. Tsukahara, Problem of the Relation of Intensity of 
Sensation to Attention, 1907. — Cf ., further, G. E. Muller, 
Zur Theorie d. sinnlichen Aufmerksamkeit, [1873] 2 ff . ; 
Fechner, Elemente d. Psychophysik, ii., 1889, 452 f . ; Re- 
vision, 1882, 271 ; T. Lipps, Suggestion u. Hypnose, 1898, 
398 ff . ; A. Lehmann, Die Hypnose, 1890, 22 ; J. Geyser, 
Ueber den Einfluss der Aufmerksamkeit auf die Intensitat 
der Empfindung, 1897. 

" Reported briefly in Psychol. Bulletin, iv., 1907, 212 f. 
Professor Bentley allows me to quote here the full text 
of his paper. 

"I have to report, at this time, only a single group of 
experiments, which deal with the intensity of noise; and 
I shall reserve for some future occasion a full discussion 
and interpretation of the results. 

" Both my apparatus and my method are familiar. The 
Leipsic type of gravity phonometer was used, and the 
sound stimuli were given in pairs. To the one stimulus 
the observer was attentive; from the other he was dis- 
tracted. The distraction was made effective both by the 
brevity of the sound and by the character of the distracting 
stimuli (odours). The success or failure of distraction 



362 NOTES TO LECTURE VI 

was always checked (as were also the state and degree of 
attention and the conscious filling of the silent interval) 
by introspective control. Care was taken to eliminate 
constant and variable errors; and especially to keep 
the physical and organic conditions as unvarying as pos- 
sible. 

" The pairs of stimuli were given usually in series of ten, 
each pair occupying 13 sec, with an interval for rest 
between successive pairs. An equal number of Distrac- 
tion-Attention (D-A) and Attention-Distraction (A-D) 
pairs were introduced in haphazard order in every series. 
The difference in height of fall within each pair was 
(with one exception noted below) 5 cm., and the absolute 
heights varied between 24.4 and 89.6 cm. 

"Table I. gives the results for Set I. (100 pairs for each 
one of three observers) and Set II. (120 pairs for each 
observer). Set I. covers all intensities between 24.4 and 
79.4 cm., while Set II. contains only two pairs of stimulus 
intensity, 24.4-29.4 and 74.4-79.4 cm. As a check upon 
these observations, a group of ' attention ' experiments was 
added to Set II., where both sensations were received in 
maximal attention (A- A order). 

"As regards arrangement in the Tables, note the fol- 
lowing points. The first horizontal line of figures con- 
tains the number of correct or ^ true ' judgments ; the second 
line, the times that the ' attention ' stimulus (Rq) was over- 
estimated, i.e, judged too great ; the third line, the under- 
estimations of the 'attention' stimulus; and the fourth 
line, the cases thrown out on the basis of introspection 
(failure to attend or to distract). In the lower half of the 
Table, at the right, are given the A-A series, which are 
self-explanatory. 



NOTES TO LECTURE VI 



363 



No. OF Set 



"TABLE I 

I. (10 A-D AND 

10 D-A Series) 



II. (8 A-D, 8 D-A AND 
4 A-A Series) 



Height of Fall 


24.4-79.4 cm. 


24.4-29.4 cm. 


74.4-79.4 cm. 


Observer 


B G M 


1 


B G M 


3 


B G M 


S 

o 


1 


73 

§1 


True 
Ra over- 

est'd 
Ra under- 
est'd 
Thrown 
out 
Total 


35 U 40 
52 42 42 

7 15 18 

6 9 
100 100 100 


109 
136 

40 

15 

300 


17 22 23 

11 11 12 

7 4 3 

5 3 2 

40 40 40 


62 

34 

14 

10 
120 


13 17 13 
19 17 13 

8 6 9 

5 

40 40 40 


43 
49 

23 

5 
120 


105 

83 

37 

15 
240 


§ 

•43 

< 


Right 

X 2 
Wrong 

X 2 
Doubtful 

X 2 
Total 

X 2 






12 28 24 

22 12 16 

6 

40 40 40 


64 

50 

6 

120 


14 12 12 

24 28 26 

2 2 

40 40 40 


38 

78 

4 

120 


102 

128 

10 

240 



"It is to be observed that, in nearly half (136) of the 
300 experiments of Set I., the sound attended to is, for a 
wide range of intensities, overestimated. The number is 
somewhat greater than the number of 'true' cases (109) 
and is about three and one half times as great as the num- 
ber of underestimated cases (40). Thus far, the results 
indicate, then, that a noise attended to is sensibly louder 
than the same objective sound received in distraction. 

"But the problem demands more specific treatment. 
It demands, in the first place, the distribution of over- 
estimated cases throughout the scale of intensity. Set I. 
furnishes too few judgments at any single intensity to 
meet this demand. But Set II. contains results from a 



364 



NOTES TO LECTURE VI 



single weak (24.4-29.4 cm.) and a single intensive pair 
(74.4-79.4 cm.). A comparison of the two pairs shows 
that the number of overestimated cases is uniformly in- 
creased, for all observers, with increase in physical in- 
tensity. That this relation does not obtain with weak 
and strong stimuli whose differences are relatively (not 
absolutely) the same, is shown by Table II. 

"TABLE II 
No. OF Set III and IV.* (14 A-D, 14 D-A, and 8 A-A Series) 



Height of Fall 


24.4-29.4 cm. 


74.4-79.4 cm. 


Observer 


B 


G 


M 


Total 


B 


a 


M 


Total 


Total 




True 


30 


31 


37 


98 


29 


38 


41 


108 


206 


c6 O 

ll 


Ra overestimated 


37 


26 


18 


80 


33 


26 


19 


78 


158 


Ra underestimated . 





7 


13 


20 


4 


4 


7 


15 


35 


%i 


Thrown out .... 


3 


7 


2 


12 


4 


2 


3 


9 


21 


5^Q 
< 


Total 


70 


70 


70 


210 


70 


70 


70 


210 


420 


§ 


Right X 2 . . . 


32 


35 


41 


108 


27 


52 


36 


115 


223 


u 
fl 


Wrong X 2 . . . 


30 


32 


27 


89 


33 


18 


34 


85 


174 


^ 


Doubtful X 2 . . . 


8 


3 


2 


13 


10 








10 


23 


< 


Total X 2 . . . 


70 


70 


70 


210 


70 


70 


70 


210 


420 



"Table II. presents results from two pairs of stimulus 
intensities which may be supposed to measure (under 
Weber's Law) like sense-distances. Under the given con- 
ditions, the overestimations for weak and loud sounds are 
found to be almost identical (80 and 78) ; or, viewed from 
the negative side, distraction may be said to weaken, by 
a like amount, loud and weak auditory sensations. 

"A comparison of the upper and lower halves of the 
Tables reveals the curious fact that the number of 'true' 

* In Set IV. (4 distraction and 2 attention series), the position 
of O's head was controlled by means of a biting board. The re- 
sults were consistent with those of Set III. 



NOTES TO LECTURE VI 365 

cases with distraction is almost as great as the number of 
'right' cases with continuous attention (A-A series), — 
namely, 206 and 22S, It would seem, at first sight, as 
if the large constant error introduced by distraction must 
have materially damaged the function of judgment. But 
a moment's reflection will make it plain that this error 
would tend as often toward the increase as toward the 
decrease of the difference between sensations. Its effect 
appears, therefore, rather in the distribution (to under- 
estimations and overestimations) than in the number of 
incorrect judgments. The small difference in number 
obtained (17) is probably due to the more unfavourable 
conditions for judgment afforded by distraction from the 
one of the sounds compared. — 

" It is plainly impracticable, at the present state of the 
problem, to attempt an explanation or even a full inter- 
pretation of the bare results. Granted that distraction 
lowers the intensity of certain sensations, we have still to 
ask what factor in the distracted consciousness is responsi- 
ble for the effect. Is loss of intensity due to loss of clear- 
ness ? or to the affective colouring of the distracting 
odours ? or to the impairment of memory through dis- 
traction ? or, finally, are the conditions purely physio- 
logical, i.e, without conscious representation.^ We shall 
hope, by further work, to find satisfactory answers to these 
questions. At present we can make only preliminary 
observations. (1) Whatever relation obtains between 
clearness and intensity, the two things were distinct in 
the minds of the observers. Not only were the latter 
familiar with the difference between strength and clear- 
ness; they were also warned, during the experiments, 
against confusion of the terms. (2) As regards the pos- 



366 NOTES TO LECTURE VI 

sible influence of feeling, it may be noted that striking 
individual differences in depth and range of feeling did 
not, in our three observers, seem to run parallel with the 
overestimations in question. Finally, (3) against the in- 
direct effect of memory upon intensity, we may bring the 
fact that overestimation through attention was independent 
of the interval separating the ' attention ' and the ' distrac- 
tion' stimuli. It obtained whatever the order: whether 
distraction came before or after the interval, and therefore 
whether judgment followed upon the heels of the dis- 
traction or only after the interpolation of another, attentive 
consciousness. — 

" In conclusion : certain strong and weak sounds suffer 
an intensive reduction under distraction. Whether this 
reduction represents a general dependency of intensity 
upon attention, and whether the reduction rests upon 
physiological or psychophysical grounds, remain questions 
which demand further investigation." 

This reference to the * intensifying eflFect of attention' 
naturally brought out instances and opinions of a contrary 
tenor. So far as I see at present, the cases of the ' weak- 
ening' of an impression by direction of the attention upon 
it may be classified under the following heads. 

(1) We prepare for the reception of a very intensive 
stimulus by protective adjustment of the sense-organ and 
by inhibition of the start of surprise. Cf. Mtiller in 
Pilzecker, Sinnliche Aufmerksamkeit, 1889, 80 f. 

(2) Foregone accommodation of attention, sensory and 
motor Einstellung, may give a like result. If we are 
habituated to very heavy weights, a moderately intensive 
weight will seem light. — Cf. G. E. Muller and F. Schu- 



NOTES TO LECTURE VI 367 

mann, Pflilger's Archiv, xlv., 1889, 42 ff . ; and references 
in my Exper. Psychol., II., ii., 1905, 366. 

(3) Expectation may be 'worse than the reaHty.' The 
expected impression may be weakened (a) by the fatigue 
that follows from the strain of expectation itself, or (b) by 
the conscious Einstellung, by expectation's overshooting 
its mark and predisposing us for something more intensive 
than we actually experience. 

(4) Intensity may be affected in two ways by the con- 
currence of other stimuli, (a) An associated whole may 
be stronger than any one of its constituents. Thus the 
pain of a dental operation is enhanced by the odour of 
the room, the sight of instruments, the uncomfortable posi- 
tion of the jaws and lips, etc., etc. : a resolute fixation of 
attention on the pain itself will sometimes reveal a sur- 
prisingly low degree of intensity. Cf. Kulpe, Outlines^ 
398. No doubt, a part is here played by (3) (6). — 
(6) A sensation may be w^eakened by its fusion with other 
sensations ; thus an overtone, singled out by anticipatory 
attention, may appear surprisingly weak. Cf. Muller, 
Sinnliche Aufmerksamkeit, [1873] 21, 38 f., 71 ff. ; Stumpf, 
TonpsychoL, ii., 1890, 231. 

(5) A simple case is that of the weakening of a sensation 
by peripheral adaptation. The most sustained attention 
cannot prevent adaptation; and, if sustained attention is 
there, the adaptive weakening may appear, at first sight, 
to be the direct result of attention itself. — Where the 
stimulus is too strong for noticeable adaptation, or where 
the phenomenon of adaptation is absent, sustained atten- 
tion may, I think, result in a sort of hypnotic anaesthesia ; 
but I am not sure upon this point. 

^2 J. M. Baldwin, Senses and Intellect, 1890, 63 ff., 68. 



368 NOTES TO LECTURE VI 

" J. R. Angell, Psychology, 1904, Q5 f. 

^^Monist, xiii., 1902, 38 f., 57. 

^^ Zeits. / PhiL u, philos. Kritik, ex., 1896, 31 f., 35. 
Cf. H. E. Kohn, Zur Theorie der Aufmerksamkeity 1894; 
F. Schumann, Zeits,, xxiii., 1900, 24. 

^^Art. Psychology, Encyc. Britan,, xx., 1886, 47. 

^^Fechner, Elem. d. Psychophysik, ii., 1889, 39. Cf. 
my Exper. Psychol. , II., ii., 1905, clxiii. 

^^ H. R. Marshall, Instinct and Reason, 1898, 38 f. 

^^ H. Helmholtz, Zur Lehre von den Tonempjindungen^ 
1877, 107; Sensations of Tone, 1895, 62. 

^® K. Fortlage, System der Psychologic, i., 1855, 102 ff. ; 
Lotze, Med, PsychoL, 1852, 505; A. Tucker, The Light 
of Nature Pursued, 2d ed., i., 1805, 225. I have not 
found the metaphor, as I had expected to do, in I. H. 
Fichte's Psychologic, though the author indicates his 
familiarity with it in i., 1864, 161. 

'^ Wundt, Physiol Psychol, 1874, 717; iii., 1903, 33 f. 
The change was made in the fourth edition of 1893. 

2'76id., iii., 1903, 117 if., 552, 557. 

^^ W. Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, i., 1859, 352 f . ; 
Wundt, ihid,, 554 ff. with references. 

'''Ibid,, 595 f., 600 f. 

^^ C. L. Morgan, Introd, to Comparative Psychol, 1894, 
14, 19. 

^^Princ. of Psychol, l, 1890, 224 ff. 

^^ Op, cit, 13 f. 

2' Op. cit, 119. 

^® G. Dietze, Untersuchungen iiber den Umfang des 
Bewusstseins bei regelmassig auf einander folgenden 
Schalleindriicken, Philos, Studien, ii., 1885, 362 ff. ;' 
Wundt, op. cit, 351, 353. 



NOTES TO LECTURE VI 369 



^^Dietze, op. cit, 391. 
3^ Op. cit, 353, 356. 



^^F. Schumann, Zeits., i., 1890, 77 f., 80; li., 1891, 
115 fF.; xvii., 1898, 121; Wundt, Philos. Studien, vi., 
1891, 250 ff. ; vii., 1892, 222 ff. ; W. Wirth, ihid., xx., 1902, 
561 ff.; J. Quandt, Psychol. Studien, i., 1906, 137 ff. 
Klilpe leaves the introspective question open: Outlines, 
394. Munsterberg seems to accept Wundt's vievi^, since 
he identifies the question of the range of consciousness 
with the question "wieviel Schallnachbilder bei regel- 
massig succedierenden Schalleindrticken gleichzeiting in 
unserem Bewusstsein bleiben": Grundzilge, i., 1900, 214. 
— Cf . also the discussion of the Psychische Prasenzzeit 
by L. W. Stern, Zeits., xiii., 1897, 325 ff., and the refer- 
ences there given. 

^^ Wundt, Physiol. Psychol., iii., 1903, 353. These are 
the observations which I believe Wundt has in mind 
ibid., 119. 

^^ On cognition, see Wundt, ibid., 535 ff. This explana- 
tion, which I have given in lectures since 1904, is also 
offered by K. Mittenzwey, Psychol. Studien, ii., 1907, 386. 

^^ See W. Wirth, Die Klarheitsgrade der Regionen des 
Sehfeldes bei verschiedenen Verteilungen der Aufmerk- 
samkeit, Psychol. Studien, ii., 1906, 30 ff. ; K. Mittenzwey, 
Ueber abstrahierende Apperzeption, ibid., 1907, 358 ff. ; 
A. Kastner and W. Wirth, Die Bestimmung der Auf- 
merksamkeitsverteilung innerhalb des Sehfeldes mit Hilfe 
von Reaktionsversuchen, ibid., iii., 1907, 361 ff. 

^® Angell, Psychology, 1904, 65. 

'Uames, Princ. of Psychol., l, 1890, 237 ff., 284 ff.; 
esp. 255, 258 f. In his last section James is dealing with 
clearness and obscurity. "We actually ignore most of 

2b 



370 NOTES TO LECTURE VI 

the things about us." "Attention, . . . out of all the 
sensations yielded, picks out certain ones as worthy of its 
notice and suppresses all the rest." Here, however, is no 
mention of 'fringes.' 

^^ Certain of my hearers objected to this argument that 
I had worked out the ' law of the two levels ' on the basis 
of the observation with the puzzle picture. This, they 
contended, represents an exceptional case : a consciousness 
may, in fact, show only a single level or may show a great 
variety of levels at a given moment. 

The first part of the objection does not hold. I had 
worked out the ' law ' long before I thought of the use of 
the puzzle-picture; it was in the course of an extended 
search for a suitable illustration of the law that the puzzle- 
picture occurred to me. I give the illustration because 
it seems to me to present, in clear and striking form, what 
is the normal state of affairs ; but it is this latter, the nor- 
mal conformation of consciousness, that I am concerned 
with. Continued observation of the conscious levels under 
very different circumstances, in the laboratory and in 
everyday life, led me to the law. 

The second part of the objection raises the question of 
fact. So far, it is both legitimate and welcome. When, 
however, I pressed for instances, I found the following 
sources of error: (1) confusion of peripheral with atten- 
tional clearness ; (2) confusion of attentional clearness with 
cognition; (3) confusion of a single consciousness with a 
series of consciousnesses, and therefore of a single 'act of 
attention ' with several successive acts ; and even (4) con- 
fusion of the question of the conscious 'levels' with the 
question of the 'range' of attention. I got no clear 
case either of a single-levelled or of a many-levelled 
consciousness. 



NOTES TO LECTURE VI 371 

In the abstract, the objection usually took this form. 
*An idea or a presentation may pass very slowly from the 
background to the focus of consciousness; it does not 
always, does not ordinarily, jump from the one to the 
other. Hence a cross-section must show ideas or presenta- 
tions in all sorts of intermediate positions between ob- 
scurity and maximal clearness; there are many levels.' 
I grant, of course, that we do not perceive anything of the 
nature of a jump, — but I cannot either find anything of 
the nature of the slow passage. Now a certain idea is 
obscure; now, without conscious transition, it is clear. 
I admit, also, that our response to an intruding stimulus, 
when the attention is already engaged, varies widely with 
variation of conditions; I discuss some instances in 
Lecture VII., under the 'law of temporal instability.' 
But I do not find, in this variation of response, any 
evidence of new levels. For the rest, observation of 
consciousness in the rough is always unsatisfactory; the 
appeal lies to experiment. 

I may add — what my critics did not suggest — that 
in abnormal circumstances consciousness may conceiv- 
ably show but one level; or, at any rate, that the normal 
relation of the two levels may be radically changed. 
The narrowed consciousness of profound hypnosis may, 
at moments, be wholly clear ; the idiotic consciousness may 
be wholly obscure. Cf . my Primer of Psychology y 1902, 
273. 

^^ Tonpsychol, I, 1883, 309. 

'' Wundt, Physiol, Psychol, iii., 1903, 96 f., 337 f., 434, 
439. Here we are already encroaching upon the field of 
inertia. — On accommodation-time in reaction experi- 
ments, cf. G. della Valle, Psychol, Studien, iii., 1907, 294 ff. 



372 NOTES TO LECTURE VI 

^^See G. Kafka, Psychol Studien., li., 1906, 256 ff.; 
B. Berliner, ibid,, iii., 1907, 91 ff., with references. 

In order to bring out my point clearly and sharply, I 
have spoken in the text almost as if the ^n^^i^gr-determina- 
tions might be transferred bodily from their present in- 
tensive context to that of clearness. I have, it is true, 
safeguarded the proposal by insisting on the necessity of 
'interpretation.' However, my idea may be expressed 
more accurately — and more cautiously — as follows. 
Clearness and intensity are both involved in the determi- 
nations; it is evidently wrong to ascribe everything to 
intensity and nothing to clearness. Let us, then, take up 
the ^n^^i^gr-question from the side of clearness, varying 
our method in such a way as to secure varying degrees of 
clearness. We shall then be able to give the earlier results 
a setting in which due regard is paid to each one of the 
two concurrent factors. 

^"^r attention, 1906, 17; Attention, 1908, 13. 

*^ G. T. Fechner, Revision der Hauptpuncte der Psy- 
chophysik, 1882, 283; cf. Ueber einige Verhaltnisse des 
binocularen Sehens, AbhandL d, kgL s, Ges, d, Wiss,, vii., 
1860, 395: "bei der willkuhrlichen Richtung der Auf- 
merksamkeit selbst ist der bewusste Willensact, durch den 
wir die Aufmerksamkeit richten, von dem Erfolge, d. i. 
der gerichteten und fixirten Aufmerksamkeit, wohl zu 
unterscheiden. Jener Act erfolgt ein- fiir allemal, und 
dann bleibt die Aufmerksamkeit gerichtet, ohne dass wir 
einen fortgesetzten oder neuen bewussten Willensact 
nothig haben, sie in dieser Richtung zu erhalten." — 
Stumpf, TonpsychoL, i., 1883, 386; cf. 244, 391; ii., 1890, 
318, 358. F. Auerbach, in Wiedemann's Annalen, iv., 
1878, 509 f. F. Schumann, Nachr. d. Ges. d. Wiss. zu 



NOTES TO LECTURE VI 373 

Gottingen, 1889, 536 ff.; Zeits., iv., 1893, 1 ff.; xxiii., 
1900, 9; McDougall, Mind, N. S., xv., 1906, 349. 

Here belong, at least in part, the experiments on word- 
exposure with previous suggestion ; certain phenomena of 
sensory Einstellung, — absolute impression, etc. ; and 
perhaps also certain optical illusions. 

*^ On Per sever ationstendenz see, provisionally, Ebbing- 
haus, Grundzilge, i., 691; Wundt, Physiol. Psychol,, iii., 
600 f . 

*^ See Wundt, op. cit, 45 S. 



NOTES TO LECTURE VII 

* James, Princ, of Psychol, i., 1890, 427 ff. ; Wundt, 
Physiol. Psychol,, iii., 1903, 410 S. ; Ebbinghaus, Grund- 
zuge, i., 1905, 614 ff. 

2 Wundt, op. cit, 64 ff. 

^ H. C. Stevens, A Simple Complication Pendulum for 
Qualitative Work, Am. Journ. Psychol., xv., 1904, 581. 

* M. Geiger, Neue Complicationsversuche, Philos. Stu- 
dien, xviii., 1903, 347 ff. See also the references there 
given. 

^ Wundt, op. cit., 67. 

® W. von Tchisch, Ueber die Zeitverhaltnisse der Apper- 
ception einfacher und zusammengesetzter Vorstellungen, 
untersucht mit Hulfe der Complicationsmethode, Philos. 
Studien, ii., 1885, 603 ff., esp. 621 f. 

^ Physiol. Psychol., ii., 1880, 272 ff . Geiger (op. cit, 400) 
says that Wundt's and von Tchisch's explanations are 
^grundverschieden.' So they are ! But I think that von 
Tchisch, if he believed that he was repeating Wundt, had 
some excuse for his mistake. He says (622) : " die 
Apperception reproducirt unmittelbar den Eindruck." 
Wundt says (273) : " es wird auch von der Apperception 
der Eindruck unmittelbar reproducirt." (Cf. also the 
passage in Lehrbuch der Physiologic des Menschen, 1878, 
793: "das Centralorgan scheint auf einen erwarteten 
Eindruck so sich vorzubereiten, dass der Vorbereitungsact 
selbst, wenn er eine gewisse Intensitat erreicht, zur 
Erregung wird.") All through the exposition of 1880 

374 



NOTES TO LECTURE VII 375 

Wundt makes very incautious use of the ' Erinnerungsbild ' : 
it is not difficult to read * hallucination ' into his pages. 
In the edition of 1887 (ii., 339 f.) the' reproduction' 
and the ' memory image ' have disappeared, and Wundt's 
theory stands out in sharp contrast to von Tchisch's. 
Since James had the edition of 1887 in his hands, when 
preparing his chapter on Attention for the press, Geiger is 
justified in charging him with an unwarranted confusion 
of the two views. 

' Op. cit, 415 f. 

^ Geiger, op. cit.y 399 ff. It is to be noted that the ex- 
planation offered by Ebbinghaus in Grundzitge, i., 1902, 
593, does not appear ibid., 1905, 615, save in the reference 
to "allerlei Ueberlegungen." 

^^ Physiol. Psychologies 1874, 767. The phrase appears 
in all subsequent editions. 

^^ Geiger, op. cit., 409 ff. I have, of course, taken the 
simplest possible case. 

^^ Physiol. Psychol, iii., 1903, 75 f., 86. 

^^Ibid., 352. 

^^ Grundzuge, i., 618 ff. Ebbinghaus is, perhaps, follow- 
ing James: Princ, i., 409. 

^^ Op. cit., 334, 352. The italics are in the original. 

^^ Op. czY., 621. — Both Ebbinghaus (620) and James 
(408) refer here to the experiments of F. Paulhan (Revue 
scientifique, 3 S., xiii., 1887, 684). Neither these nor the 
kindred experiments of A. Binet (Rev. philos., xxix., 1890, 
138) appear to me, however, to bear out the conclusions 
derived from them. I have myself repeated and extended 
Paulhan's work, and have attained, with practice, to mark- 
edly greater time-differences. But the results belong to 
the domain of habit, of 'normal motor automatisms,' — 



376 NOTES TO LECTURE VII 

where analysis is not difficult, but where we gain no know- 
ledge of the range of attention. Simultaneity of two psy- 
chologically disparate 'attentions' is, in my experience, 
altogether impossible. — Cf . S. E. Sharp, Amer, Journ, 
Psychol., X., 1899, 356, 381. It is noteworthy that, in the 
case reported by R. d'Allonnes {Rev, philos., Deer. 1905, 
592 ff .), there was, apparently, no loss of attention with loss 
of feeling: see pp. 611 f. Cf., however, Lect. II., note 2. 

^' Op, cit, 404. 

'' Op. cit, 634. 

'' Op, cit, 366. 

2' Op. cit, 520; cf. 518 ff., 544 ff., 558 ff. 

^^ Principles, i., 237. The reader may be reminded that 
the distinction between ' substantive ' and ' transitive ' parts 
of the stream of thought, in James' exposition, is a distinc- 
tion in terms of time alone ; it does not imply discontinuity. 
" The successive psychoses shade gradually into each other, 
although their rate of change may be much faster at one 
moment than at the next " : ihid., 243. 

2' Op, cit, 624. 

^^ References to the experiments on touch are given by 
L. R. Geissler, Fluctuations of Attention to Cutaneous 
Stimuli, Amer, Journ, Psychol,, xviii., 1907, 309 ff. Cf. the 
general account in my Exper, Psychol., I., ii., 1901, 194 ff. ; 
and, for the 'Tastzuckungen,' J. Czermak, Sitzungsber. d, 
mathem,-naturw, Classe d, kais, Akademie d, Wissen- 
schaften zu Wien, xv., 1855, 486 f. {Physiol, Studien, ii., 
64 f.). 

^^ References are given by K. Dunlap, The Fluctuation 
of Diapason and Gas Flame Tones, Psychol, Rev., xi., 1904, 
314 ff. See also W. Heinrich, Zeits, f, Sinnesphysiologie, 
xli., 1906, 57. 



NOTES TO LECTURE VII 377 

^^ See my Exper. Psychol., loc. cit.; C. E. Ferree, An 
Experimental Examination of the Phenomena usually 
attributed to Fluctuation of Attention, Amer. Journ, 
Psychol., xvii., 1906, 84, 94 f. ; J. AV. Slaughter, ibid., xii., 
1901, 331; W. Heinrich, Sur la fonction de la membrane 
du tympan. Bull, de V Academie des Sciences de Cracovie, 
July, 1903, 536 ff . ; Ueber die Intensitatsanderungen 
schwacher Gerausche, Zeits. f. Siiinesphysiologie, xli., 
1906, 57 f. ; Ueber das periodische Verschwinden kleiner 
Punkte, ibid., 59 S. Heinrich's view of auditory accom- 
modation is that the drum-skin reacts to a given tone in very 
different states of tension, so that the pulsations of the ten- 
sor tympani have no effect upon tonal hearing. On the 
other hand, the adjustment of the membrane to noise is 
extremely delicate ("das Trommelfell ist ausserst fein auf 
Gerausche gestimmt; . . . man ist erstaunt zu sehen, wie 
indifferent das Trommelfell gegen Gerausche ist, bis man 
zu der richtigen fur das Gerausch entsprechenden Span- 
nungkommt"), so that after accommodation is effected 
the slight changes of tension due to the pulsating muscle 
make themselves apparent in sensation. 

2^ C. E. Ferree, Amer. Journ. Psychol., xvii., 1906, 81 ff., 
esp. 83; xix., 1908, 58 ff., esp. 129; C. Hess, Arch. f. 
Ophthalmol., xl, Abth. 2, 1894, 274 ff. ; B. Hammer, Zeits. 
f. Psychol, u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorgane, xxxvii., 1905,363 ff., 
esp. 365, 375. Hammer has the priority of extended pub- 
lication ; but I have given first place to Ferree in my text 
because his work was begun, and his theory already out- 
lined, in 1903. A brief report will be found in Journ. 
Philos. Psijchol. Sci. Meth., i., 1904, 240; Science, N. S., 
xix., 1904, 659. 

Hammer is criticised by C. E. Seashore in Zeits., xxxix., 



378 NOTES TO LECTURE VII 

1905, 448 ff. With the critique of the auditory experi- 
ments I am in general agreement. I do not understand, 
however, how Seashore can say of adaptation and eye- 
movement : " die wichtige Rolle der genannten und anderer 
physiologischer Momente ist wohlbekannt." I suppose 
that he refers to Pace, who had written in 1902: "for the 
eye, the ' peripheral ' includes the retina ; and, so far as I 
am aware, the retinal conditions as affected by the fluctua- 
tions have not been investigated" {Philos, Studien, xx., 
234). Pace himself works in terms of retinal 'fatigue' 
(242), i.e, of local adaptation: but he brings peripheral 
fatigue into speculative connection with 'central changes' 
and the process of accommodation, and says nothing what- 
ever of eye-movement (244). I know of no further refer- 
ence before 1904, when G. E. Muller sets Hess' observations 
in the perspective of the experiments on attentional fluc- 
tuation (Oesichtspunkte und Tatsachen, 110), and the two 
notes on Ferree's work appear in Woodbridge's Journal 
and in Science. — 

In a paper entitled The Fluctuation of Visual Stimuli 
of Point Area, read by title at the 5th Annual Meeting 
of Experimental Psychologists (Cambridge, Mass., April 
15-17, 1908) and to be published in the Amer. Journ, 
PsychoL, Mr. Ferree reports a repetition and extension 
of the experiments of Heinrich, referred to in the fore- 
going^ Note, and concludes that " in so far as adaptation- 
tests can be applied, these stimuli follow the laws of 
adaptation and recovery, in the phase-relations of their 
fluctuations, as closely as do the areas commonly em- 
ployed." Positive evidence is also adduced against 
Heinrich's theory of lenticular pulsation. 

Mr. Ferree informs me, further, of the following re- 



NOTES TO LECTURE VII 379 

suits of unpublished experiments with auditory stimuli. 
(1) The tone of an electrically driven tuning-fork does 
not fluctuate at the limen, and objective interruptions of 
the sound are at once remarked. (2) Of three trained 
observers, tested at the same time with the watch-tick, 
two reported no fluctuations (90 sec.-2 min.), while the 
third gave fluctuations of the orthodox sort. Unfor- 
tunately, the positions of the observers were not inter- 
changed. 

Hammer has done good service in calling attention to 
the objective inconstancy of the watch-tick (op. cit,, 
371 ff.). I am sure, however, that this observation must 
be supplemented, for explanatory purposes, by reference 
to sound-reflections or similar phenomena. We were 
accustomed, in the early nineties, to perform Sanford's 
experiment (58 6, Amer, Journ, Psychol., iv., 1891, 307; 
61 6, Course in Exper, Psychol,, 1898, 55) in the Cornell 
Laboratory with a number of students simultaneously. 
We found, as I remember, occasional instances of absence 
of fluctuation, and a good many cases of approximately 
coincident fluctuation ; but we also found many cases of 
non-coincidence. 

2^ See Stumpf, TonpsychoL, I, 40 f., 360. 

^^Helmholtz, Physiol, Optik, 1896, 242, 510; so J. 
Mliller, Ueber die phantastischen Gesichtserscheinungen, 
1826, 15 f . (" diese Lichterscheinung war mit dem Ausath- 
men synchronisch"). Fechner, curiously enough, found 
no such oscillation : Revision, 1882, 32. — A. Lehmann, 
Philos, Studien, ix., 1894, QQ ff . ; J. W. Slaughter, Amer, 
Journ, Psychol, xii., 1901, 329 ff. 

^^ The whole series of related articles is as follows : 
Slaughter, The Fluctuations of the Attention in Some of 



380 NOTES TO LECTURE VII 

their Psychological Relations, Amer. Journ. Psychol., xii., 

1901, 313 ff. ; R. W. Taylor, The Effect of Certain Stimuli 
upon the Attention Wave, ibid,, 335 ff. ; H. C. Stevens, The 
Relation of the Fluctuations of Judgments in the Estima- 
tion of Time Intervals to Vaso-motor Waves, ibid., xiii., 

1902, Iff.; W. B. Pillsbury, Attention Waves as a Means of 
Measuring Fatigue, ibid., xiv., 1903, 541 ff. ; C. E. Gallo- 
way, The Effect of Stimuli upon the Length of Traube- 
Hering Waves, ibid., xv., 1904, 499 ff. ; B. Killen, The 
Effects of Closing the Eyes upon the Fluctuations of the 
Attention, ibid., 512 S.; G. L. Jackson, The Telephone 
and Attention Waves, Journ. Phil. Psychol. Sci. Meth., 
iii., 1906, 602 ff. 

Cf. also Pillsbury's general account in ^attention, 1906, 
90 ff. ; Attention, 1908, 69 ff. ; F. G. Bonser, A Study of the 
Relations between Mental Activity and the Circulation 
of the Blood, Psychol. Rev., x., 1903, 120 ff. Ct. W. Mc- 
Dougall, Mind, N. S., xv., 1906, 356 f. ; H. Berger, Ueber 
die Icorp. Aeusserungen psych. Zustdnde, ii., 1907, 153 ff. 

^^ S. Exner, Entwurf zu einer physiologischen Erlcldrung 
der psychischen Erscheinungen, i., 1894, 302 f. ; Pillsbury, 
Amer. Journ. Psych., xiv., 552. 

Exner writes (302) : " nach meinen Selbstbeobachtungen 
dlirfte die Dauer der gleichmassigen Lebhaftigkeit einer 
Vorstellung kaum eine Secunde sein." Even if we put the 
very strictest interpretation upon 'gleichmassig,' the state- 
ment seems curiously exaggerated. 

^^ Philos. Studien, xx., 1902, 234. 

^^ Lehmann, op. cit. ; other references in Ferree, Amer. 
Journ. Psychol., xix., 1908, 58 ff. 

^^ Cf. The Problems of Experimental Psychology, Amer, 
Journ, Psychol., xvi., 1905^ 218. 



NOTES TO LECTURE VII 381 

In the first edition of his Gritndziige (i., 1897, 263) 
Ebbinghaus wrote as follows: "Nun sind aber doch die 
Licht- und Farbenempfindungen, wie wichtig sie auch 
immer als Material flir weitere Verarbeitungen sein mogen, 
an und fur sich noch relativ niedere und elementare Be- 
thatigungen der Seele, das sie vermittelnde Organ ist ein 
Aussenwerk des eigentlichen Seelenorgans. Wenn also 
schon das vergleichsweise Einf ache sich der eindringenden 
und intensiven Beschaftigung mit ihni als ein ungeahnt und 
fast verwirrend Reichhaltiges enthullt, wie mag es erst mit 
dem hoheren Seelenleben, das doch zweifellos etwas be- 
trachtlich Verwickelteres ist, in Wahrheit bestellt sein?" 
I fear that there is here a ' trace,' as the analysts say, of an 
untenable genetic psychology. That apart, I am — as the 
above quotation shows — unable to see the force of Ebbing- 
haus' argument. The passage is not reprinted in 1905. 

What are we to say, however, to the results of H. 
Berger (Korp, Aeusserungen, ii., 1907, 118 ff., 181 flF.), 
who was able, in Fechner's words, to look into the brain 
of another person, and who there saw the apperception 
waves w^ith all desirable plainness.^ This, surely: that 
the introspective control which Berger finds lacking in his 
first series of experiments (139 f.) is equally necessary 
for the series made by ' Zoneff 's method.' There is no 
evidence that the ' inattention ' of his observers was not 
an ' attention to something else.' The same criticism 
holds of the experiments of Zoneff and Meumann, so far 
as their report has been published ; we are not told any- 
thing in detail of the ' Nachlassen der Aufmerksamkeit ' 
(Philos. Studien, xviii., 1903, 46). But, apart from this, 
it was a paradox of the older investigations that fluctua- 
tion of attention occurred without any subjective remis- 
sion of attention. 



382 NOTES TO LECTURE VII 

^^ L. R. Geissler, Amer. Journ, Psychol., xviii., 1907, 
310 f. ; E. A. Pace, Philos. Studien, xx., 1902, 244. 

The fluctuation of two simultaneously presented stimuli 
offers no new difficulty. I have myself made preUminary 
experiments upon memory-images, without observing 
fluctuation. See, however, N. Lange, Philos, Studien, iv., 
1888,408 ff.; H. Eckener, ibid,, viii., 1893, 370, 379; H. 
Mlinsterberg, Beitr. zur exper. PsychoL, ii., 1889, 119 ff. 
The illusions of reversible perspective (Lange, 406), which 
still figure in Pillsbury's account (JJ attention, 93 ; Attention, 
1908, 71), have been ruled out of court by Wundt himself, 
who finds their primary conditions in the physiological pro- 
cesses of fixation and eye-movement {Die geometrisch- 
optischen Tdiischungen, 1898, 23 [Ahh, d, mathem.-phys. 
CL d. kgL sdchs. Ges. d. Wiss,, xxiv., 75]; Phys. Psych,, ii. 
1902, 545 ff.). 

^^ Kulpe, Outlines, 429 ; Ebbinghaus, GrundzUge, 623 f . 

^^ See A. J. Hamlin, Amer. Journ. Psychol., viii., 1896, 
3 ff. ; F. E. Moyer, ibid., 1897, 405 ; L. G. Birch, ibid., ix., 
1897, 45; L. Darlington and E. B. Talbot, ibid., 1898, 
332 ; E. B. Titchener, ibid., 343. My outline of method is 
(as I say later in the text) entirely schematic ; but I think 
that with time and patience and technical skill the method 
itself can be carried through. And I know of no other 
that will serve the same purpose. 

It has often been proposed that the method of distraction 
should be applied objectively, without introspective control. 
See, e.g., A. Bertels, Versuche liber die Ablenkung der 
Aufmerksamkeit, 1889 ; E. J. Swift, Amer. Journ. Psychol., 
v., 1892, 1 ff. ; Kulpe, op. cit, 428 f. ; E. Krapelin, Psychol. 
Arbeiten, I, 1895, 57 ff . ; R. Vogt, ibid., in., 1899, 62 ff . ; 
W. McDougall, Brit. Journ. Psychol, i., 1905, 435 ff. 



NOTES TO LECTURE VII 383 

Stumpf sees the difficulty, but does not suggest a way out : 
TonpsychoL, i., 74 f. Pillsbury, in his new chapter in 
Attention^ 89 ff., treats the method in this objective way, 
and thus naturally — but mistakenly — regards the work 
published from the Cornell Laboratory not as preliminary, 
but as done for its own sake. I have, however, never be- 
lieved that the method of distraction, taken objectively, 
could furnish any psychological result, and I can therefore 
subscribe to Pillsbury's criticism. In 1898 I wrote as fol- 
lows : " The three Studies . . . were undertaken with the 
view of discovering a means of distraction that should be 
capable of gradation, uniform in its working and applicable 
to normal subjects. With such a distraction it would be 
possible, on the qualitative side, to describe the attributes 
of mental processes given in the state of inattention, and, on 
the quantitative, to measure the magnitude and delicacy 
of sensitivity and sensible discrimination in the same state " 
(343 f. : the italics are not in the original). The * state of 
inattention' is a clumsy expression, but it is evident that 
my psychological appeal was to lie to introspection. 

^^ Stumpf, TonpsychoL, i., 73 f. ; H. Munsterberg, Die 
Willenshandlung, 1888, 72; Beitr. z. exper. Psychol,, ii., 
1889, 24. 

^^ See, e.g., B. Bourdon, Observations comparatives sur 
la reconnaissance, la discrimination et I'association, Rev, 
philos., xl., 1895, 166 ff. ; E. Toulouse et N. Vaschide, Atten- 
tion et distraction sensorielles, Compt, rend, de la soc. de 
bioL, 1899, 964 ff. ; A. Binet, Attention et adaptation, 
Annee psychol., vi., 1900, 248 ff . ; F. Consoni, La mesure 
de I'attention chez les enfants faibles d'esprit (phrenas- 
theniques). Arch, de Psychol, ii., 1903, 209 ff.; W. Peters, 
Aufmerksamkeit und Reizschwelle : Versuche zur Mes- 



384 NOTES TO LECTURE VII 

sung der Aufmerksamkeitskonzentration, Arch, f, d. ges, 
Psychol, viii., 1906, 385 ff . ; P. Janet, The Mental State 
of Hystericals, 1901, 70 ff. ; Mlinsterberg, Die Association 
successiver Vorstellungen, Zeits.f. Psychol. , i., 1890, 99 ff. ; 
W. G. Smith, The Relation of Attention to Memory, Mind, 
N. S., iv., 1895, 47 ff. ; T. Ziehen, Ein einfacher Apparat 
zur Messung der Aufmerksamkeit, Monatsschr, f, Psy- 
chiat. u. Neurologic, xiv., 1903, 231. 

On the use of the MV, see A. Oehrn, Experimentelle 
Studien zur Individualpsychologie, Psychol. Arbeiten, i., 
1895, 92 ff., esp. 128, 138; V. Henri, Annee psychol, ii., 
1897, 245; J. J. van BiervHet, Journ. de Psychol., i., 1904, 
230; A. Binet, Ann. psychol., xi., 1905, 71. On the use 
of the fluctuation- values, see E. Wiersma, Zeits.f. Psychol., 
xxviii., 1902, 180 ff. ; Pillsbury, Amer, Journ. Psychol., 
xiv., 1903, 541 ff. 

^^ For a list of the investigations of attention by the ex- 
pressive method, see H. C. Stevens, Amer. Journ. Psychol., 
xvi., 1905, table facing 469; and add E. A. McC. Gamble, 
ibid., xvi., 261; M. Kelchner, Arch.f.d. ges. Psychol., v., 
1905, 7 ff . ; H. Berger, Korp. Aeusserungen, i., 1904, 
77 ff.; ii., 1907, 40 ff., 118 ff., 167 ff. Noteworthy is 
Binet's suggestion of immobility: Annee psychol., vi., 
1900, 279. 



NOTES TO LECTURE VIII 

^ With these paragraphs, cf. Vfundt, Physiol. Psychol, y\\.^ 
1902, 362 ff . ; also the insertion from the fourth edition 
in Princ. of Physiol. Psychol., i., 1904, 21 if. ; Orth, Gefuhl 
u. Bewusstseinslage, 1903, 6 ff. (esp.the remarks on Tetens). 

^ Amer. Journ. Psychol., xvi., 1905, 213. 

^ See the discussion in Psychol. Bulletin, iii., 1906, 52 ff. 

^ J. Merkel, Philos. Studien, iv., 1888, 594; v., 1889, 245. 

^ Physiol. Psychol., ii., 1902, 369. 

^ The first idea of the theory here outlined came to me 
some years ago — in 1901 or 1902 — in the course of con- 
versation with my then assistant. Professor G. M. Whipple. 
How much of it belongs to Dr. Whipple and how much 
to myself I cannot now say, and I imagine that Dr. Whipple 
is in the same case. In its general features, the theory 
seems to resemble that put forward by M. F. Washburn 
(Journ. Philos. Psychol. Sci. Meth., iii., 1906, 62 f.). I do 
not agree, however, that mental processes may appear, in 
alternation, as feelings and as organic sensations or ideas. 
Another similar view is that of R. Lagerborg, Das Gefilhls- 
problem, 1905, 36; Arch.f. d. ges. Psychol., ix., 1907, 455 f. 

^ Cf . the terminological note in Orth, Gefuhl u. Bewusst- 
seinslage, 1903, 5; and H. N. Gardiner, Journ. Philos. 
Psijchol. Sci. Meth., iii., 1906, 57 f. 

^ Ebbinghaus, Grundzilge, 568 ff. 

^ J. J. Thomson, The Corpuscular Theory of Matter, 
1907, 1. " From the point of view of the physicist, a theory 
of matter is a poli«"y rather than a creed ; its object is to 
2 c 385 



386 NOTES TO LECTURE VIII 

connect or coordinate apparently diverse phenomena, and 
above all to suggest, stimulate, and direct experiment." 

'' Op. cit, i., 1902, 577 f.; i., 1905, 602 f. 

"G. F. Stout, Analytic Psychol, i., 1896, 224 ff.; cf. 
Manual of Psychol, 1899, 232 ff. 

^^ Kulpe, Outlines, 272. 

^^ r attention, 1906, 72; Attention, 1908, 55. "Things 
are interesting because we attend to them, or because we 
are likely to attend to them ; we do not attend because they 
are interesting." — Cf. with this discussion F. Arnold, The 
Psychology of Interest, Psychol Rev,, xiii., 1906, 221 ff., 
291 flF. ; Interest and Attention, Psychol Bulletin, ii., 1905, 
361 ff . ; W. H. Burnham, Attention and Interest, Amer. 
Journ. Psychol, xix., 1908, 14 flF. 

^^ Physiol Psychol, iii., 1903, 342 : the following pages 
give the distinction between active and passive appercep- 
tion. Cf. Grundriss, 1905, 266 (Engl., 1907, 246). 

^^ Tonpsychol, ii., 1890, 283. Voluntary attention is 
" nichts Anderes als der Wille, sofern er auf ein Bemerken 
gerichtet ist." Involuntary attention may pass into volun- 
tary : " sie ist nicht mehr davon verschieden, als der Wille 
uberhaupt von Lusgefuhlen verschieden ist. Fassen wir 
' GefUhl ' im weiteren Sinne, so kann der Wille ja selbst zu 
den Geflihlen, und zwar naturlich zu den positiven Ge- 
fiihlen, gerechnet werden." The whole passage, 277 ff ., is 
interesting, though there are parts that I do not find very 
clear. 

'' Grundzuge, I, 1905, 588, 607, 610 f. — On the other 
side, cf. A. Marty, Vjs.f, wiss, Philos,, xiii., 1889, 195 ff. 

'^ Op. cit, 603. 

^^ Physiol Psychol, iii., 1903, 279; cf. Grundriss, 1905, 
230 flF. (Engl., 1907, 213 flF.). The doctrine appears first 



NOTES TO LECTURE VIII 387 

in the Physiol. Psychol, of 1880 (li., 410), and is worked out 
in the essay on Die Entwicklung des Willens, Essays, 1885, 
286 ff. 

In Essays, 1906, 344, Wundt ascribes his "Bekehrung zu 
einem psychologischen Voluntarismus " to two influences : 
the positive indications of his own experiments on reactions, 
and the negative eflFect of J. Baumann's intellectuahsm. 
Now the reaction experiments were done ten years before the 
second edition of the P. P. appeared, whereas Baumann's 
Handhuch der Moral was pubhshed in 1879. Here, then, 
is another instance of the movement of Wundt's thought, as 
I have characterised it in Lecture IV. : the voluntaristic 
idea had been ' incubated ' for a decade ; it was gradually 
maturing in Wundt's mind; and Baumann furnished the 
external stimulus that brought it to clear expression. 

'^ Art. Psychology, Encyc. Brit., xx., 1886, 43. 

2^E. D. Cope, The Origin of the Fittest, 1887, 395, 413, 
447. Cope's essays are the more interesting as he seems 
to have worked out his ideas independently, without know- 
ledge of contemporary psychology ; he makes at most only 
a casual reference to Carpenter or Bain. 

^^ Cf. my paper in the Pof. Sci. Monthly, Ix., 1902, 
458 if. I should now replace the Wundtian argument, 
467 f., by pointing out that there does not appear to be any 
reflex movement — heart-beat, widening and narrowing of 
the pupil, etc. — that may not be brought, to a certain de- 
gree, under 'conscious control'; and I should urge that 
this state of affairs probably indicates a resumption, not an 
usurpation of sovereignty. Cf . G. H. Lewes, The Physical 
Basis of Mind, 1877, 367 ff. 

I add only, to avoid possible misunderstanding, that my 
own position is that of parallelism, not of interactionism ; 



388 NOTES TO LECTURE VIII 

and that there is no reason to be scared by the bogey of 
'the inheritance of acquired characters.' There are more 
ways than one of speculating oneself out of a biological 
difficulty ! 

^^ Physiol Psychol, iii., 1903, 348; cf. 116. 

2' Grundriss, 1905, 262 (Engl., 1907, 243). 

^^ See Lecture VI., note 38, siibfin. 

^^ I have avoided any detailed reference to the central 
conditions of attention. The most recent accounts are 
those of W. McDougall {Mind, N. S., xi., 1902, 316; xii., 
1903, 289, 473; xv., 1906, 329; cf. Physiol Psychol, 1905, 
90 ff.) and Ebbinghaus (Grundzuge, 1905, 628 ff.). Pills- 
bury gives a general review of theories in his Attention, 
1908, chs. xiv. ff. As for the central conditions of affec- 
tion, I do not see that we need travel beyond the Korper- 
filhlsphdre; but this is mere guesswork. 

'' Physiol Psychol, i., 1893, 588, 590. 

^' Ibid., ii., 1902, 357. 

2' Grundriss, 1905, 263 (Engl., 1907, 244). " Jeder In- 
halt des Bewusstseins libt eine Wirkung auf die Aufmerk- 
samkeit aus, infolge deren er sich teils durch seine eigene 
Gefuhlsfarbung, teils durch die an die Funktion der Auf- 
merksamkeit gebundene Gefuhle verrat. Die gesamte 
Ruckwirkung dieser dunkel bewussten Inhalte auf die 
Aufmerksamkeit verschmilzt dann aber, gemass den all- 
gemeinen Gesetzen der Verbindung der Gefuhlskom- 
ponenten, mit den an die klar bewussten Inhalte gebun- 
denen Gefuhlen zu einem einzigen TotalgefUhl." Here it 
is the obscure contents that react upon the attention ! We 
must surely conclude that the doctrine has not settled down 
to final form. Indeed, I am disposed to think that the 
section on ' Die Gefuhle als psychophysische Vorgange ' is 



NOTES TO LECTURE VIII 389 

intended to convey that idea {Physiol. Psychol., ii., 1902, 
358 ff., esp. 362). 

Pillsbury, in his Attention (1908, 189 ff.), appears to 
refer to the Wundtian doctrine of 1893, and not to that of 
the current edition of the Physiologische Psychologic. 

""^ Physiol. Psychol., iii., 1903, 341, 342 ff.; Grundriss, 
1905, 264 f. (Engl., 1907, 244 f.). 

^^ See, e.g., Orth, Gefilhl u. Bewusstseinslage, 1903, 50. 

^^ Princ. of Psychol., i., 1890, 300. 

^^ H. E. Kohn, Zur Theorie der Aufmerksamkeit, 1894, 
48; cf. my Ex^er. Psychol, I., ii., 1901, 210 f. 

^^ Kohn says (op. cit., 36) : " wenn Wundt statt wir ' ich ' 
gesagt hatte, so konnte man ihn den Satz [wir nehmen in 
uns in wechselnder Weise mehr oder weniger deuthch eine 
Thatigkeit wahr] nicht bestreiten. Ich muss jedoch dem 
gegeniiber wiederholen, dass ich bei der sorgfaltigsten Prii- 
fung meiner Bewusstseinslage nur selten ein solches Ge- 
fiihl gefunden habe." 

^^ Grundriss, loc. cit. 

^^ Physiol. Psychol, iii., 1903, 342 ; Grundriss, 265 (Engl., 
245). 

^^ Physiol. Psychol, 341. 

'' Mind, N. S., xi., 1902, 342 f. "The complexity of the 
upper levels [of the nervous system], their numerous inter- 
connections, the extreme variability of the resistances pre- 
sented by them, and the number of alternative paths that 
may be opened in turn to the excitation-process, are the 
physiological basis of the ' Lebhaftigkeit ' of the presenta- 
tion." 

'" Grundzuge, i., 1905, 628 ff. The effect of Ebbinghaus' 
cortical Hemmungen and Bahnungen is " die Herbeifuhrung 
diffuser und sich verlaufender Erregungen einerseits, kon- 
zentrierter und differenzierter Erregungen andererseits." 



390 NOTES TO LECTURE VlII 

^^ r attention, 1906, 194 ; Attention, 1908, 284. 

*^ It is, of course, always possible to fall back upon blood- 
pressure and rate of pulse and respiratory changes, and so to 
save the motor character of the organism. I do not doubt 
that these internal reactions occur. But we are talking 
attention: and to make them available for the theory of 
attention, it must be shown, first, that a concomitant varia- 
tion actually obtains, and then, secondly, that it is relevant, 
— that the two series of correlated phenomena are not 
referable to a common set of conditions. As things are, 
the observations upon the first point are comparatively 
rough, and the evidence available upon the second does not 
favour the motor hypothesis. See Pillsbury, Attention, 282 f . 

On 'motor' psychology in general, see I. M. Bentley, 
Amer, Journ, Psychol,, xvii., 1906, 293 ff., and the refer^ 
ences there given; as well as my Exp, Psychol,, II., ii., 
1905, 364 ff. 

^^ r attention, 1906, 280 f.; Attention, 1908, 311 ff. 

^^ Grundzuge, i,, 1905, 606 f. There are, Ebbinghaus 
declares, "gewisse reflektorisch ausgeloste Bewegungen," 
that we sense " als mannigfache Spannungen oder Betati- 
gungen, ohne sie doch zumeist bestimmt zu lokalisieren, 
d. h. : man empfindet ganz allgemein sich als angespannt 
oder tatig, indem man aufmerksam ist." 

^^ Physiol, Psychol,, iii., 1903, 254 ff., 342 ff. ; Grundriss, 
223 ff., 264 f., 266 (Engl., 207 ff., 244 f., 246 f.). 

^* We have mentioned this law above, p. 34 of the text. 
Wundt uses it, in connection with action, Physiol, Psychol,, 
iii., 1903, 277 ff., 471 ff. ; Grundriss, 230 ff., 239 f. (Engl., 
213 ff., 221 f.); and esp. Die Sprache, l, 1900, 31 ff.; i., 
1904, 37 ff. It is also employed by G. H. Lewes, passim; 
see, e,g,. Problems of Life and Mind, i,, 1874, 134 ff., 226 ff ; 



NOTES TO LECTURE VIII 391 

iii., 1879, 93 ff., 143 ff., 397 flF., 432 f.; Physical Basis 
of Mind, 1877, 322 ff., 367 ff. ; Study of Psychology, 1879, 
19 ff., etc. 

'' Cf. my Primer of Psychol, 1902, 76 f. ; Outline, 1902, 
135 ff., 139 f. 

^® Grundzuge, 607, 610 f. " Bei der unwillkurlichen Auf- 
merksamkeit ist weiter nichts vorhanden als [ein energisch 
hervortretender interessierender Eindruck und Spannungs- 
oder Tatigkeitsempfindungen], bei der willkiirlichen kommt 
noch hinzu eine unablassig den Eindruck als bevorstehend 
oder als fortdauernd vorwegnehmende Vorstellung. Sie 
verhalten sich also zueinander wie Trieb und Wille." 

'^^ Ebbinghaus writes (op. cit,, 611): "dass ich endlich 
sachlich die Beschreibung des Unterschiedes zwischen pas- 
siver und aktiver Apperception, als eines einfachen, nur 
durch ein Motiv hestimmten WoUens und eines zwischen 
mehreren Motiven wdhlenden WoUens, nicht zutreffend 
finden kann, geht aus der oben gegebenen abweichenden 
Darstellung dieses Unterschiedes hervor." This formula- 
tion is not quite fair to Wundt, since the Wahlhandlung 
is, for him, just as much ' bestimmt ' as is the Triebhand- 
lung. As for the ' nicht zutreffend,' I have shown in the 
text that Wundt's distinction includes that of Ebbinghaus, 
and simply adds a causal to the common descriptive ac- 
count. The terminological issue, of the definition of ' will, * 
is, as Ebbinghaus says, a ' Zweckmassigkeitsfrage ' ; and 
here, again, I am obliged to side with Wundt. — The reader 
of Ebbinghaus' Grundzuge must, I think, feel that the author 
is not particularly interested in attention, and has not made 
the most of the available material. The chapter is, surely, 
far below the level of those on sensation and memory. I 
am sorry, nevertheless, to end these Notes with adverse 
criticism of a work which I greatly admire. 



INDEX OF NAMES 



References to the notes begin with page 321, 



Alechsieff, N., 47, 51, 55, 332, 

350. 
Allonnes, G. R. d^ 328, 376. 
Angell, J. R., 44, 187, 221 f., 

228, 230, 240, 331, 356, 368 f. 
Aristotle, 291. 
Arnold, F., 386. 
Aubert, H., 27, 327. 
Auerbach, F., 372. 

Bain, A., 82, 172, 352, 387. 
Bald^an, J. M., 184 f., 220 ff., 

228, 230, 338, 355, 367. 
Baumann, J., 387. 
Bentley, I. M., 217 f ., 323, 326 f., 

361, 390. 
Berger, H., 380 f., 384. 
Berliner, B., 372. 
Bertels, A., 382. 
Biervliet, J. J. van, 384. 
Binet, A., 280, 375, 383 ff. 
Birch, L. G., 382. 
Bonser, F. G., 380. 
Bourdon, B., 81 f., 288, 338, 

383 
Bradley, F. H., 185, 355. 
Brahn, M., 167, 350. 
Braunschweiger, D., 172, 352 f., 

359 
Breese, B. B., 358. 
Brentano, F., 33, 328. 
Bruckner, A., 358. 
Buniham, W. H., 334, 386. 

Calkins, M. W., 325, 327. 
Carpenter, W. B., 387. 
Cohn, J., 161, 347. 
Consoni, F., 383. 
Cope, E. D., 300, 387. 
Czernriak, J. N., 268, 376. 



Darlington, L., 382. 
Delboeuf, J. R. L., 201 f., 358. 
Descartes, R., 82. 
Dessoir, M., 330, 353, 359. 
Dietze, G., 233, 237, 368 f. 
Dtirr, E., 359. 
Dunlap, K., 269, 376. 

Ebbinghaus, H., 4, 12, 27, 46, 
57, 65 f., 68 f., 92, 106, 112, 
117, 153 f., 160, 174, 187, 
191 f., 196, 213 f., 260 ff., 265, 
294 ff., 303, 310 ff., 315, 321, 
324 ff., 331 ff., 340, 343 f., 
347, 352, 354 ff., 358, 360, 
373ff., 381f., 385, 388f., 391. 

Eckener, H., 269, 382. 

Engel, G., 326. 

Exner, S., 193, 273, 357, 380. 

Fechner, G. T., 13, 20, 106, 136, 
173, 200 f., 224, 245, 274, 323, 
343, 358, 361, 368, 372, 379, 
381. 

Ferree, C. E., 267 ff., 274, 377 ff. 

Ferrier, D., 186, 355. 

Fichte, I. H., 368. 

Fick, A. E., 274. 

Fite, W., 44, 331. 

Fortlage, K., 226, 368. 

Frey, M. von, 43, 82, 288, 327, 
330 f., 338. 

Frobes, J., 327. 

Galloway, C. E., 380. 
Gamble, E. A. McC, 384. 
Gardiner, H. N., 385. 
Gebsattel, E. von, 331. 
Geiger, M., 254, 258, 262, 332, 
374 f. 



393 



394 



INDEX 



Geissler, L. R., 267 f., 275, 376, 

OOQ 

Gent, v., 167, 350. 
Geyser, J., 361. 
Goethe, J. W. von, 135. 
Goldscheider, A., 17, 88, 333, 

339 
Golgi,*C., 18. 
Giirber, A., 274. 
Gurewitsch, A., 147, 346. 

Hamilton, W., 75, 172, 334, 352, 

368. 
Hamlin, A. J., 361, 382. 
Hammer, B., 272, 377, 379. 
Hayes, S. P., 47, 55, 165, 349. 
Heinrich, W., 269 f., 342, 376 ff. 
Heller, T., 193, 357. 
Helmholtz, H. L. F. von, 8, 173, 

196, 225, 273, 327, 358, 368, 

379 
Henri* V., 384. 

Herbart, J. F., 227, 255, 286 f. 
Hering, E., 7, 20, 324. 
Hess, C, 377 f. 
Hillebrand, F., 20, 324 f. 
Hoffding, H., 153, 347. 
Hollands, E. H., 38 f., 76, 329, 

334. 

Irons, D., 35. 

Jackson, G. L., 38of 

James, W., 14, 34 ff., 153 f ., 160, 
190, 196, 210, 228, 239 ff., 256, 
265, 306 f ., 323, 327, 329, 333, 
345, 352 f., 356 ff., 369, 374 ff. 

Janet, P., 280, 384. 

Jastrow, J., 198, 358. 

Jodl, F., 153 f., 347. 

Johnston, C. H., 48 f., 51 ff., 55, 
332 

Judd,'c. H., 187,356. 

Kastner, A., 369. 

Kafka, G., 372. 

Kant, I., 174 f., 286, 354. 

Kelchner, M., 92, 340, 349, 384. 

Kiesow, F., 100, 341. 

Killen, B., 380. 

Kohn, H. E., 223, 306 f., 368, 

389. 
Kozaki, N., 361. 



Kraepelin, E., 332, 382. 

Kries, J. von, 359. 

Krueger, F,, 339, 360. 

Kiilpe, O., 20 f., 41 f ., 46 f., 57 f., 
61 ff., 66, 68 ff., 75, 84f., Ill, 
117, 129 f., 153, 196, 199,209, 
212, 221 ff., 276, 321, 324, 
326 f., 330 ff., 340, 347, 352, 
354 ff., 358 f., 360 f., 367, 369, 
382, 386. 

Ladd, G. T., 42, 62, 65, 152, 154, 

184 f., 330 f., 333, 347, 355. 
Lagerborg, R., 45, 331, 338, 385. 
Lange, C, 34 f., 160. 
Lange, N., 267, 382. 
Lehmann, A., 66 ff., 76, 153, 

203, 267, 273 f., 332 ff., 347, 

358, 379 f. 
Leibniz, G. W. von, 225. 
Lewes, G. H., 387, 390. 
Lipps, T., 33, 61, 153 f., 331 ff., 

347, 349 f., 357 f., 361. 
Lotze, R. H., 28, 116 f., 206, 226, 

327, 344, 359, 368. 

McDougall, W., 310, 331, 358, 

373, 380, 382, 388. 
Mach, E., 8, 215 f., 273, 322. 
Major, D. R., 347. 
Marshall, H. R., 85, 224 f., 228, 

338 f., 368. 
Marty, A., 386. 
Meinong, A., 322, 332. 
Merkel, J., 289, 385. 
Meumann, E., 71, 73 ff., 159, 187, 

331, 333 f., 349, 352, 381. 
Meyer, G. H,, 342. 
Meyer, M., 323. 
Mill, J., 172, 352. 
Mill, J. S., 352. 
Mittenzwey, K., 369. 
Morgan, C. L., 227 f., 230, 240, 

368. 
Moyer, F. E., 382. 
Muller, G. E., 10, 20 f., 191, 195 

f., 210, 236, 323 ff., 354, 356 ff., 

361, 366 f., 378. 
Muller, J., 379. 
Muller, R. F., 333. 
Miinsterberg, H., 215, 323, 333, 

358, 360 f., 369, 382 ff. 



INDEX 



395 



Nagel, W., 44, 107 f., 159, 330 f., 
343. 

Oehrn, A., 280 f., 384. 

Orth, J., 44, 46 f., 51, 55, 57, 

135, 154, 160, 330 ff., 350, 385, 

389. 

Pace, E. A., 269, 273, 275, 378, 
382. 

Passy, J., 326. 

Paulhan, F., 375. 

Peters, W., 383. 

Pierce, A. H., 44, 331. 

Pillsbury, W. B., 5, 174, 183, 
187, 191, 193, 196, 206, 212, 
214, 218, 243, 273, 281, 296, 
298, 311 f., 322, 330, 333 ff., 
355 ff., 360, 380, 382 f ., 388 ff. 

Pilzecker, A., 356 ff., 366. 

Platner, E., 359. 

Plato, 82. 

Preyer, W., 273. 

Quandt, J., 369. 

Rehmke, J., 56, 153, 329, 331 f., 

347. 
Ribot, T., 101, 184, 342, 355. 
Royce, J., 147, 149, 347. 

Sanford, E. C, 379. 

Saxinger, R., 39, 76, 330, 332, 

334. 
Schultze, F. E. O., 332, 334, 343. 
Schumann, F., 236, 366 ff., 369, 

372. 
Scripture, E. W., 100, 340. 
Seashore, C. E., 377 f. 
Sharp, S. E., 376. 
Sigwart, C, 352. 
Slaughter, J. W., 269, 273 f ., 377, 

379. 
Smith, W. G., 384. 
Sollier, P., 328, 332 ff., 338, 340. 
Solomons, L. M., 180, 354. 
Squire, C. S., 356. 
Stein, G., 180, 354. 
Stern, L. W., 192 f., 357, 369. 
Stevens, H. C, 252, 346, 374, 

380, 384. 
Storring, G. W., 45, 160, 332, 

336, 349. 



Stout, G. S., 35, 185, 295 f., 298, 
328, 355, 386. 

Stumpf, C, 26, 33, 35 f., 40, 45, 
57, 63 ff., 82 ff., 136, 153 f., 
160, 185, 193 f., 210, 214 ff., 
228, 242, 245, 273, 278, 297, 
323 f., 326, 328 ff., 332 f., 
338 ff., 355, 357 f., 360, 367, 
372, 379, 383. 

Sully, J., 46, 331, 334. 

Swift, E. J., 382. 

Talbot, E. B., 322, 382. 
Taylor, R. W., 380. 
Tchisch, W. von, 255 f., 374 f. 
Tetens, J. N., 385. 
Thomson, J. J., 385. 
Torok, L., 324. 
Toulouse, E., 383. 
Tsukahara, M., 361. 
Tucker, A., 226, 354, 368. 

Urbantschitsch, V., 269. 

Valle, G. della, 371. 

Vaschide, N., 383. 

Vogt, O., 100, 147, 160, 340, 

347, 349. 
Vogt, R., 382. 

Ward, J., 75, 223 ff., 299 f., 330, 
334. 

Washburn, M. F., 323, 325, 329, 
385. 

Weber, E. H., 193, 214, 276, 364. 

Whipple, G. M., 385. 

Wiersma, E., 267 f., 281, 384. 

Wirth, W., 332, 369. 

Wundt, W., 5, 33, 35 f., 38 f., 
46 f., 56, 63, 75 f., 105 f., 
125 ff., 171, 173 f., 182, 199, 
206, 210 f., 213, 225 f., 230 f., 
233 ff., 239, 257, 261, 263 ff., 
276, 286, 290, 295, 297, 299, 
301 ff., 305 ff., 312, 314 ff., 
321 ff., 330 ff., 345 f., 348 ff., 
352 f., 355 ff., 360, 368 f., 371, 
373 ff., 382, 385, 387, 389 ff. 

Ziegler, T., 85, 339. 
Ziehen, T., 84, 338, 384. 
Zoneff, P., 71, 73 f., 334, 381. 



INDEX OF SUBJECTS 



References to the notes begin with page 321. 



Accentuation, subjective, 234 f., 
239. 

Accommodation, attentional, 
242 ff., 251, 371. 

Accommodation, peripheral, 
as condition of clearness, 
199, 205, 243 f., 246, 266; 
as concerned in fluctuation, 
268 ff.; Heinrich's theory of 
auditory, 377. 

Action, psychology of, 297 f., 
299 f . ; see Reaction. 

Action, reflex, 299 f., 387; see 
Reflex arc. 

Activity, feeling of, 147, 155, 
306 ff., 389 f. 

Adaptation, sensory, 40, 65 ff., 
69, 265 f., 367; range of, 
265 f.; visual, in phenomena 
of fluctuation, 270 f., 378; 
affective, 40, 65 ff., 100; 
see Habituation. 

^Esthetics, 103, 126 f., 130, 343, 
348. 

Affection, definition of, 33; 
criteria of, 33 ff., 77 f., 127 f., 
153, 289 f., 292 f., 335 f. 
(see Antagonism; Clearness, 
lack of; Habituation; In- 
tensity, central ; Non-local- 
isableness; Subjectivity); 

attributes of, 84, 128; condi- 
tions of, in Wundt's system, 
140 ff. ; manifold qualities of, 
in Wundt's system, 128, 
150 ff., 290 f.; as relation 
of sensation to consciousness, 
131, 154; as undifferentiated 
conscious process, 291 f. ; 
and sensation, 33 ff. ; and 
attention, 294 ff., 296 ff., 
334 f.; see Feeling. 



Affective judgment, analysis of, 
163 ff. (pleasantness-un- 
pleasantness, 165; excite- 
ment-depression, 165 f . ; 
tension-relaxation, 1 66) . 

After-image, negative, 69, 271 f . ; 
of feeling, 290. 

Algedonic quality, 85; sensa- 
tion, 338; see Gefuhlsemp- 
findungen. 

Alimentary sensations, 18 f., 
57 f., 329. 

Anaesthesia, 116. 

Analgesia, 115. 

Antagonism, qualitative, as cri- 
terion of affection, 56 ff., 
77 f., 128, 289, 293, 332 f., 
335. 

Apperception, 75 f., 150, 233 f., 
237 f., 255 ff., 263, 295, 297, 
303 ff., 312 f.; and cognition, 
237; and reproduction, 256, 
374 f.; see Attention. 

Apperception waves, 265, 381; 
see Fluctuation. 

Arousal, feeling of, 147. 

Associability, as test of atten- 
tion, 279. 

Association, general law of, 
262 ; indissoluble, 96 ; medi- . 
ate, 227; experiments on, 
100, 172, 354. 

Associative consciousness, 264. 

Attention, problem of, 5, 172 ff., 
209 f., 353; popular psy- 
chology of, 181 f., 301 f., 
311; Wundt's analysis of, 
182 f.; distribution of, 26 
(see Levels, Range); practi- 
cal importance of, 181 f. ; 
conditions of, 294 ff., 312 f. 
(see Clearness, conditions of) ; 



397 



398 



INDEX 



fluctuation of, 199 (see Fluc- 
tuation); genesis of, 313 f.; 
theories of, 168, 184 ff., 
388 f. (affectional, 184; of 
psychical energy, 184 f. ; cona- 
tive or motor, 185, 309 ff., 
390 ; of reenf orcement, 185 f . ; 
of inhibition, 186); laws of, 
207 ff., 251 ff. (clearness as 
attribute, 211 ff.; two levels, 
220 ff.; accommodation and 
inertia, 242 ff.; prior entry, 
251 ff. ; limited range, 259 ff. ; 
temporal instability, 263 ff.; 
degrees of clearness, 276 ff.); 
forms of, 311 ff. (active or 
voluntary, 311 ff., 386, 391; 
passive or involuntary, 311 ff., 
386, 391; secondary passive, 
309, 313 f.; reflex or mech- 
anised, 298 f., 308); and 
apperception, 150, 168; and 
intensity of sensation, 212 ff., 
219 f., 361 ff., 366 f.; and 
affection, 294 ff., 296 ff., 
334 f.; and wfll, 297 ff., 
306, 387, 391; and interest, 
294 ff., 386; in experimental 
psychology, 172 ff., 353; as 
sensory clearness, 69, 182 ff. 
(see Clearness); as motor 
reaction, 309 ff., 390; as 
total consciousness, 181, 296 
ff.,301 f., 313 f., 315; not a 
sporadic formation, 301 f. 
(see Inattention) ; directed 
upon feeling, 69 ff. (see 
Clearness, lack of). 

Attitudes, organic (receptive, 
elaborative, executive), 310. 

Attributes of sensation, 4, 8 ff., 
57 f., 127, 321, 322 f., 337; 
definition of, 8, 84 f.; in- 
separable, 8, 23, 85; in- 
dependently variable, 9 f., 
16, 20, 211 f.; intensive, 
10 f., 19 ff., 183; qualitative, 
10 ff.; of the second order, 
26 f.; of affection, 84, 127 f.; 
of image, 337. 

Auditory sensations, 12 ff., 
16, 20, 25 f., 44, 94; pain, 



94; intensity and clearness 
of, 217 f.; fluctuation of, 
267, 269 f., 272, 376, 379; 
see Noise; Tone, sensations 
of. 

Ausfragemethode, 50 f., 332. 

Automatism, in introspection, 
179 f.; normal motor, 180, 
375; of attention, 298 f., 308. 

Biology, 300, 387 f. 

Blickfeld and Blickpunkty meta- 
phor of, 73, 225 f., 234, 236, 
368. 

Blood-pressure (Traube-Hering 
waves), 273 f. 

Cessation of stimulus, as condi- 
tion of clearness, 199 ff. 

Chroma, 12, 25. 

Clearness, as intensive attri- 
bute, 11, 24 ff., 28 f., 173, 
183 f., 209 f., 211 ff., 219 f., 
285, 361 ff., 372; as starting- 
point of a psychology of 
attention, 182 ff., 209 f., 
211 ff., 285, 300, 305, 369 f.; 
physiological and psy- 
chological, 222 f., 370; con- 
ditions of, 188 ff., 231, 241 f., 
243 f., 246, 266, 359 (in- 
tensity, 188 ff.; quality, 
190 f.; temporal relations 
of stimulus, 191 ff.; move- 
ment, 193 ff.; novelty, 195 f.; 
contents of consciousness, 
196 ff. ; peripheral accom- 
modation, 199; cessation of 
stimulus, 199 ff.; as im- 
pressing nervous system, 
204 f., 206, 220, 298 f., 300; 
as objective and subjective, 
206; see Distraction); dif- 
ference of, at two levels of 
consciousness, 229; at same 
level of consciousness, 229 ff. 
(lower, 230 ff. ; upper, 233 ff.) ; 
measurement of degrees of, 
276 ff., 309; variation of, 
with degree of pleasantness- 
unpleasantness, 302 ; and cog- 
nition, 238 f., 244, 



1 



INDEX 



399 



Clearness, lack of, as char- 
acter of aUeclion, G9 ff., 
77 f., 180, 289, 292, 334 ff. 

Cognition, 238 f., 240 f., 244, 
323 f., 369. 

Colour, sensations of, 11 f., 
19, 25, 27; and attention, 26, 
190. 

Colour feelings, 105 ff., 126 f., 
134, 148 f., 163 ff. 

Colour pyramid, 12, 325. 

Complication, process of, 254 f. 

Complication experiment, 254 
ff.; inversion of, 252 ff. 

Concentration, tests of, 279 ff. 

Consciousness, area of, 220 f.; 
span of, 233 ff., 369. 

Contents, conscious, as condi- 
tion of clearness, 196 ff., 
205. 

Contrast, 53 f., 61, 63, 89, 92 f., 
290. 

Curves of affective judgment, 
in method of impression, 
162 ff., 341. 

Cutaneous sensations, 16 ff., 
25, 87 ff., 93 f., 326; af- 
fective tone of, 91 ff. ; see 
Pain, Temperature, Touch. 

Depression, feeling of, 145 ff., 
160, 163 ff., 322; and at- 
tention, 335. 

Differences, individual, 172, 190, 
216, 228, 352. 

Differences, maximal, as char- 
acteristic of sensation, 56, 
127. 

Dimensions of feeling, 128, 131, 
133 ff., 141; guaranteed by 
emotive classification, 135 f. ; 
by method of expression, 
136 ff. ; by time-relations, 
138 ff.; by conditions of 
affection, 140 ff. ; question 
of spatial, 142 ff.; nomen- 
clature of, 145 ff. ; number 
of, 147 ff. ; experimental 
investigation of, 161 ff., 350. 

Discrimination, sensible, as test 
of attention, 279, 383; and 
motor theory of attention, 



310; and affective discrimi- 
nation, 341. 

Displacement, temporal, 251 f., 
255 ff. 

Disposition, conscious, 149. 

Disposition, psychophysical, 
see Predisposition. 

Distraction, as condition of 
maximal clearness, 203, 278 f. 

Distraction, method of, 216 ff., 
252, 277 f., 281, 361 ff., 
382 f. ; inverse method of, 
232 f. 

Duration, 11, 22 ff., 28 f., 189 
f., 204, 325, 327, 380. 

Economy, principle of scientific, 
86 f., 112, 114. 

Effort, 203, 278 f., 308 ff., 
311 f.; see Kinaesthetic sen- 
sations. Strain. 

Eindringlichkeit, 24, 26 f., 191, 
326 f., 356 f. 

Einstellung, 243, 373. 

Element, psychological, 4, 7 f., 
37 f.; psychophysical, 7 f.; 
* sensational,' 327. 

Emotion, James-Lange theory 
of, 34 f., 160; Stumpfs 
theory of, 35, 63, 86; in 
Wundt's system, 128 f., 135 f. ; 
classification of, 136, 139; 
and feehng, 33 ff., 54, 328. 

Empfindungslust, 45, 160 f., 336. 

Epistemology and psychology, 
36 f., 81. 

Exaltation, feeling of, and at- 
tention, 335. 

Excitement, feehng of, 128, 
138, 140 f., 145 f., 149 f., 
156, 160, 163 ff., 322. 

Experiment, definition of, 175. 

Expression, method of, 70, 136 
ff., 160, 281 f., 384. 

Extension, 11, 22 ff., 28 f., 
63 f., 189 f., 204, 325 ff.; 
range of attribute, 25, 326. 

Eye movement, in fluctuation 
experiments, 270 f., 378. 

Faculties, psychology of, 181, 
286 f. 



400 



INDEX 



Feeling, problem of, 4 f., 33 ff., 
125 ff., 285 ff.; inteilectu- 
alistic view of, 285 ff.; af- 
fectional view of, 286 f.; 
tridimensional theory of, 5,, 
36, 128 f., 291; sensation- 
alistic theory of, see Ge- 
fuhlsempfindungen ; author's 
theory of, 291 ff., 385, 388; 
always present in conscious- 
ness? 116 f.; faculty of, 
286; dimensions of, 128, 
131, 133 ff., 141 (see Dimen- 
sions) ; objectifi cation of, 
330 f.; as reaction of ap- 
perception upon sensory con- 
tents, 75, 294 f., 303 ff., 
306, 388 f.; as condition of 
attention, 191, 294 ff,, 365 f.; 
as condition of action, 297 f.; 
as dependent on quality of 
sensation, 117 f.; and emo- 
tion, 33 ff., 54, 328; and 
organic sensation, 293, 328 f., 
385; and will, 306. 

Feelings form a single system, 
128; mixed, 45 ff., 61, 293, 
333, 335; relational, 179, 
240; coexistence of, in con- 
sciousness, 39, 53 f. ; fusion 
of, 38 f., 42, 52, 156 f.; in- 
hibition of, 52 f. ; reenforce- 
ment of, 52 ; summation of, 52. 

Fluctuation of attention, 199, 
263 ff., 281, 376 ff., 381 f. 

Focal processes, 26, 227 f., 
240 f., 307. 

Fringe, psychical, 179, 239 ff., 
370. 

Fusion, affective, 38 f., 42, 52, 
156 f.; sensory, 303; of 
sensation and affective tone, 
97; of taste and smell, 
97 5.; tonal, 97 f., 156. 

Gefuhlsempfindungen, 64, 81 ff., 

286, 288', 290, 294. 
Gestaltqualitdt, 339. 
Grey, Miiller's endogenous, 21 f. 

Habit, introspective, 179, 197; 
scientific, 198; implies fore- 



gone attention, 300, 357, 
375. 

Habitual, indispensableness of 
the, 67 f., 203. 

Habituation, effect of, 192; 
as characteristic of feeling, 
65 ff., 77, 333 f. 

Hallucination, affective, 64, 102 
f., 104, 108; of pain, 102 f., 
104; in complication experi- 
ment, 256, 375. 

Hue, 12, 25. 

Hunger, 18 f., 57, 59, 329. 

Hypnosis, 100, 371. 

Ideas, intensive, spatial and 
temporal, 142. 

Idiocy, 371. 

Illusions, optical, 373, 382. 

Image, 3, 61 f., 102, 104, 342 f.; 
affective, 101 ff., 110, 290, 
341 f. ; of weak sensations, 
106 f.; of momentary sensa- 
tions, 102, 342; fluctuation 
of, 382; and sensation, 63 f., 
321, 337. 

Imagery, organic, 102, 343. 

Impression, method of, 50 f., 
105, 148, 152, 161 ff., 350; 
twofold control by, 162 f. 

Inattention, 301 f., 381, 383; 
field of, 224 f. 

Independence, movement for 
affective, 286 ff. 

Indifference, 67, 85 f., 116 f., 
302. 

Inertia of attention, 242, 245 f., 
251, 371 f. 

Inhibition, feehng of, 128, 138, 
145 f. ; in theory of attention, 
305, 389; of feelings, 52 f. 

Instinct, 191, 298, 308. 

Intellectualism, 286 f. 

Intensity, central, as character- 
istic of feehng, 61 ff., 333. 

Intensity, definition of, 10, 24; 
independent variability of, 
20; of visual sensations, 20 
ff.; a ^qualitative' attri- 
bute? 28; doctrine of sensi- 
ble, 173; as condition of 
feeling, 131, 141; as condi- 



INDEX 



401 



tion of clearness, 188 ff., 
204, 356; in classification 
of emotions, 136; and clear- 
ness, 211 ff., 218 ff., 361 ff. 

Interest and attention, 294 ff., 
386. 

Interests, permanent, 197 f. 

Intervals, repeated, affective 
tone of, 163 ff.; see Purity. 

Introspection, 63, 77, 132, 144 
ff., 151, 162 f., 165 f., 197, 
225, 235 f., 254 f., 262, 264 f., 
277, 281, 293, 306 ff., 333, 
336, 354, 362, 369, 381 ff.; 
compared with inspection, 
175 ff., 355; interpretation 
of, 332, 360 f. 

Itch, 17, 90 f., 324. 

Kinaesthetic sensations, 18, 25, 
58 f., 309; see Effort, Strain, 
Touch. 

Lability of attention, 242, 264, 
276. 

Law of continuity, 224 f.; 
of indispensableness of the 
habitual, 67 f., 203; of 
reduction and expansion of 
conscious processes, 34, 313 f., 
390; of tedium, 68; Weber's, 
214, 218, 276, 364. 

Laws of attention, 211 ff., 251 
ff.; see Attention. 

Levels of consciousness, 220 ff., 
301 f., 305, 370 f. 

Limen, temporal, 246, 251 f. 

Local sign, 43 f., 55. 

Localisation, as characteristic 
of sensations, 43 ff., 303. 

Marginal processes, 26, 227 f., 
231, 240 f., 309. 

Measurement of attention, 276 
ff . ; by introspective dis- 
tinction of degrees of clear- 
ness, 277 f.; by measure- 
ment of effort, 278 f., 309; 
see Tests. 

Memory, 172, 365 f.; see 
Image. 

2d 



Movement, as condition of 
clearness, 193 ff., 205; sensa- 
tions of, 193. 

MVy as measure of attention, 
280 f., 384. 

Nausea, 18 f. 

Need, organic, 68, 203. 

Noise, sensation of, 16, 20, 270, 
379. 

Non-localisableness, as char- 
acteristic of feeling, 43 ff., 
77 f., 331 f., 335 f.; external, 
43 ff.; internal, 45 ff. 

Novelty, as condition of clear- 
ness, 195, 205; as non- 
associatedness, 195, 357 f. 

Nuancirung of pleasantness- 
impleasantness, 160. 

Objectivity, as characteristic 
of sensation, 36 ff.; of feel- 
ing, 330 f. 

Observation, definition of, 175. 

Odours, as distracting stimuli, 
278, 361; see Smell. 

Opposites, movement between, 
see Antagonism. 

Organic sensations, 18 f., 25 f., 
38 f., 44, 54, 57, 93 ff., 158 ff., 
349; localisation of, 44, 330 
f.; affective tone of, 126; 
and attention 190; and the 
Wundtian dimensions, 160 f., 
163, 301 f.; and feeling, 293, 
328 f., 385. 

Organs, peripheral, of feeling, 
292. 

Pain, sensation of, 17 ff., 25 f., 
43, 87 ff., 92 ff., 292, 324; 
quality of, 17 f., 88 f.; Ein- 
dringlichkeit of , 26, 190,327; 
affective tone of, 89, 92 f. ; 
as unpleasantness, 82 f., 87 
ff., 334; from intensive stim- 
ulation of pressure, tempera- 
ture, sight, and hearing, 94. 

Paired comparisons, method of, 
161 f. 

Parallelism, psychophysical, 
225, 387. 



402 



INDEX 



Partial feelings, 155 fiP.; tones, 
196 f. 

Perseverationstendenz, 246, 373. 

Physiology, 4, 206, 256, 310 f.; 
and psychology, 286. 

Pitch, tonal, 12 ff., 26 f. 

Pleasantness, qualitative dif- 
ferentiation of, 160 f., 293, 
336 f., 349. 

Pleasantness-unpleasantness, 33, 
125 ff., 290 ff., 298, 308 f., 
329, 341; see Affection, Di- 
mensions, Feeling. 

Pleasure, sensation of, 81 f., 
83, 93, 96; cutaneous, 93; 
organic, 83, 93, 96; due to 
intensive stimulation, 95 f.; 
as absence of pain, 82. 

Practice, 192, 252, 277, 375. 

Predisposition, psychophysical, 
196, 199, 202, 205 f., 209, 
243, 246, 252, 266; and 
fluctuation of attention, 275. 

Pressure, sensations of, 17 ff., 
25; pain, 94. 

Prick, sensation of, 17, 88, 
90 f., 108; image of, 102, 342. 

Prior entry, law of, 251 ff. 

Psychology, descriptive, 83, 99, 
111, 113, 266, 312, 314 f.; 
experimental, 171 f., 206, 210, 
266 f., 274, 286, 288 f., 316 f.; 
explanatory, 288, 313, 315; 
genetic, 113, 115, 118 ff., 126, 
206, 381, 387 (of feeling, 
291 ff. ; of reflex action, 299 f., 
387; of attention, 313 f.); 
physiological, 288 ; syste- 
matic, 3, 73, 129 ff., 142, 154, 
158 f., 167f., 282, 296ff.,314, 
353; of feeling, 4 f., 285 ff., 291 
ff. ; of attention, 5, 31 3 f . ; and 
epistemology, 36 f., 81. 

Psychophysics, 7 f., 21 f., 90, 
97 ff., 101, 112 ff., 118, 189, 
206, 289, 336, 354. 

Pulse, and fluctuation of at- 
tention, 273. 

Purity, feeling of tonal, 119, 
339, 360. 

Puzzle picture, observation of, 
228 f., 370 f. 



Qualities of affection, inWundt's 
theory, 150 ff. ; see Affec- 
tion, Pleasantness. 

Quality, definition of, 10, 24, 
28 ; of visual sensations, 1 1 f . ; 
of auditory sensations, 12 ff.; 
of pressure, 17; of pain, 
17 f., 88 f. (see Pain); of 
kinsesthetic sensations, 18 f.; 
of alimentary sensations, 18 
f.; of smell, 16, 19; of taste, 
16, 19; algedonic, 85; as 
criterion of sensation, 27 ff.; 
as condition of feeling, 131, 
141; as condition of clear- 
ness, 190 f., 204; in classi- 
fication of emotions, 136; 
doctrine of sensible, 173. 

Quiescence, feeling of, 147, 150. 

Range of attention, 259 ff., 
370, 376; as test of degree 
of concentration, 279. 

Reaction, simple, 242, 252, 
280, 308, 371. 

Reflex arc, 310, 390. 

Reizmethode, 160, 350. 

Relaxation, feeling of, 128, 
138, 140 f., 145 ff., 160, 
163 f., 166, 322; and at- 
tention, 335. 

Repetition, as condition of 
clearness, 191 f., 204. 

Respiration, and fluctuation 
of attention, 273, 379. 

Restlessness, feeling of, 147. 

Retrospection, as psychologi- 
cal method, 178 f. 

Rise of sensations, 243, 245, 
251 f., 372. 

Sensation, attributes of, 4, 8 ff. 
(see Attributes) ; character 
of, as elementary process, 
4, 14 f., 323 f.; central 
concomitant, 96, 112 f., 115 
ff. ; centrally excited, 333; 
criterion of, 27 ff.; single, 
coextensive with conscious- 
ness, 55; in psychology and 
psychophysics, 7 f. ; and 
image, 63 f., 321, 337. 



INDEX 



403 



Sensationalism, 286, 288; see 
Gefuhlsempfindurigcn. 

Sensations, number of discrimi- 
nable, 27; focal and mar- 
ginal, 26, 227 f., 231, 240 f., 
307, 309; alimentary, etc., 
see Alimentary sensations, etc. 

Sense-feelings, 83, 131. 

Sensitivity, as test of con- 
centration, 279, 383. 

Smell, quality of, 16, 19; pene- 
tratingness of, 26, 190, 326; 
localisation of, 43 f. ; af- 
fective tone of, 126, 331; as 
distraction, 278, 361. 

Space, psychology of, 209. 

Stimmungslusty 45, 160 f., 336, 
349. 

Sting, sensation of, 17, 88, 90 f., 
108; image of, 102, 342. 

Strain, sensation of, 18, 278, 
307, 312; feeling of, 322, 
335 (see Tension). 

Stream of thought, 228, 376. 

Streaming phenomenon, 271. 

Strehen-Widerstrehen, 147. 

Strehungsgefuhl, 147. 

Subconscious, the, 220, 224, 
226 f., 230. 

Subjectivity, as character of 
feeling, 36 ff., 77 f., 329 ff., 
335 f. (as tendency to fusion, 
38 ff. ; as individual variabil- 
ity of experience, 40; as 
inability to stand alone in 
consciousness, 41 f., 61, 100; 
as textural flimsiness, 43, 336). 

Suddenness, as condition of 
clearness, 191 ff., 195, 204 f. 

Summation of stimuli, 192; 
of feelings, 52. 

Tachistoscopic experiments, 
231, 237 f., 259 ff. 

Taste, quality of, 16, 19; im- 
portunity of, 26, 190. 

Taste feehngs, 100, 126, 331, 
336, 341. 

Tastzuckungen, 268. 

Teleology, 120 f. 

Temperature, sensations of, 16, 
25, 57 f.; pain, 94. 



Temporal conditions of clear- 
ness, 191 ff. 

Temporal course of emotions, 
136; of mental processes, 
138; as condition of feeling, 
141. 

Tension, feeling of, 128, 138, 
140 f., 145 ff., 160, 163 f., 
166. 

Terminology of Wundt's theory 
of feeling, 145 f. ; of feeling, 
385. 

Tests of concentration, 279 ff. 

Theories, scientific, 48, 198, 
293 f., 385 f. 

Tickling, 17, 81. 

Time, psychology of, 209; as 
condition of feeling, 149 f.; 
as condition of clearness, 
189. 

Tingling, 95. 

Tint, 12, 25. 

Tonal change, 194; fusion, 
see Fusion. 

Tone, affective, 41, 83 ff., 
125 ff., 131, 286 f., 329; as 
concomitant sensation, 96, 
112 f., 115 ff.; as pleas- 
antness-unpleasantness, 125 
ff. 

Tone, organic, 293, 300. 

Tone, sensations of, 12 ff., 
25 f., 119 ff.; localisation of, 
44; affective tone of, 105 ff., 
120 f., 126 f., 132, 149, 156 
ff., 163 ff., 343 f., 348; and 
attention, 215 f. 

Tone-colour, 26, 326. 

Tones, partial, 196 f. 

Total feeling, 39, 147, 151, 
155 ff., 346. 

Touch, 25, 326; affective tone 
of, 126; fluctuation of, 267 
ff., 272, 376; direct and in- 
direct, 193 f. 

Tranquillisation, feeling of, 128, 
140 f., 145 f., 156. 

Unconscious, the, 220 f., 226 f. 
Unnoticed stimuli, 199 ff. 
Unpleasantness, see Affection, 
Pleasantness-unpleasantness. 



404 



INDEX 



Vision, stereoscopic, 196 f. 

Visual sensations, 11 ff., 20 ff., 
24 ff., 326; pain, 94; fluc- 
tuation of, 267, 269 ff., 378. 

Volume of tones, 13 ff., 26 f., 
324, 327. 

Voluntarism, psychological, 387. 



Waves, apperception, 265, 381; 
Traube-Hering, 273 f. 

Weakening of sensation by- 
attention, 366 f. 

Will, and attention and action, 
297 ff., 306, 387, 391; and 
feeling, 306. 



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